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Preface
Wee felt it before in sense; but now wee know it by science.
Edward Misselden (1623)
The collective effort reported in this volume is the outcome of the diffusion
of the idea of diffusion as a fundamental process in society. The considerable
number of disciplines represented here indicates the weight of the problem
area. The editors are to be congratulated for their initiative in drawing
together present thinking at a vivid meeting, now also in print. An old-
timer in the business has not much to add. But maybe some things, bearing
in mind that a Preface is a celebration and not a review.
As always with ideas it is hard to identify those who first gave shape
to the idea of diffusion. In a general sense it is probably an observation as
old as human self-reflection that groups of populations exchange ideas and
copy habits and implements from each other. Sometimes it has even been
recommended, as a Chinese proverb suggested millenia ago, "If you wa.nt to
become a good farmer, look at your neighbor".
A scholarly interest in the matter emerged toward the end of the la.st
century. Friedrich Ratzel's Anthropogeographie II (1891) is one of the early
landmarks. Ratzel spent much time studying archeological and ethnographic
artifacts and pondered about the causes of their geographical distribution
before they ended up on the shelves of museums. The dominating view at
the time was that societies inevitably progressed, from simple to complex
stages, almost like growing organisms. According to this belief, tools and
habits of similar shape found among different populations indicated that
they were at the same stage of a unilinear evolution.
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Ratzel disagreed with this view, "Life is movement" and "Man is rest-
less," he exclaimed. But more than that, he also found order in the changes
and movements. He recognized centers of creation each exhibiting a radial
spread. Since Ratzel was also the father of the concept of Lebensraum (later
to become so disreputable) he could easily have said that life comprises mul-
tiplication and expansion. There are close relationships between diffusion
and invasion.
Ratzel entertained quite realistic ideas about social responses to innova-
tions.
Some things are readily adopted and thus spread fast. It is naturally those
which are necessary or comply with the inclinations of people, whereas what
is difficult and toilsome is dropped and forgotten. Narcotic stimulants have
fast conquered large areas. Consider how widely tobacco, betel, and spirits
have spread. Then the diffusion of effective weapons is surprising. They
compete with spirits not only in today's Africa but made their way equally
fast into old America.
In some respects restless man does not seem to have changed preferences
during this century. However, qualitatively and quantitatively we now live
in a different world, reshaped by wave after wave of innovations.
At the same time as Ratzel carried out his studies on human cultures
with biological analogies, the French scholar Gabriel Tarde saw things from
a social psychology vantage point. In Les lois de l'imitation (1890) he saw
society as the sum total of invention and subsequent imitation. And he
pointed out that only a tiny fraction of all inventions were actually imitated
and became collective property. In this respect things are not different today.
Research into the mortality of inventions would be an interesting complement
to studies of diffusion. In technology, at least, it would not be impossible to
do this.
At the turn of the century the time was not yet ripe for quantitative
answers to questions concerning diffusion. Nor were efforts at predicting
the agenda. It did not occur to scholars that contemporary observations
could reveal something of general interest with reference to their problem.
Gradually, however, the mood changed. In his book Cultural Change (1928)
F.S. Chapin made frequent use of the "curve of cumulative growth", bor-
rowed from demography and epidemiology. He may not have been the first
to do so, but since the 1920s the S-curve, with its many empirical and mathe-
matical varieties, has been the favored device for describing and interpreting
innovation diffusion.
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Work in the spatial tradition of Ratzel and his generation has been more
restricted. The reason is perhaps that it is more time-consuming to pin down
events place by place than it is to take time-series data from statistical
publications. In addition the mathematical treatment of space and time
phenomena is a lot more cumbersome. Many would probably argue that
space is less relevant in our present era of high physical mobility and easy
global communication than it was in former times. However, to my mind
there is more to space than mere distance. Only maps can show where
items under study are missing. This might also reveal something about
both causes and consequences. In the higher topology of networks we still
have, in all likelihood, centers of creation and structured channels of spread.
The "niche" is also a spatial concept as it refers to society's ability to provide
"room" for the specific kind of "choreography" every new device requires.
But to give empirical substance to such dimensions is clearly very difficult.
One can think of many reasons why it is important to understand the
forces behind diffusion. One obvious reason is the use that people in public
policy and industry can make of improved methods of prediction. A more
purely academic reason is that the spread and nature of innovations can cast
light on the structures and workings of cultures and societies.
A further reason - I believe the most important in our present historical
situation - is the increasing necessity for global and national policy makers
to concentrate on such innovations that put the world on the road toward
sustainable development. This task must be tackled not only by UN res-
olutions and national legislations. Real implementation entails widespread
dissemination of new values and new tools and materials. Careful selection
of normative centers and suitable designs for inviting niches are required in
order to enlist the needed support of market forces.
Rigid planning is out these days. The time has come for the art of caring
about the content of innovations and guiding their diffusion.
Torsten Hiigerstrand
Lund, Sweden
November 22, 1990

Introduction
The adoption of innovations is at the core of the dynamic processes un-
derlying social, economic, and technological change. Diffusion phenomena
occur at different hierarchical levels of society and on different temporal
and spatial scales; they are all-embracing, starting at the micro level of
products and processes and continuing up to large pervasive systems and
infrastructures, sometimes enveloping certain forms of social and political
organization. Consequently, the timing, duration, and patterns of innova-
tion diffusion vary greatly. A deeper analysis of diffusion processes often
reveals increasing levels of complexity and a multitude of interdependencies
and nonlinear feedback mechanisms.
Considerable progress has been made in understanding the nature of dif-
fusion processes and their underlying driving forces both theoretically and
empirically. Many studies have been published during the last few decades
that deal with technological and social diffusion processes. New theories
of innovation diffusion have been proposed and numerous case studies have
been analyzed. More recently, diffusion analyses have been applied to aid
strategic business decisions and planning activities. It is therefore fair to say
that both theories and applications have established a new body of knowl-
edge that is being used more widely in a variety of ways: to explain the
process of social and economic change and restructuring, to integrate tech-
nological change into economic theory, and as a policy tool. In view of
the importance of this research area an international, interdisciplinary con-
ference on Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior was held at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg,
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Austria, in June 1989, to review the results of diffusion research, to dis-
cuss the value and usefulness of accomplished work, and to identify future
research directions.
The aim of the conference was to stimulate future research and to en-
hance the integration of various diffusion research disciplines. The range
of disciplines represented at the conference included physics, engineering,
economics, political science, sociology, management science, history, and ge-
ography. In addition to researchers, the 91 conference participants from 16
countries included practitioners engaged in public and private policy making
and marketing. The individual sessions were devoted to a review of diffu-
sion theories, including spatial and temporal approaches, economic theory,
and sociology; an overview of empirical case studies of both product and
process innovations; and applications of diffusion studies for strategic policy
formulation. The conference concluded with a summary session addressing
the major open questions of diffusion research and possible future research
strategies. The contributions to this volume are representative of the confer-
ence presentations l . The Conference Program and List of Participants are
included at the end of the book.
Chapter 1 by Jesse Ausubel gives a comprehensive summary of both the
individual contributions to the conference and the discussions. It provides an
excellent insight into the complexity of diffusion phenomena. On a general
note Ausubel raises the issue of what constitutes "diffusion-oriented policies"
and notes the importance of heterogeneity between technological options,
economic agents, and their expectations of the future which often appear as
a prerequisite for evolution. He stresses the need for multiple perspectives,
for the exploration of several paths in both the analyses and policies that
deal with diffusion phenomena, for more cross-cultural comparisons, and he
lists some of the issues that remain on the research agenda. Ausubel raises
the question of whether by "looking at the patterns of the patterns" some
meaningful taxonomy or classification can be attempted in order to identify
and eventually explain differences and similarities of diffusion processes.
In Chapter 2, George Modelski and Gardner Perry III present an inter-
esting answer to two vital but difficult questions: How much democracy is
there in the world? Is there a regular pattern to the global spread of democ-
racy? These are very timely questions in view of the encouraging process
I A smaller selection of conference papers entitled "From Democracy to Chain Saws:
New Perspectives on Innovation Diffusion" is to be found in a Special Issue of Technological
Forecasting & Social Change 39(1-2), March-April, 1991.
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of liberalization and spread of democracy in Eastern Europe and certainly
very apt for a conference held in Laxenburg, Austria, the crossroads between
East and West. The authors estimate that in 1986 approximately 40 percent
of the world population was "democratic," with a projected increase to 50
percent shortly after the year 2000. By adopting a long-term perspective,
democracy is analyzed as a superior "technology of collective choice," the
spread of which is seen as a pervasive diffusion process. Pronounced discon-
tinuities with peaks and setbacks are "strewn along the way," but the overall
upward direction of the process is clearly demonstrated. However, it may
take another 100 years or so before the majority (90 percent) of the world
population will live under a democratic social and political order.
William Peirce (Chapter 3) analyzes diffusion processes from a regional
perspective focusing on the "single Europe" and the possible effect of in-
ternational integration on promoting or retarding innovativeness. He argues
that a single market and the removal of national barriers within the Commu-
nity would yield benefits from economies of scale and promote competitive-
ness, while some institutional rigidities would tend to exacerbate inefficient
policies, abet the reformation, and augment the strength of existing distri-
butional coalitions. The author argues that governments can remove some
barriers by improving the general environment for diffusion and by taking
specific measures to encourage technological change. However, he empha-
sizes that it is not clear that they have much direct influence on adoption
decisions and that it is generally difficult for any government to accelerate
diffusion processes. This finding may be the reason why some studies show
similar diffusion rates in dissimilar countries and periods of time.
Harold Linstone demonstrates in Chapter 4 the limitations of reduction-
ist approaches in systems research and the gap that exists between mod-
els and real-world decisions. He argues for the augmentation of what he
calls the "technical" perspective, by explicitly introducing organizational
and personal perspectives into the analysis. The chapter includes a num-
ber of case studies ranging from strategic planning to risk evaluation and
management, energy forecasting, trade deficits, and cross-cultural analy-
ses, where a multiple-perspective approach has been used. Guidelines are
provided on how to balance the description and integrate different perspec-
tives on a particular issue. He also identifies a growing mismatch between
the rates of technological and socio-institutional change and arrives at the
intriguing conclusion that "even the most advanced countries continue con-
fronting 21st-century technology with 19th century institutions."
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Linstone refers to information technology as a unique diffusion factor, the
degree and speed of which will affect the diffusion of all other technologies.
This idea is extended in Chapter 5 by Dirk-Jan Kamann and Peter Nijkamp
stressing in particular the importance of information exchange (external and
internal learning) and of the role of informational and social-spatial networks
in the diffusion process. The authors analyze the intricate relationships
in the "triangle" of technology, economy, and space within a given socio-
cultural setting. They are critical in determining the development trajecto-
ries that in turn shape new conditions for technological progress and spatial
dynamics. The latter are path-dependent and marked by nonlinear evolu-
tionary patterns of growth and decline that sometimes seem to accompany
each other even within the same region or sector. Spatial differentiation and
diversity in the selection environment are the cause of social-spatial networks
which serve as potential channels of diffusion between actors. The authors
conclude that network cooperation between actors creates a synergetic sur-
plus which is largely appropriated by those actors who dominate other actors
or even entire network segments.
The next two chapters give an overview of the evolving perspectives and
models developed to analyze diffusion processes from two different disci-
plines - marketing (Chapter 6) and economics (Chapter 7). Both address
many common concepts and issues, e.g., "externalities" such as market in-
tervention, or more generally, the role of institutions and policies in diffusion
processes.
Chapter 6 by Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller, and Frank M. Bass reviews
the evolution of marketing diffusion models since the pioneering work of
Bass in 1969. A common characteristic of all models is that they analyze
diffusion after the turbulent (d. Chapter 9) selection phase of new ideas and
innovations. The authors analyze the salient characteristics and the appli-
cations of the main models, and investigate ways to make them theoretically
more sound and practically more effective. Eleven areas are considered to be
particularly suitable for extensions and refinements. The authors also high-
light the importance of interaction and experience sharing between firms
and diffusion analysts to further validate diffusion models and enhance their
usefulness.
In Chapter 7 Giovanni Dosi gives an overview of innovation diffusion
research from the perspective of evolutionary economics. The discussion fo-
cuses first on the economics of R&D, highlighting in particular the dichotomy
between the partly public good nature of information and the "tacitness"
of cognitive structures, skills, and capabilities guiding inventive activities.
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Departing from a number of "stylized facts" concerning diffusion the author
then gives an overview of the hypotheses underlying diffusion models in eco-
nomics. These are related, inter alia, to the questions of the heterogeneity
of potential adopters, to their behavior and decision procedures, and to the
nature of the dynamics of technological and economic change. A taxonomy
of diffusion models is developed based on a two-dimensional classification
(equilibrium versus disequilibrium dynamics and optimizing versus institu-
tionalized behavior of the adopters). In particular the chapter highlights the
merits of evolutionary approaches based on principles of self-organization
(cf. Chapter 8) for modeling diffusion processes involving various forms of
increasing returns, circular feedbacks between innovations, or diffusion en-
vironments where "rational behavior" is not only empirically unlikely but
also theoretically impossible to define. The chapter concludes by identify-
ing a number of broader macro issues and challenges for diffusion research
which may bring together economics, history, social disciplines, and policy
analysis.
The next three chapters describe the dynamics of selection and diffusion
mechanisms from an evolutionary perspective and demonstrate that inno-
vation adoption processes are governed by interdependence (e.g., between
demand and supply), heterogeneity in expectations and appropriability con-
ditions, and a multitude of nonlinear feedback mechanisms.
Gerald Silverberg (Chapter 8) emphasizes an important dimension of
the evolutionary nature of diffusion phenomena - the path-dependency and
self-organization of collective behavior in the innovation adoption process.
He shows that a unique "optimal" payback period for innovation adoption
may not exist independent of market structure and pricing strategies, and
he demonstrates the basic nature of collective behavior that may lock an
industry into alternative combinations of locally stable payback periods and
consequently different adoption patterns among economic actors. He bases
these conclusions on simulation "experiments" with an evolutionary model of
market competition and incremental technical change. The model illustrates
that the dynamic appropriability of an innovative strategy is a function of
the rates of learning, both internal and public. He shows that S-shaped dif-
fusion paths at the macro level result from diversity in technological design,
individual behavior, and uncertainty about and interdependence between
the actions of economic agents and their effect at the micro level.
In Chapter 9 Sergei Glaziev and Yuri Kaniovski present a stochastic
model of the uncertainty and random fluctuations prevailing in the early
phase of diffusion processes. It has been frequently argued that one of the
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conditions for "take-off" of diffusion is the emergence of standardization
and a dominant design. Thus, it is particularly important to elucidate the
conditions and dynamics underlying the selection mechanisms in the early
diffusion phases. The authors treat two sources of uncertainty in this early
phase concerning the characteristics of technologies and the market. The
model clearly illustrates that adopters can influence but not predetermine
the final outcome of the selection process under conditions of uncertainty.
Yet, it is exactly this highly turbulent environment and diversity of expecta-
tions that shape and "lock in" the future characteristics of technologies and
strategies of adopters.
Ove Granstrand presents a diffusion model in Chapter 10 where the orga-
nizational units representing users and producers of technology are explicitly
coupled in order to incorporate the interdependence between the demand
and supply sides of diffusion processes. The model considers both diffusion
(entry) and substitution (exit) processes. Interesting insights are provided
into the complex dynamics of (unstructured) subpopulations in terms of the
interactions between buyer and seller populations that are subjected to a
stream of innovations. At the macro level, conclusions are similar to those
that emerge from the evolutionary modeling approaches: diffusion is a result
of complex, nonlinear dynamics and the interaction of a diverse number of
subpopulations of potential adopters.
The remaining chapters are concerned with specific case studies that il-
lustrate innovation diffusion from the macro down to the micro level. They
illustrate the pervasiveness and universality of diffusion phenomena under-
lying the processes of techno-economic and social change.
The chapters by Gerhard Rosegger and Sergei Glaziev analyze diffusion
in the context of technology transfer, the former from the perspective of a
single economic sector and the latter from the perspective of a whole na-
tional economy. Both papers illustrate that the interrelatedness between
technological, institutional, and organizational settings account for many of
the differences in the rates of technology diffusion and changes in competi-
tiveness.
Gerhard Rosegger (Chapter 11) examines interfirm cooperation in the
global automobile industry and the function of such partnerships in promot-
ing the transfer of technology. He shows that the mature American automo-
tive industry used partnerships with foreign rivals as a strategic instrument
for the diffusion of innovations originally introduced into imported vehicles.
It is demonstrated that this particular catch-up strategy on the product
side did not succeed in closing the performance gap (between the American
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and the European and Japanese products). This illustrates that "corporate
culture" and organizational styles (e.g., attitudes, routines, and standard
operating practices) may require channels other than those through which
individual, capital-embodied techniques are diffused, and that the "Japanese
approach to manufacturing" cannot be copied but must be learned in con-
text. The short-run benefits of promoting diffusion through cooperative
agreements may be overshadowed by the longer-run loss of innovative capa-
bilities or, as Rosegger provokingly states, there is a danger of "forgetting
by not doing."
Sergei Glaziev (Chapter 12) introduces the notion of interrelatedness of
whole clusters of technological, infrastructural, and organizational innova-
tions. This aspect of interrelatedness, which has become familiar under the
concept of socioeconomic paradigms is demonstrated using a principal com-
ponent approach to describe technological change and diffusion in a number
of market and centrally planned economies. The author illustrates that dur-
ing the post-World War II period there was a simultaneous development of
successive generations of technology clusters in the USSR. In view of the
current restructuring efforts of perestroika, the author argues that an oppor-
tunity window exists in such transitional periods representing an "advantage
for the backward." By a careful assessment of the emerging new directions,
technologies, and growth sectors, optimal strategies for closing the technol-
ogy and productivity gap could be developed by "surpassing without over-
taking." Appropriate institutional and organizational reforms, however, are
a precondition for redirecting investments and the future orientation of the
economy as a whole toward newly emerging key industries.
The chapters by Charlie Karlsson and by Maryellen Kelley and Har-
vey Brooks analyze innovation diffusion in manufacturing industries. Both
examine the diffusion of technology from the perspective of the structural
characteristics of adopting firms. In particular, they focus on the size of the
firm, external linkages, and information channels.
Charlie Karlsson (Chapter 13) analyzes the characteristics of firms in the
engineering industry that were early adopters of information technology in
two peripheral regions of Sweden. In addition to the influence of firm size on
adoption date, he also studies other pertinent characteristics. The results in-
dicate the importance of direct and indirect information channels of external
and internal learning and appropriability conditions for the early adoption of
technologies. More generally, the chapter also presents conclusions regarding
regional technology and innovation policies stressing that both information
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channels and skill levels of the labor force can be promoted by appropriate
government policies.
In Chapter 14, Maryellen Kelley and Harvey Brooks analyze the fac-
tors that influence the adoption of programmable automation by American
manufacturers based on a recent survey of more than one thousand estab-
lishments. They show that there is a wide range of "incentive structures"
between metal-working and machinery manufacturing. Differences in firm
size appears to be the most important factor in explaining the range of
adoption rates. Other important factors include external linkages and the
network participation of firms. In fact, well-connected small firms tend to
demonstrate higher adoption rates. Conversely isolated, small firms tend to
rely on traditional techniques. One way of promoting diffusion would be to
strengthen the linkages between economic agents by appropriate institutional
arrangements that enhance external learning and learning by doing.
The next five chapters analyze more traditional economic and techno-
logical factors such as cost and performance in determining diffusion rates.
Whereas the previous two chapters have shown that the social and insti-
tutional dimensions of innovation diffusion are difficult to treat in terms of
"standard" diffusion models, the next five chapters show that it is often diffi-
cult to apply simple univariate analytical tools to more traditional diffusion
measures such as market shares.
John Tilton (Chapter 15) analyzes the process of material substitution
from the perspective of technology diffusion and from the more traditional
perspective that emphasizes the role of relative material prices. He stresses
that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but that the technolog-
ical change view provides a better understanding of the dynamic processes
that operate over longer time scales. He describes the American beverage
container industry, where very dynamic and complex temporal patterns in
material substitution for beer and soft-drink containers have resulted in six
different container types competing simultaneously for market shares. This
also illustrates the inadequacy of simple S-shaped models to describe mul-
tiple innovation diffusion processes. An important finding is that while a
price rise over a limited range may have little or no effect on demand, once
the price increases beyond some threshold level it may stimulate the intro-
duction of a new technology that shifts the demand curve downward. This
indicates that material substitution should be most pervasive in those appli-
cations experiencing rapid technology change and that significant changes in
the prices of competing materials would enhance the substitution process.
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Dominique Foray and Arnulf Griibler (Chapter 16) deal with another
important conceptual and methodological area of diffusion research: the
definition of the object diffusing, its interaction with the technological en-
vironment in which it is embedded, and the transformation it undergoes
during its diffusion. To this end, the authors introduce the concepts of
"technological neighborhood" and "distance" derived from a morphological
analysis of the entire technological space for a particular function. This then
serves as a methodology for defining competing technological routes, illus-
trated for the case of non-ferrous casting processes in the FRG and France.
The authors illustrate the critical importance of small initial market niches
providing the ground for experimentation and learning within the industry.
Although initially inferior to its competitors, this allows a new technology
to escape from a "lock-in" situation, become competitive, and diffuse into
a larger market. The authors conclude by presenting an evolutionary tree
developed to describe the changing nature and characteristics of technologies
during diffusion.
Robert Ayres and Ike Ezekoye (Chapter 17) describe the complex in-
terplay of competition and complementarity in the adoption of tetraethyl
lead as an antiknock additive in gasoline. They show that it is difficult to
apply the standard "life cycle" model of technological evolution in the con-
text of complex systems that often portray nonlinear dynamic behavior and
self-reinforcing "lock-in" mechanisms. In particular, the authors investigate
possible explanations for the failure of antiknock additives to displace crack-
ing as a means of raising gasoline octane (or vice versa). They demonstrate
that technological substitution in the petroleum-cracking processes followed
similar patterns as shown by Tilton (Chapter 15) for material substitution:
simultaneous competition and a sequence of process replacements. However,
petroleum cracking and production of additives have not been substituted
for each other but have instead maintained a complementary character. The
economies of adoption apparently favor this·complementarity rather than the
replacement of additives by further p~troleum refining. The authors note
another important difference between the two technological routes: while
cracking evolved rapidly, tetraethyllead additives remained static until reg-
ulation forced a change.
Arnulf Griibler (Chapter 18) introduces a further degree of complexity in
describing temporal and spatial patterns of diffusion processes. Using several
case studies ranging from merchant marine propulsion systems to raw steel
production processes he demonstrates that observed diffusion processes often
cannot be described in terms of a single (simple) diffusion curve. Also the
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importance of any individual driving force such as relative costs, prices, or
technical change is not only different in the various phases of the diffusion
process but also in successive technological generations. Therefore, diffusion
phenomena and their driving forces need to be analyzed in a larger context,
e.g., as elements of so-called "techno-economic paradigms" that constitute
a hierarchy of cross-enhancing and related diffusion clusters. He therefore
proposes a classification scheme for assessing the importance of diffusion
processes: the longer a diffusion process lasts the more pervasive it would be
in terms of its social and economic impacts. He concludes that the transition
from one "cluster" of innovation diffusion to the next generates pronounced
discontinuities in the longer-term evolution of our socioeconomic systems.
Chapter 19 by Nebojsa Nakicenovic discusses the linkages between indi-
vidual diffusion processes that constitute a whole "cluster" associated with a
given techno-economic regime. Based on the characteristic time constants of
diffusion processes the chapter demonstrates that the time span between the
start of diffusion in leading and lagging countries tends to decrease as the
whole cluster matures. However, the leaders achieve higher adoption levels
than the followers roughly in proportion to the time lag in introduction. This
catch-up effect and its relationship to the adoption level are illustrated on
the basis of the evolution of transport infrastructures and systems in several
countries. A comparison of the evolution of transport systems in the United
States and the Soviet Union indicates that the catch-up effect also occurs
over longer periods, spanning three successive generations of diffusion clus-
ters. These conclusions about the focusing of the diffusion clusters toward
saturation are, of course, only tentative. It is suggested that a taxonomy
and classification of hierarchies within each cluster could be a possible route
toward determining the driving forces behind the clustering effect observed
in the samples presented.
The following two chapters by Theodore Modis and Alain Debecker and
by Paul Diederen and colleagues deal with diffusion phenomena in a rapidly
expanding part of the economy: the service sector. Chapter 20 by Theodore
Modis and Alain Debecker analyze an often neglected but important "oppo-
site" to diffusion: the mortality of products. Using experience drawn from
a very dynamic and rapidly expanding industry they report that the life
cycles of computers are shortening considerably: 1 to 2 years for some mod-
els. Their modeling approach to determine product life spans (as opposed
to sales life cycles only) is particularly appealing in its duality of growth
and mortality formulations in the form of a convolution function. One of
the most interesting findings emerging from their study is the difference in
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computer mortality: models phase out at the same time as their techno-
logical generation becomes outdated. This "accelerating" mortality of the
later models of a particular generation provides an interesting symmetry to
a similar phenomenon in the clustering of diffusion processes discussed in
the previous Chapter.
Paul Diederen together with Rene Kemp, Joan Muysken, and Rombout
de Wit report in Chapter 21 on the results of a larger study of techno-
logical change: employment and skill formation in Dutch banking. First
an overview is given of new information technologies applied to banking
and other related technological and organizational innovations. A model is
then introduced that analyzes the diffusion of these new technologies based
on the notion that technological change involves a learning process so that
the availability of a more profitable technique does not automatically im-
ply that it will be used immediately. Diffusion takes time because different
techniques will be employed at each moment to produce a certain mix of
services. These are captured in the model by the concepts of technological
distance, efficiency barrier, competitive power, and pressure. The case study
illustrates that technological change is a result and consequence of learning
and adjustment processes. For example, the change in the handling of ac-
counts from the traditional product-oriented approach to "custom banking"
has repercussions for the whole nature of the business and especially on the
skill requirements of human resources.
The next two chapters illustrate the social dimension of diffusion phe-
nomena. Chapter 22 by Jonny Hjelm focuses on the change of skill require-
ments in Swedish forestry as a consequence of the diffusion of the motor-
driven chain saw. While this had far-reaching consequences and fundamen-
tally transformed the nature of the whole industry, the salient point is that it
was the forest workers themselves who originally financed and bought chain
saws to increase productivity. In fact, the diffusion of the chain saw was only
one component of the overall process of structural change in the industry;
another important accompanying institutional change was the introduction
of the piece-rate wage system. Under this wage system any savings resulting
from productivity increases due to innovation diffusion tended to increase
the intensity of work. Hjelm's analysis deals explicitly with the social context
into which any diffusion case is embedded, an aspect too frequently ignored
in many diffusion studies. It stresses the collective nature of the process of
technological change and the uncertainty and interdependence of individual
adoption decisions.
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Chapter 23 by Emilio Casetti and Cindy Fan returns to the origins of
diffusion studies: the spread of epidemics. Their analysis illustrates the
importance of spatial differentiation and contexts in diffusion phenomena
and deals with the spatial dimension of the spread of AIDS at the regional
level (Ohio, USA). In contrast to the other chapters, the importance of the
social and behavioral changes that are necessary to slow down the spread
of AIDS is stressed: a "diffusion" process that is not based on voluntary
adoption decisions. The authors use a spatial polynomial expansion method,
focusing upon variation in the temporal growth patterns of AIDS in response
to population densities. The results from this regional analysis illustrate
the importance of social and infrastructural networks in the spatial spread
of the disease. On an optimistic note, the authors observe that the rate
of increase in AIDS cases has started to slow down, pointing to the fact
that increasing awareness and modification of individual behavior are crucial
factors in controlling the spread of this epidemic.
The concluding chapter is by Cesare Marchetti, one of the pioneers of
diffusion research. It is a very personal contribution; it annotates his pro-
fessional preoccupation with diffusion phenomena for almost 20 years. It
demonstrates the pervasiveness and universality of the phenomena that other
contributions in this book have tried to embrace from a wide range of dis-
ciplinary, modeling, and empirical perspectives. Ranging from the process
of technological and economic change to transformations in the social fab-
ric and cultural traits, Marchetti describes diffusion phenomena as fractal
in nature "branching out into the universe." Perhaps it is true that our
understanding of the deeper underlying mechanisms of the process of tech-
nological, economic, and social change is still fragmented and insufficient.
But as Marchetti says, the phenomenon is of true universal importance and
holds the key to striking "a deeper level of truth."
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Chapter 1
Rat Race Dynamics and
Crazy Companies: The
Diffusion of Technologies
and Social Behavior
Jesse H. A usubel
1.1 Introduction
How and why do technologies spread when and where they do? What are the
implications and consequences for the structure, wealth, and management
of human organizations? These expansive questions were the subject of the
presentations and discussions of the International Conference on Diffusion of
Technologies and Social Behavior, summarized in this chapter. The chapter
is organized under the following headings: empirical regularities; theoret-
ical issues; predictability; roles of time and space; definition of niche and
innovation; selection dynamics; role of marketing; social aspects of diffusion;
globalization of diffusion processes; and applications of diffusion. While the
chapter treats some questions for policy in both the public and private sec-
tors, it emphasizes research needs and opportunities in the diffusion field.
2 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
The conference represented a convergence and a maturation of studies
of diffusion. A great range of disciplines was represented from both the so-
cial sciences and the natural sciences. There were geographers, historians,
economists, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists. There were
physicists and mathematicians. Along with researchers, there were also prac-
ticing engineers and managers. The conference was made more special by
the participation of several of the modern pioneers of the exploration of dif-
fusion, including Torsten Hiigerstrand, Harold Linstone, Cesare Marchetti,
and Robert Pry, people who have facilitated diffusion research over the years
and provided many of the ideas on which the conference was built.
The first point to address is why the group came together. The an-
swer is the importance of diffusion as a key process in social and economic
change, made powerfully evident by the growing and widespread recognition
of regularities of diffusion processes.
1.2 Empirical Regularities
In a sense, the conference, like diffusion research itself, had an empirical ori-
gin and a phenomenological orientation. Each discipline, each group of re-
searchers, discovered, somewhat independently, diffusion phenomena. One of
the most satisfying aspects of the conference was the presentation of data on
newly charted diffusion processes. There were examples of resins and plastics
from Vladimir Falzman from the Soviet Union and examples in transport by
Veniamin Livshits, also from the Soviet Union. There were two examples on
AIDS. There were examples from Oskar Ullman from the Federal Republic of
Germany in the solar energy area. There were examples on automated bank-
ing from the Netherlands (Paul Diederen and Rene Kemp), electronic mail
from Sweden (Tomas Astebro), chain-saws from Sweden (Johnny Hjelm),
and Catholic saints from Italy (Marchetti). George Modelski presented the
spread of democracy as a global diffusion process. The multitude of exam-
ples is most important. One of the significant features of the conference was
the recognition that there is in fact now a large library of cases of diffusion,
perhaps 3,000 cases that are well-documented and quantified.
One of the major tasks for diffusion research for the next years is the
meta-analysis of ensembles of diffusion processes analyzed in the various
disciplines. Can one undertake some meaningful taxonomy or classification
of the many examples? There might be various criteria, for example, the
time constant of diffusion processes (the so-called "~t"). Other facets to
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examine might include relationships of clusters of technologies, relationships
of levels in the system, and pervasiveness of phenomena, as Roberto Vacca
suggested at one point. The job is to look at the patterns of the patterns:
to compare countries, to compare industries, and so forth, according to their
characteristic forms and configurations of technological innovation and diffu-
sion. The objective would be to identify and eventually explain differences,
similarities, and congruences of diffusion processes and their causes.
Whatever discipline one comes from, we all now have a rich empirical
library on which to draw. There is, however, a need to make this library and
its raw data more accessible.
1.3 Theoretical Issues
While there is excitement and satisfaction with the construction ofthe empir-
ical base, there is considerable questioning of the adequacy of the theories
resting upon the data. In each field, theoretical models have been devel-
oped. For example, in economics new mathematical approaches to treat
the complex dynamics of diffusion and selection processes and the collective
behavior of economic agents were presented by Giovanni Dosi and Gerald
Silverberg. They also referred back to earlier contributions in economics
by Josef Schumpeter, Edwin Mansfield and others. In geography, theories
and models of Hagerstrand and others were mentioned. Vijay Mahajan pre-
sented an overview of diffusion models from the perspective of marketing and
management science. New models were shared at the conference as well, by
Heinz-Dieter Haustein and in a paper by ave Granstrand. But, one senses
that there is considerable dissatisfaction about the theoretical base. We do
not feel able to explain the phenomena well. We do not feel we understand
mechanisms.
At the same time, there seems to be an acceptance of a vocabulary for
talking about the phenomena. The vocabulary is largely derived from the
field of biology. There is not too much debate about the usefulness of the
biological metaphor. Harvey Brooks presented the metaphor clearly and suc-
cinctly, describing principal features of the evolutionary process as generally
understood in life sciences and extending them to the seemingly inanimate
world of technological objects. Other biologically-derived ideas were pre-
sented as well, for example by Michael Sonis who suggested examining the
usefulness of the competitive exclusion principal and principals of collec-
tive behavior, not based on optimization. There were other suggestions of
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this kind, but certainly no field represented seemed to be satisfied with its
theoretical base.
At a general theoretical level, I was reminded of the statement by the late
Elliot Montroll, a well-known American physicist, from 1978, that "Evolu-
tion is a sequence of replacements" (Montroll, 1978). That statement is, for
the most part, consistent with research presented in the conference. There
may be some examples to contest, but Montroll's assertion is the kind of
theoretical hypothesis that might be used generally in diffusion studies. It
also reminds researchers of the limits of focusing on only a single diffusion
process in which a new technology replaces an old one. As Arnulf Griibler
emphasized, evolution is composed of a series of interlaced and multiple
diffusion processes, characterized by various driving forces and adoption en-
vironments.
Among the most promising directions for the search for theory appears
to be the field of communications, as well as biology. In communication, the
aspect stressed was networks. Networks were raised in different forms by
several speakers, for example, Kirk-Jan Kamann and Peter Nijkamp from
the Netherlands. Gerhard Rosegger, talked about a particular type of net-
work, the curious mix of formal and informal alliances that give shape to the
global automobile industry. Wigerstrand mentioned the need to research the
architecture of social communication and relayed the wonderful quote, "First
I make friends, then I make business." There were also the AIDS examples
(Emilio Casetti and Cindy Fan), which stressed very much the importance
of networks. Here is an area in which the existence of networks, the revealing
of social networks over the last few years as the epidemic has spread, has
been readily apparent. Illumination may come from understanding commu-
nication in more detail, as manifested in spatial and other characteristics of
networks.
The question of networks is intimately linked to the question of people's
behavioral rules. A relevant insight comes from The Book of The Courtier,
by Baldesar Castiglione, one of the first advisors to policy makers (Cas-
tiglione, 1528). Castiglione did not emphasize analytic processes in explain-
ing diffusion. "Usage is more powerful than reason in introducing new things
among us and in blocking out old things and anyone who tries to judge of
perfection in such matters is often deceived." That was published in 1528.
Perhaps, as Marchetti would say, the rules of the game do not change very
much.
The need to understand the filtering and acceptance of messages evokes
a remark about causality. There was discussion at the conference, and I will
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return to this later, about the meaning of space or location. Ake Ander-
son raised the issue of space. Students of philosophy may remember that
the 18th century Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume had three
principles of causation: first, temporal precedence of cause over effect; sec-
ond, spatial contiguity; and third, constant conjunction. In the context of
diffusion, it may be useful to revisit ideas about causation from philosophy
and other fields. What are the underlying principles and requirements for
the reproduction and spread of technology?
As mentioned already, another field which merits a careful diffused look
is biology. It is clear that there are exciting developments going on in the
life sciences that bear both directly and indirectly on diffusion. Within the
discipline, there is a highly developed vocabulary of passive and facilitated
diffusion, active transport, and membrane inhibitors. There is also poten-
tially relevant work with regard to the role of messenger chemicals (of course,
the messenger RNA). In neurosciences, there have been fascinating discov-
eries about so-called cell adhesion molecules that also transfer messages and
guide cell-cell interaction.
Vladimir Rudashevsky commented in the conference that diffusion is a
process of mutual exchange. That statement can certainly be fruitfully re-
flected upon by our biologist colleagues, who would probably agree and have
many examples at the cellular and genetic level. Back at the level of human
society, Marchetti made the remark that people diffuse in and out of scien-
tific and other sectors based on the rates of difficulty and success in finding
new things. As the effort to develop a theoretical basis for diffusion studies
continues, individual researchers must look beyond their own disciplinary
borders to areas of communication theory, biology, and other fields.
There was much discussion about the importance of diversity. Diversity
again recalls biological issues, this time those current in the vast undertaking
proposed to map the human genome. Most biologists think that much of the
genome may contain little information, or is junk as the mappers sometimes
say. There may be only particular segments, or sequences of genes, that
are vitally important. There may be some metaphors here with economic
and social processes that are worth exploring. Dosi and others noted the
importance in economics of the heterogeneity of preferences, expectations,
and competencies, and that the heterogeneity is required for evolution. What
seems to be true at the genetic level needs to be understood and appreciated
better at the economic and industrial levels.
Now this seemingly inefficient evolutionary model introduces some awk-
wardness for traditional economic theory. It runs counter to some of the
6 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
preferred assumptions in economics for the last three or four generations
about perfect information, rationality, and existence of equilibria. Another
aspect that came through quite clearly in several talks is that the role of
prices from a diffusion point of view is unclear. Prices convey certain kinds
of information and send certain signals, but their roles and causal function
from a diffusion perspective would seem to be less important, especially in
the early phases of diffusion, than mainstream economic theory would say.
What emerges is the importance of specific history, captured in the phrase
that Brian Arthur (1988) has popularized and that was mentioned by several
speakers, including Yuri Kaniovsky, "path dependence."
Castiglione was an early supporter of path-dependency. Let me share
another quote, which relates to some of the marketing questions discussed
in the conference. "Custom often makes the same things pleasing and dis-
pleasing to us. Whence it comes about that customs, dress, ceremonies,
and fashions that were once prized become despised and contrariwise the
despised become prized." History matters. Where you are will affect where
you will be the next day. Where you are now is determined by where you
were before. You do not and cannot reshuffle all the cards everyday.
Continuing on these general issues of methods and theory, certainly one
of the debates is about the literal use and exercise of curve-fitting. Many
examples of curve-fitting are seen in the diffusion literature. There are sim-
ple examples taken from biology, the growth-to-limits behavior of bacteria.
There are the Fisher-Pry competition models. There are the multiple sub-
stitution models. There are logistic functions, Gompertz functions, and
modified exponential functions. There are also questions raised about the
applicability of each kind of curve-fitting to each case. Moreover, does the
curve-fitting in practice usually apply to cases that are so simple as to be
trivial? There is no resolution of that debate, other than to say, use a model
that makes sense and enjoy the fact that some simple relationships are deep
and important.
1.4 Predictability
The sight of good fits of data and the scent of a theory raise hope of pre-
dictability. There was disagreement in the conference about the extent to
which understanding of diffusion enhances ability to predict. A majority was
on the positive side, saying there is quite a lot of predictability, but there
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were several strong caveats. Haustein reported one example where predic-
tion based on a diffusion theory failed. Was it a failure of diffusion theory
in general or of a particular model or application? Robert Ayres presented
a possible counter-example in the area of motor fuels, where the product
under study did not follow a simple S-shaped path. John Tilton shared the
problems of using diffusion for prediction in multiple substitution, with a
case of six competing kinds of beverage containers. How strong are current
tools in the face of real world complexity?
At the same time, there were promising papers about methods in pre-
dictability. Vacca and Valerio Franchina presented a method which is a
virtually completely automatic procedure using triplets - three data points,
including early data points out of the chaotic, turbulent, initial phase of
technology innovation - to estimate growth processes, and showed several
striking examples, excellent fits. They say it appears to be a more objective
process than others that have been employed. Alain Debecker also presented
some interesting rules of thumb about the accuracy of prediction, certainly
handy for practitioners to use. The prerequisite for most analyses though
is that the process already has to be visible, signalling to the human eye.
There has to be a reasonably high level of signal. The crystal ball cannot
be completely empty or cloudy. There has to be a reasonable number of
data points in it. Underlying any look into the crystal ball are diverse views
about the extent to which natural and social systems are chaotic, tending
toward certain forms of (self-) organization, or more strongly deterministic.
1.5 Time and Space
The question of predictability naturally raises the question of time. Follow-
ing is a quote from another distinguished physicist, Robert Herman. Back
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Herman and Ralph Alpher were responsi-
ble for predicting the background radiation of the universe, the black body
radiation, which led to the Big Bang Theory. This was certainly a discovery
that would reinforce the arrow of time. Herman is said to have commented
subsequently, "Time is the disgusting coordinate of the universe." The con-
ference participants heard a lot about time, mostly as a strict clock ringing
the hours of diffusion.
Scientists who build models of the global climate talk about processes,
like the changes in the ice caps, as having slow physics and other processes,
like formation of thunder clouds and storms, as having fast physics. Social
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processes may also be said to have slow and fast physics. While transporta-
tion infrastructures spread over intervals of fifty years or more, as shown by
Nebojsa Nakicenovic, clothing fashions diffuse worldwide in a few months. In
fact, it was suggested by Griibler that diffusion processes have a hierarchical
structure, perhaps a fractal structure. Alternatively, there is a continuum of
parameters on short and long time scales. To what extent is there measur-
able structure within the temporal dimension of technological diffusion?
Perhaps the most widely discussed feature of temporal diffusion is the
bunching of innovations. Like a baby boom there appear to be periods of in-
creased birth activity, when clusters of technologies are initiated together for
certain reasons that we may not understand. Under what circumstances are
there multiple innovations or clusters? Similarly, is there a focusing of diffu-
sion phenomena at the end of certain time periods? On the one hand, there
were proposals that there are bouquets of innovations, and on the other
hand, there are forces that act as lenses or cones that appear to concen-
trate diffusion processes. So, there are most interesting phenomena in time.
Of course, the question was raised if technological life-cycles are becoming
shorter. Is there an acceleration taking place such that each successive in-
novation spreads more rapidly? Is there an acceleration taking place within
the hypothesized 50-year long-waves or pulses of economic growth such that
innovations taking off later within such a time frame diffuse more rapidly?
Time is an important issue not only for research. Time is important
because it has implications for equity. It is not only that everybody gets
things, but who gets something first, that matters a great deal. The time is-
sues are also important for education, as was raised by Maryellen Kelley and
some others. There may be mismatching of technology diffusion processes
with the educational system. To what extent does this mismatch stem from
ignorance that might be overcome?
Returning to the issue of whether the average life-cycle is becoming
shorter, I, for one, am unconvinced by the evidence shared at the confer-
ence. It is possible there is such a shortening. However, the situation may
be confused by an increase in the number of diffusion processes. To give
an illustration, the typical supermarket in America now has an average of
18,000 items for sale, whereas 40 years ago it had 2,000 items. It may well
be that the life-span of an average product has not changed much. However,
because there are so many products, there is the illusion of acceleration.
Perhaps changes in quantity and complexity of processes are being mistaken
for an acceleration. This is a question that should be researched.
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One more question in the time area relates to the notion of appropri-
ability. This is the ability to prevent others from taking or making use of
technology without authority or right and thereby relates to the capability of
innovators to internalize some of the economic benefits of technical progress.
Appropriability was raised several times by economists. Is appropriability
just a diplomatic word used by economists for the control of diffusion over
time? It seems to be a word that landlords would like and renters might not.
To turn from time to space, there was lively discussion about spatial dif-
fusion. Helga Nowotny asked whether, when diffusion researchers talk about
space, is the meaning of space metaphorical? The meaning appears to go
beyond traditional geographical coordinates. Anderson talked about tech-
nology dissolving the role of contiguity. Several speakers, including Lawrence
Brown, Hagerstrand, Kamann, and Sonis pointed out the need to examine
spatial and temporal diffusion together. It was said that more complete
coordinate systems are needed. This view recalls the question of networks.
Clearly, spatial issues need to be revisited.
Yet, the traditional notion of space can still be important. There is the
question, for example, of diffusion within the single Europe that is foreseen
(Charles Edquist and William Peirce). So, even as new kinds of spatial or
space/time relationships are important, space by itself may still be meaning-
ful. Anderson offered a reminder about the parts of the world that are not
included in rapid diffusion. The relationship of diffusion and development is
obviously critical. Sonis also emphasized special spatial niches, wombs, one
might say, that are needed, areas where technological innovations take hold.
The conclusion is that it would be a loss to abandon completely the study
of space as simply metaphorical or illusory.
1.6 Innovation and Niche Definition
There was forceful debate about what is an innovation and what is a niche.
Anderson warned about perils in theories based on ill-classified phenom-
ena. There was also discussion about the differences between fundamental
and incremental innovation. For example, there was debate about, what is
Computer-Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), what is a Flexible Manufactur-
ing System (FMS), what is just-in-time inventory. Are these innovations?
If not, what are the boundaries of innovations? Certainly, such concepts are
not as clear-cut as are innovations in genetics or the invention of the auto-
mobile. Modelski, with his analysis of democracy as an innovation, raised
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more generally the question of forms of government and forms of social and
institutional innovation.
The argument about niches had several facets. The work by Dominique
Foray on metal casting raised the issues of the appropriate definition of the
diffusing object and the relationship of the occupant to the niche. There
is also the important question of how to modify the niche. The fascinating
case of the car and the horse was presented. At first, the niche for the car
is replacement of the horse. Then all the horses are gone, and the niche for
the car becomes a new expanding niche which the car itself largely creates.
In short, innovations and niches are themselves interacting and dynamic.
1.7 Selection Dynamics
Analysis of the population of innovations naturally leads to the issue of
selection. Selection was addressed in a variety of ways. There is the canonical
statement from the Bible, "Many are called, few are chosen." Mahajan said
that the rule of thumb in marketing is that 70 percent to 90 percent of all
new products fail. Marchetti said that from his studies looking earlier in
the process, one percent of innovations succeed. Then the question is, what
drives us to experiment under such bad odds? It seems crazy.
Silverberg pointed out that many innovations are inferior and more ex-
pensive than their competitors at the outset. Bruce Guile noted that perhaps
the way out is to recognize the triumph of action over analysis. Maybe some
combination of ignorance coupled with a general attitude of optimism be-
gins to explain the yearly parade of bankruptcies. Dosi and Silverberg argued
that diversity of expectations, including those that may lead to failure, are
required to explain diffusion processes. Also striking was Theodore Modis'
statement that studies done about the history of diffusion are usually the
history of winners. It is a bloody history, and Modis suggested more effort in
counting the casualties, the deaths, the lunatics, and losers. It is important
to understand more about what has happened at the end of life-cycles and
in aborted processes.
Dosi made the perceptive comment that product markets select tech-
nologies, but financial markets select firms. The two processes are not iden-
tical. There were several papers relevant in this area. A paper by Charlie
Karlsson that examined why enterprises adopt technologies emphasized in-
formation channels and frequency of exposure. In a way, his view is similar
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to a marketing perspective. Edquist looked at empirical differences in diffu-
sion within the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and emphasized social and cultural factors. Kelley
and Brooks offered a study in the manufacturing technology area trying to
understand a particular sequence of adopters among firms. Of course, there
is the question of the role of entrepreneurs. It would seem that there are
many open questions in the area of selection.
1.8 Role of Marketing
By now marketing has been mentioned several times. Marketing is an at-
tempt to change or modify selection. Marketing people may be considered
true aspiring bio-engineers of human society. But, one may also raise the
question whether marketing matters. We saw several comparisons between
the Western economies and the Soviet Union with some strikingly similar
diffusion data. One has to ask the question, given such different marketing
and distribution strategies and channels, how is it that some results are so
similar? Perhaps marketing is the pageantry, the flags flying in the proces-
sion of the king. To use a different metaphor, perhaps it is the navigation
system for a largely pre-set trajectory. Marketing may only rarely change
the niche to be filled.
It is also important to ask how marketing changes over technology life-
cycles. Thomas Lee raised this issue well. One idea is that it is necessary
to market in pulses in order to fill successive niches, with information that
needs to be distributed through time in certain ways. There were several
comments, some flippant and others serious, about the importance of word-
of-mouth. This appears to remain the dominant way for people to communi-
cate decisively. Technologies may make the shelves of our marketplaces look
modern, but diffusion processes may show how close today's humans are to
our chattering, oral ancestors.
Cross-cultural comparisons would help show what is deeply similar and
what is superficially different, given similar outcomes of diffusion processes.
It should be possible to do revealing comparative studies of the effects of
marketing strategies for the same products or technologies in different coun-
tries. In such studies, it would be useful to explicitly employ hypotheses
from the diffusion literature. For example, one could explore reasons that
early penetration may be associated with high ultimate levels of market sat-
uration, while cases of later penetration are associated with lower ultimate
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levels of saturation, as found by Nakicenovic in the analysis of diffusion of
transportation technologies.
1.9 Social Aspects
Quite a few participants raised the question of social factors. Everyone rec-
ognizes that the diffusion of an innovation or several innovations can have
many social effects. Several people noted that there are many causal chains
leading to an overall effect. To give an example, automobiles, which were
mentioned a number of times, replaced horses, diminished the number of
stables, and reduced the number of flies and the amount of solid waste.
They thus may have lessened somewhat the spread of communicable dis-
eases. They helped the growth of suburbs. They reduced railroad traffic
and transformed shipping. They changed the nature of the hotel business.
They diminished the employment of domestic servants. They changed mar-
keting areas. They caused international difficulty over oil resources. They
affected rural life. They made drive-in movies and new kinds of vacations
possible.
There were suggestions that more of the social dimensions of diffusion
should be explored. At the same time, Silverberg and others made the point
that social change represents the combined contributions of many inven-
tions. While the automobile made possible the suburbs, the suburbs may
also have required the telephone. What is visible is almost always the re-
sult of an accumulation of influences, in many cases of smaller innovations.
These smaller innovations are a significant part of the process. The force
of any particular invention or innovation might be quite weak. The phrase
that Silverberg used was the collective nature of technological progress. In
fact, several participants referred to the notion of development trajectories
and the concept of techno-economic paradigms consisting of clusters of in-
terrelated technical, organizational, and social innovations that has been
associated with Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez (1988).
One issue that might be evaluated more in the future is a social, even a
moral and an aesthetic, one. Diffusion itself (or competition) has countervail-
ing effects, and the balance changes through time. On the one hand, diffusion
is a force for homogenization. On the other hand, it multiplies difference.
We have both the increase in the number of inventions and innovations, and
at the same time the possibilities for greater or wider standardization. In
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the discussion sometimes people were talking about innovation and diffu-
sion as something quite subversive that would overthrow and would change
the society. This was evident in discussions and papers of Soviet colleagues
about innovation in the context of perestroika. At other times, there was a
sense that technology and diffusion are a force of standardization, a conser-
vative force in a certain way. These offsetting tendencies might be explored
more. A starting proposition may be that fluctuation generates diversity,
but propagation leads to homogenization.
1.10 Globalization
Another social, and also political and economic, issue that was discussed
was that of globalization. This was raised by Hagerstrand, Lee, Marchetti,
and Modelski. Two aspects of globalization were talked about. There is
the global diffusion of technology, and there is the more specific process of
technology transfer between nations. Research presented indicated isolation
of technology, technological protectionism, fails in the long run. Technology
simply does diffuse globally. The question is then how much one can abet or
retard it. In the East-West context especially, are there more positive ways
to handle the diffusion of technology?
At an abstract level, the issue may be phrased, is there a widely ac-
ceptable way for nations to capture income globally that is attributable to
research and development? It appears that nations behave, or would like to
behave, much like the successful firms described in the Silverberg model. It
is therefore not surprising that there is growing international debate about
equitable and optimal national levels of investments in R&D. It is the appro-
priability question in another guise or at a higher level of the system. The
critical point is whether the diffusion of innovation and its benefits remain
ordered in a civilized way, without wars and other violent conflicts referred
to by Modelski and others.
In globalization, with regard to technology transfer, the issue is catch-up.
To what extent can the introduction and diffusion of innovations be acceler-
ated, especially to developing countries like China? Sergei Glaziev's paper
had a good, provocative phrase, "the advantages of the backward." There
is a need to understand better what the potential advantages of the back-
ward are. Some examples of acceleration of diffusion processes were shown;
these appeared to follow a kind of learning or experience curve in which late
adopters were spared some of the time-consuming experimentation of the
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early adopters. To what extent does this hold for sophisticated, as well as
trivial, cases?
Ultimately, it must be asked, "After catch-up - What?" It is unrealistic
to think that everybody, at some moment in future history, whether firms or
countries, will be at a relatively even point in the adoption of technologies. It
is even less realistic to expect that such parity could be sustained. Diffusion
phenomena in a way seem to be elastic, with some leaders always pulling
away, but then a pack of followers periodically coming nearer, only for a
leader, sometimes a new one, to pull away. Although not frequently, the
ordering of diffusion processes does change among nations, and the desire
to lead, to take the lead, is the essence of competition in politics, as well as
business.
To return to the status of the less developed countries, one of the trou-
bling features of the conference was that, while there is a large library of
evidence on diffusion processes, quantitatively documented cases from de-
veloping countries are scarce. The past behavior of countries like the United
States, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and increasingly the Soviet Union has
been studied extensively. In contrast, there are few data and analyses from
India, China, Argentina, and other such countries. On the empirical side it is
urgent to do more work on less developed countries. It would help crucially
to answer questions about whether and how catch-up occurs.
1.11 Applications
The last area for comment is applications of diffusion for policy, especially
in firms and the national economy. The prospects for applications were ad-
dressed by several people, including Brian Sullivan and Guile. Judgements
here are closely related to views on the predictability question. Sullivan
points out that application of diffusion methods is itself diffusion and adop-
tion. It might be called the diffusion of diffusion. Presumably there should
be a competitive edge from employing the kind of ideas and analyses shared
at the conference, at least until they reach saturation. There was debate
about whether there is a vicious circle in use of diffusion research, in that
if the information is widely publicly available, it may no longer be valu-
able. This debate resembles other debates about the value of information in
markets.
At the same time, there are broader and probably useful guidelines about
behavior related to diffusion that appear to emerge from the presentations
J.H. Ausubel 15
and papers. For example, there is the evidence from Griibler and Nakicenovic
that late adoption is associated with fast diffusion, but a relatively low satu-
ration level. There is also evidence of seasons of saturation, when many
diffusion processes concurrently reach their culmination and create both
economic stress and windows of opportunity for initiation of new growth.
Rudashevsky explored how such macro patterns of diffusion link to issues
of restructuring or perestroika. Thus, at a conceptual level, there may be
useful notions for policy and applications apart from specific predictions.
At the micro-level, there are, however, potentially specific applications
of diffusion analysis. Among these is the remarkably precise application
from Vacca and Franchina in the AIDS area. The question is if it would be
socially robust to accept or use such a prediction? How much should it be
relied upon? Should the health minister of Italy risk the entire government
health care system on this prediction? Would even supporters of diffusion
theory prefer to place, say, half of their resources on their own forecast and
then diversify a little? Even if one has a high level of confidence in the
diffusion-based prediction, strategically and tactically, how is it best to deal
with this faith?
Both at the macro and micro level, the system almost always seems
to keep away from homogeneity. Dosi made the playful comment that for
growth it is important to have many economic agents grossly uninformed
about the future. This appears to be a general prerequisite for evolution.
It may also assuage any fears that experts may have that everyone will
adopt or act upon their ideas. Linstone emphasized the benefits of multiple
perspectives, of exploration of several paths. Shunsuke Mori provided a
valuable caution about the extent to which one enterprise, or presumably
one nation, can effectively manage the whole process from invention through
innovation and diffusion. There may always be gaps between intention and
performance in application, whether due to inherent capability or external
surprise. The environment may be so turbulent that one is unable to pursue
a strategy over a long enough period for it to matter.
Guile stressed the delicacy of timing for successful applications of diffu-
sion analyses. He talked about possible mismatches, the need for matching
time scales, and the need for the fertility of the receptor. To illustrate, here is
a quotation about the fax machine, which has proliferated rapidly worldwide
since about 1987. "One possible extension of electrical invention ... is fac-
simile transmission. Newspapers have been thus sent from New York to San
Francisco ... Other uses of the same mechanism are for sending news pic-
tures, identifications of criminals, x-ray photographs, weather maps, signed
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documents, chemical formulae, graphs and messages in other alphabets and
symbols." This was an exactly correct statement by an analyst, a technol-
ogy assessor, a distinguished sociologist ... in the year 1933 (Ogburn and
Gilfillan, 1933). Of course, the simple fax machine concept was 54 years too
early from the point of view of diffusion. A related cluster of innovations,
including high quality telecommunications, was required to potentiate the
fax. Certainly, timing is critical in commercial application.
Finally, in the applications area, one must raise again the question that
has been posed in the work of Henry Ergas (1987) and also raised by Edquist.
At the government level, what specifically constitute diffusion-oriented poli-
cies? Peirce wondered whether governments have at their disposal appropri-
ate policies that can influence diffusion processes at all. Diffusion-oriented
policies is a most tempting term and needs to be explored and clarified.
To conclude, let me recall two of the best phrases used in the confer-
ence. One participant (Kamann) referred to diffusion processes as "rat-race
dynamics." Another (Dosi) commented on the necessity for "crazy compa-
nies." Tilton asked the question what has changed in 20 years of diffusion
studies in economics and other fields. My answer is that we have sorted a lot
of order from the apparent chaos of social behavior, but have also recognized
better the necessity of disorder, and we are trapped as ever in the race. But,
as shown in Figure 1.1, our paradigm is gaining.
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Figure 1.1. Diffusion of techno-economic paradigms.
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Chapter 2
Democratization from a
Long-term Perspective
George M odelski and Gardner Perry III
2.1 Introduction
Democracy is a mechanism of collective choice and a form of social organiza-
tion that can be considered a superior substitute for other such mechanisms
or forms of organization. As such, democracy may be expected to grow, or
diffuse, over time, amongst the world's population, and the question posed
in the present study is: does that growth follow a regular pattern, according
to the Fisher-Pry substitution model of technological change?
Our inquiry finds that, prior to 1800, democratic development was exper-
imental in character, but it has been growing fairly rapidly since the middle
of the 19th century, generally fitting the model of diffusion quite closely. At
the present time, about forty percent of the world's people live in democ-
racies; by extrapolation the model suggests that the democratic community
might reach the 90 percent level toward 2100.
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2.2 Democracy and Democratization
Democracy literally means rule of the people. More analytically speaking it
might be seen both as a technology of collective choice, and also as a type
of social behavior or community organization. The technical, or instrumen-
tal, aspects of democracy are best recognized in the election process, a form
of macro-decision by which a community selects some individuals to posi-
tions of public leadership. In this sense, practical democracy consists of a
number of rule-governed devices - media, parties, voting, and majority rule
- and of policies executed via working mechanisms of representation. The
substantive, or expressive, aspects of democracy, on the other hand, relate
to its characteristics of equality and freedom, and they reflect the optimum
conditions in which democracy operates effectively: a community of equals
(symbolized by one man, one vote) in which, in a state of autonomy, all
live as free individuals. The first recorded discussion of democracy aptly
combines these two aspects in the phrase "equality under law" .[1]
Democratization is the process of building, or creating, democracy. That
process, also, moves along two distinguishable, if related, paths: wherever
democratic techniques of macro-decision are discovered and spread, a process
of diffusion of these innovations occurs. Alternatively, we see it also as the
process by which democratic communities grow, via a form of clustering (or
concentration) into larger communities of democracy; for the evolution of
new types of community, too, is a form of innovation. The two processes
are obviously interdependent: the diffusion of democratic procedures will
produce no more than formal democracy unless rooted in, and nourished
by, conditions of greater equality and freedom, where procedural rights are
effectively exercised and are seen to work; a society of equality and freedom
cannot last without observing democratic procedures.
Viewed from another angle, democratization may be either intensive or
extensive. By intensive (or vertical) democratization we understand the
change in the quality of the democratic experience in a given community;
that is, we ask, how good is this particular democracy? We may wish to
judge it, e.g., by the extent of voting rights, the working of representative
institutions, or the presence of democracy at the several levels or fields of
social organization (such as national, local, political, economic, etc.). We
might also want to judge it by some general standard of perfect democracy
(analogous to perfect competition in economics). That means that nation-
states, and communities, might be seen as less, or more democratic, and that
the quality of democracy is subject to change over time, in both positive and
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negative directions. Conceptions as to what is democratic might also change,
and the point at which a given community is to be called democratic might
therefore be a variable one.
Extensive (or horizontal) democratization, on the other hand, measures
the quantitative extension of democratic communities, and their global spa-
tial reach. It asks: how much democracy is there in the world? The present
chapter addresses this question.
The process of democratization occurs in an environment (or niche) of
finite carrying capacity. We conceive of it as unfolding within the limits of
the world system, in the context of its evolution, and as part of it. That
is, democratic procedures are diffused inside a market that extends to, and
is limited by, the social organization of the human race on this planet, and
democratic communities grow as part of world system evolution. We assume
that democracy is not limited in its reach to certain regions or cultural areas
or special circumstances. Hence the limit of the process of democratization,
its potential, is the world population; however, we also need to bear in mind
that this population has been a steadily expanding one, by more than one
order of magnitude in the period under discussion.
As a set of techniques, and principles of community organization, democ-
racy is in some respect a superior substitute for other technologies and forms
of community organization. In its classic Greek form, democracy was the ba-
sic alternative to monarchy, with aristocracy an intermediate solution. In the
modern era republics and (increasingly absolute) monarchies emerged as the
two principal forms assumed by the rising nation-state. Gradually, republics
(and constitutional monarchies) evolved into democracies as substitutes for
absolute rule, or for narrowly based, arbitrary, despotic, or dictatorial forms
of organization, and they have been shown to have wide potential appeal,
on such grounds as flexibility, accommodation of variety, self-legitimating
properties, and capacity to civilize conflict. On such a view democratization
has been a process of gradual substitution of democratic for nondemocratic
forms of organization; or else as a persistent problem of choice between alter-
native and competing forms available to communities for dealing with their
problems.
Democratization is, moreover, a time-bound process. We do not expect
it to be completed, all at once, worldwide, but rather to spread in stages,
gradually, and slowly at first. We would expect it to emerge following a
series of experiments, some of which are bound to falter, and only a few to
succeed. We know that the first trials with direct democracy occurred in rel-
atively small urban communities in ancient Greece, prominently in Athens,
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ca. 500-300 Be. They did not last, but their failure was a noble one and is
remembered to this day. Another series of attempts at popular rule material-
ized in Italy, after the year 1000, among self-governing cities of which Venice
was the most successful; but there, too, most experiments deteriorated into
tyrannies, and even Venice ultimately turned into an oligarchy.
The seeds of modern democracy began to sprout after 1500 as alterna-
tives to the unfettered monarchy, which was then prevailing as the answer to
the question of the character of the modern nation-state: Le., was the state
to have unlimited or limited powers?[2] The critical events were the wars
of religion in Western Europe after 1561: they produced both the absolute
monarchies of Spain and France, and the republican United Provinces of the
Netherlands. In limited monarchies, this republican stmin went under the
banner of commonwealth (as in John Locke's Two treatises of government).
Helped though it was by the Venetian model, now transposed to the larger
scale of nation-states, the republican way advanced slowly at first. Eventu-
ally, it acquired a strong liberal flavor and came to be strongly tied (as in
the British case) to representative institutions.
Democratization took a leap forward in the 19th century in the form of
representative democracy. But it could not have done so without suitable
techniques of representation that had been previously devised in the repub-
lican and liberal states. That is why the achievements of the 16th-18th
centuries are an essential part of the master trend of democratization.
The propensity to view democracy from a long-term perspective can
hardly be claimed as altogether new. Having observed the American expe-
rience with Jacksonian democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, p. 9) an-
nounced more than a century and a half ago that "a great democratic rev-
olution ... is taking place in our midst" and added that some saw it as
"irresistible" because it is "the most continuous, the most ancient, and the
most permanent tendency known to history" .[3] But this revolution, if we
are to credit de Tocqueville's term, is still in progress, and its precise shape
remains to be determined.
2.2.1 Democracy as innovation
From a long-term perspective, democratization can therefore be regarded as
a process of structural change, or innovation or, better still, as a cluster of
innovations. An innovation is an idea or practice that is new to an individual
or a community. Democracy certainly was such an idea when its techniques
originally evolved in a simple but persuasive form; it was again innovative
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in its modern version, when it had to be adapted to a larger scale of social
organization and (by continuous evolution) it has come to form a repertoire
of some complex new practices. While in the "old democracies" this inventive
aspect is apt to be forgotten, it is much in evidence in those communities
where democratic practices are still unfamiliar.
The question arises: is it not likely that democratization, as a process of
innovation diffusion, is in fact also a learning process?
We know that innovations spread in a diffusion process involving regular
patterns in social systems over time. According to Everett Rogers (1962,
p. 67) "the process by which innovations are adopted by individuals is es-
sentially a limited example of how any type of learning takes place". More
generally, we might assume, with Cesare Marchetti (1980, p. 267), that "so-
ciety is a learning system", that learning is "random search with filters" that
brings about lasting changes in behavior, and that such "random searches"
are characterized by logistics (a curve representing a function involving an
exponential and shaped like the letter S). Logistic functions have been used
to study the growth of human and other populations.
"A general finding of past investigations," Rogers argues, is that the
pattern characterizing the way innovations are adopted (that is, "adopter
distributions") follows "a bell-shaped curve over time and approaches nor-
mality.... this type of distribution is essentially S-shaped when plotted on
a cumulative basis".
Three reasons have been adduced why adopter distributions might be
expected to approach normality: early sociologists, including Stuart Chapin,
who studied the city manager form of government in the United States,
observed that the adoption of an idea followed a bell-shaped pattern. The
learning of individuals follows a normal curve, and the gain in learning per
trial is proportional to the product of the amount already learned and the
amount remaining to be learned before the limit of learning is reached. As
the individual learning curve is extended to the case of a social system,
experience with the innovation is gained as each successive member adopts
it. Last, the interaction effect is the process through which adopters of an
innovation influence those members who have not yet adopted; the group
pressure for adoption rises as the number of adopters increases (Rogers,
1962, pp. 152-155).
This time pattern of diffusion in turn suggests a categorization of
adopters. The simplest might be one that distinguishes between innovators,
early adopters, late adopters, and laggards. We might regard innovators as
the first 10 percent of adopters, and the next forty percent as early adopters.
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At this point (50 percent, the population mean, or the :flex point) adoption
ceases to increase at an increasing rate, brings in the late adopters, and
ultimately levels off for the laggards (the last ten percent).
In this chapter we shall apply one basic form of the diffusion model, the
Fisher-Pry (Fisher and Pry, 1971) model of technological substitution, on
the assumption that democratization may be considered as a competitive
substitute for other methods of social organization. Basic human needs for
organization and collective choice need to be satisfied, and democracy pro-
vides that better substitute. The Fisher-Pry model expresses that process,
and its most convenient form is the equation (Fisher and Pry, 1971, p. 77):
F/(l- F) = exp[2a(t - to)], (2.1)
where F represents the fraction of substitution (in our case, the fraction
democratic), and 1 stands for the size of the market (in our case, the world
population). Then 2a is the slope of the curve, and t (in years) is the
time constant (called by Fisher and Pry the take-over time), defined as the
number of years required to go from 10 percent to 90 percent saturation
level. The mid-point of that range (50%) is the :flexpoint to. Then a plot on
semilog paper of F/(1-F) as a function of time allows one to fit a straight
line through the data and make appropriate extrapolations.
In the remaining portion of this chapter we shall address the following
questions: Can democratization be shown to be a major pattern of the
world system? Might it be no more than a series of unrelated national
developments governed by local conditions? Ifnot, then how do we document
it and what is the evidence for it? What has been the shape of (horizontal)
democratization over time?
This is a large field; for our present brief, we propose the following course:
• To operationalize the question by asking what proportion of the world
population has lived in democracies at various times since about 1500?
• To further ask does this information fit the substitution (or learning)
model and, if so, what might be the implications?
For if the cumulative growth of the share of world population living in
democratic communities (that is, in the global democratic community) can
be described by a logistic-type (S-shaped) distribution (that in a semiloga-
rithmic plane appears as a straight line), then we have grounds for arguing
that democratization is a social learning process (of innovation-diffusion/
community growth).
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We propose to test our hypothesis against two sets of data now available on
the population of democratic communities since about 1500. Our data on
these communities are in two parts:
(1) For the period 1800-1986 our basic source is the POLITY II dataset
(Gurr et al., 1989); the background to that collection is explained in
(Gurr et al., 1990).
The POLITY II survey covers "all independent members of the in-
ternational system", those that have attained independence by 1975 and
whose population exceeded one million by the mid-1980s.[4] It gives, for
each such polity, an annual score of "institutional democracy", on a scale
ranging from zero to ten. The score is constructed from three codings,
those for (a) competitiveness of political participation - via the party
system; (b) openness and competitiveness of political recruitment, that
is quality of the electoral system; and (c) constraints on the chief execu-
tive (checks and balances). There are no coded data on human rights or
political liberties.
The "institutional democracy" score is constructed by adding these
three indicators, so that party competitiveness rates a maximum weight
of three, executive recruitment via elections also a maximum of three,
and restraints on the chief executive, four. It measures the degree of
intensity of democracy for each polity.
Selected for inclusion in this survey since 1800 are all polities that
had, in any year since 1800, an "institutional democracy" score of six and
above. There was one in 1800 (United States, with a score of seven); 14 in
1900, and 46 in 1986 (of which 29 scored 10). The most populous national
polities and their POLITY II scores in 1986 are shown in Table 2.1.
(2) For the period between 1450 and 1800 we apply the same criteria (parties,
elections, checks, and balances) and the same scoring weights and ask:
what are the polities that can reasonably be described, on these criteria,
as "democratic experiments" - that is, those exploring a variety of paths
of trial and error, at first in the republican, and later also in the liberal
traditions, all generally tending in the democratic direction.
This yields a tentative list of eight independent polities as follows[5]:
Venice (1450-1640); Swiss Confederation (1499-1531)[6]; Poland (1505-
1605) (Poland-Lithuania after 1569); the Dutch Republic (1579-1787);
Britain (1688-1800); Sweden (1718-1771); United States (1776-1800);
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Table 2.1. Major national polities 1986.*
Institutional
Democracies
India
United States
Brazil
Japan
Germany, F .R.
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Thailand
Score
(7)
(10)
(7)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(8)
Others
China
U.S.S.R.
Indonesia
Nigeria
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Mexico
Vietnam
Philippines
Egypt
Turkey
Iran
Score
(1)
(1)
(1)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(3)
(1)
no data
(3)
(4)
(2)
Parentheses show POLITY II institutional democracy scores for 1986.
*Populations (49 million or greater) exceeding 1 percent of the world total in 1986, arranged
in descending order of size. Polities shown here account for 75 percent of the world
population.
France (1789-1799). Each rates a score of at least four on the POLITY
II scale; a somewhat lower threshold is used to take into account the
experimental character of these early cases. Only two (Britain and the
United States) remain in 1800, which is a time of crisis amidst global
war, and only the United States carries over to the POLITY II survey,
where it rates a seven. Britain keeps a score of four until 1837.
The data on democratic communities are then combined with population
figures, for the relevant communities, and for the world, based on McEvedy
and Jones (1978) and other sources cited in Perry (1987). The populations
are those of the metropolitan territories, and do not include dependencies.
2.4 The Analysis
Table 2.2 summarizes in Part (a) the data for the period 1450-1800, basically
the era of the innovators. The period up to about 1750 is one of experimenta-
tion, with a world share of population (fraction democratic) ranging between
one and two percent. The same data are presented graphically in Figure 2.1,
Experimental Democracy; the trend line fits the data with a correlation (R2 )
of 0.7.[7]
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Table 2.2. World population fractions (fraction democratic).
No. of F
polities (x 100) FI(1-F)
(a) Experimental Democracy
1450 1 0.05 0.0005
1500 2 0.24 0.002
1550 2 0.78 0.008
1600 3 1.96 0.020
1650 1 0.37 0.004
1700 2 1.11 0.011
1750 3 1.56 0.016
1790 3 4.74 0.050
1800 2 1.87 0.019
(b) Institutional Democracy
1800 1 0.58 0.006
1810 1 0.74 0.008
1820 1 0.93 0.009
1830 3 1.37 0.014
1840 3 3.88 0.040
1850 6 7.52 0.081
1860 7 5.43 0.057
1870 10 6.75 0.072
1880 13 11.56 0.131
1890 12 11.91 0.135
1900 14 12.32 0.141
1910 15 13.07 0.150
1920 29 20.63 0.260
1930 26 18.33 0.224
1940 15 11.35 0.128
1950 29 34.45 0.526
1960 41 41.32 0.704
1970 37 36.43 0.573
1980 43 38.07 0.615
1986 46 39.61 0.656
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Figure 2.1. Experimental Democracy (1450-1800).
Table 2.2, Part (b), summarizes the data for the period 1800-1986, the
era of the early adopters. The same data are presented graphically in Figure
2.2, Institutional Democracy; the R2 of the trend line is 0.915. But starting
the analysis in 1837 (Figure 2.3) yields a trend line with a somewhat lower
growth rate.[8]
The American and the French Revolutions launch, after 1776, the stage
of early adoption, even though the American Revolution is, in the first place,
seen mainly as a republican achievement, and the French Revolution soon
loses its democratic character. But the democratic trend takes off strongly in
the mid-19th century, moves past the 10 percent range, and in the late 20th
century approaches the fiexpoint. This theoretical half-way mark, when 50
percent of the market could be expected to be saturated with democratic
practices, is, for Figure 2.3, the year 2003; the actual fraction democratic
was approaching the 40 percent level in the late 1980s.
The overall directionality of the process is unmistakable. But the process
is not unilinear; both peaks and setbacks are strewn along the way. The
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Figure 2.2. Institutional Democracy 1800-2000 (1800-1986 data).
early record, the (a) series, shows two peaks (in 1600 and in 1790) each
followed by declines, when the proportion fell as compared with the preceding
decades. In the more detailed and more recent series (b), we observe four
abrupt increases; a major spurt beginning with the years 1837 (when Britain
enters), and going on to 1877 (when France enters), 1918-1921 (post-World
War I), and 1945-1950 (post-World War II). A perceptible decline marks the
years after 1930 and World War II. In other words, democratization shows
fluctuations in a generally upward movement; the fluctuations are due to
lumpiness (when large countries become - or cease to be - democratic); the
process is also adversely affected by global wars.
2.5 Discussion
Our test has been conducted with two sets of data, but with the same clas-
sification and scoring. Should other data become available, using somewhat
different criteria of democracy, such as those incorporated in the annual sur-
veys conducted by Freedom House after 1972 (see Gastil, 1989a and 1989b)
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Figure 2.3. Institutional Democracy 1825-2125 (1837-1986 data).
and that also give additional weight to civil or political liberties, then the test
must obviously be replicated. It appears though that these two particular
surveys are not that dissimilar in their rankings. For the year 1986, the dif-
ference between the POLITY II and the Freedom House surveys, expressed
in fractions democratic, as shown in Table 2.3, is only 2.4 points.
Our analysis shows that the cumulative growth in the fraction of the
world's population that comprises its democratic communities conforms to
the Fisher-Pry model. Is this no more than a descriptive finding? How might
we explain this unexpected regularity?
For such an explanation (as already indicated), we reach to theories deal-
ing with innovation diffusion and learning, phenomena that in societal di-
mensions and in long perspective might best be viewed as collective evo-
lutionary processes. Democratization is a pervasive process of structural
change at the global level that effects a host of other developments and
serves, indeed, as an envelope curve for most of what we commonly view
as technological and economic innovation. It is also a long-range process,
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Table 2.3.
Survey
Two surveys compared.
Fraction Democratic (percent)
1986 1988
39.6
POLITY II
(Institutional Democracies)
Freedom House
(Free Countries) 37.2 39
The differences between the two surveys are chiefly due to the following discrepancies in
ratings. Thailand, Malaysia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala
rate six or higher on the POLITY II scale, but are coded only partly free by Freedom
House; Honduras, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic, coded free by Freedom House, do
not make a score of six in POLITY II for 1986. Included as well in the Freedom House
listings are a score of very small countries that do not meet the POLITY II population
criteria.
Accounting for the change between 1986 and 1988 in the Freedom House fraction is mostly
the movement of the Philippines and Korea (South) from partly free to free status.
with a time constant on the order of 200 years. If the trend line for. "in-
stitutional democracy 1800-1986" is extrapolated into the future, the world
will be passing the 90 percent mark in 2075 (Figure 2.2); if we take as our
guide the analysis that treats the current pulse of democratization as having
begun in the mid-19th century, and we extrapolate our data starting with
1837, then the 90 percent level is attained in 2117 (as shown in Figure 2.3).
Either way the status of democratization as a major evolutionary process is
unmistakable.
The process has, in the first place, the aspect of the diffusion of a tech-
nology of collective choice, and can be easily understood as such. The wide
dissemination of improved artifacts of life (or better mousetraps) is, after
all, one of the most obvious facets of civilization. It can be studied, for
example, by asking who are the experimenters and the innovators, how are
they followed by early adopters, and how do they come to be engulfed in
the great majority. It can also be studied by establishing the mechanisms
and conditions facilitating or obstructing diffusion: proximity, similarity, or
opportunity for interaction.
The process might also be viewed as one of community formation: one by
which cooperation gradually evolves into more stable and institutional forms,
first by trial and error experimentation, and then by a species of clustering
(or nucleation), which via coalescing, branches out into structures of global
cooperation. This second aspect, about which we know less than about
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diffusion proper, makes it clear that the process must be a slow one because
communities change only at a deliberate pace and grow but gradually.
What lends stability to this process, and credibility to our extrapola-
tions? Might it not be said that the Fisher-Pry model assumes an un-
changeable environment, whereas changes are bound to affect future struc-
tural change in unfathomable ways?
Democratization is one of a family of global, collective, evolutionary
processes.[9] Other members of that family are the Kondratieff wave, and
the long cycle of global politics. The Kondratieff, with a time constant of
more than 50 years, governs global economic innovation and exchange. The
long cycle, with a period of just over 100 years, and centered on the roles
of global leadership and challenge, shapes the structure of global politics
(Modelski, 1987 and 1990). These are coupled processes that are mutually
reinforcing, jointly ensuring a dynamically stable development.
The role of global politics in all this is essential. The mechanisms of
diffusion and clustering are set in motion by the long cycle. In that pro-
cess the role of global leadership has served as a source of innovation and,
via demonstration effects, as a center of innovation diffusion, as well as the
nucleus of the emerging global democratic community. From the success
of nation-states performing that role (the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the
United States) has sprung the process of reinforcement that is essential to
learning (the key to which is the proposition that reinforced behavior becomes
more frequent). The world powers have been the preferred models of imita-
tion, and, successively, the centers of gravity for community organization.[10]
When these centers, at times, ceased to hold (as in the 1930s or about 1800,
and in the 1670s or the 1580s), the prospects of democratic organization
dimmed. The long cycle of global politics, itself a learning process, inter-
meshes with, supports, and in turn derives strength from the evolution of
the global democratic community (Modelski, 1987 and 1990; Huntley, 1980).
Viewing democratization in long perspective has enabled us to see it
as the slow and gradual substitution of republican, liberal, and democratic
regimes for monarchical, absolutist, and dictatorial (or autocratic) forms of
government and society. The question might be asked: do we expect this
process to reach some form of equilibrium between democratic and dictato-
rial (or autocratic) forms, or should we look forward to the steady expansion
of democracy through its entire global market, that is through the bulk of
the world's population?
Our view inclines toward the latter interpretation, and significantly on
grounds having to do with the present phase of global politics that calls
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for worldwide "socialization", or "civilizing" of conflict. If global nuclear
war is indeed unthinkable, then alternatives to it need to be put in place.
The obvious forms of such socialization, or civilizing, are the forms that
have been nurtured in the emerging democratic community. Those which
democracy has been substituting for, forms of absolute and dictatorial rule,
have been too closely linked to the origins of the global wars of the past and
do not offer a sound basis for development, or for dealing with other global
problems including environmental ones. It is from within the democratic
community that substitutes for global war as a mechanism of collective choice
are likely to emerge, and it is from within this mechanism that new forms
will materialize that will be the substance of competitive substitution in the
future.
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Notes
[1] In Herodotus' The Histories (Book III, 83) (written ca. 450-430 BC), where it
is compared and contrasted with monarchy and aristocracy. Writing a century
later (in Politics Ill, 7), Aristotle added new distinctions to these terms but,
like Plato, he also put a negative spin on the term democracy.
[2] Early modern writers on politics were familiar with the concept of democracy
from classical sources; prominent examples include Niccolo Machiavelli (Dis-
courses, 1531), Gasparo Contarini (1599) (whose book on the Venetian con-
stitution originally published in 1543 quickly became a classic of republican
and constitutional thought), Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski (1551), Hugo Grotius
(1600), Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1762), James Madison (1787), and Immanuel Kant (1795). But they all saw
it as direct democracy and doubted its practicality, except perhaps for small
states (Rousseau), and might have been influenced by the negative spin put
on it by Plato and Aristotle; in a republic, on the other hand, they saw at
work the principle of representation, together with the idea of commonwealth
(a whole body of people united by common consent to form a political commu-
nity, a res publica). For Madison a republic was "a government in which the
scheme of representation takes place" and it was to "modern Europe" that the
"great principle of representation" was owed (The Federalist, Nos. X, XIV).
Not until the publication of Democracy in America in 1835 did the concept of
democracy regain wide acceptance, and this time, in a representative form.
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[3] Woodrow Wilson (1918, p. 35) wrote that "democracy seems about universally
to prevail. Ever since the rise of popular education in the last century ... the
spread of democratic institutions ... promise(s) to reduce politics to a single
form ... by reducing all forms of government to Democracy". When James
Bryce (1921, pp. 24, 42) posed the same question: "whether the trend toward
democracy ... is a natural trend due to a general law of social progress" his
answer was less sanguine: "although democracy has spread . .. we are not yet
entitled to hold ... that it is the natural and therefore ... the inevitable form
of government" .
[4] This means that a number of small communities (such as Barbados, Belize,
Kiribati, Malta, Solomon Islands, etc.) have thus been omitted, many of which
are democratic.
[5] C/. Cole's (Cole, 1987, p. 88) table of "Liberal Regimes in the World System
since 1600" to which two earlier cases have been added: Venice (factions, elec-
tive chief executive, checks on chief executive by Grand Council) and Poland-
Lithuania (factions, elective chief executive, checks on chief executive by Diet;
described in Reddaway et al., 1950, p. 440, as "Gentry Democracy"). Portugal
ca. 1500 might be a borderline case (proto-parties, limits on chief executive),
as well as Florence (1494-1512). This listing is entirely tentative and is meant
to highlight representative trends at the national level of organization rather
than draw up an exhaustive and definitive inventory of free and self-governing
communities.
[6] The Swiss Confederation, emerging out of the Everlasting League of 1291,
became virtually independent from the Empire in 1499. By 1513 it consisted
of 13 cantons, the government of some of which, including Schwyz, Uri, and
Unterwalden, was a form of direct democracy (by an assembly of all male
citizens offull age). By 1531 (war of Catholic cantons against Zurich) religious
conflict divided it and "common action became impossible" (Langer, 1972), yet
this did not exhaust the persuasive power of the Swiss example. Such models
were a source of inspiration, i.e., for political writers in the Dutch republic ca.
1600.
[7] The equation for the trend line in Figure 2.1 is y == 0.009x - 19.6.
[8] The equation for the trend line in Figure 2.2, Institutional Democracy 1800-
1986 is y == 0.025x - 49.6. The time constant ~t (10-90 percent) is 176 years;
the flexpoint is 1987, and 90 percent is reached in 2075. Calculating a seven-
year moving average raises R2 only slightly, to 0.919. For the years 1837-1986
only (Figure 2.3), the regression line is y == 0.019x - 38.54, and the time
constant is 228 years. The 10 percent level was reached in 1889; the flexpoint
is 2003, and 90 percent saturation is reached in 2117; R2 is 0.893.
[9] Writing in 1795, Immanuel Kant proposed the hypothesis of a self-organizing
social process tending to bring about the condition of perpetual peace via, e.g.,
the creation of republican regimes.
[10] For a study of the post-1945 growth of the "Atlantic-Pacific" system as a basis
for a community of democracies, see Huntley (1980).
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Chapter 3
Innovation and Diffusion in
a Single Europe:
Institutional Structure and
Industrial Prospects for the
European Communities
William S. Peirce
3.1 Introduction
The recent flurry of motion toward the goal of a Single Europe (at least for
the 12 members of the European Communities) has been marked by consid-
erable optimism about the effects of the elimination of internal barriers on
the economy of the European Communities (EC). Indeed, the high expecta-
tions of economic gains are inseparable from the progress toward integration
because the expected economic gains are a principal benefit that compen-
sates for the costs of conveying some control over national ways of life to the
strange quasi-government of the EC. Because the integration process will
cause some losses in the national individuality that people value, progress
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toward integration would be unlikely to occur if people did not expect eco-
nomic gains.
The initial economic effects of integration do offer prospects for real
gains (Cecchini, 1988; ECC, 1988). These include such direct benefits to
consumers as the reduced prices that can be expected when the slightly dif-
ferentiated products of national monopolists are subjected to more intense
competition from rivals in other nations. In addition, there is the hope
that the larger market will permit longer production runs and economies
of scale. Rationalization of production in a smaller number of plants spe-
cially designed to capture economies of scale might be expected, but that
evokes consideration of the pain of closing the inefficient plants. Moreover,
the US and Japanese firms that are building plants in the EC because of the
attractions of the single market or the fear of possible European protection-
ism, may speed up the diffusion of technology. Of course, border crossing
formalities themselves consume resources, and these losses can be greatly
reduced.
More to the point of this chapter, however, is the hypothesis of Mancur
Olson (Olson, 1982) that jurisdictional integration reduces the power of some
of the existing distributional coalitions or rent-seeking groups, which try to
use the powers of government to redistribute income or wealth in their own
favor. One of Olson's examples was the original Common Market of Six,
which did seem to have had a more dramatic influence on economic growth
than could be explained with the tools of static economic analysis. This
experience was consistent with the idea that opening the borders destroyed
some of the power of the distributional coalitions that had worked closely
with the separate national governments to obtain benefits at the expense
of poorly organized groups, including consumers and taxpayers (McCormick
and Tollison, 1981; Olson, 1965). Not only can consumers benefit directly
when a redistribution is eliminated but, more important, if the payoff for
trying to obtain redistributive favors is reduced, more effort will be devoted
to productive activities.
That argument raises the more general question of whether the gains
from integration consist of a one-time improvement in consumer welfare
(perhaps realized over a decade or two), or whether the benefit also includes
an increase in the long-term rate of economic growth. In the Olson argument,
that depends, in part, on the speed with which the interest groups can
reorganize to suit the new political arrangements and thereby resume their
redistributive successes. This is a point to which we will return in a later
section.
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In the long run, of course, growth in consumption per capita is limited
by the growth in productivity, which leads to the question of whether ju-
risdictional integration will lead to more rapid adoption of innovations. It
turns out that this is related to rent-seeking behavior, but that takes us
too far ahead of our story. The immediate question is whether any aspect
of integration, including the diffusion policies that may be adopted by the
EC, will lead to more rapid productivity increases in the long run. It is not
clear that this is a reasonable expectation, given our knowledge of the diffu-
sion process, the political process, and the instruments that are available to
government to influence diffusion.
One crucial aspect of this is the effect of jurisdictional integration on
competition. Most discussions have focussed on the competition among firms
and have, correctly, stressed that expanding the size of the market permits
the market to include enough firms to yield the advantages of rivalry without
eliminating the possibility for firms to enjoy economies of scale.
The other form of competition, however, is competition among govern-
ments, analyzed in a different context by Backhaus and Wagner (1987),
which prevents the development of extremely inefficient laws. As the juris-
diction increases in size, it faces less stringent constraints on its behavior
because those who bear the costs of inefficient laws find it harder to escape.
If the Netherlands or Austria passes an inefficient law or operates with an
institutional structure that is conducive to inefficiency, the damage is lim-
ited by the fact that the small country must export to survive and laws that
make that impossible are quickly amended in formal or informal ways.
As long as relatively open borders are nearby, individuals will contrive
to buy goods in the cheapest market and move capital to the least repressive
environment. As the national boundaries within the EC are increasingly
opened to the movement of goods, labor, capital, and firms, the economic
powers of national governments will therefore be increasingly constrained.
Perhaps this process will lead to a libertarian Economic Community, but
in view of the traditions in most of the member countries it seems more
plausible that the locus of regulatory activity will shift to the EC level. Since
the constraints on the repressiveness and inefficiency of government and on
its redistributive activities are relaxed as the jurisdiction becomes larger,
the net effect could be an increase in inefficient regulatory and redistributive
activity.
Much of the discussion of innovation and productivity in the European
Communities refers to the United States and Japan as large, innovative
economies. One might, however, turn to the USSR, instead, and see a large
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economy that has had difficulty in introducing rapid rates of innovation and
an increase in productivity. The point, of course, is that the specific institu-
tional factors, in addition to the size of the market, may have something to
do with the initial adoption and the rate of diffusion of innovations.
The European Communities have a very peculiar political structure.
While that structure can be explained historically, it sets limits on what can
be done efficiently by that quasi-government. In particular, the structure
of the EC abets the reformation of the distributional coalitions. That fact
combines with the attenuation of international competition by integration
to produce a situation in which most of the instruments by which govern-
ments have tried to speed up innovation and diffusion become ineffective or
counterproductive. The following section develops this topic further.
3.2 The Instruments of Diffusion Policy
Ideally a list of instruments of diffusion policy would be based on a well
developed theory of diffusion. This list has less ambitious origins in obser-
vations about the actions of governments that have influenced diffusion or
been adopted in an attempt to do so. However, if one examines a compre-
hensive framework for factors influencing diffusion rates, such as that given
by Rosegger (1986), it would appear that the direct interventions of govern-
ment play a relatively limited role. That is also an implication of studies
that show similar diffusion rates in dissimilar countries and times.
It would obviously be possible for the EC to refrain from an active dif-
fusion policy; it could allow all innovation to be determined by the "animal
spirits" of the entrepreneurs combined with whatever policies the individual
member countries choose to adopt. As the EC pursues integration more
actively, however, the range of policy choices for member nations will be re-
stricted to a subset ofthose observed by Vickery and Blair (1987). Moreover,
a passive approach by the EC to diffusion is not consistent with the expec-
tations that have been raised or with the traditions of most of the countries
involved.
3.2.1 The background for diffusion
Diffusion is a complex process, and it may be that some of the general
measures that governments can take to improve the environment for tech-
nological change and investment are as important as direct approaches. For
I
I
I
I
Ii
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example, in some circumstances an effort to improve the technical capac-
ity of the population by a major educational investment could increase the
rate of diffusion of technological innovations. In the case of Western Eu-
rope, however, the common complaint has been that the results as measured
by industrial innovation are not commensurate with the investment in high
quality scientific and technical education. Moreover, under current plans,
the educational systems will remain the responsibility of the national gov-
ernments, so the EC has little positive influence on this variable.
Indeed, the influence of integration on education could become negative
for two reasons. First, the tax competition, discussed in the next paragraph,
places all expenditures under increasingly heavy pressure. Second, countries
will not capture the full returns from investments in education because some
of the benefits spill over to other countries as the educated people move.
Any countries that have been concerned with a "brain drain" in the past
will find that the increasingly open borders within the EC will exacerbate
the problem.
Roughly similar comments apply to the other set of background mea-
sures, the general measures designed to increase the profitability of invest-
ments or of research and development in particular. The traditional tech-
niques include such manipulations of the corporate tax law as tax credits for
investments and rapid depreciation (US Congress, 1985). These, of course,
cannot be EC measures because the EC has no corporate profits tax. More-
over, the national governments are beginning to yield to competitive pressure
to reduce corporate tax rates, which is part of the phenomenon that has been
called the "Delawarization of Europe" (Aretz, 1988). One result of a reduc-
tion in tax rates is to reduce the value of tax breaks for specific activities.
Of course, governments can, and do, subsidize investments directly, with-
out using the tax mechanism. This, too, is likely not to become a general
activity at the EC level because of the large costs and the political prob-
lems involved. At the national and local level, where such activities have
been common, governments are now encountering opposition from the EC
because such subsidies interfere with the completion of the internal market.
3.2.2 Targeting public spending toward diffusion
In addition to improving the general environment for diffusion, governments
can take more specific measures to encourage technological change and the
diffusion of innovations. The most direct method is to subsidize research and
development expenditures, but this does not necessarily lead to innovation,
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to say nothing of diffusion. Nevertheless, governments have difficulties in fo-
cusing resources very far along the spectrum that begins with pure research
and ends where the innovation has become a routine investment. If the dif-
fusion stage is defined as what happens after the first commercial adoption,
then any direct subsidy of the diffusion process raises the question of why
a subsidy is necessary if the project is worth doing. Innovation, even after
the first adoption, is risky, but much of this risk reflects the real difficulties
and ignorance surrounding an innovation, so it is not clear that efficiency is
served by allowing the costs to be borne by anyone other than the decision
maker. Payment of a share of the costs by the public sector can be justi-
fied only if there are external benefits from adoption or if the public sector
decision makers are better informed than are the people in the enterprise.
Neither condition seems likely in most cases.
The other difficulty with direct aid at the diffusion stage is that it is
likely to be very expensive. The EC does not have a large enough budget to
do much of this. Moreover, any national efforts at direct subsidy would be
called into question in the interests of maintaining a "fair" internal market.
Quigley's analysis (Quigley, 1988) of decisions by the Commission (ECC,
1971-1985) suggests that, as a rough rule, subsidies for research and devel-
opment are acceptable to the Commission, while subsidies for operations are
not. It would require an unprecedented degree of bureaucratic subtlety to
subsidize only the innovative aspects of new investments and to defend the
decision rules before the Commission.
The experience with the ESPRIT program is illustrative of some other
problems that can be expected with EC programs of this sort (Sharp, 1987;
Sharp and Shearman, 1987). ESPRIT subsidizes precommercial research in
information technology, so one could argue that the results are not directly
applicable to diffusion. Nevertheless, there are certain structural features
that would be relevant for any direct subsidy program. In particular, at
this stage in the process of European integration the political problem of
geographic distribution of any subsidies must be considered explicitly in the
legislation or implicitly in the administration. This has been a continuing
theme of personnel policy in the Commission, the Common Agricultural
Policy, and, of course, regional policy where, as late as 1987, 45% of the
population of Germany lived in assisted areas (EC, 1987).
The technique for handling this in ESPRIT was to require that each
project involve firms or other organizations from at least two EC countries.
This helps to solve the political problems of geographic distribution and
especially of integration, but it makes the program inaccessible to small
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firms, as Sharp and Shearman (1987) noted. A study by Mytelka and De-
lapierre (1987) found that only 34% of the ESPRIT projects for 1983-1985
did not involve the 12 major electronics firms that helped devise the pro-
gram (ICL, GEC, Plessey, AEG, Nixdorf, Siemens, Thomson, Bull, CGE,
Olivetti, STET, and Philips). Many of the other participants were also very
large firms from other industries. Moreover, to the extent that ESPRIT
really does change the patterns of cooperation on research and develop-
ment, one might raise the question of whether the Communities will gain
any economic benefits. Studies by Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1988) and
Valls-Pasola and Valles (1988) have indicated that European firms are more
likely to cooperate with firms from the USA than with firms from other Eu-
ropean countries, and presumably this reflects the best business judgment
about long-term costs and benefits. Of course, it is to be expected that when
government uses an instrument of policy to pursue a non-economic goal, the
performance of purely economic measures of success will suffer.
In addition to making direct grants, a policy which is better suited for
research than for diffusion, governments can speed the diffusion process for
some products by specifying them in the requirements for products pur-
chased by government (Katz and Phillips, 1982; Levin, 1982; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1982). One of the classic examples of this is the assistance given
to the computer and electronics industries in the USA, not only by research
contracts, but also by specifications for military and space systems that
pushed firms beyond what was routinely available (Flamm, 1987 and 1988).
However, the EC itself does not purchase enough to make much difference.
The traditional sector in which to hide activities related to research and de-
velopment is the military, both because it has a large enough budget to dwarf
most research activities and because opponents traditionally have found it
difficult to argue against military strength. The member countries have
enough government procurement to influence diffusion, but are now under
EC pressure not to use procurement as a device for favoring domestic pro-
ducers. The case that has attracted a great deal of attention recently is
the relationship between national telephone companies and the producers of
telecommunications equipment.
3.2.3 The government as a regulator
The powers of a government as a purchaser are limited by its budget, while
the powers of a government as a regulator are limited only by imagination.
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There is no doubt that governments can have substantial effects on the dif-
fusion process through regulation. In the most direct cases, it can require
or forbid particular products or processes. The interesting cases are more
complex than, for example, the requirement that seatbelts be fitted in auto-
mobiles that results in the diffusion of seatbelts. If the requirement is that
automobile emissions be reduced to a particular level, the regulation does
not specify a technique, but it serves as an inducement to adopt particular
methods of meeting the regulation. Such regulations are usually adopted
in the name of health, safety, or the environment, so one would not expect
them to improve standard economic measures of productivity. As the EC
takes on more of these functions from the national governments, however,
some have hoped for indirect improvements in productivity.
The reasoning here is straightforward. If each country has a set of regu-
lations that covers the same items, but does so in ways that differ, eliminat-
ing the country regulations and replacing them with one set of regulations
for all twelve countries would contribute to efficiency in a variety of ways.
Competition, as viewed by any consumer, would increase because any item
manufactured in any part of the EC could be sold in any other part. Man-
ufacturers could expect longer production runs for the standard product
that met specifications throughout the EC. Furthermore, the design prob-
lem would be simpler when new models were introduced if only one set
of regulations had to be met. Pelkmans (1987) analyzed past and present
practice in the EC regarding technical harmonization.
It would seem, however, that providing the consumer with more choice
and the manufacturer with longer production runs may not be fully consis-
tent. One must make some specific assumptions about the rationalization
process, the elasticity of demand, and the value to the consumer of different
types of product differentiation to show that benefits are fairly general in
the short to intermediate run. In the long run, of course, the larger market
should permit economies of scale for the surviving producers; and consumers
should benefit from lower prices if the surviving producers compete with one
another or with imports.
Before proceeding to consider the implications for diffusion, however, it is
necessary to examine one of the crucial assumptions. Is it likely that moving
regulation from the level of the country to the level of the EC will keep
the total amount of regulation unchanged? Tumlir (1983) noted that the
amalgamation of national agricultural policies into the Common Agricultural
Policy produced a more inefficient transfer scheme covering more crops than
any of the separate national policies. Similarly, the process of negotiating
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health, safety, and environmental regulations may result in more detailed
coverage of a greater number of products and processes than most countries
had regulated independently. In any event, one can be certain that some
formerly unregulated items become regulated somewhere. This may have
implications for innovation and diffusion.
In short, in the area of technical regulations and standards, the possibility
exists that the European Communities can prepare the way for more rapid
diffusion, but whether that happens depends on how things are done. Thus it
is necessary to examine the process by which the EC is attempting to achieve
technical harmonization. The early efforts put the Council of Ministers in
the untenable position of trying to reach unanimous agreement on detailed
questions on the design of lawn mowers and tire pressure gauges. In this era,
Pelkmans (1987) has suggested, new discrepancies in technical standards
were accumulating among the member countries of the EC faster than the
old ones were being eliminated.
The "new approach to technical harmonization and standards" was
spelled out in a Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 (EC, 1985). Under
the new approach the Council will set the broad requirements for health,
safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection. The detailed
technical interpretation of these general requirements will be published as
standards by separate organizations. The designated organizations are CEN
(the European Committee for Standardization) and CENELEC (for electri-
cal equipment). Manufacturers or importers meeting the CEN or CENELEC
standards will be deemed to have met the basic requirements legislated by
the Council and will thus be free to sell throughout the EC. Those who do
not meet the standards are invited to prove to a national government that
they do meet the requirements.
The existence of a way around the standards will probably prevent this
procedure from being used to build a "Fortress Europe." Major US and
Japanese firms can adapt their designs for European markets or prove the
case for their own methods to meet the requirements. The more important
question is whether the standards will be used in the future to inhibit en-
try into the market by small European firms with innovative ideas. From a
public choice perspective that would appear to be inevitable. The process of
standard setting is so obscure to the public, and the particular process estab-
lished by the Council is so remote from electoral control, that the eventual
capture of the standard-setting organization by the established producers
would seem to be as close to a sure thing as is any institutional forecast.
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The net result would be to inhibit diffusion relative to that in a world
with no controls, but the more important comparison is to the realities of
the European Communities without a centralized harmonization process.
Davidson (1983) argued that the internal technical barriers to trade would
gradually have eroded anyway as a result of the strong position taken by the
European Court of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon and similar cases. Such an
approach to harmonization would have been slow, of course, but as borders
become more open within the EC, it becomes easier for consumers, labor,
capital, and firms to escape from the most repressive national regulatory
regimes.
In one type of case the EC provides what should be a superior mechanism
to increase the rate of diffusion. This is in the choice among rival standards in
situations where system interdependency requires a unique choice. Choice
of the particular type of high definition TV system to be adopted or the
particular standards for the telecommunications system are examples that
come to mind. Yet, the evidence from an earlier era suggests that conscious
choice, not difficulties with the decision process, were the source of such
inconsistencies as did occur in systems such as railroads. The European
Communities provide a permanent forum within which such choices of sys-
tem can be made, but it remains to be seen whether the decisions will in fact
be made more quickly than by the old style of first-mover advantage and ad
hoc negotiation.
3.2.4 Summary: The effect of the EC on diffusion
This discussion has exhausted the list ofthe most important policies available
to speed up diffusion. The EC could, of course, provide information about
innovations, but information is rarely the constraint to diffusion of industrial
innovations among large firms and private advertisers seem able to tell the
public about consumer innovations. If special efforts must be made to reach
many small firms, national governments seem better equipped for that task.
The more important direct action may be the dismantling of some existing
barriers to diffusion by either the regulatory or the legal route noted above.
The generally negative tone of this discussion in part reflects the fact
that diffusion is difficult for any government to accelerate. To the extent
that adoption can be analyzed in the same way as routine investment, gov-
ernments generally have crude macro techniques mainly incorporated into
the tax code or resulting from monetary policy that may make a difference.
These are not available to the EC and the existence of the EC increasingly
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constrains their use at the national level. To the extent that any adoption
decision can be viewed as innovation, it is not clear that government has
much influence, except for the barriers that it raises or removes. If some-
thing about the increasing integration of Europe is expected to increase
innovation and diffusion rates in the Communities, the mechanism must be
indirect and subtle.
3.3 Innovation and Rent-Seeking in the European
Communities
As noted earlier, Mancur Olson (1982) used the original Common Market
of Six as one of his examples of how the distributional coalitions that had
gained increasing power in the individual nations were disrupted by the ju-
risdictional integration. Similar bursts of energy could probably be detected
in the other members after they joined the EC. During such eras of inno-
vation and growth, one would expect measures of diffusion of technological
innovation to show improvement. Actual measurement of diffusion rates is
difficult enough for single, identifiable products and processes and, of course,
becomes essentially impossible in terms of aggregates for an economy. One
would probably have to settle for such aggregate measures as the growth
rate of GNP and the aggregate productivity measures associated with it.
Traditional justifications for customs unions are not phrased in terms of
the Olson hypothesis, however (Gowland, 1983). The most satisfying theo-
retical argument is the argument for free trade combined with some political
constraint that limits the free trade to a selected group of countries. In
the case of European integration, obviously, the political arguments are very
strong, but one must presume that most people expect some economic gains
as well, at least compared with the condition of non-integration, although
perhaps not when compared with the (unattainable) free trade. Perhaps
that explains the stress on scale in discussions of the EC, because the source
of economies of scale is specialization of functions within the firm that is
closely parallel to the classical specialization of functions among nations
(Gold, 1981).
If scale is the source of the expected gains, then rapid technical harmo-
nization and reduction of other internal barriers become goals of the highest
priority. In some modern versions of the theory of trade, moreover, scale
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is particularly important in keeping firms at the forefront of technology be-
cause the costs of research and development can be recovered from a larger
output before the firm's advantage is eroded away by other innovations.
The two views - one emphasizing size of firm and size of market while
the other emphasizes distributional coalitions - have different policy impli-
cations. If one believes that size brings innovation and progress, one uses
whatever tools are available to break down the barriers in the internal market
and one tolerates or even encourages mergers and cooperative arrangements
among firms. In contrast, if one believes that Europe has been inefficient
because of a legacy of guild-type restrictions, special privileges, and subsidies
and transfers to interest groups, then one takes whatever steps are available
to discourage the counterattack of the rent-seeking groups that lost some
power when the market was widened.
The relationship between size of firm and innovation has generated too
much literature to be considered here, but the rapidity with which the in-
terest groups have formed around the European Communities has received
less attention. Table 3.1 presents the basic data regarding the number of
interest groups by year of founding. The cumulative percentage would make
a respectable diffusion curve. Of the 546 officially recognized interest groups,
462 have a known date of founding. More than half of these were already
in existence before 1965. If Mancur Olson's model is correct, the European
Communities may have already enjoyed the golden age of growth.
Table 3.1. Interest groups of the European Communities (number by year
of founding).
Years
Through 1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
Date not reported
Total
Number founded
19
40
119
93
53
54
55
29
84
546
Percent of known
4
9
26
20
11
12
12
6
Cumulative
4
13
38
58
70
82
94
100
Source: Compiled from European Communities (1986).
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The three reasons for the rapid formation of groups to lobby the EC are
that representation of interest groups is required by the basic treaties estab-
lishing the EC, that the task of organizing at the EC level was easy, and
that the structure of the EC is conducive to strengthening the influence of
such groups. The interest groups are formally represented in the Economic
and Social Committee and thus have an official status and a slight amount
of formal power. Organization was easy for those EC interest groups that
are federations of existing national groups. Most important, however, is the
structure of decision making in the European Communities (Peirce, 1991).
The absence of clearly defined political authority and the necessity of ap-
proaching consensus for major explicit decisions means that many decisions
must be made within the bureaucracy or delegated to private groups. In
either event, the group that has its representative actively engaged in the
whole process has much to gain.
3.4 Conclusions
Firms are responding to the increasing economic integration of Europe by
mergers and rationalization of production within Europe. Firms that had
no capacity within the EC are building or acquiring plants within its bound-
aries. In the long run, however, economic progress of the EC depends on
the diffusion of innovations within its borders. The most common policies
used by governments to encourage innovation and diffusion, notably public
procurement and incentives built into the tax law, are not available to the
European Communities. Moreover, the reduction of internal barriers to the
movement of goods, labor, capital, and firms will increasingly inhibit the use
by member countries of such policies. The structure and procedures of the
EC are conducive to the dominance of the interests of established producer
groups. Although this has been traditional in many European countries, it
becomes a more serious problem for the economy as the jurisdiction increases
in size because of the attenuation of competition among jurisdictions. The
established producer groups are well-positioned to inhibit innovation by new
entrants. Thus the EC will rely heavily for its innovations on the same group
of firms that the individual countries have relied upon in the past. This leads
to the question of whether the larger market will provide these firms with
sufficient stimulation to increase the rate of diffusion.
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Chapter 4
Multiple Perspectives on
Technological Diffusion:
Insights and Lessons
Harold A. Linstone
Since World War II there has been a remarkable proliferation in the use of
mathematical modeling under the labels of systems analysis, decision analy-
sis, operations analysis, management science, and policy analysis. Technol-
ogy forecasting, impact, and transfer have also reflected the trend. However,
serious limitations are inherent in these reductionist approaches and they
have created a serious gap between the model and the real-world decision
maker. This discussion focuses on the problem and a means to overcome it.
4.1 The Analyst's Perspective
Science and technology represent the most successful "religion" of modern
times. From Galileo to the Apollo lunar landing, from Darwin to recombi-
nant DNA, the paradigms of science and technology have yielded dazzling
triumphs. This world view is typified by the following characteristics:
• We define problems by abstraction from the world around us, with the
implicit assumption that such problems can be solved.
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However, in the living world a solution nearly always creates new prob-
lems; we shift problems rather than solve them. Public health measures
have cut the death rate drastically; however, they have also led to a
global population explosion and, indirectly, to starvation.
• We seek the best or optimal solution.
Cost-benefit analysis and linear programming are typical of this search.
But complex living systems strive to maximize their options rather than
confine them by selecting the best one. They seek to minimize the cost
of failure rather than the likelihood of failure. They recognize that we
learn more from our failures than from our successes. Ecological systems
sacrifice efficiency for resilience; they trade avoidance of failure for the
ability to survive failure, the fail-safe strategy of the engineer for a safe-
fail strategy.
• Reductionism is the norm; a system is defined in terms of a very limited
number of variables and the relationships are often linearized.
Complexity begets nonlinearity. But the theorems are in the abstract
linear domain. The analyst is caught between two unpalatable choices:
solving linear, irrelevant problems and struggling unsuccessfully with
nonlinear relevant ones.
• Reliance is placed on data and models, and combinations thereof, as the
only legitimate modes of inquiry and as a basis for theories.
The analysts' emphasis on certain types of models easily leads to a kind
of "groupthink." For example, as system dynamics has proliferated and
the number of modelers has multiplied, conferences, papers, and books
create a community. Shared interest and mutual reinforcement increas-
ingly focus attention on baroque model improvements and compulsive
extensions. Econometrics is another case in point. In its most extreme
form modeling becomes an end rather than a means (the Pygmalion com-
plex - the modeler falls in love with his model and believes it to be the
reality). A look beyond the realm of traditional science and engineering
opens our eyes: there are other important modes of inquiry; indeed, the
lawyer and the government executive make effective use of them.
• Quantitative analyses drive out qualitative analyses.
We confuse dollars spent with effectiveness, because money is easier to
count. We produce masses of numerical trend extrapolations but shy
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away from probing the underlying assumptions. We find comfort in the
six-figure precision of output data although it masks the real uncertain-
ties. The faith in econometrics reflects this tendency.
• The conviction persists that the analyst is an objective observer and that
truth is observer-invariant.
In the complex real world virtually everything interacts with everything,
and this includes the observer. Without the observer there are no de-
scriptions; the observer's faculty of describing enters, by necessity, into
his description.
• The individual may be considered as type, but not as a unique person.
Complexity has been defined as the ability to hold conflicting world views
at the same time and to benefit therefrom, to see the world globally and
in terms of unique individuals. Abstraction and generalization are not a
substitute for specific case studies.
• Time moves linearly at a universally accepted pace, with no consideration
of differential time perceptions, planning horizons, and discount rates.
Recent experiments demonstrate how human beings apply a psycholog-
ical discount rate to their own past and thus distort the integration of
their own experience, that is, their subjective probability. Recent events
are overstressed in comparison to more remote ones. Similarly, we look at
the future as if through the wrong end of a telescope: distant crises and
opportunities appear smaller than they actually are, so they are ignored.
Such discounting of the future drastically affects the choice among alter-
natives in technology transfer. It particularly downgrades local training
and product improvement (R&D) with its long-term payoff in favor of
imported turn-key operations.
The characteristics discussed here suffice to explain the traditional per-
spective of the engineer and scientist. Figure 4.1 schematically shows the
application of this technical (or T) perspective to well-structured engineering
systems and in Figure 4.2 we see its extension to the study of ill-structured or
messy systems, typically involving people - as in technology diffusion. Agri-
cultural development or modernization constitutes such an ill-structured sys-
tem. Modern farming techniques are worthless if they are not adopted by the
farmers. Cash or commodity crops do not produce cash if false assumptions
are made about the market. Ethnic concerns, such as Bhumiputras versus
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Figure 4.1. Viewing a technological system.
T Technical
perspective
Figure 4.2. Extension of the same perspective to a system involving people
and technology.
Chinese and Indians in Malaysia, lead to special operational constraints on
technology diffusion that are easily missed by outsiders.
If the T perspective is not adequate, how do we proceed?
4.2 The Multiple Perspective Concept
The following two examples suggest an answer to the question raised above.
• The engineering technique of system dynamics (Forrester, 1961) pro-
vides important insights about an enterprise, particularly its material
and money flows. Machiavelli also provides valuable insights about orga-
nizations and how to control them (cf. Jay, 1968). Both are looking at
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organizations, but from very different angles. Each perspective presents
insights not obtainable with the other.
• A regional government leader must make a decision on allocating major
development funds under his control. He has an analysis from his tech-
nical staff concluding that a certain distribution is the best of several
alternatives. But he does not make his decision solely on the basis of
this report. He talks to various bureaus to determine whether there is
strong support or opposition. At an unrelated meeting with leaders of
other regions, he talks to a close friend from a distant region whom he
has known for thirty years and whose judgment he values. He also has
his own intuition and experience to draw upon. Then he decides. He
has integrated in his mind - without a weighting formula - several dif-
ferent, probably conflicting, perspectives: technical, organizational, and
personal.
We also find it desirable, indeed essential, to calIon several perspectives
in addressing systems which are ill-structured, which deal with people as well
as artifacts (Allison, 1971; Linstone et al., 1981; Linstone, 1984 and 1985).
We emphasize that we are augmenting, not replacing, the T perspective.
Specifically, we draw on three types:
T: the technical perspective (see Section 4.1),
0: the organizational or societal perspective, and
P: the personal or individual perspective.
The different perspectives force us to distinguish how we are looking
from what we are looking at. They do not represent different mathematical
models, but rather different sets of paradigms. Table 4.1 summarizes the
features of these distinct world views and Figure 4.3 is a schematic that
may be compared with Figures 4.1 and 4.2. As the figure suggests, there
are usually several 0 and P perspectives appropriate in anyone situation.
The following points are stressed:
• Any complex problem may be viewed from any perspective. For example,
an organizational decision may be seen from a T perspective, as decision
analysis does; technology may be viewed from a P perspective, as does
The Existential Pleasures of Engineering (Florman, 1976).
• Our perspectives differ in their underlying paradigms, inexorably moving
us beyond those associated with science and engineering. Experimental
design and validation of hypotheses are intraparadigmatic: they operate
58 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the three perspectives.
Technical (T) Organizational (0)
Goal Problem solving, action, stability,
product process
Personal (P)
Power, influence,
prestige
Mode of
inquiry
Ethical
basis
Planning
horizon
Other
characteristics
Modeling,
data, analysis
Rationality
Far
Cause and effect
problem simplified,
idealized
need for validation,
replicability
claim of objectivity
optimization (seek
best solution)
quantification
trade-offs
use of averages,
probabilities
uncertainties noted,
(on one hand ... )
Consensual and
adversary
Justice, fairness
equity
Intermediate
Agenda (problem
of the moment)
problem delegated
and factored
political sensiti-
vity, loyalties
reasonableness
satisficing (first
acceptable solution)
incremental change
standard operating
procedures
compromise and
bargaining
avoid
uncertainties
Intuition, learning,
experience
Morality
Short, with
exceptions
Challenge and
response
hierarchy of
individual needs
need for
certainty
need for beliefs
cope only with few
alternatives
fear of change
leaders and
followers
creativity and
vision by the few
filter out incon-
sistent images
Communication Technical report,
briefing
Source: Linstone (1984).
Language differs for
insiders, public
Personality
important
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T Technical
perspective
Person aIIi ndividua I
perspectives
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Organizational
perspectives
Figure 4.3. T, 0 and P perspectives on a system involving people and
technology.
within the framework of a perspective. They cannot prove that a model
gives the most "correct" representation ofreality; they cannot give assur-
ance that the variables chosen are sufficiently inclusive or appropriate.
• We cannot prove that a set of perspectives is the "right" set any more
than an executive can prove he listened to the right input before making
his decision. We cannot derive the "proper" weighting in integrating
perspectives any more than a jury can in integrating the testimony of
different witnesses.
• Two perspectives may reinforce each other or cancel each other out; they
frequently "cross-cue" each other. As Churchman (1977) observes:
The mature individual is [one] who can hold conflicting world views
together at the same time, and act and live, and that his or her life
is enriched by that capability - not weakened by it.
• Taken together, the multiple perspectives constitute a meta-inquiring
system (Churchman, 1971). As such it is pragmatic and includes
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application of all other inquiring systems, for example, data and model
based or dialectic, as needed.
• In real life situations, technology diffusion management consists of three
activities: (a) finding paths, (b) decisions, and (c) implementation. The
T perspective focuses most strongly on (a) and least on (c), hence the
"gap" between analysis and action. But implementation depends first
and foremost on the use of human resources and that means 0 and P
become crucial as we move from (a) to (c).
In sum, the justification for the use of multiple perspectives is basically
twofold:
(1) Each perspective yields insights not obtainable with the others, and
(2) The 0 and P perspectives are essential in bridging the gap between anal-
ysis and action in tasks such as technology diffusion.
The multiple perspective concept has been applied successfully to a wide
spectrum of problems in the private and public sector, such as military sys-
tem decisions, education planning, policy analysis, technology assessments
of national hydropower development and new agricultural crops, as well as
health care planning (Linstone, 1984).
4.3 Illustrations
(a) Strategic Planning and Decision Making: The American
Experience
In his survey of strategic management in 25 major US corporations Ralal
(1980 and 1984) found that
skillful executives do not rely primarily upon the outcome offormal planning
. . .. The decision maker continually gathers opinions, pieces of data, new
ideas, etc., through exchanges with persons that are trusted and respected
[Halal, 1980, pp. 57-58].
Peters and Waterman (1982) in their analysis of 43 particularly well-run
US corporations similarly stressed that success is correlated to the ability to
go beyond the "rational" model, in other words, the T perspective. A more
recent survey by Business Week (1984) similarly attributed the failure of
the majority of strategic plans to number-crunching professional planners:
The quantitative, formula-matrix approaches to strategic planning devel-
oped ... in the 1960s are out of favor ... [Mead's former chief strategic
I
I
I
I
1
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1
I
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officer says:] "The old process was just too mechanized. The real world
is just too complicated for that." [The vice-president for corporate plan-
ning at Westinghouse adds:] "The notion that an effective strategy can be
constructed by someone in an ivory tower is totally bankrupt" .
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The results of these three surveys all point directly to the inadequacy of
the T perspective.
Intuition, a facet of the P perspective, is well appreciated by top
executives:
R.P. Jensen, chairman of General Cable Corp.:
On each decision, the mathematical analysis only got me to the point where
my intuition had to take over [Rowan, 1979].
R. Siu, management consultant:
Effective CEO's ... are aware that rationality and the scientific method
provide critical inputs to only one of three questions overarching key deci-
sions. These are: (a) Does it add up? (b) Does it sound OK? and (c) Does
it feel right? Logic and science contribute primarily to the first question,
less to the second, and even less to the third [Siu, 1978].
The personal perspective has historically played a key role in US enter-
prises, being instrumental in entrepreneurship and leadership. Recent (1987)
business writings place renewed attention on the latter.
What's required now ... are not merely managers, but leaders .... The
new paragon is an executive who can envision a future for his organization
and inspire colleagues to join him in building that future .... Corporate
America has always maintained at least a nodding interest in the subject of
leadership, but recently the exigencies of global competition, deregulation,
and accelerating technological change have whipped that interest into an
anxious search for new answers to old questions: Can leadership be taught?
How do you spot potential leaders? And what, precisely, sets leaders apart
from everyday managers? [Main, 1987]
The strong difference in Japanese and American approaches to strategic
planning can be traced to cultural traits. The Japanese have tended to
submerge the personal to the societal view, the American the societal to the
personal view. In Japan 0 and T have become tightly bonded, while P
is minimized. In America P plays a much stronger role. Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) undertakes to do long-range
planning for entire industry sectors, while there is no equivalent concern
in the USA with collective long-range industrial policy and strategy. On
the other hand, the relative strength of the P perspective in the USA is
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reflected in its individual creativity output or basic research dominance: 135
US Nobel Prizes in science to 4 for Japan.
(b) Risk Evaluation and Management: American and Soviet
Experiences
Technology management is always concerned with risks. We consider here
only two types, physical risk and political risk.
At the Three Mile Island nuclear plant the errors included inadequate
training of the utility company operators and supervisors, toleration of poor
control room practices, and failure of the construction engineers (Babcock
& Wilcox) to inform their nuclear reactor customers of persistent failures of
pilot operated relief valves. The President's Commission concluded
... the fundamental problems are people-related problems and not equip-
ment problems ... wherever we looked, we found problems with the human
beings who operate the plant, with the management that runs the key or-
ganization, and with the agency that is charged with assuring the safety of
nuclear power plants. [Report of the President's Commission on the Acci-
dent at Three Mile Island, 1979].
At Chernobyl, a mishap on April 26, 1986 occurred in the context of
a turbine test. Faulty actions caused a loss of the water that continuously
cools the uranium fuel rods in the reactor's core. This led to a partial
core meltdown. As of August 1986, 31 fatalities were noted and over 200
were hospitalized with radiation sickness. A total of 135,000 people had to
be evacuated and the long-term effect is estimated by one source at 4,000
additional cancer deaths in Europe, by another at 5,000 to 24,000 in the
Soviet Union alone over the next 70 years (Washington Post, August 30,
1986). While Westerners have pointed to technical flaws in the reactor design
(New York Times, 1986), the Soviet report to the International Atomic
Energy Agency focused on a series of human errors, mistakes that violated
safety regulations and, in some cases, common sense. Andronik Petrosyants,
head of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, said:
For almost 12 hours the reactor was functioning with the emergency cooling
system switched off .... It is quite possible that the (previous) smooth
operations brought on complacency and that this led to irresponsibility,
negligence, lack of discipline, and caused grave consequences [Washington
Post, August 22, 1986].
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Valeri Legasov, first deputy director of the principal Soviet atomic re-
search institute, added:
If at least one violation of the six would be removed, the accident would
not have happened. The engineers psychologically did not believe that such
a sequence of improper actions would be committed. Such a sequence of
human actions was so unlikely that the engineer did not include (it) in the
project. Is that human or technical? [Washington Post, August 22, 1986]
Table 4.2 shows how the three perspectives illuminate different views of
risk. The T perspective undertakes probabilistic calculations and draws up
fault trees; the 0 perspective deals with standard operating procedures and
threats to organizational integrity; the P perspective perceives personal fears
and images of horror. Not surprisingly, there is a dramatic difference between
actuarial, societal, and personally perceived risk rankings. According to a
recent survey, the typical individual views the risk of auto accidents as equal
to those of nuclear power, while the actual annual mortality rate of the
former is over 500 times that of the latter. Strokes kill 85% more people
than do accidents; yet people estimate that accidents take 25 times as many
lives as strokes.
Table 4.2.
T
Probabilistic
Actuarial/
statistical
Perspectives on Risk.
o
Threat to organization
survival
Threat to product line
or image
p
Time for consequences
to materialize
Personal experience or
history
Quantification vital
Margin of safety
design
One definition of
risk for all
Statistical
inference
Fault trees
Political sensitivity
Ease of diffusing blame
Definition varies with
organization
Standard operating
procedures
No single decision maker
Age of individual
Peer esteem
Definition varies with
personal fears
Ethical values
Risk is danger to some,
opportunity to others
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In political risk forecasting for international enterprises, Ascher and Over-
holt (1983) move
beyond a tradition of studying forecasting primarily as a series of discrete
mathematical methods .... An exclusive emphasis on formal methods, par-
ticularly complex quantitative methods, will often prove self-defeating ....
We affirm the importance of studying forecasting in the context of the actual
behavior of people and institutions rather than in a formalistic manner.
A clear distinction is drawn between the policymaker's "rational infor-
mation needs" and his "political needs". The former refer to the meaning
and content of the information, the degree of certainty, and the policy rec-
ommendations embedded in, or implied by, the information. The latter focus
on the ability (Ascher and Overholt, 1983):
• To be a convincing advocate of preferred policies, hence to have access
to appropriate information.
• Whenever possible to be correct, that is, to choose policies that produce
positive results.
• When wrong, not to be disastrously so - thus, to make conservative
decisions that avoid major risks even at the expense of foregoing certain
opportunities.
• When wrong, to avoid adverse political repercussions for the policymaker.
• To maintain his decision-making discretion at all times.
It is evident how important a role is allotted to organizational loyalties
(0). The authors are also convinced that long-range strategic thinking is
qualitatively different from short-range tactical thinking, frequently to the
extent of requiring different personalities (P).
(c) Energy Forecasting
A careful analysis of accuracy in academic, government, and industry fore-
casts of population, energy, and economic trends (Ascher, 1978) yields a clear
and consistent pattern: the core assumptions underlying the forecast are the
major determinant of forecast accuracy. They prove to be far more crucial
than the sophistication of the model used. A back-of-the-envelope model
with good core assumptions is preferable to a sophisticated computer model
with obsolete core assumptions. In other words, the methodology cannot
"save" the forecast when the core assumptions are poor. An example of a
poor core assumption is that used in the early ultimate petroleum reserve
forecasts: no significant change in the technology of recovery.
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A recent study (Sapp, 1987) examined the energy demand forecasting
process at Bonneville Power Administration in the Pacific Northwest region
of the United States. Such analysis is a vital input used by utility com-
panies for planning resource acquisitions and for financing decisions. The
econometric models inevitably favored by the economists who constitute the
forecasting group are very complex. Many core assumptions underpinning
the models were accepted without question. For example, they assumed
that there would be no major economic, social, and political discontinuities
or structural changes over a 25 year period. Therefore, the long-term pro-
jections were inevitablY biased by short-term trends. A five percent average
annual rate of growth of regional electricity demand was accepted by all
utilities in the region as realistic until the late 1970s. Major power supply
shortages were anticipated in the mid-1980s on the basis of an assumed con-
tinuation of the regional economic boom experienced in the 1960s and early
1970s as well as a continuation in old customer behavior patterns. Ascher
(1978) calls this tendency "assumption drag". Uncertainties and possible
surprise events were submerged in a sea of quantitative model output and
"best estimates."
The decision to build the five nuclear power plants (the Washington
Public Power Supply System) was based on such forecasts. The result
was a planning disaster: major changes in the forecasts due to altered as-
sumptions could simply not be accommodated in the construction program
without enormous financial losses. Analysts are not accustomed from their
background to maximize adaptability to unanticipated changes, that is, to
disaster-avoidance planning. Even the leadership of the Bonneville Power
Administration is a salient factor. One head administrator saw the impend-
ing power shortage as a technical problem; his successor saw it as a political
problem; the third saw it as a business problem. Different foci lead to dif-
ferent solutions. The 0 and P perspectives are important for this reason:
who is doing the forecasting is as important as what is being forecast.
The central nature ofthe 0 perspective for the decision process in energy
facility siting has been illuminated in detail for four specific cases of liquified
natural gas (LNG) projects - in the United States, Scotland, the Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG), and the Netherlands (Kunreuther and Linnerooth
et at., 1983). The comparison shows very different institutionalized styles of
risk handling that reflect cultural distinctions. The United Kingdom pro-
cess was characterized by trust in experts and informal inspections as well as
deference to top-down leadership. This consultative, consensual style con-
trasted with the American adversary, statutory bottom-up leadership style.
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In all cases two insights stand out: the siting decision process was political
and it was sequential. The final outcome depended strongly on the actors'
styles, their interactions, and the way the agenda was set.
The dialectic approach characteristic of the 0 perspective is also reflected
in the history of energy resource forecasts in the Uni ted States (Wildavsky
and Tenenbaum, 1981). The deep division between industrial interests and
conservationists on oil and gas resources was already apparent in the early
1900s. In 1908 the US Geological Survey (USGS) forecast total US oil re-
sources between 10 and 24.5 billion barrels and indicated that supplies of
oil would be depleted between 1935 and 1943. Each side seized on these
estimates to confirm its policy stand. Many forecasts have been made since
then and, except for the World War I and II periods, each faction habitually
accuses the other of manipulating the forecasts for its own purposes. Table
4.3 suggests the different 0 views on resource forecasts. It becomes clear
that the forecasts are the servants of policies already determined or preferred
rather than being prerequisites for policy formulation. The T perspective
quests for more accurate forecasts in this area are thus only of marginal
relevance.
Table 4.3.
Industrialists
favor
o perspectives on oil reserve forecasts.
When prices are high When prices are low
High forecasts Low forecasts
"Major new supplies can "Higher prices are needed to
be found if prices are high" bring on more supplies"
Consumers
favor
Conservationists
favor
Low forecasts
"Oil is no longer the
solution"
Low forecasts
"High prices encourage
overproduction"
High forecasts
"No need to raise prices"
Low forecasts
"Low prices encourage
overconsumption"
Source: Wildavsky and Tenenbaum (1981).
Cd) Trade Deficits
Technology diffusion is linked to trade balances and the problem of trade
deficits is of intense concern to policymakers. Udwadia and Agmon argue
that
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perceptions of the trade deficit and its effect on decisions that lead to na-
tional trade policies can only be understood through the incorporation of
economic, political, and moralistic arguments, where the compound expla-
nation goes beyond that which can be obtained from anyone of these sep-
arate fields of study [Udwadia and Agmon, 1988].
We can readily identify the economic argument with the T perspective,
the political one with 0, and the moralistic one with P. The arguments
arising from each perspective are summarized in Table 4-4. The perspectives
interact with each other and must therefore all be taken into account in policy
planning.
Table 4.4.
Economic (T)
Perspectives on trade deficits.
Political (0) Moralistic (P)
Rational choices
If we maximize
current consumption
(max. net pres. value,
high discount rates,
min. current R&D)
result is trade deficit
If we maximize
current production
(low discount rate,
high consumption
later)
result is trade surplus
Simply a free choice:
produce now and
consume later, or v.v.
Trade surplus =
national strength
Trade deficit = weakness
Power has precedence
over profit
Use of political intervention
to maintain power
- industrial policy
- trade barriers
Western culture precepts:
- "Only enjoy what you
can afford"
- "Don't live beyond your
means"
- Practice "fair play"
- "Save for a rainy day"
Should a positive or nega-
tive discount rate be used?
Am I more important than
my grandchildren, or v.v.?
Is it moral to burden later
generations?
Senior's bumper sticker:
"I am spending my
children's inheritance"
Deficit no problem Deficit undesirable
Source: Udwadia and Agmon (1988).
Deficit undesirable
We have sampled the menu of application areas. As the technology diffu-
sion process inevitably involves systems that are not purely technological in
nature, the multiple perspective concept is being called upon with increasing
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frequency in this domain. In the next section a few basic guidelines for in-
terested users are summarized. Following that discussion, we will turn to
applications involving technology diffusion (Section 4.5).
4.4 Guidelines for Users
The Multiple Perspective Concept is not simply another methodology to
add to the analyst's tool kit. There is no 6-step procedure, no formula to
weight perspectives. Table .4-1 makes it clear that the 0 and P perspectives
use inquiring modes and paradigms not natural to the T-trained engineer
or economist - although quite familiar to managers, lawyers, politicians,
bureaucrats, and even journalists. In this section we propose some guidelines
to assist in applying the concept. Those who are already effectively bridging
the gap between analysis and action obviously do not have need for them.
It is hoped that the guidelines will help the many others who are struggling
to link theory with implementation in the real world.
(a) Balancing T, 0 and P
Strive consciously for a balance between T, 0, and P perspectives. Either
use an individual who exhibits a good balance ofT, 0, and P (an uncommon
breed) or create a team with diverse backgrounds. We do not refer here to a
philatelic mix, say, an engineer, an economist, and a computer systems ana-
lyst. They are all T-driven and concerned with model detail and precision.
They are likely to spend 90% of the available time on the T perspective with
which they are comfortable and 10% on 0 and P with which they are not.
A better mix is an engineer, a lawyer, and a businessman.
(b) Choice of 0 and P Perspectives
Do not confuse what you are looking at with how you are looking at it. There
are as many 0 perspectives as there are affected or affecting organizations
and interest groups. Within a company or agency each department has its
unique 0 perspective. You cannot include all; the choice is necessarily judg-
mental. Do not be surprised if perspectives are in conflict - this is, after all,
the real world. The same cautions apply to the selection of P perspectives.
Experience will make it apparent that the hierarchy or organization chart
is not always a good guide; some key individuals in the decision process do
not appear on the charts. An in-depth understanding of the organization
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will illuminate its myths, standard operating procedures, and actual decision
process. The P perspectives pose the most difficult challenge; they lie at the
deepest and least accessible level. Look particularly for individuals who are
likely to act outside of an institutional role and would affect outcomes.
(c) Use of Interviews for 0 and P
The T perspective is developed using traditional data and model based anal-
ysis. We have stressed that more of the same will not yield the 0 and P
perspectives. Rather, they depend strongly on personal immersion, on dig-
ging below the surface, on really understanding what makes the actors "tick."
Interviews are of great value in gaining 0 and P perspectives. But they re-
quire talent: the interviewer must be a good listener and sensitive to nuances
and nonverbal communications. What is not said may be as important as
what is said. Volunteered asides may be as significant as answers to ques-
tions. The effective interviewer recognizes that structured questionnaires or
Delphi are no substitutes for such exchanges.
Language and cultural differences must be understood for the interview-
ing process. Our recent experience in China [see Section 4.5(c)] showed that
the Chinese well understood what was being probed with O-type questions.
Clearly the Chinese culture is bureaucratic and hierarchic, so that 0 games
and strategies are known to all. Power relationships are enshrined in all
kinds of slogans, such as "two down, one up" and "the pyramid of power."
P perspectives presented more of a problem. We found that it was very
important to keep pushing for concrete examples and anecdotes to flesh out
and interpret the often too general and spare answers.
Since interviews play such a central role in the multiple perspective ap-
proach, the quality of information generated by key interviewees is of major
concern. All translation becomes interpretation, and this requires a sophisti-
cated knowledge of the local culture. Since simple word-for-word translations
are not possible and the Chinese language contains many untranslatable
metaphors, similes, and allusions, very well trained and sophisticated inter-
preters are essential. Often an interviewee's apparently peripheral response
may bring forth valuable insights not anticipated by the questioner.
For those who wish to apply this "new systems analysis" to their own
sociotechnical systems, the obvious answer to the interview problems is to
learn to develop the 0 and P perspectives themselves through interview
techniques uniquely suited to their dialog and interpersonal communications.
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But for cross-cultural systems work and joint ventures, there is no easy
solution. Detailed guidelines for interviewing are found in Linstone (1984).
(d) Integration of Perspectives
The question is often asked: Should the perspectives be integrated into one
picture before submission to the decision maker or should the set of different
perspectives be presented? In answer to this question, it is useful to call
on the analogy of the trial courtroom. The jury hears the testimonies of
the various witnesses (perspectives) and summations by the prosecutor and
defense attorney. The jury can accept one or the other integrated version or
use the original perspectives in arriving at its decision. The executive has
similar options. We recommend displaying the different perspectives and
possibly our own "prototype" integration. We must keep in mind that our
cross-cuing and weighting of perspectives cannot simulate that of the decision
maker. There is no way we can predict this mental process; indeed he or she
often cannot articulate this crucial decision process even a posteriori. As
President Kennedy wrote:
The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer -
often, indeed, to the decider himself .... There will always be the dark and
tangled stretches in the decision-making process - mysterious even to those
who may be most intimately involved [Kennedy, 1963].
However, the presentation of the several perspectives encourages cross-
cuing among them. For example, a manager's vision of the company's future
(his P perspective) may become the organization's 0 perspective if he has
the flair to engage others in sharing that vision. Such interplay also leads
to consideration of important facets that are not captured by anyone per-
spective. The willingness of a corporation or government to balance projects
having only long-term payoff with those providing near-term payoff requires
a conjunction of quite distinct perspectives.
(e) Communication
The technical report or briefing is ideal for communicating the T perspective.
The 0 perspective often involves a private insiders' language in combination
with a hortatory one for the public. However, as any successful artist, drama-
tist, and media producer knows, the personal level of the P perspective is
the most effective of all. Even in the industrial world,
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we are more influenced by stories (vignettes that are whole and make sense
in themselves) than by data (which are, by definition, utterly abstract)
[Peters and Waterman, 1982].
It is hardly surprising to find that the T -type analyst is not the most per-
suasive scenario writer. Recognition that, to a degree, the medium is indeed
the message, is the first step to the skillful communication of perspectives.
(f) Implementation
The inherent process orientation of the 0 perspective virtually assures avoid-
ance of a trap commonly encountered with the T perspective: walking away
from problems of implementation, problems that focus on the role of human
beings, both collectively and individually.
4.5 Cross-Cultural Applications: Asia
In the process of technology diffusion, be it domestic or transnational, verti-
calor horizontal, we must obviously deal with multiple perspectives: techni-
cal, organizational/societal, and individual. The preceding discussion points
to the desirability of applying our concept to develop insights that help to
bridge the wide gaps inevitably created by the different perspectives of the
diverse actors in the process (societies, bureaucracies, and individuals with
unique cultural, educational, and economic backgrounds).
As noted earlier, Kunreuther and Linnerooth et ai. (1983, pp. 235-240)
have examined the liquified natural gas facility siting process in four West-
ern countries and found significant culturally-induced differences that can
be determined using distinct perspectives. Ascher and Overholt (1983) have
found the organizational perspective to be "the central metaphor" in strate-
gic forecasting for Mexico and South Korea. The institutional infrastructure
is crucial for any culture, and the differences between cultures are strongly
reflected in the system change process.
We shall now consider application of the multiple perspective con-
cept in the framework of three settings: Nepal, India, and China. The
first deals with technology indirectly (environmental problems), the second
with a consequence of technological transfer, the third with technological
modernization.
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(a) Nepal
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Thompson and Warburton (1985) were commissioned by the United Nations
Environmental Programme to construct a systems framework for the appar-
ently severe environmental problems in that developing region. They found
it exceedingly difficult to gather factually precise information, but
the information that is gathered does quite accurately reflect the various
social forces that are at work in the Himalayas. In this sense, it is institu-
tionally accurate and, as we shall argue later, perhaps institutional accuracy
is more valuable (and more accessible) than factual accuracy ... it is the
institutional forces that muddle [the scientist's] attempts to analyze and
solve what, at first glance, appear to be technical problems. In many ways,
it seems to us, the institutions are the facts ... [Thompson and Warburton,
1985, pp. 6, 11].
In the case of the Himalayas (Nepal) there is remarkable uncertainty
in the physical facts (values of variables such as per capita fuel wood con-
sumption) as well as in the causation (interactions among variables, Le., the
system structure). On the other hand, there is reasonable certainty about
the institutions. Each has its own perception of the world, its own 0 per-
spective. They exist and function; indeed they are what we have to work
with, like it or not.
The process of institutional development is inherently unplannable. But
it does, at certain places and at certain times, offer points of leverage -
localized opportunities for facilitating and integrating the development of
institutions in the desired direction [Thompson and Warburton, 1985, p. 13].
The authors remind us that the classic development approach has been
to sound the alarm and then tell the country what it will have to do.
It has not worked. It has not because it ignored (as ifit were a mere detail of
implementation) the deep political, economic and cultural structure that is,
in fact, what determines the country's attention and lack of attention. What
is needed is a more sensitive approach; an approach that places the "mere
details" - the institutions that constitute the deep structure - at the very
center of the stage and relegates to the wings the alarm bellringers and their
immaculate prescriptions .... Grand designs are appropriate only when
there is a shared understanding of "the problem" and complete knowledge
of the causes of the problem [Thompson and Warburton, 1985, pp. 10, 17].
In 1950 the Nepalese government increased its centralization of power.
In the past thirty years there has been an enormous increase in the total
amount of power in the system. Now the government is devolving more
control back to the local levels while retaining much central power.
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The situation facing a proposed project may be described as in Table
.4.5. Many projects fall into category 3, few into category 4.
Table 4.5. Planning alternatives.
Institutional support: match or mismatch
Neither top nor bottom level support
Bottom level support only
(grass roots enthusiasm but no funds)
Top level support only
(top-down planning)
Top and bottom level support
(in China labelled "top-down, bottom-up")
Probable result
Dead loss
Strangled at birth
Difficulties in implementation
No problem
As systems analysts the authors consciously part company with their T-
focused professional peers by recognizing the centrality ofthe 0 perspective
for regional planning in developing countries.
Though what we have done is applied systems analysis, it may not look
like it. There is, we concede, a fair-sized break between the traditional
single problem/single solution approach and the one we have developed here.
There are many ways to characterize this break but perhaps the best is in
terms of the shift it makes from product thinking to process thinking. The
systems frame is no longer a model of the problem but simply an evaluative
mechanism. When the problem is to know what the problem is, we need
more than one perspective. The approach by way of plural institutions and
divergent perceptions meets this need. It gives us problems and solutions
that are multiple but not infinite; certainties that are contradictory but not
chaotic [Thompson and Warburton, 1985, p. 33].
Thompson and Warburton conclude that:
• Anything that increases the security and local control of the peasant
farmer will also increase the total quantity of power within the wider
system.
• Top-down development is in the nature of a project (an intervention);
"bottom-up" development is in the nature of a process; the project comes
down from the top, but must be modified from the bottom.
• The meshing of top-down and bottom-up requires constructive interven-
tion at the "right" points of leverage; it may be described as tinkering
in contrast to a grand design approach; finding the "right" points is not
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easy, indeed, it is an art for they may be few and far apart, invisible to
the unsensitized viewer.
(b) India
A recent multiple perspective examination of the Bhopal disaster is also illu-
minating. On December 2-3, 1984, a catastrophic leak of methyl isocyanate
(MIC) occurred at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal. Each perspective
applied draws forth elements which contribute to an understanding and de-
velopment of recommendations (Bowonder, 1987; Bowonder and Linstone,
1987). Some examples:
T: The technical perspective shows that causal factors include:
(1) Hard errors such as bad structural design (vent gas scrubber, water
sprays), defective pressure gauge, and poor instrumentation.
(2) Human errors such as failure to recognize entry of water into the MIC
tank during line and valve cleaning, and failure to communicate a major
pressure rise in the MIC tank.
(3) System errors such as lack of total system audits and lack of follow-up
to these audits.
As in the case of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl [Section 4.3(b)], we
are dealing here with a system involving (a) man + machine, as well as (b)
an event characterized by the combination of very low probability + severe
consequence. Such combinations are termed by Perrow (1984) "normal ac-
cidents" and the engineers' standard T-type analysis, e.g., fault trees and
expected value computations, are of very dubious validity.
0 1 : The corporate perspective informs us about:
(1) Proprietary aspects, such as the inadequate dissemination of information
on the toxicity and clinical treatment of exposure to MIC.
(2) "Stonewalling" as the standard initial corporate reaction to a disaster.
(3) The need for training in "crisis management" capability.
(4) Blind technology transfer.
(Technology transfer) takes place from one societal/cultural setting to an-
other. In the case of the United States and India, there are vast differ-
ences between these settings and they affect the success of the transfer ....
Therefore application to an Indian facility of safety rules and procedures
developed for American use is naive. The T-focused technical audits of the
H.A. Linstone
Union Carbide staff failed to consider vital aspects of Indian culture, such
as attitudes toward preventive maintenance and precise adherence to rules
of operation ... [Bowonder and Linstone, 1987].
O 2 : The governmental perspective shows:
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(1) Poor enforcement of worker safety and environmental rules - 15 fac-
tory inspectors to monitor more than 8,000 plants, two mechanical engi-
neers with little knowledge of chemical hazards assigned as inspectors in
Bhopal.
(2) Ignoring of the Bhopal development plan requiring plants manufacturing
pesticides to be relocated to an industrial zone 15 miles away - the
existing plant received an MIC license just two months after the issuance
of the development plan.
P: Personal perspectives indicate
(1) Filtering out of input conflicting with ingrained views, a plant manager
stated: "we do not know of any fatalities either in our plant or in other
carbide plants due to MIC."
(2) The importance of an effectively trained leader - a neighboring plant
suffered no losses because the manager, a former brigadier in the Indian
army, efficiently evacuated 1,400 workers upon detection of the leak.
Integration and cross-cuing of the perspectives exhibit their interactive-
ness. For example, the safety audit (T) and the financial priorities of the
company (0) affect the correction of problems. The combination of cultural
differences (0) and standard operating procedures (0) foil adequate train-
ing. Most important, they lead to a basic reconsideration of the action levels
in the treatment of risk:
Level 1. Seek a means to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic consequences
with the existing system. Examples:
T: Try to make the system safe-fail by decoupling of subsystems so that an
accident can be bounded or limited to one subsystem.
0: Revise instruction manuals to allow for cultural differences, resulting in
equivalence in practice rather than merely literal equivalence in language.
P: Give investigative reporters and "whistleblowers" more protection in ex-
posing poor practices, thus anticipating potential catastrophes.
Level 2. Redesign the system to reduce dangers. Give added weight to:
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T: Decoupling of subsystems in the design stage rather than after
installation.
o /P: Partial customization of the system to the local culture for increased
safety.
Level 3. Probe conceptually different system solutions that avoid cata-
strophic consequences altogether.
T: Alter the production process or use materials in such a way that the same
need is met in a technologically new way which excludes the possibility
of catastrophic accidents.
Level 4. Ask the final question: can the consequence of a catastrophic
accident be tolerated or not?
0: This is clearly a societal, more than a technical, question. With rapidly
moving technology, the possible kinds of low likelihood/severe conse-
quence accidents will grow. Example: Today AIDS makes the possibility
of a future bioengineering error creating a deadly virus which sweeps over
the world with lightning speed seem far less remote than it did twenty
years ago. Also, the demands for management capability are becoming
more severe. History has shown that the human and ecological resilience
to disaster is enormous - but there are limits!
(c) China
Cultural Background
Let us begin by sampling some characteristics indicative of cross-cultural
distinctions that have a major impact on technology transfer.
• Primacy of the group
In China the danwei, one's group or unit, is most important for each
person, counting more than one's name; without a danwei a person's
existence is barely recognized. This concept captures a vital difference
between Chinese and Western cultures: the relative importance of the
group and the individual. The traditional view implies that individual
lives virtually do not exist separately from the life of the unit and privacy
is not recognized in the same way as in the West (Bonavia, 1980; But-
terfield, 1982). Individuals do not like to express personal preferences,
but prize conformity. A set of guidelines for doing business in the PRC
advises:
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The foreign businessman should not focus on the individual Chinese
person, but rather on the group of individuals who are working for
a particular goal. If a Chinese individual is singled out as possessing
unique qualities, this could very well embarrass the person .... In
discussions with Chinese people, the foreigner should avoid "self-
centered" conversation in which the "I" is excessively used. The
Chinese view with contempt the individual who strives to display
personal attributes, as Chinese are much more oriented to the group
[Harris and Moran, 1987, p. 406].
The value of the primacy of the group lies in the ability to undertake
all kinds of collective activities and projects. In a country of one billion,
the resulting harmony and cohesion are of tremendous significance.
• Language
For thousands of years the Chinese language, composed of more than
8,000 characters, has evolved to express the most complex ideas and has
united the people. But,
... despite its beauty and subtlety, it has increasingly become an
obstacle to modernization. The language does not absorb new ideas
readily and new characters are rarely invented. As a geneticist at the
Chinese Academy of Sciences described the situation, "We are being
held prisoners by our language. There is an information explosion
in the world that we cannot cope with in our language as it is now"
[Los Angeles Times, 1982].
• Analysis
In the past six years the "opening" of China has led to a growing
number of professional contacts between Chinese and Americans. It is
interesting to note the comments of several American analysts:
On decision analysis:
Our impression is that the three fundamental activities underlying
decision analysis (generating alternatives, accounting for uncertain-
ties, and eliciting decision makers' preferences), at least as esponsed
in Western countries, are not being accepted nor are they likely
to soon be accepted by the Chinese bureaucracy '" . A distin-
guishing feature of decision analysis is the explicit consideration of
uncertainty. What we found in China, however, was a decision-
making environment that was almost completely devoid of a formal
concern for uncertainty. Within a planned society, deviation from
the established goals is anathema. This seemed to make it par-
ticularly uncomfortable for our Chinese colleagues to accept uncer-
tainty. Our impression was that any analysis would proceed under
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the assumption of complete certainty about almost all important as-
pects: costs, technological availability, construction timing, weather,
effects of treatment on the measures of pollution, social benefits, gov-
ernmental policies, and so forth .... In a formal, ritualistic culture
that values the expected (certainty), assigning probabilities to events
must seem strange indeed . .. . Our experience in China was there-
fore bound to be frustrating .... Perhaps it was presumptuous of us
to expect the Chinese - with a bureaucracy and decision-making cul-
ture highly evolved over a period of more than 3,000 years - to accept
with more than polite acknowledgment a way of looking at problems
that is so obviously Western: reductionist, empirical, quantitative,
democratic in its approach [Pollock and Chen, 1986, pp. 34-37].
On operations research:
MS/OR [management science/operations research] problem solving
may suffer from the traditional Chinese tendency to categorical for-
malism reflected by the fondness for such constructs as "the Four
Modernizations," "the Ten Major Relationships," and "the Three
Fundamental Principles." Indeed the one weakness of my otherwise
exceptional students was their tendency to force problems into a
"type" like those types studied in class. They displayed great inge-
nuity in solving formal problems, but when faced with less formal
problem descriptions, it rarely occurred to them to think "outside"
of the problem, to change it, or to wonder whether there was a
problem at all. Even more tellingly, they seemed to lack skepticism
about the tools, methods, and applicability of MS/OR [Bartholdi,
1986, pp. 29-30].
Wei Bei Agricultural Development
A recent joint China-US project funded by the National Science Foundation
(Linstone et al., 1987) considers the issue of the agricultural development of
the semi-arid Wei Bei region in Shanxi Province. We sketch here a summary
of the clues provided by the use of multiple perspectives.
Figure 4.4 shows the nature of cross-cuing among some of the major
elements or factors contributing to the improvement of the Wei Bei economy.
There is a strong likelihood that "everything interacts with everything,"
although the time to do so may vary greatly from one impact to another.
Wei Bei regional development has three primary goals:
(1) Maintenance of the grain crop at a satisfactory level.
(2) Modernization of agriculture, including high value cash crops, animal
husbandry, and use of uncultivated lands for forestry and grazing.
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Resources --+ Technology
inadequate farm land --+ need for fertilizers, water management
minimal financial resources --+ inadequate quality of research and training
Technology --+ Resources
pressure resulting from resource shortages increases research support --+
new resources (materials, energy systems) (Goeller and Weinberg, 1976)
Culture --+ Leaders
centrality of danwei --+ use of power pyramids
Leaders --+ Culture
Mao Tsetung --+ irrevocable change in culture effected
Culture --+ Organization
conformism tradition --+ strong hierarchy and centralization
Organization --+ Control
centralization --+ strict controls on hiring and movement
Culture --+ Individuals
importance of blood relations --+ family connections used
Organization --+ Individuals
sudden policy shifts --+ peasants' desire to keep individual land plots for security
Organization --+ Technology
horizontal isolation --+ poor diffusion of research among institutions
Technology --+ Organization and Control
information technology --+ unprecedented centralization and decentralization possible
Leaders --+ Organization
little modern management experience --+ redundancy at all levels of hierarchy
Figure 4.4. The nature of cross-cuing.
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(3) Diversification into profitable non-agricultural enterprises at the county,
prefecture, and township levels.
Goal (1) corresponds to what the corporate planning literature terms a
"disaster-avoidance" strategy (as contrasted to an optimization strategy). It
is a desirable direction when operating in an uncertain environment, i.e., a
safe-fail strategy (see Section 4.1).
We shall concentrate our attention on goals (2) and (3). We recall the
point made by Thompson and Warburton: "the problem is to know what
the problem is." This is certainly apt when Wei Bei agricultural develop-
ment is seen as a "three-dimensional" (T+O+P) task rather than a "one-
dimensional" T problem. It becomes apparent at once that there is not a
shared understanding of the problem. The actors tend to blame each other
- agency people insist government is good, but the farmers do not listen;
the farmers feel the government is filled with incompetents and scientists
propose impractical schemes; the technicians see the problem as the closed
minds of the people at the rural level. This is the "responsibility merry-go-
round." We now comment on several of the factors brought to the surface
by the multiple perspective approach.
• Reorganization for modernization (0)
A very important and basic insight provided by the perspectives in-
volves the nature of the reorganization itself. A policy change at the top
was necessary, but is hardly sufficient to make it happen. Modernization
involves non-traditional kinds of crops and activities, such as fruit or-
chards, dairy products, forestry, and tobacco processing. The profitable
local enterprises or non-agricultural sideline businesses also demand non-
traditional functions of the Wei Bei labor force. It is one thing to shift
responsibility to lower levels of government as part of the decentraliza-
tion policy. As long as the activities to be conducted are familiar ones, it
is reasonable to expect such a shift to proceed smoothly. An example of
this is the introduction of the responsibility system. It permitted individ-
ual peasants and groups of households considerable freedom of decision
in agricultural production. But it is another thing to expect the shift to
proceed smoothly when the activities involve non-traditional tasks that
are unfamiliar to either local government or peasants, management or
labor.
It is easy to be lulled by the clear evidence of success of the policy
in raising food production in the past eight years. Indeed, the shift
has had uneven success. Many villages, especially those near towns
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and cities, have prospered remarkably under the decentralization pol-
icy. They planted familiar food crops, sold to markets within easy reach,
and developed sideline activities (e.g., brick yards, cement plants) that
they well understood. Even so, there were wasteful surges of overproduc-
tion (e.g., watermelons, rabbits). At the same time the vast hinterlands
saw many communities remain impoverished.
With non-traditional activities the needed skill levels in production,
marketing, and management as well as support services (financial, trans-
port, equipment servicing, technology, and administration) are simply
not available at the local level. The tasks cannot be organized into
a working system, let alone, an efficient one. The development of non-
traditional activities at the local level is quite analogous to the more gen-
eral challenge of technology transfer from advanced countries to China.
This has been the subject of a recent statistical study by the Science
and Technology Policy Research Division in Beijing (Technology Import
Project Group, 1986). Sampling 220 projects, the study concluded that
the leading factors affecting the "digestion and absorption" of a tech-
nology in China involved not only the obvious ones of available funds
and technical hardware, but weakness of the management system, lack
of supporting policies, and lack of qualified technical personnel.
Our own 0 and P insights indicate:
There are clashes of interest among stakeholders - between levels of
government, between technical agencies, between government and
technical agencies, between government or institute and peasant
producer. This clouds the fulfillment of the projected goals. There
is confusion as to which level and agency of government is to provide
a resource such as capital, managerial oversight, entrepreneurial ex-
pertise, and technical advice for a given project.
Experimental or demonstration plots run by agricultural institutes,
"sparking" funding for small innovative projects, or "lead" families
are not the answer in tackling non-traditional, unfamiliar agricul-
tural or sideline enterprises. There is a need for all kinds of support
services not readily accessible to the peasants.
The need for information is particularly strong when dealing with
non-traditional, unfamiliar production activities. Much essential
information is unavailable or inaccessible due to compartmentaliza-
tion, a lack of coordination, and poor communications. The result
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is duplication of effort, waste of limited skilled manpower, inability
to make decisions, and failure to build on on each other's findings.
In Wei Bei agricultural modernization and non-traditional sideline
businesses in towns and villages require outside support on a sustained
basis until these activities have proven their worth to the local peasants
and local expertise is at hand.
It was beyond the scope of this study to make specific recommenda-
tions to overcome these difficulties. But there are some clues on the di-
rection to be taken. We point to a reorganization analogy in the United
States. Hierarchical business organizations were highly effective from
1850 to 1950. After World War II, complexity grew and hierarchical
organizations were increasingly transformed into matrix organizations.
This means that the project tasks determined the team composition, in
contrast to the traditional procedure of assigning a project to an exist-
ing functional department. The project organization exists only for the
duration of the project; it does not have the permanence of the depart-
ments. The most suitable expertise is selected from various departments
and placed under the direction of the project leader.
A modernization project in Wei Bei should be viewed as a series of
tasks that must be accomplished. There are managerial/entrepreneurial,
administrative, and production tasks. There are questions of jurisdiction
and authority, and each task creates resource requirements: information,
skills, material, and services. The tasks and work organization vary
from project to project. The following questions must be addressed and
answered in pragmatic, not ideological, terms:
Which entity (government agency, town, or village) has overall re-
sponsibility for the project?
For administrative tasks, does the entity have appropriate jurisdic-
tion? Does it have the skills and information?
With regard to managerial/entrepreneurial tasks, does the man-
ager /entrepreneur have the authority to act? Bounds of authority
should be clear and appropriate. Conflicts between authority and
jurisdiction can also be avoided by negotiation. Does the manager
have the skills and information? The managerial function should
not be assigned to government personnel whose training is political
rather than managerial.
For production tasks, does the entity have the information, skills,
material, and service resources? If not, where are the resources
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located that can fill the need for the project? They may be scat-
tered throughout the province, in agencies and institutes, or they
may only exist outside the province. There is no need to place the
necessary resources, for example, services, at each town or village
that has a project requiring them. If, say, a prefectural-level service
has the resource, it can assign one of its persons to be a project
team member to supply the expertise or coordinate its availability
to the project.
The interviews and workshop elicited many instances of mismatch
between needed and accessible resources. Examples: dairy projects are
hampered by the lack of county-supplied veterinarians; farmers have
problems obtaining county pest-control services and market information.
Another complaint was that the county or prefecture does not have the
expertise to market its products in other provinces. A matrix organi-
zation provides the flexibility to maximize effectiveness in the use of
resources which is essential in moving beyond the current level of agri-
cultural development. We stress that a matrix organization does not
imply the abolition of existing functional departments. (In the United
States the introduction of matrix organizations in corporations did not
mean the end of their functional departments.) In the case of Wei Bei,
we are suggesting a concept somewhat similar to the matrix during the
transition phase. As capability develops at the lower levels, there will
come a time when the services will be either internalized in the produc-
tion enterprise or they will become enterprises themselves and contract
their support directly to the production enterprise, a common feature in
advanced service economies.
It is interesting to recall that the problem of reorganization in the
face of technological modernization is one that confronted Chinese and
Japanese society already in the nineteenth century when Western tech-
nology was introduced (Fried and Molnar, 1978, p. 92). The primary
managerial responsibility was officially assigned to the provincial civil
servant category in China (particularly the Mandarins). In Japan it was
given by the Meiji reformers to the daimyo, or feudal lords (who later
merged with merchant groups to form the zaibatsu oligarchy). It failed in
China largely because the civil servants were not experienced managers
or entrepreneurs; it succeeded in Japan because the daimyo were.
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• Managers and entrepreneurs (P)
China is the richest country in the world with respect to one resource:
human brains. So there must be more potential leadership material in
China than anywhere else. Switzerland and Israel have a tradition of
drawing on the military for leaders in the civilian sector. In these coun-
tries the military establishment with its high standards constitutes a
superb training ground for leadership. Senior officers retire early and
often become top managers in nonmilitary enterprises. Does China with
its immensely greater manpower resources have any such reservoir of
leadership capability?
Many Chinese professors and bright students now go to Western uni-
versities for advanced management training. This is an important long-
term strategy. But it is not nearly enough. For one thing, such academic
upgrading misses the practical, hands-on learning that business and in-
dustry experience provide.
Let us pause to consider the American experience. After one of the
best known academic authorities on organization theory and manage-
ment, Richard M. Cyert, co-author of the classic text A Behavioral The-
ory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963), became a university president,
he wrote:
As a professor of organization theory and management, I used to
wonder about the practical value of these academic fields. For the
last eight years I've had some first-hand experience finding out ....
And I've concluded that the study of management makes a useful,
but only limited, contribution to the practicing manager [Wall Street
Journal, 1980].
Similarly, the foreign educational institutions are not likely to be an
adequate provider of managerial/entrepreneurial talent for China. An
effort should be made to place more Chinese as apprentices or man-
agement trainees in Western enterprises. Alternatively, it may be very
fruitful to invite retired Western managers and entrepreneurs to spend
time, preferably the duration of a project, with the Chinese enterprises
in order to give them the benefit of their experience. Finally, there is the
possibility of having successful foreign agricultural companies set up lo-
cal enterprises. Here local managerial capability can be developed more
effectively (see below).
• Technical training, outside expertise, and the brain drain (T/0/P)
The need for major improvements in technical education and training
is self-evident. Two impeding factors are evident: the short-term focus
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of the farmer and the poor horizontal communications. We now pause to
consider a fundamental problem, one that is implied by the entire raison
d'etre of the multiple perspective concept. In moving beyond familiar
crops and simple sideline activities, we also obviously move into more
complex technology transfer at the local level. An implication of all that
has been said about the need for multiple perspectives is that training
in universities and institutes, be it in China or Western countries, is not
going to encompass an adequate basis of preparation for undertaking
such activities in Wei Bei (or anywhere else). The total is more than
the sum of its parts. A prestigious Harvard MBA (Master of Business
Administration) degree does not constitute an adequate preparation for
operating a business enterprise.
The same limitation applies in Wei BeL The availability of academ-
ically trained technical and management personnel does not insure a
successful project. Actual system operation provides an essential "total-
system," multiple perspective learning experience. What can be done?
Turn-key operations as a mode of technology transfer are a familiar con-
cept. A foreign company may set up a plant in China that duplicates its
own enterprise. Their disadvantage is that they often do not provide a
proper learning environment for the local people and may not be suit-
able in terms of 0/P in the local cultural setting. In dealing with rural
areas there are other interesting possibilities to effect development of a
balanced local capability.
China has drawn in foreign private sector expertise in its industrial
development; it is therefore not beyond reason to consider drawing in
integrated (T+O+P) foreign private sector expertise in agricultural de-
velopment. There have been some cases involving private sector com-
panies from developed countries effectively performing agricultural tech-
nology transfer in Third World areas where agriculture is pursued on
small family farms (one to five hectares). In this approach the compa-
nies, processors and marketers of foodstuffs and cash crops, develop an
integrated operation with the strong involvement of local farmers. They
reach agreement with these small producers guaranteeing a fair mar-
ket price, providing credit, technology, inputs such as fertilizers, herbi-
cides, and seeds, assistance in soil preparation, harvesting, and storage,
and servicing in moving the product to processing and market. Suc-
cessful operations cited by Freeman and Karen (1982): sugarcane and
tobacco enterprises in the Dominican Republic, a banana enterprise in
the Philippines.
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• Information technology and technical support (T)
The technical information available is severely limited and often in-
accurate or unreliable. Even if it is correct and meaningful, it does not
circulate easily. Information retrieval systems leave much to be desired.
A particularly significant problem impeding development of technical
know-how and provision of services in rural areas is the poor horizon-
tal communication capability. It is not clear to us whether information
technology can overcome the cultural/societal patterns in Wei Bei, but
the potential for movement of information with today's state of the art is
enormous. In particular, such concepts as (a) the use of satellite commu-
nication links and videotape for rural education as well as training, and
(b) desk top publishing for rapid, low-cost spread of information need to
be explored. But China is faced with at least four serious handicaps:
There is a lack of funds for information systems and telecommuni-
cations infrastructure development.
There is an acute electricity shortage. Per capita consumption of
electric energy remains at a very low level. (In 1984 China ranked
112th in the world in per capita electricity generation.)
There is the Chinese language itself. It vastly complicates the use
of today's state of the art information technology.
There is culturally a disinclination to share information. (This may
be tied to the dominance of the 0 perspective in the culture: it is
a common characteristic of organizational thinking.) Consequently,
computers and available links are underutilized.
One result is the incredible redundancy in research. Often there are
impermeable information barriers. According to the Chinese Liberation
Daily (1984):
research units were carrying out duplicate research in 27 out of 53
projects begun between 1973 and 1974 and in 28 out of 63 projects
begun between 1978 and 1979.
It is important to remind ourselves that information technology greatly
facilitates both centralization and decentralization. Indeed, it will have
a more pervasive impact on the entire society than any other technology
between now and 2000. The first challenge is to avoid a widening of
the gap between China and the developed information-age world before
2000; the second challenge is to close the gap after 2000.
More generally, we have noted that in China 0 tends to dominate
T and P. Thus, more emphasis on T and P is obviously indicated. But
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the partial decentralization policy in progress today also necessitates a
major reorientation of 0 on the part of the Chinese. Traditional con-
cepts such as the hierarchy and power pyramid, the cadre/peasant and
city/ countryside divisions need to be reassessed. The new policy im-
plies higher organizational sophistication and complexity. So there is a
challenge to all three perspective types.
(d) Addendum
It may be of interest that perhaps the most striking example of the relevance
of the P perspective in technology diffusion is represented by Dr. Hyung-Sup
Choi of the Republic of Korea. This dynamic US-trained engineer played
a central role in the creation of the Korean Institute of Science and Tech-
nology and served as Minister of Science and Technology for seven years.
His policy of concentrating on a few strategic industry sectors, assimilating
and adapting technologies, and proceeding to higher sophistication levels has
had much to do with Korea's remarkable success. Close linkages between
research institutes and industry are emphasized. The theme is creation, not
merely imitation (Choi, 1986a and 1986b). The point to be made here is
that Choi himself is a critical factor in understanding the effectiveness of the
diffusion process. As in the case of Theodore Judah and the US transconti-
nental railroad and Wernher von Braun in rocketry, one person can make a
major difference in technology diffusion.
Indeed, a culturally-based distinction between Korea and Japan is ev-
idenced by Sharif's finding that the relative strengths of 0 and P differ:
P is stronger in Korea, 0 in Japan (Sharif, 1989). Both foster a strong T
perspective, with the respective P+T and O+T combinations creating two
distinct paths to success.
4.6 Information Technology: A Unique
Diffusion Factor
Information technology is the most dynamic, pervasive, and influential tech-
nology of our times. It may be said that we are moving from an industrial
society to an information society. In the terms of Perez (1983), information
technology is the overarching style of the present Kondratieff cycle as oil,
steel, and railroads were the dominant technologies of the three preceding
cycles, respectively. As such, this technology will alter our labor, business,
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governmental, and other socio-institutional structures. The degree and speed
of diffusion of this technology will affect the diffusion of all other technolo-
gies. Countries, government agencies, and corporations that adapt to it will
be able to facilitate the technology diffusion process, while those that resist
will be relatively impeded. lllustrative of the problem/opportunity are:
• The support or resistance to the use of personal computers by individuals
in the Soviet Union.
• The readiness or hesitation to share information in China - horizontal
communications are traditionally much poorer than vertical communica-
tions [see Section 4.5(c)].
The explosion of information technology accentuates the growing mis-
match between the rates of technological and socio-institutional change.
Even the most advanced countries are confronting 21st century technology
with 19th century institutions. There is growing concern that this widening
gap may lead to a slowdown of the diffusion of information technology and
consequently also of other technologies.
This technology can move a country or a firm toward power concentration
and uniformization, or toward power distribution and diversity (Linstone,
1989; Perez, 1983). Experience underscores the dangers of the former and
the advantages of the latter for technology diffusion. By the beginning of
the modern era (around 1500), Ming China and the Ottoman Empire had
become centers of power with scientific and technological strength, while Eu-
rope was decentralized and technologically backward. However, the Eastern
empires
suffered from the consequences of having a centralized authority which in-
sisted upon a uniformity of belief and practice, not only in official state
religion but also in such areas as commercial activities and weapons devel-
opment [Kennedy, 1989].
It was decentralized Europe that benefited from a stimulating compet-
itive, entrepreneurial environment and overtook the existing empires. A
startling example of technology diffusion is the Gutenberg printing press:
only 23 years passed from the time of the single Mainz press of 1457 to
the establishment of presses in 110 towns. Pocket books, "how to" books,
and translations of the Greek classics soon became available at low cost.
Democratized knowledge and mass education played a decisive role in the
subsequent diffusion of other technologies.
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As we noted at the outset, the multiple perspective approach is by no means
a new concept to the successful decision maker. Effective leaders and man-
agers use it intuitively. But it is not natural to most technologists or govern-
ment officials. Scientists and engineers are at home with the T perspective
and ignore or downplay 0 and P. This is the reason they overemphasize
analysis and underemphasize implementation, overemphasize product and
underemphasize process. And process is the essence of technology diffusion.
They are even prone to misinterpret the multiple perspective approach itself
as another T-type methodology for the analyst's tool kit. One objective of
our study has therefore been to rectify the analysts' and technicians' mis-
conceptions and to show that, beyond an awareness of multiple perspectives,
conscious use of them yields very practical benefits. Many bureaucrats have
the reverse problem: they focus on 0 and avoid T.
In any cross-cultural situation we face another problem. The 0 and P
perspectives bring to the surface subtle cultural distinctions. These affect
technology diffusion in important ways. They are certainly masked in a
one-dimensional T-type analysis and may even elude a Westerner's effort at
o or P (Westerners produce Westernized perspectives). Wherever possible,
those fully familiar with the local culture should be involved in developing
the 0 and P perspectives. For example, our experience in using multiple
perspectives in the case of agricultural modernization in the Wei Bei region
of China [Section 4.5(c)] should have relevance to planning for Malaysia's
priority industrial sectors, i.e., food, rubber, palm oil, timber, metal, and
plastics. But Malaysia's unique mixture of races - Malay (Bhumiputra),
Chinese, and Indian - has an important influence on its culture. And the
culture (values, attitudes, etc.) plays a very significant role in technology
diffusion (Fallows, 1988).
Our work corroborates the system view of Thompson and Warburton
(1985): (a) we should not expect a clear problem definition, and (b) the
institutions rather than the data may constitute the "facts." A deep un-
derstanding of the institutional actors is a prerequisite for dealing with im-
plementation, specifically, with determining points of leverage. This means
that "systems analysis" must move beyond its traditional bounds if it is to
be useful in decisions on complex, ill-structured sociotechnical systems. Its
core is no longer a model of the problem but an evaluation process.
We must cope with wide gaps - between theoretician and practitioner,
between technology donor and recipient, between national technology planner
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and decision maker. Our first aim in introducing multiple perspectives is to
raise the awareness of the need for a better balance among T, 0, and P.
The second is to promote a reduction of these gaps through the effective use
of this approach in technology diffusion policy planning.
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Chapter 5
Technogenesis: Origins and
Diffusion in a Turbulent
Environment
Dirk-Jan F. Kamann and Peter Nijkamp
5.1 Introduction
In recent years a wide variety of different terms has come into being: tech-
nological innovation, spatial dynamics, economic restructuring, industrial
rejuvenation, urban incubation, and many others. All such expressions mir-
ror the drastic changes that took place in the "roaring eighties".
The offspring of this sudden interest in the triangle of technology, econ-
omy, and space in a sociocultural setting is to be found in the reorientation
of general economics which has realized that contextual factors (technolog-
ical progress, urban and regional incubation) are of critical importance to
the trajectory of the economy as a whole, which in turn is shaping new
conditions for technological and spatial dynamics.
Spatial development patterns have in the past decade exhibited dramatic
changes leading to more diversification; even within the same country growth
and decline seem to accompany each other. Therefore, it is extremely im-
portant to analyze the conditions under which such structural changes may
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occur. This is especially relevant, because spatial dynamics is marked by
nonlinear evolutionary patterns, which may incorporate bifurcations and
even chaotic behavior (Nijkamp et al., 1988).
Particularly in recent years, various researchers have claimed that re-
cent spatial trends exhibit a clean break with the past (cf. Bluestone and
Harrison, 1982). A major analytical question is whether such structural
changes are due to endogenous spatial developments or to exogenous spatial
key forces. This problem runs parallel to the current scientific debate on the
existence of long waves, and in particular on the Schumpeterian viewpoint
regarding the endogeneity of Kondratieff cycles with their major phases of
takeoff, rapid growth, maturation, saturation, and decline.
In such debates the supply side of the economy (which is intertwined with
technical progress and spatial dynamics) is of critical importance. The recent
literature in this area has made plausible the idea that industrial innovations
(either basic or process innovations) may be regarded as major driving forces
for structural changes in the space-economy. In this context, the so-called
depression-trigger hypothesis is an important analytical departure, as this
hypothesis takes for granted that a down-swing phase of the economy will
induce the invention and implementation of radically new (often clustered)
technologies. The demand side of the market can, in this framework, be
incorporated by means of the so-called demand-pull hypothesis (see Ewers
and Wettman, 1980). The depression-trigger hypothesis, which is essentially
based on a challenge-response type of economic behavior, is extremely rele-
vant in a spatial (urban or regional) setting, as it states that a stimulus for
economic restructuring requires basic innovations in the productive sector.
Such innovations need not only the production of new commodities, but also
the provision of new locations for innovative entrepreneurs. This also implies
that the implementation of new urban or regional infrastructures is a sine
qua non for spatial economic dynamics. Thus the combination of produc-
tive capital, public overhead capital, R&D capital, and the emergence of new
markets are critical conditions for creating radical technological changes.
In light of the foregoing remarks two major questions seem to emerge.
First, technological innovation is not a deus ex machina which serves to
save a malfunctioning economy without active efforts by all actors involved.
Thus this leads to the question which are the driving forces that stimulate
technogenesis (economic mechanisms, urban and regional seedbed condi-
. )?tlOns, etc..
Second, even when technological innovations have materialized (or when
they are potentially available), this does not mean that all firms or regions
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are able to "reap the fruits" of a new technogenesis. Apparently, there are
many bottlenecks to be overcome. Thus this leads to the question, which
transfer mechanisms (e.g., networks) are favorable for ensuring a smooth
diffusion and adoption of new technologies?
These two questions are central in this chapter. The chapter is organized
as follows. Section 5.2 is devoted to a review of findings regarding the inter-
woven relationship between spatial incubation and technological innovation.
In Section 5.3 the relationship between industrial dynamics and the impact
of technological progress is further taken up, among others by referring to
diffusion mechanisms. Next, Section 5.4 deals with an often neglected but
extremely important interaction and diffusion pattern, viz., networks. The
various concepts used in literature will be reviewed and synthesized into
an approach that seems, from preliminary tests, to be a useful analytical
instrument.
5.2 Technogenesis: A Spatial Perspective
Regions and cities are the "workfloor" of technological developments. In gen-
eral, regions and cities are competitive geographical units which will try to
obtain an economic advantage by either generating technologically advanced
products (or processes) or attracting a maximum share of the pool of avail-
able technologies. Thus the question of the spatial selection environment
which induces technogenesis is at stake here.
It is noteworthy that the technological performance of a region (or city)
is dependent upon two factors: (1) its sectoral structure in terms of in-
dustrial composition, firm size, industry-technology life cycle, R&D invest-
ments, industrial networks, etc., and (2) its incubation potential in terms of
agglomeration economies, information networks, accessibility, labor market,
cultural amenities, production milieu, and similar.
It is evident that the sectoral structure and the incubation potential are
not entirely independent factors, as innovative entrepreneurs are operating
in an open economic and spatial system. According to Ewers and Wettman
(1980) the task environment of a firm and its internal behavior are mutually
interlinked phenomena.
In general, the innovative performance of a firm can be characterized by
answering various questions, such as:
• Is the firm creating a new technology or only adopting an existing
technology?
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• Is the firm a member of an innovative sector (e.g., high-tech) or of a
traditional (e.g., old-line) sector?
• Is the firm located in a creative environment (e.g., a science park) or in
a conventional industrial climate?
In Malecki and Nijkamp (1988) it has been argued that the blend of
entrepreneurial spirit, technologically sensitive sectoral structures, and cre-
ative environments is of critical importance for a successful technological
transformation process. Since new technology is an important weapon in
a competitive market, firms will consider a favorable geographical location
as being an important dimension of their entrepreneurial strategy. Conse-
quently, the locational aspects of technogenesis have become an important
aspect of current technology research. In this context, six types of studies
may be distinguished, viz., technological production factors, technological
performance, industrial sectors, regional seedbeds, longitudinal evolution of
firms, and regional (technology) policy. These categories will now briefly be
discussed.
5.2.1 Technological production factors
In these types of analysis the attention is focused on the inputs which are
necessary to generate technological progress. Particular emphasis is usually
placed upon R&D. From a geographical perspective this implies that spatial
variations in R&D investments may explain to a large extent the technolog-
ical differences among regions in a national economy. Since in general new
technologies increase the productivity of firms, it is evident that investments
in such technologies may be regarded as efficiency enhancing production
factors.
5.2.2 Technological performance
Studies on technological performance focus attention on the output side of
production. Various criteria for measuring the technological performance of
a firm may be distinguished, such as numbers of product or process innova-
tions, numbers of patents, etc. It is evident that the technological perfor-
mance of a firm will depend on both the composition of the sector it belongs
to and the spatial incubation potential of the place it is located. In most
studies on technological performance a causal link with the regional selection
environment is usually assumed (Oakey et at., 1980).
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Analysis of technological evolution from a sectoral angle is usually based
on the question, which sectors are concentrated in which areas? A good
example of such studies from this point of view can be found in the many
attempts at identifying the geographical pattern of high-tech industries. The
regional selection environment - or in a broader setting the regional incuba-
tion potential - is then confronted with the spatial concentration pattern of
given sectors, among others by using the location quotient method. Special
attention is often given to the question whether city centers, urban rings,
intermediate areas or semi-peripheral areas show a certain concentration of
innovative industrial sectors.
5.2.4 Regional seedbeds
Analysis of regional seedbeds starts with a comprehensive inventory of geo-
graphic factors which in a given area favor technological progress. Examples
are the functioning of the regional labor market, the availability of university
research facilities, a favorable quality of life, etc. On the basis of a regional
angle the technological performance of an area is then analyzed and judged.
In general, the hypothesis is then tested whether a region with a promis-
ing incubation potential is technologically more advanced than others (for a
critical review see also Davelaar and Nijkamp, 1987).
5.2.5 Longitudinal evolution of firms
In recent years there has been increasing awareness that the time horizon of
technological transformations is fairly long, so that static or cross-sectional
studies have by definition many shortcomings. This has led to a new re-
search endeavor, called company life-history analysis. The aim of this type
of longitudinal analysis is to trace the most critical decisions of a firm (e.g.,
investment decisions, new markets, product or process innovations) over a
long period of time (20 to 40 years) and to confront these with locational
developments and general economic circumstances. Instead of individual
firms, it can also be applied to networks of firms. This type of analysis
does more justice to the evolutionary process of industrial developments and
places technological evolution in a comprehensive and broader setting.
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5.2.6 Regional (technology) policy
In recent years, there has been considerable debate about the impact of pub-
lic policy on technological innovation. This debate has mainly centered on
two major questions, namely, the conditions for a "technological takeoff",
and the degree of diffusion and pervasiveness of new technologies. The per-
formance of technological innovation was measured not only in terms of new
firms or new jobs (the incubator profile), but also in terms of the modern-
ization of existing plants, social equity, regional development, and resource
impacts.
Nowadays it is a widely held belief that technological innovation is not
"manna from heaven" but can be generated by well-focused public policies
at national, regional or local levels (in close cooperation with private initia-
tives). And hence the question has emerged: which type of policy is needed
for which type of technology? The microelectronics technology, telecommu-
nications technology, biotechnology, agrotechnology or off-shore technology
all may have different seedbed conditions, and hence there is no uniform
technology policy which can generate all kinds of new technologies. Tech-
nology policy is essentially more a tailor-made endeavor to favor the creation
of specific innovative activities in specific sectors and at specific locations.
This implies that technology policy cannot be separated from other fields of
public policy such as socioeconomic policy and physical planning, nor can
it be implemented only from one (national) level; in this context, much em-
phasis is being placed upon the self-organizing potential of a region. Until
recently technology policy was mainly pursued in isolation from socioeco-
nomic policy and physical planning. In recent years, however, an increasing
awareness has grown that technology, economics, and space have an inter-
woven triangular interrelationship with close interactions between all three
components. It is noteworthy that in several countries there has been a shift
towards a more coherent approach to technology policy, economic policy,
and physical planning, and this shift is also reflected in regional-economic
technology research.
This concise overview of various studies in the area of spatial dimen-
sions of technology shows that there is a wide variety of different research
endeavors seeking to link economic performance, technological progress, and
regional selection environments. Both analytically and empirically many
advances have been made, although the long-term perspective of spatial
technogenesis is still underdeveloped. In the next section, the issue of the
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spatial diffusion of new technologies, seen from an industrial dynamics view-
point, will be discussed.
5.3 Diffusion of Technologies in an Industrial
System
The spatial picture of technological evolution has been given due attention
in the past years. Space not only acts as a dimension upon which techno-
economic processes are projected (e.g., in terms of locational dynamics) but
also provides the medium through which economic dynamics is generated
and transferred (witness the importance of both incubation and diffusion
theories). The spatial economic structure appears to provide the vehicle for
the generation and adoption of innovations in an industrial system (e.g., on
the basis of producer services). In this context, the increasing importance
of (spatial and socioeconomic) networks is noteworthy.
It should be noted that differences in the rate of economic growth be-
tween regions in advanced economic systems are explained not only from the
sector structure and the selection environment of those regions, but also from
the diffusion pattern of new technologies. Such diffusion patterns are partly
influenced by indigenous competitive forces in a spatial economy, partly by
information transfer channels, and partly by institutional structures (e.g., fi-
nancial agencies, subcontracting systems, university attitudes). A major role
is played by organizational structures of industrial and commercial compa-
nies and by the organization oflabor within companies. In this context, the
emergence of neo-Fordist modes (e.g., based on flexible organizational struc-
tures, economies of scope, customization of products, and rapid adjustment
to market demand) has to be seen. The pathway of new techno-economic
structures is marked by much variation, ranging from conventional hardware
investments to company migration (or branch plants) and from internal up-
grading of skills to purchase (or transfer) of skills from elsewhere (or even
takeovers) .
The impacts of new technologies may be twofold, either as direct spinoffs
in a local economy (e.g., via inter-firm interactions) or as transfers in a
broader spatial system (e.g., via new information technologies). Thus a
favorable seedbed function of a region is a necessary, but by no means a
sufficient, condition: information channels ensuring an appropriate transfer
of technological achievements are equally important (Townroe, 1988).
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Diffusion analysis has in recent years become an important field of re-
search in industrial economics. This analysis not only focuses on the distri-
bution and adoption of new technologies, but also on the business services re-
lated to technological transformations. According to Cappellin (1990) there
are at least three reasons to regard business services explicitly in the context
of technological innovation:
• The transfer of new producer services to industrial firms may be regarded
as a major organizational (or process) innovation at the firm level.
• The creation of such services (either as new products of existing firms or
in the form of the birth of new service firms) in a certain area may be
regarded as a product innovation.
• Service firms may adopt such organizational (or process) innovations in
order to increase their productivity or to improve the quality of services
offered.
In most diffusion studies the S-shaped curve forms a central component.
Both the adoption time and the adoption rate can be pictured in this curve.
The precise shape of the S-curve can then be explained from firm size, market
structure, profitability of innovations, etc. An important role can be played
in this context by (barriers to) information transfer in a spatial system (see
Giaoutzi and Nijkamp, 1988). It is evident that the adoption of innovations
via a spatial transfer mechanism brings also the demand side of innovations
back into the picture. In this context various social-spatial communication
linkages/patterns are often distinguished, such as hierarchical and contagious
diffusion patterns.
Diffusion models can then be used to mirror the techno-economic land-
scape of a spatial system, although normally such models are hampered by
a major shortcoming, i.e., the presupposed stability of parameters. This is
a major flaw in diffusion analysis, as in this case the Schumpeterian swarm-
ing effects of new basic technologies and the feedback effects from adopted
innovations on spatial structures cannot be adequately taken into account
(see also Alderman, 1990).
Another field where operational research would still need further devel-
opment is the channels along which diffusion takes place. Information trans-
fer systems, technology and R&D centers, industrial institutional agencies,
consultancy and banking institutions, and many other (formal or informal)
channels serve to enhance the flexible transmission and adoption of (infor-
mation on) new technological innovations. However, which channels are eco-
nomically most efficient and politically most effective is still an open research
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question in diffusion research. Therefore, it is worth exploring these points
by dealing more explicitly with networks of relations - potential channels of
diffusion - between actors.
5.4 Networks
Networks are becoming an increasingly popular issue in the scientific litera-
ture. There is a growing awareness that firms should not be seen as individual
organisms that live their own lives independently from other actors in their
economic, social, and cultural environment. Waves of merger activities and
takeovers have resulted in noticeable effects (and sometimes disruption), not
only in financial circles, but also in local employment situations and welfare.
Technological change, e.g., in telecommunications - information technology
- has resulted in locational changes of parts of multinational organizations
and changing activity patterns. Government efforts to stimulate innovative
industries, and the growing interest for autonomous growth potential, ter-
ritorial industrial complexes, and local initiatives have induced a great deal
of interest in the networks of relations between firms, including the diffusion
of innovations.
After a brief review of existing theoretical paradigms, we will explain the
behavior of the actor in his contextual situation. We do so, in order to deal
with two main issues already raised in Section 5.1, Le., the impact of (the
configuration of) actors in a network upon technogenesis, and the impact of
(the configuration of) these actors upon adoption and diffusion inside the
network.
Two main streams of theorizing playa major role in the network litera-
ture: field theory and systems theory. For instance, Perroux (1955) describes
how actors meet on a plan in abstract economic space, where they try to
dominate other actors and the relevant plan in economic space. Some actors
may be active on various plans - they are multidimensional. The position of
an actor in the arena on the plan - in the field - is determined by external
forces and internal forces. External forces are demand, public policies, etc.,
internal forces are the - nonrational - drives of actors.
Systems theory may be used to describe attempts to externalize internal
problems of actors (resulting in negative external effects) and to internal-
ize external problems (by means of, e.g., internal labor markets, informa-
tion systems, capital supply). It also assists in describing behavior to resist
threats and challenges. A process comparable with "negentropic" behavior:
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the capability to attain stability in a time-dependent steady state. In our
context, we would use stability in terms of market power, aggregate power,
and network power. The major drawback of this approach is the assumed
equilibrium that ignores Schumpeterian disequilibria. The continuous shifts
in coalitions between actors in a network would call for a more dynamic ap-
proach, like chaos theory, game theory combined with Markov-type decision
models.
After this brief overview, we will deal with the adoptive behavior of the
actor and the contextual role.
5.4.1 Cause for change: The competitive challenges
The major reason for actors to reorganize their activities, to change their
routines, originates from the competitive forces to which they are subjected.
Actors that fail to respond to competitive challenges, threats or opportuni-
ties, will find themselves on the loser's side. Actors that opt for the wrong
strategy may face the same fate, or may be the subject of takeover raids.
Although a proper response to competitive challenges is of vital importance,
three major categories of causes for weak performance may occur:
(1) Actors are not aware of the challenge or alarmingly poor performance.
(2) Actors are aware of the challenge, but do not know the proper strategy
to follow.
(3) Actors are aware of the challenge, know the proper response but are
unable to implement the proper strategy.
The first two cases are information gap problems. The reason for this
gap can be manifold. Ignorance, poor information retrieval systems, value
perception gaps, false routines, inertia, no gatekeepers, isolated location,
poor management, and so on are examples (cf. Kamann, 1985). Or, the
configuration of actors, the network, one participates in may be a combina-
tion of poor quality. This may be caused by geographical backwardness or
isolation, but also by selecting the wrong companions. However, the actor
also may be a victim of deliberate exclusion. Strategic information may be
withheld by other actors in an attempt to gain a more advantageous po-
sition. This aspect also causes the third bottleneck: an actor is unable to
seize opportunities or fight threats because of external circumstances beyond
his control. Therefore, when we want to study the innovative behavior and
performance of individual actors, we have to do so in the proper context of
external relations.
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5.4.2 Three dimensions of space
In the preceding sections we have dealt with two spatial dimensions: geo-
graphical space and economic space. We will now add a third dimension:
sociocultural space. Actors have to work in a given sociocultural setting.
This local sociocultural environment may favor certain technologies, ways
of producing goods and services (Kamann, 1988), like Tayloristic production
techniques, and by doing so may hamper other technologies. It favors a par-
ticular regime d'accumulation, a particular regime de regulation (Aglietta,
1986). The finding that technologies and their organizational and ideological
or cultural dimensions are closely related elements, also means that changes
in any element requires suitable or adequate adaptations in the other ele-
ments. In network and organizational terms: a network with a traditional
- Tayloristic - organization and matching culture, will be a slow adopter of
technologies that are alien to that organization and culture, and vice versa.
Part of the influence of sociocultural space is the process of socialization
and culturalization that individuals experience. This moulds the internalized
value system and behavior, the personality (Kamann, 1988) of the actors,
given their biological and genetic inheritance.
All three spaces show a differentiation. Geographical space is polarized
with large metropolitan areas and rural areas. Economic space is polarized
for many types of activities: Toyota, Nissan, GM, Ford as giants in the seg-
ment - the plan - of automobile industries versus the peripheral sweat-shops
in dual production situations. Sociocultural space also is polarized: "west-
ern" societies, with their emphasize on individual action versus societies with
more "traditional" or even feudal value systems. As a result, actors in some
societies are better able to cope with western competitive systems or decen-
tralized decision-making procedures and production systems than others,
in other societies. Even inside western societies, the large cities show dis-
tinct differences from the rural areas; both in sociocultural environment and
technology. It results in different types of personalities and characteristics;
different managerial types. These elements, which playa role when start-
ing new high-risk enterprises or when drastically changing routines, show a
distinct geographical differentiation.
To the differentiation in the three dimensions of space we have to add
their dynamics. The environment is not static, it changes. Some actors
may even have the perception to live in a chaotic environment. In light of
the diffusion theories described above, we may say that these dynamics do
not occur at all places at the same time; some actors are facing turbulence
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earlier than others. It also means that some actors have adapted to the new
situation at the same time other actors are in a state of shock, which makes
them vulnerable to attacks from the first category. Furthermore, the nature
of the environment shows a significant differentiation in geographical space,
apart from the diffusion aspects. Whereas actors in one area may have a
very stimulating environment, other actors, in other areas may find their
environment very hostile. They have to use much of their energy to solve
the problems arising out of that environment.
The spatial differentiation of the three dimensions is one cause for dif-
ferences in performance between actors. A second cause can be found when
studying the nature of external relations with other actors. We could term
this the network performance of actors. The question is, why do actors
participate in networks at all?
5.4.3 Motives for participation and types of partnership
The answer to the question why actors participate in networks is a rather
easy one: since they have suppliers and buyers, they automatically are partic-
ipants in a network. Networking not only consists of cooperative projects,
partnerships and relations based on trust. Network relations also include
those with actors one considers to be "the enemy". Apart from this auto-
matic - passive - network participation, we will describe the motives for
active network participation.
Keeping or increasing the market share is one of the most important
strategies of actors. Therefore, given the information gap we mentioned,
we will find that a significant part of network participation of actors is di-
rected towards collecting information about customers, suppliers, the com-
petitors and his products, prices, R&D programs and policies, new markets
and changes in market shares of existing markets. Hence, the information
contents of relations are important.
In his attempts to increase his share of the market or simply to meet the
challenge posed by competitors or newcomers, an actor is likely to run into
obstacles or may well find some bottlenecks when implementing a proper
and adequate strategy. These bottlenecks can occur in research, develop-
ment, finance, production, distributing, marketing, organization, and so on.
Actors have become aware that technological developments these days very
rarely take place in a single firm. It is an "interplay between different or-
ganizations where independent activities are taking place simultaneously in
different parts of the network" (Laage-Hellman, 1987, p. 31). This implies
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that firms realize that in a number of cases it is better to co-develop product
and process innovations with suppliers, buyers or even competitors. "Dif-
ferent units have different resources and skills which are complementary in
nature" (Laage-Hellman, 1987, p. 37). The value of the network in this case
is the combination of "resources" and "skills" which as such is unobtainable
for each of the actors involved. This positive value remains positive, even
when the individual actor has to increase his dependency on other actors.
Active network participation and distribution of activities enable increased
specialization of each actor, while increasing the need for interaction because
of the required coordination. "The establishment of development relation-
ships may in other words be a pre-condition for increasing specialization of
the in-house development process" (Axelsson, 1987, p. 131). Actors start
partnerships depending on the bottleneck they experience and the type of
specialization they prefer.
When network performance is defined as the wayan actor is able to use
external relations to achieve his goals and to solve bottlenecks, the following
two questions follow: Who are the other actors? What is the nature of
external relations?
As a collective operator, one network may compete with other networks
in the same market. However, the more - different - actors that participate,
the more important coordination becomes. Efficient networks show fast in-
formation diffusion - when such is required - and coordinated innovative
efforts. As we will see later on, we may find that control and coordination
often coincide.
5.4.4 The other actors
The question "who are the other actors" relates to matters such as effec-
tiveness of relations. Does an actor have suppliers that provide him with
the latest products, machines, know-how, and information? Is he in contact
with producers of new substitutes? Are the suppliers and buyers reliable
and trustworthy? What about the competitors? To answer these questions,
we first have to make a brief detour and describe the class of potential ex-
ternal actors an actor can relate to. This class of entities external to the
individual actor and determining his behavior and performance is known as
the selection environment, milieu innovateur or "atmosphere". Because of
its dynamic character, terms such as turbulent fields or even chaos are used.
We distinguish four sub-categories of actors in the selection environment
(Kamann, 1988):
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• Friends and relatives.
• Actors related to locational factors.
• Institutional - usually non-market - actors.
• Actors that are specific to the product market combination of an actor
and his corporate linkages.
Family and relatives playa role in the socialization process, act as a
peer group and sometimes advise in business matters. Here, we find a cul-
tural differentiation between countries and areas. In some areas, social and
business contacts are mixed, in others, they are not.
Locational factors make a location attractive or unattractive. Actors,
related to these factors, for instance, represent infrastructural services, water
works, energy suppliers or railroad companies. Examples of actors of the
third category are trade union representatives, public administrators, and
lobbies. Two organizational elements included here are the organization
of firms and the organization of the built-up environment. The former is
better known as industrial agglomeration effects in economic space, while
the latter is known as urbanization effects in geographical space. Economic
and geographical space used to coincide for agglomeration effects. Because of
improved transport and communication techniques and modes, we find that
agglomeration effects in economic space no longer necessarily coincide with
geographical space. The widespread phenomenon of the branch-plant that
links to a corporate network of communication, information and transport is
a good example from the 1960s. Presently, we find that just-in-time deliveries
allow for a hundred miles - for the Dutch case - between suppliers and their
main buyer, even for vital parts and components. In spite of this, we still
find examples of agglomeration effects in geographical space (Storper and
Scott, 1990). However, it is not a necessary condition any more for survival
of especially the niche operating firm, particularly when it is linked up to
a proper network. As to urbanization effects, apart from the usual public
services, they also include business services and as such are a locational
factor for, e.g., office activities.
The fourth category of actors in the selection environment we mentioned
contains units of the corporate network and competitors, suppliers, cus-
tomers, producers of potential substitutes or possible entrants.
We can project the differentiation in economic and sociocultural space on
geographical space, and add these to the existing differentiation in locational
features of its selection environment. Together, they show the differences in
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opportunities for existing firms, the formation of new firms and the innova-
tive behavior of actors.
5.4.5 The nature of relations
Having introduced the potential set of actors one can relate to, we face the
second question: what is the nature of these relations?
Markets and Hierarchies
Following Williamson's (1975, 1979, and 1987) transaction cost theory,
we could use a continuum between "markets" and "hierarchies" or intra-
organizational arrangements. The choice between the two extremes - the
make or buy question - is based on an optimalization process of the organi-
zational form and a minimalization of costs. Three aspects playa role:
(1) Asset specificity. Durable goods and R&D tie up large investments. This
reduces the flexibility in changing policies. The most common types of
asset specificity are:
• Site specificity, resulting in minimizing transport costs.
• Physical specificity, related to machines or products that can be
used for only one particular product or item.
• Human asset specificity, related to the built-up routines of employ-
ees, researchers, shop-floor workers and directors.
Investments in machines and employees required to satisfy the de-
mand of a large buyer may result in a situation of bilateral monopoly; the
supplier and buyer are mutually dependent. The supplier has no other
alternative demand for his products, nor can he shift to other products
without a great loss, while the buyer has no alternative supplier, nor can
he make the product himself without heavy investments in machines and
human capital and at a cost of lost loss of sales because of transitional
problems. Asset specificity is no exceptional case, although buyers try
to prevent such by means of "dual sourcing". Because of recent techno-
logical developments, asset specificity has become a rule rather than an
exception in numerous intermediate markets.
(2) Uncertainty about the future. Like other human beings, actors try to
reduce risks, allowing for maximum freedom to break up relations when
they become burdensome. The price to be paid is determined by infor-
mation, negotiating, and quality assurance costs. The choice between
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long-term relationships and short-term relationships is what we would
call the relation specificity. Investments in mutual trust, knowing each
other, understanding each other, and especially knowing whom to ad-
dress for information or to fix things.
(3) Frequency. Transaction chains show a repetitive pattern. This reduces
the costs of breaking up a relation, although this is difficult to quantify.
This problem of quantifying costs of a relation coincides with the problem
of quantifying the costs and benefits when externalizing certain activi-
ties. Quantifying the immediate production-related costs may be quite
possible. Quantifying the costs of increased uncertainty in information,
quality, and reliability is another thing.
The choice between markets and hierarchy, in-house production, is rather
easy for the two extreme cases: the one-off job versus eternal production.
However, these extremes are not always the case in real life.
The transaction cost theory assumes that hierarchy does not exist in mar-
kets, and markets do not exist in organizations. Real-life experience shows
that the opposite is true: a market transaction between completely equal
partners - atomistic actors - is an exception rather than a rule. Further,
it ignores that, as Johanson and Mattson (1984) correctly state, today the
goals of many actors cannot be achieved but through other actors. In other
words, actors depend on their network partners for the realization of their
goals. This implies a minimal mutual trust in relations. It means that actors
have to recognize the goals of their partners.
In large corporations, an additional problem occurs when the decision to
externalize or internalize has to be taken. Externalizing an activity means
that the internal unit that used to perform that activity will lose power.
Therefore, that unit is likely to oppose such a decision and will lobby to pre-
vent such. Or, in the opposite case, the unit will give favorable information
about its abilities to perform activities that previously were done externally
and is tempted to give low-cost figures.
Given the fact that the theory largely ignores spatial differentiation - in
any space - and knowledge, skills, machines, products, and sites are consid-
ered to be homogeneous, one is tempted to declare transaction cost theory
to be a neoclassical equilibrium theory (Johanson and Mattson, 1984). Still,
the basic question of whether to make or buy is valid; when less unrealistic
assumptions are included, the theory could become rather valuable.
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Between Markets and Hierarchies: Networks
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We just discussed the polarity markets and intra-organizational hierarchies.
We now focus on the part in between: network relations. We express the
degree of dependency, hierarchy, induced by these remaining relations by a
scale. On one side we find completely symmetric exchange relations between
equal partners. On the other side of the continuous scale we find the asym-
metric relations of complete dependency/dominance in market relations.
The ideal case of a symmetric transaction relation is the exchange of a
product for money between two atomistic actors. An example of a symmetric
relation in partnership is the exchange of production of certain products by
Dutch oligopolistic dairy companies. Neither partner would reach economies
of scale for either of the two products. When exchanging the production of
the two products, each firm produces one product for both partners involvedj
thereby achieving economies of scale.
An example of the other extreme case can be found in the "dual produc-
tion organization" j for instance, the case of the Japanese kanban system of
a many-tiered hierarchy of sub-contractors (Storper and Scott, 1990).
Hence, we find a continuum of partnerships:
• Exchange of production between two or more competitors enable all ac-
tors involved to obtain scale effects.
• The joint venture, a form useful for:
Development of products and penetration of markets.
Expansion in markets.
Consolidation of markets by horizontal integration.
Retreat from markets.
• Long-term contracts between suppliers and one of their important buyers.
They should guarantee timely and reliable deliveries, and enable suppliers
to invest in innovations required by their buyer.
• Joint production planning between suppliers and buyers to enable zero-
stock-inventories and just-in-time deliveries.
• Joint planning of suppliers and their industrial buyers where the latter
give active support to R&D and capital.
• Dual production organizationj the sweat shops, sub-contractors, and
other supliersj here a one-sided monopoly exists. For the buyer, it is
easy to shift to other suppliersj for the supplier, this is impossible.
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Licence agreements can be part of any of the partnerships mentioned,
including straightforward market transactions without any partnership in-
volved.
Type of Dependency
As we said before, various activities between network participants are linked
together in transaction chains that tend to repeat established configurations.
This may induce the following dependencies in relations:
• Technical dependency occurs when products and services fit technically
together and result in inter-industry standards. Therefore, within net-
works, coordination mainly focuses on rigid transaction chains, while ac-
tors are allowed more freedom in less rigid links (Kamann and Strijker,
1990).
• Knowledge dependency means that the supplier has to know the re-
quirements of users of their products, while users have to know what
they actually can do with their input materials, machines, hardware and
software.
• Continuity dependence occurs when a supplier sells a large share of his
output to a single buyer. The actual percentage is a function of the power
of the actors involved, the profit margins and the profitability of other
activities of the firm. The reverse occurs when producers depend on a
single supplier for a particular product or service they require. Firms will
try to prevent this situation by applying dual sourcing. However, in a
large number of cases, increased specialization has led to single sourcing.
• Social dependency is the result of normal social group behavior, where
participants are likely to cooperate with other participants before estab-
lishing contacts with actors outside the network. Axelsson (1987, p. 159)
uses the term soft distance to indicate the sociocultural distance between
actors or entire networks: attitudes, values, norms, culture. The term
hard distance indicates the distance in kilometers.
• Logistical and administrative dependency means that suppliers and buy-
ers have to use the same system to be able to communicate. High switch-
ing costs prevent small suppliers to switch easily to other buyers with
different systems.
• Innovative dependency exists in three varieties: (i) user dominant, (ii)
supplier dominant, (iii) research dominant. Increased cooperation be-
tween suppliers, users, and research institutes or consultants makes this
division less valid today. The new question is who took the initiative -
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the impetus - for new developments, rather than who actually carried
out the development work, produced or used the product or process.
• Financial dependency may have rather important effects, ranging from
profits and strategic information leaking away to enforced purchase of
licences, goodwill, and products. Complete takeovers tend to lead to cen-
tralization of production activities in a particular location and centraliza-
tion of overhead activities in another location. The actor involved runs
the risk of converting his plant into a standardized production branch
plant. Even when he remains relatively independent as a business unit,
corporate planning, investment decisions, and tax management are trans-
ferred to the parent company.
The various types of dependency, usually in a user dominant relationship,
may result in the dual production organization. Based on the dual segmen-
tation theory this theory assumes a primary and a secondary sector. Large
and technically sophisticated corporations are part of the primary sector or
core of the economy. They operate in stable and safe segments of markets
applying modern, capital intensive Fordist mass-production techniques. In
the secondary sector or peripheral sector, relatively small firms operate with
flexible technologies, catering for fluctuating and risky markets. Companies
in the core sector externalize uncertainty and labor costs to the peripheral
firms. In secondary firms, wages are low, prospects are poor, working con-
ditions are bad. Alan Scott (1985, p. 17), for instance, found that many
secondary firms in Orange County employ Mexican and Asian workers since
these "cannot perceive or are unable to demand ... recognition of rights".
Although it increases local linkages compared to the situation with branch
plants, it dominates local firms and segments the labor market. It is a new
variant of the cumulative causation theory.
Most of the relations we discussed so far were of a dyadic nature: between
two actors. We will now broaden our scope to more relations: the network.
5.4.6 Plans in space
Returning to Perroux's description, we see that actors meet on an abstract
plan in economic space. For the time being, we will assume, that an actor
coincides with the entire firm: a holistic concept of the firm.
Some actors only deal with actors in their own production column: their
upstream and downstream partners. We would label these actors one-
dimensional actors. They operate on a single plan in space [Figure 5.1(a)].
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A second category deals with actors that operate on two unrelated plans. For
instance Philips microelectronics, and formerly Philips-Duphar pharmaceu-
tics. These actors can be named multidimensional unrelated actors [Figure
5.1(b)]. Because of the present increased emphasis on core activities, many
actors of the latter type are separated into two independent actors. Finally,
a third category operates on more plans in space at the same time. For
instance the transport firm, specialized in transporting cut flowers, operates
on the transportation plan, facing large carriers, car manufacturers, logis-
tical services and so on. It also operates on the horticultural plan, facing
large wholesalers, auctions, state agencies, and so on. The transport firm in
fact operates in an intersection of the two plans. These actors can be named
multidimensional related actors [Figure 5.1 (c)].
Role of Dimensions
The effect of being one-dimensional, multidimensional related or multidi-
mensional unrelated is twofold:
• The performance of one-dimensional actors is determined by the nature
and configuration of the network on a single plan. The performance of
multidimensional actors on a particular plan is also determined by the
nature of the networks and the position of the particular actors in those
networks on other plans. This implies that an actor may be hampered
to pursue certain strategies on one of the plans, networks, it operates on
since it has to put all its resources in its struggle for survival on another
plan. Or the reverse side could occur in that an actor may improve
its position on one plan because of cross-subsidizing its efforts with the
profits earned on another plan.
• Diffusion of innovations may be facilitated from one plan to another plan
through bridge actors that operate on both plans. This may give this
actor a competitive edge. It also means that actors not only have to
be aware of new developments - innovations, potential substitutes - on
their own plan, but also on all related plans. This is, with the limited
time available, a severe handicap for the average small firm.
5.4.7 Type of network
Actors meet other actors on plans, sometimes passively, sometimes actively.
The question is, when are we allowed to say they are part of a network and
when is it just a dyadic relation? A rather general definition of network is
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Figure 5.1. One-dimensional and multidimensional actors in space.
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the "totality of all units connected by a certain type of relationship" (Jay,
1964, p. 138) or Cook and Emerson's (1978, p. 725) statement that between
actors, "sets of two or more connected exchange relations" are established,
shaping the network. The obvious question here is, how many relations have
to exist before we can use the term network. From the literature we derive
five categories:
(1) The dyadic relation, when based on information "tend to grow out of in-
terpersonal associations between organizational representatives" (Whet-
ten, 1987, p. 240), both agency theory and transaction cost theory focus
on a dyadic relation.
(2) The cluster of relations, forming a clique or coalition inside the
organization.
(3) Organization sets, constituted around a focal actor, "it is not a real
network, because ... the relations between the interacting organizations
are ignored" (Whetten, 1987, p. 240).
(4) The action set is a coalition or clique between organizations; "purposive
networks ... working together to accomplish a specific purpose" (Whet-
ten, 1987, p. 241), compare Galbraith's (1963) theory of countervailing
power.
(5) Networks, "consist of all interactions between organizations in a pop-
ulation, regardless of how the population is organized into dyads, or-
ganization sets or action sets" (Whetten, 1987, p. 242). This broad
definition can easily become an "every actor has to do with every other
actor". However, "a network ... is a construct created by an investiga-
tor" (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981, p. 387), which means in practice that
networks are limited in size because the researcher usually has to limit
his scope.
5.4.8 Conspiracy, opportunism, and trust
The difference between the various types of clusters that may be found in
networks sometimes is a matter of the number of relations. In some types,
we find an element of conspiracy. However, as with most conspiracies, not
every participant will receive an equal share of the cake. Given the inequal-
ity among the conspirators - inequality in market force, financial strength,
know-how, and especially, information - the winner may try to take it all.
This may induce a new series of attempts to conspire more successfully by
those who find themselves less privileged than they had hoped.
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The reason for using the term conspiracy is that in our perception this is
a combination of mutual trust and opportunistic behavior. It is reflected in
the cooperation paradox: actors realize that they need each other to pursue
their objectives, but at the same time do not want to become dependent on
others. They are worried that the partner gets more out of it or runs off with
all the benefits and secrets. This paradox causes cooperative agreements,
e.g., joint ventures, to show an unstable pattern of behavior; exist until the
conditions that favored cooperation change. This cooperation paradox not
only exists in relation to production economics; all kinds of social systems
show such unstable cooperation patterns.
In conclusion, we say that actors show an opportunistic behavior in some
relations, establish mutual trust in others and finally mix the two elements
in conspiracies with a third set of actors to which they relate.
5.4.9 The selection process: From potential reservoir to
actual segment
Given the potential number of actors with which contacts could be made,
an actor selects a certain network segment. This term coincides with the
term microposition (Johanson and Mattson, 1984), and stands for the ac-
tual configuration of relations between actors. In such a segment, there are
some actors that one particular actor very rarely meets, while he may have
intensive contacts with others. When an actor has no direct contacts with
certain actors, but assumes that other persons, who are included in his list
of contacts, meet these actors, then this is termed indirect contacts.
J know someone, and they know someone, but I don't know who they know.
The power of the network is that the participants all know it exists. We
all know that we know lots of people in the Valley ... the rate of rumor-
passing in Silicon Valley is simply phenomenal. Reputations, successes,
people leaving a firm, new products. The mill grinds out these rumors at a
prodigious rate [Rogers and Larssen, 1987, p. 80].
We find two types of weak contacts in literature:
• Infrequent contacts or weak relations that are "kept in storage" for mo-
ments they become of importance: public agents in charge of, e.g., build-
ing permission, grants or subsidies. They are of no importance for the
regular operation of the firm. Relations with frequent and intensive con-
tacts are termed intensive.
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• Sole contacts with actors that belong to another network or cluster or
plan. Breaking up the relation ends all contacts between two clusters.
These contacts may provide important information about new technolo-
gies and increase diffusion from one cluster to the actor's; the bridges
between clusters. When they are sole operators, not closely related to
any specific cluster or network, they are termed liaisons - e.g., knowledge
brokers.
5.4.10 The role of personality
The choice of the actual network segment - whether contacts will be direct
or indirect, strong or weak - is a strategic choice. Since this choice is very
rarely made with full information about the potential network, the resulting
incompleteness is aggravated by a geographical limitation of the actor's scope
and his sub-sector fixation.
This stage of the selection process is largely determined by the personality
of the actor, his business routines, and goals. A multiple actor organization
has many actors in different functions, roles, and tasks. Each actor has his
own personality, and groups of actors demonstrate subcultures and coalition
behavior.
5.4.11 Leaving the holistic concept of the firm
In the last paragraph, we actually left the holistic concept of the firm. Actors
in each functional department of a firm will have their own interest and type
of information required and their own sets of actors that are important to
them. For instance, actors in the sales department focus on buyers while pro-
duction workers focus on machine suppliers (Hamfelt and Lindberg, 1987).
In the management literature, this view is supported by Porter (1985). It
makes our understanding of networking more complete.
5.4.12 Porter's "value chain" and "value system"
Porter (1985) introduced his "value system" and "value chain" to analyze
competitive advantage. The value chain disaggregates a firm into its strate-
gically relevant activities (Porter, 1985, p. 33). These activities are primary
activities, such as inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, market-
ing and sales, and service; and support activities, like firm infrastructure,
human resource management, technology development, and procurement.
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The primary activities form the columns, the support activities the rows in
a matrix.
Firms now may start "coalitions", that "involve coordinating or sharing
value chains with coalition partners" (Porter, 1985, p. 34). In other words,
a firm may try to increase its competitive advantage by starting cooperative
partnerships for certain segments of its value chain: the cells of the matrix
to which we referred. The actors involved are also required to understand
the jargon of each segment, the segmental "culture" and, to use the words
of Crevoisier and Maillat (1989), the "savoir-faire". It implies that:
• Firms are a vector of network segments in which they operate, represent-
ing functions and activities.
• This vector contains different segments.
• The firm as unit is to be a multidimensional actor.
• Some of the network relations may show conflicting interests.
• When the size of a firm is an indicator for functional segmentation and
diversification, it also means that large firms may run into coordination
problems between the various networking interests involved.
• Large firms are likely to pick up innovations from related network seg-
ments that are valuable for its competitive position.
The required coordination is a matter of balancing control; a delicate bal-
ance between centralized authority and decentralized decision-making power.
The optimal balance varies between products, markets, and especially tech-
nologies used. It determines the success of the entire corporate organization.
In fact, a very similar argument goes for networks. Therefore, methods of
running a network bear resemblance with the strategic management and con-
trol of a corporate firm. However, this assumes an unequal distribution of
power over the participating actors. The issue to study therefore is whether
the so-called symbiotic networks, with flat networks, are as successful as con-
trolled hierarchical networks. Or, perhaps they are not as flat as has been
assumed.
5.4.13 Network orientation and geographical orientation
We concluded that activities in the organization differ in their mix and types
of internal and external contacts and with different actors involved. From
research in contact systems and urban orientation, we know that some of
the external actors are exclusively located in metropolitan areas (Goddard,
1973). This implies that a single actor firm with restricted time available
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will find it hard to have proper network contacts. A large multiple actor or-
ganization can specialize and distribute the various contacts. Although this
requires an internal network that also consumes time, special gatekeepers
act as the interface with the environment and provide relevant external in-
formation, translated into the jargon of the internal network. As a result of
this, activities that draw their information from the internal network are less
dependent on the location in the source area of their relevant information,
the focus (Kamann, 1988), as long as their gatekeepers are there. To extend
the parallel between corporations and networks to this point: we may say
that proper networking may give the same results to the participants, and
may make actors relatively "footloose".
Using relocation costs and opportunity costs of missed information, an
organization may optimize its location. However, persons have a mix of ac-
tivities and therefore may have different priorities and preferences for certain
localities. In an organization with numerous actors the usual social processes
will take place, where coalitions or cliques and power rather than individual
ratio will decide where the total group will locate. These social processes
with their culturally determined characteristics should be incorporated in an
attempt to describe and predict organizational behavior in this context.
5.4.14 Measuring control: The distribution of power
When visualizing and measuring relations between actors, we will use the
terms manifest and latent. Manifest characteristics of relations are observ-
able entities. They consist of:
(1) Material relations: flows of goods, services, capital, printed information,
human embodied information, and skills.
(2) Immaterial exchange relations: information through personal contacts.
The first category can be visualized by applying input/output analysis
or by means of the expanded filiere approach (Kamann, 1988). The second
category can be visualized through contact systems and interlocking systems.
The latent characteristics of relations are not directly observable but may
be derived or inferred from observable manifest characteristics. Latent char-
acteristics mainly deal with the "strategic value of a relation related to the
issue of dominance and performance. Manifest relations are the materialized
dimension oflatent relations" (Kamann and Nijkamp, 1990, p. 15). Features
of latent relations are classified under three headings:
(1) The already mentioned dependencies.
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(2) Instability; at the micro level found in the growth or decline of the in-
dividual firm; at the meso level found in takeovers, mergers, market-
concentration, and collusive and conglomerate behavior; at the macro
level found in the general reduction of life cycles, the international shift
in economic power in geographical space, and the duality between mass
production and flexible, customized production.
(3) Paradigm fixation; such aspects as inertia (Kamann, 1986) of entire net-
works may occur (compare asset specificity). The social aspect of this
implies that areas with an activity dominating the social network "re-
pulse" actors with activities perceived as "alien" to those in power.
5.4.15 Techniques to visualize latent relations
A common method of visualizing networks uses directed graphs and matri-
ces (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981, p. 397; this also includes a discussion on
methodological problems involved). Terms such as "density", "reachability",
and "hierarchy" or "centrality" are used and operationalized. Its static ori-
entation, however, makes this type of analysis less suitable for our purpose.
Following the work of Simon (1962) and others, the linking pin theory
became a popular object of study. "Having ties to more than one action-
set or subsystem, linking pin organizations are the nodes through which a
network is loosely joined" (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981, p. 390). The three
main functions of linking pin organizations are:
• Communicating between organizations.
• Providing general services interlinking third parties.
• When dominant, serving as an example.
A popular technique to visualize the structure of loosely connected sub-
systems is ~~block modeling" based on a transaction matrix. This technique
seems to be useful for identifying pockets of intense interaction between
members, but does not examine relationships between the clusters (Whet-
ten, 1987, p. 242). This makes it less suitable for our purposes.
We propose a triple technique as a methodology to visualize dominance
in networks:
(1) Draw up an expanded jiliere, containing all material links that the re-
searcher judges as significant; in order to increase a proper judgment,
the researcher should be familiar with the sector and actors involved.
(2) Visualize immaterial links between actors; compare this picture with (1).
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(3) Use the technique of shocks: threats and challenges (Kamann and Strij-
ker, 1990). Using a dynamic analysis of the network, the enforcement
of power and possible shifts in power can be traced. The outcome of
(3) feeds back to (1) and (2) to check whether all significant actors and
their links are included. It checks the initial arbitrary judgment of the
researcher.
To this triple technique, we suggest to add a fourth layer, covering the
cultural dimension: the symbols, myths, stories, heroes, customs, script,
shared values, and uses of the network.
5.4.16 How to observe power, dynamics, and paradigm
fixation
In order to operationalize the various types of dependencies, dynamics, and
paradigm fixation, we first of all have to deal with terms such as "control",
"power" or "dependency". In a static situation, power supposedly leads to
an unequal distribution of profit margins over the actors involved. Further-
more, one could use market share or the market concentration ratio, and
the aggregate concentration ratio. Other potential useful indicators are the
share of input or output that an actor, a single supplier, or a buyer accounts
for and, related to this, the situation of dual sourcing of input versus a sin-
gle buyer of output. However, in our opinion, power of control should be
measured in a dynamic context. Kamann and Strijker (1990) describe it as
the ability to:
• Prevent a partner from terminating the relation, the no exit power.
• Prevent a partner from duplicating relations with other actors, the power
of exclusiveness.
• Exclude potential newcomers from the network or even from the market
involved, the no entry power.
• Start and induce innovations in products, processes, materials used and
organizational setup, set standards, dictate research agendas, in other
words, dictate the technological trajectory or even the entire paradigm.
• Prevent innovations, standards, and research projects.
• Internalize external threats to the network without giving up central
control.
• Dictate network responses to outside dangers and opportunities.
• "Control" the interlocking system, to have one's representatives replace
representatives of other actors.
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• Increase shareholding and/or board functions.
• Dictate the social paradigm.
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An analysis that tries to trace centrality of control - power - has to be
dynamic; attention should be paid to the various types of dependencies and
paradigm fixations or shifts as mentioned earlier.
5.4.17 Conclusions about networks
Actors do not live in an atomistic world, they depend on other actors. Be-
cause of cooperation between actors, specialization is possible and projects
can be pursued that otherwise would not be possible for each of the actors
involved. This network behavior creates a synergetic surplus.
The resulting degree of dependence is determined by the nature of the
mutual relations between actors. It affects the strategic value of flows of
information, goods, and services an actor is able to obtain. It involves the
freedom to act in the network and to select products, processes and markets,
suppliers and buyers, partners or competitors. Those actors who manage to
dominate network relations or even entire networks will try to consume the
synergetic surplus of the network, at the cost of an equal distribution over
all participants.
Whether this is organized in the style of the spatial product life cycle
- head office, pilot plant, standardized branch plants - or with more au-
tonomous business units is important for actors that are part of a corporate
network. For "independent" actors, it is important whether they are equal
partners or participants of a dual production organization, to mention the
two extreme cases of a scale. Takeovers of actors in a region by actors
that operate within the same region will result in job losses because of ra-
tionalization of production and overheads, but may increase the region's
competitiveness with actors from other regions. External control however,
from minority shareholding to complete takeovers may, in its worst form,
result in the closure of actors in the network and because of this, loss of jobs
and capital.
Therefore, we conclude that network domination not only affects the
locational choice of actors, but also the intrinsic value of activities in an
area. It therefore determines the present incomes generated in an area and
the possible incomes in the future.
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5.5 Conclusions
The spatial differentiation in the selection environment is an important as-
pect of the origin of new ideas and innovations. It also plays an important
role in the opportunities actors have to be informed about new developments
of relevance to them. Whether they can actually use new developments is to
a large extent determined by their network freedom and participation. Net-
work cooperation between actors creates a synergetic surplus. Those actors
who succeed to dominate other actors or even entire network segments will
consume that synergetic surplus at the cost of others.
Dominant actors will therefore, through these network relations, dom-
inate those areas where they are situated. Distribution of power over the
participants of a network and the ability to monopolize strategic informa-
tion in a network are important for the diffusion of innovations and for the
related distribution of incomes generated.
Unfortunately, so far only a few analytical models have been devised that
seek to cover the above-mentioned conflicting patterns of spatial
development.
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Chapter 6
New Product Diffusion
Models in Marketing:
A Review and Directions
for Research*
Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller, and Frank M. Bass
6.1 Introduction
The diffusion of an innovation traditionally has been defined as the process
by which that innovation is "communicated through certain channels over
time among the members of a social system" (Rogers, 1983, p. 5). As such,
the diffusion process consists of four key elements: innovation, communica-
tion channels, time, and the social system.
As a theory of communications, diffusion theory's main focus is on com-
munication channels, which are the means by which information about an
innovation is transmitted to or within the social system. These means con-
sist of both the mass media and interpersonal communications. Members
*Reprinted with permission from the Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 (January 1990),
1-26. Published by the American Marketing Association, Chicago, lL 60606, USA.
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of a social system have different propensities for relying on mass media or
interpersonal channels when seeking information about an innovation. Inter-
personal communications, including nonverbal observations, are important
influences in determining the speed and shape of the diffusion process in a
social system.
Since its introduction to marketing in the 1960s (Arndt, 1967; Bass,
1969; Frank et ai., 1964; King, 1963; Robertson, 1967; Silk, 1966), inno-
vation diffusion theory has sparked considerable research among consumer
behavior, marketing management, and management and marketing science
scholars. Researchers in consumer behavior have been concerned with evalu-
ating the applicability of hypotheses developed in the general diffusion area
to consumer research (Gatignon and Robertson, 1985). The marketing man-
agement literature has focused on the implications of these hypotheses for
targeting new product prospects and for developing marketing strategies
aimed at potential adopters (see, e.g., Engel et ai., 1986, Chapter 20; Kotler
and Zaltman, 1976; McKenna, 1985, Chapter 4). Researchers in manage-
ment and marketing science have contributed to the development of diffusion
theory by suggesting analytical models for describing and forecasting the dif-
fusion of an innovation in a social system. More recently, this literature also
has been concerned with developing normative guidelines for how an inno-
vation should be diffused in a social system.
We focus on the contributions of management and marketing science
literature to the cumulative understanding of the dynamics of innovation
diffusion. The main impetus underlying these contributions is a new prod-
uct growth model suggested by Bass (1969). The Bass model and its revised
forms have been used for forecasting innovation diffusion in retail service, in-
dustrial technology, agricultural, educational, pharmaceutical, and consumer
durable goods markets (Akinola, 1986; Bass, 1969; Dodds, 1973; Kalish and
Lilien, 1986a; Lancaster and Wright, 1983; Lawton and Lawton, 1979; Nev-
ers, 1972; Tigert and Farivar, 1981). Representative companies that have
used the model include Eastman Kodak, RCA, IBM, Sears and At&T (Bass,
1986).
Since publication of the Bass model, research on the modeling of the
diffusion of innovations in marketing has resulted in an extensive literature.
Contributions of this literature through the 1970s were reviewed by Mahajan
and Muller (1979). However, in the ensuing decade a plethora of studies has
contributed to our understanding of the structural, estimation, and concep-
tual assumptions underlying diffusion models. Though some of these recent
developments have been documented by Mahajan and Peterson (1985) and
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Mahajan and Wind (1986a), we now extend these efforts by presenting a
critical evaluation of the cumulative developments since the Bass (1969) and
Mahajan and Muller (1979) articles. Table 6.1 is a summary of these de-
velopments over the last two decades across five subareas: basic diffusion
models, parameter estimation considerations, flexible diffusion models, re-
finements and extensions, and use of diffusion models.
6.2 The Basic First-Purchase Diffusion Models
Mahajan and Muller (1979) have stated that the objective of a diffusion
model is to present the level of spread of an innovation among a given set
of prospective adopters over time. The purpose of the diffusion model is to
depict the successive increases in the number of adopters and predict the
continued development of a diffusion process already in progress. In the
product innovation context, diffusion models focus on the development of
a life cycle curve and serve the purpose of forecasting first-purchase sales
of innovations. That is, in the first-purchase diffusion models one assumes
that, in the product planning horizon being considered, there are no repeat
buyers and purchase volume per buyer is one unit. The number of adopters
defines the unit sales for the product. Diffusion models, by definition, are
concerned with representing the growth of a product category.
The best-known first-purchase diffusion models of new product diffusion
in marketing are those of Bass (1969), Fourt and Woodlock (1960), and
Mansfield (1961). These early models attempted to describe the penetration
and saturation aspects of the diffusion process. After briefly reviewing the
original formulations of these models, we review the recent developments
that further evaluate their basic structure.[l]
6.2.1 The Bass model
The main impetus underlying diffusion research in marketing is the Bass
model. Subsuming the models proposed by Fourt and Woodlock (1960) and
Mansfield (1961), the Bass model assumes that potential adopters of an
innovation are influenced by two means of communication - mass media and
word of mouth. In its development, it further assumes that the adopters
of an innovation comprise two groups. One group is influenced only by
the mass-media communication (external influence) and the other group is
influenced only by the word-of-mouth communication (internal influence).
Bass termed the first group "Innovators" and the second group "Imitators."
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Unlike the Bass model, the model proposed by Fourt and Woodlock (1960)
assumes that the diffusion process is driven primarily by the mass-media
communication or the external influence. Similarly, the model proposed by
Mansfield (1961) assumes this process is driven by word of mouth.
Figure 6.1 is a plot of the conceptual and analytical structure underlying
the Bass model. As noted in Figure 6.1 (a), the Bass model conceptually
assumes that "Innovators" or buyers who adopt exclusively because of the
mass-media communication or the external influence are present at any stage
of the diffusion process. Figure 6.1 (b) shows the analytical structure under-
lying the Bass model. As depicted, the noncumulative adopter distribution
peaks at time T*, which is the point of inflection of the S-shaped cumula-
tive adoption curve. Furthermore, the adopter distribution assumes that an
initial pm (a constant) level of adopters buy the product at the beginning
of the diffusion process. Once initiated, the adoption process is symmetric
with respect to time around the peak time T* up to 2T*. That is, the shape
of the adoption curve from time T* to 2T* is the mirror image of the shape
of the adoption curve from the beginning of the diffusion process up to time
T* (Mahajan et al., 1990).
The Bass model derives from a hazard function (the probability that an
adoption will occur at time t given that it has not yet occurred). Thus
f(t)j[l- F(t)] = p +qF(t) is the basic premise underlying the Bass model.
The density function of time to adoption is given by f( t) and the cumulative
fraction of adopters at time t is given by F(t). This basic premise states
that the conditional probability of adoption at time t (the fraction of the
population that will adopt at time t) is increasing in the fraction of the pop-
ulation that has already adopted. Therefore, the basic premise states that
part of the adoption influence depends on imitation or "learning" and part of
it does not. The parameter q reflects that influence and parameter p reflects
an influence that is independent of previous adoption. If q is zero, f( t) will
follow the negative exponential distribution. If m is the potential number
of ultimate adopters, the number of adopters at time t will be mf(t) = n(t)
and the cumulative number of adopters at time t will be mF(t) = N(t).
The basic premise of the Bass model can be manipulated, along with the
definitions just provided, to yield:
n(t) = dNd(t) = p[m - N(t)] + i-N(t)[m - N(t)].
t m
(6.1 )
The first term, p[m-N(t)], in equation (6.1) represents adoptions due to
buyers who are not influenced in the timing of their adoption by the number
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Figure 6.1. The Bass new product diffusion model. (a) Adoptions due to
external and internal influences in the Bass model. (b) Analytical structure
of the Bass model.
of people who have already bought the product. Bass (1969) referred to
p as the "coefficient of innovation." The second term in equation (6.1),
q/mN(t)[m-N(t)], represents adoptions due to buyers who are influenced by
the number of previous buyers. Bass (1969) referred to q as the "coefficient
of imitation." Note in equation (6.1) that at time t = 0, n(O) = pm.
Equation (6.1) is a first-order differential equation. It can be integrated
to yield the S-shaped cumulative adopter distributor, N(t). Once N(t) is
known, further differentiation yields expressions for the noncumulative num-
ber of adopters, n(t), and the time (T*) and magnitude [n(t*) and N(t*)] of
the peak of the adoption curve.[2]
V. Mahajan, E. Muller, and F.M. Bass 131
Given the basic structure of the Bass diffusion model, three questions
can be raised:
• How does the Bass model compare with the classical normal distribution
model proposed by Rogers (1983)?
• Is the Bass model complete in capturing the communication structure
between the two assumed distinct groups of innovators and imitators?
• How can the Bass model, which captures diffusion at the aggregate level,
be linked to the adoption decisions at the individual level?
Recent developments that address these three questions are discussed
next.
6.2.2 Unbundling of adopters
Rogers (1983, p. 244) has articulated that because of the interpersonal in-
teraction, the adoption curve should have a normal distribution. In fact,
using two basic statistical parameters of the normal distribution - mean and
standard deviation - Rogers has proposed an adopter categorization scheme
dividing adopters into five categories of Innovators, Early Adopters, Early
Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards.
To establish the linkage between the Bass model and the classical normal
distribution model, Mahajan et at. (1990) compared the two approaches. In
their comparison, they highlight two points. First, they argue that adopters
termed "Innovators" in the Bass model should not be called innovators be-
cause they are not necessarily the first adopters of an innovation, as defined
by Rogers. Following Lekvall and Wahlbin (1973), they suggest that because
the Bass model captures the spread of an innovation due to the mass me-
dia and interpersonal communication channels, the Bass model coefficients
p and q should be referred to as the coefficient of external influence and the
coefficient of internal influence, respectively. (We will use these labels in the
rest of this article.) They also provide an explicit expression to estimate
the total number of adoptions due to external influence at any time in the
diffusion process:
p [ 1+~ ]N}(t) = m-q In q (+ )t '1 + 15 e- p q
where N1(t) represents adoptions due to external influence. Hence, adoptions
due to internal influence are, N2(t) = N(t) - N1(t).
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Second, Mahajan et al. (1990) suggest that because one standard devi-
ation away from the mean of the normal distribution represents its points
of inflection (the analytical logic underlying the categorization scheme pro-
posed by Rogers), the same analytical logic can be used to develop adopters
categories for the Bass model. This scheme also yields five adopter categories
with the number of buyers (pm) who initiate the Bass model being defined
as innovators. Examining the diffusion of personal computers, Mahajan et
al. (1990) show how the adopter categories based on the Bass model can be
used to study differences among their profiles.
6.2.3 Innovators versus Imitators
Irrespective of the term "Innovators" used to label buyers who adopt because
of external influence in the Bass model, a question can be raised as to whether
the Bass model really captures the communication structure between two as-
sumed groups of adopters called "Innovators" and "Imitators." Emphasizing
this argument, Tanny and Derzko (1988) suggest that the communication
structure assumed in the Bass model is not complete. They propose an ex-
tension of the Bass model wherein (1) potential adopters are divided into two
distinct groups of Potential Innovators (say mI) and Potential Imitators (say
m2), (2) both Potential Innovators and Potential Imitators are influenced by
the mass-media communication, and (3) only Potential Imitators are influ-
enced by word of mouth due to Innovators and Imitators. To appreciate the
linkage between the Bass model and its extension proposed by Tanny and
Derzko (1988), consider the following rate equations they proposed:
dNI(t)
Innovators: dt = PI[mI - NI(t)]
Imitators: d~P) = P2[m2 - N2(t)] + q2[NI(t) + N2(t)]
[m2 - N2(t)]
(6.2)
(6.3)
(6.4)p[mI +m2 - NI(t) - N2(t)] +q2N(t)[m2 - N2(t)]
p[m - N(t)] +q2N(t)[m2 - N2(t)]
If we assume that PI = P2 = P (Le., the coefficient of external influence
is the same for both the groups), the total adoptions can be represented by
summing the two rate equations [and noting that mI +m2 = m and N(t) =
NI(t) + N2(t)].
dN(t)
dt
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Note that equation (6.4) is identical to the Bass model, equation (6.1),
except for the fact that equation (6.4) considers the word-of-mouth influence
on the potential adopters that are Potential Imitators rather than on all of
the potential adopters as is done in the Bass model. In their empirical
work on some of the consumer durable products analyzed by Bass (1969),
Tanny and Derzko (1988) did not find satisfactory results for their proposed
extension (the model either reduced to the Bass model or it failed to provide
estimates for the additional model coefficients). These empirical results are
not surprising because as the diffusion process progresses, the population
of potential adopters mostly comprises Potential Imitators, justifying the
parsimonious model suggested by Bass.
6.2.4 Diffusion models from individual adoption decisions
A key aspect of the Bass model is that it addresses the market in the aggre-
gate. The typical variable measured is the number of adopters who purchase
the product by a certain time t. The emphasis is on the total market re-
sponse rather than an individual customer. This approach is convenient in
practical terms but it raises the following issue: Can the diffusion model be
built by aggregating demand from consumers who behave in a neoclassical
microeconomic way? That is, assume that potential adopters are smart and
are not just carriers of information. They therefore maximize some objective
function such as expected utility or benefit from the product, taking into ac-
count the uncertainty associated with their understanding of its attributes,
its price, pressure from other adopters to adopt it, and their own budget. Be-
cause the decision to adopt the innovation is individual-specific, all potential
adopters do not have the same probability of adopting the product in a given
time period. Is it possible to develop the adoption curve at the aggregate
market level, given the heterogeneity among potential adopters in terms of
their probability of adopting the product at any time t? Development of a
model that answers this question can potentially assist in ascertaining the
effect of marketing mix and other variables on demand for the product via
their effect on individual consumers.
In recent years, attempts have been made by Hiebert (1974), Stoneman
(1981), Feder and O'Mara (1982), Jensen (1982), Oren and Schwartz (1988),
Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1989), and Lattin and Roberts (1989) to develop
diffusion models by specifying adoption decisions at the individual level. In
these models one assumes that, at any time t, a potential adopter's utility
for an innovation is based on his uncertain perception of the innovation's
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performance, value, or benefits. The potential adopter's uncertain percep-
tions about the innovation, however, change over time as he learns more
about the innovation from external sources (e.g., advertising) or internal
sources (e.g., word of mouth). Therefore, because of this learning, whenever
his utility for the innovation becomes greater than the status quo (he is bet-
ter off with the innovation), he adopts the innovation. Aggregation across
the various potential adopters yields the cumulative adoption curve.
Table 6.2 contrasts the various individual-level diffusion models on sev-
eral dimensions. Of all the models compared in Table 6.2, only three provide
explicit functions for aggregate diffusion models. Depending on the assump-
tions made about the distribution of parameters that measure heterogeneity
across individuals, the model by Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1989) yields
several basic diffusion models. If risk aversion across potential adopters is
assumed to follow a negative exponential distribution, the model by Oren
and Schwartz (1988) reduces to the Mansfield model. If the perceived differ-
ences in the potential benefits of the product across potential adopters are
assumed to follow a uniform distribution, Lattin and Roberts (1989) suggest
the following model.
d
N(t) = a +bN(t - 1) - N( )
c + t-1
(6.5)
where a, b, c, and d are constants. Using the data on several consumer
durables, they indicate that their model provides a better fit to the data
than the Bass model. Their model contains four parameters, however (vs.
three in the Bass model) and, unlike the Bass model, it does not provide
N(t) as an explicit function of time, which limits its long-term forecasting
ability.
6.3 Parameter Estimation Considerations
The use of the Bass model for forecasting the diffusion of an innovation
requires the estimation of three parameters: the coefficient of external influ-
ence (p), the coefficient of internal influence (q), and the market potential
(m). Though the estimate for the market potential of a new product can
be derived from the diffusion time-series data, recent applications of dif-
fusion models have obtained better forecasting results by using exogenous
sources of information (such as market surveys, secondary sources, man-
agement judgments, or other analytical models) for estimating m (see, for
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example, Heeler and Hustad, 1980; Mesak and Mikhail, 1988; Oliver, 1987;
Souder and Quaddus, 1982; Teotia and Raju, 1986).
In the 1980s, several estimation procedures were proposed to estimate
the Bass model parameters (see Table 6.1). Meta-analyzing the results of 15
such diffusion studies, Sultan et al. (1990) report average values of 0.03 and
0.38 for the coefficients of external influence and internal influence, respec-
tively. Their analyses further suggest that the values of these coefficients are
influenced by the type of estimation procedure used to estimate them. For a
practitioner, the main question is which of the several estimation procedures
should be used and why. The answer to this question depends partially
on the amount of data available to estimate these parameters. We review
estimation procedures that are designed to develop estimates both in the
absence of and in the presence of time-series diffusion data.[3]
6.3.1 No prior data available
If no data are available, parameter estimates can be obtained by using either
management judgments or the diffusion history of analogous products.
One procedure that exclusively uses management judgments to estimate
the diffusion parameters is an algebraic estimation procedure suggested by
Mahajan and Sharma (1986). The implementation ofthis procedure requires
information from managers on three items: (1) the market size (m), (2) the
time of the peak of the noncumulative adoption curve, and (3) the adop-
tion level at the peak time (n*). That is, the key information required by
the estimation procedure is the peak of the noncumulative adoption curve.
Knowing this information, one can estimate the coefficients of external in-
fluence and internal influence. Though the algebraic estimation procedure
has been implemented in actual applications by some firms (e.g., Institute
for the Future), Bass (1986) has questioned its desirability, suggesting that
one of the key outputs of the diffusion model is the prediction of the timing
and magnitude of the peak. Therefore, if one can guess these items, there is
no need to estimate model parameters.
An alternative algebraic estimation procedure has also been suggested by
Lawrence and Lawton (1981). This procedure also involves obtaining infor-
mation from management on three items: (1) the potential market size (m),
(2) the number of adoptions in the first time period, and (3) an estimate
of the sum of the coefficients of external influence and internal influence,
that is, the p + q value. Though managers may be able to guess the adop-
tion level for the first time period, how does one guess the p +q value? A
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record of the parameter values of earlier new products may provide a basis,
by analogy, for guessing p + q. From an analysis of the diffusion patterns
of several products, Lawrence and Lawton (1981), for example, recommend
using a value of 0.66 for industrial product innovations and a value of 0.50
for consumer product innovations (for an application of this procedure to
consumer durables, see DeKluyver, 1982). Such a recommendation may be
too general, however, and does not consider idiosyncratic characteristics of
a particular diffusion situation. Thomas (1985) therefore has recommended
that, for a new product under consideration, the parameters can be esti-
mated by taking a weighted sum of the parameters of analogous products
where weights are determined by establishing the similarity/dissimilarity re-
lationships between the new product and the various analogous products on
five bases of comparison: environmental situation, market structure, buyer
behavior, marketing mix strategy, and characteristics of innovation itself. In
fact, to consider idiosyncratic characteristics of a new product in a partic-
ular social system, recent analogical approaches estimate its coefficients of
external influence and internal influence from regression models that express
a historical empirical relationship between these coefficients and product or
market attributes of several current products. Once this relationship has
been established, the values for the coefficients of a new product can be es-
timated by knowing its characteristics. Four such approaches for the Bass
model have been suggested by Srivastava et al. (1985), Gatignon et al.
(1989), Sultan et al. (1990), and Montgomery and Srinivasan (1989).
In studying parameter estimates of the Bass model, Lawrence and
Lawton (1981) have found that p + q ranged from 0.3 to 0.7 over sev-
eral innovations. They note that first year sales, S1, may be expressed
as m[l - e-(p+q))/(1 + (q/p)e-(p+q)] and hence q/p can be expressed as
[m(l- e-(p+q)) - S1]/S1e-(P+q). It is possible to use judgment in guessing m
and S1. In strategic terms, probably the most critical forecast deriving from
the Bass model is the time of peak of adoptions, T*. This value is given
by [l/(p + q)]Ln(q/p). Because p +q varies over a relatively narrow range
and has a mode around 0.5, for consumer products, guesses of p+ q, m, and
S1 may provide good estimates of T*. Lawrence and Lawton (1981, p. 535)
report good results with this method.
6.3.2 Availability of data
Since the Bass model contains three parameters (p, q, and m), adoption
data for a minimum of three time periods are required to estimate these
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parameters. Recent empirical studies, however, have documented that esti-
mates of these parameters, and hence the adoption forecasts, are sensitive
to the number of datapoints used to estimate them (see, e.g., Hyman, 1988;
Tigert and Farivar, 1981). In fact, these studies suggest that stable and
robust parameter estimates for the Bass model are obtained only if the
data under consideration include the peak of the noncumulative adoption
curve (Heeler and Hustad, 1980; Srinivasan and Mason, 1986). Because of
these concerns, attempts have been made in recent years to develop estima-
tion procedures that update parameter estimates as additional data become
available after the initiation of the diffusion process. These procedures in-
clude Bayesian estimation procedures and adaptive filtering approaches that
provide time-varying parameter estimates.
Time-invariant estimation procedures. One of the first procedures suggested
to estimate the diffusion parameters is the ordinary least squares (OLS)
procedure proposed by Bass. The OLS procedure involves estimation of
the parameters by taking the discrete or regression analog of the differen-
tial equation formulation of the Bass model [Le., equation (6.1)]. In fact,
rearrangement of equation (6.1) yields:
N(t + 1) - N(t)
n(t + 1)
pm + (q - p)N(t) - :; N 2(t)
at +a2N(t) + a3N2 (t)
(6.6)
where at = pm, a2 = q - p, and a3 = -qjm. That is, regression analysis
is used to estimate at, a2, and a3 in equation (6.6). Once a's are known,
p, q, and m can be estimated. If one has reason to believe that all datapoints
in the diffusion time series should not have an equal weighting in the least
squares procedure, discounted least squares may be used for estimating a's
(for an application of discounted least squares to the discrete analog of the
Bass model, see Young and Ord, 1985).
The OLS procedure, however, has three shortcomings (Schmittlein and
Mahajan, 1982):
• Because of the likely multicollinearity between independent variables in
equation (6.6), that is, N(t) and N 2(t), the procedure may yield param-
eter estimates that are unstable or have wrong signs.
• The procedure does not directly provide standard errors for the estimated
parameters p, q, and m (and, hence, statistical significance of these
estimates cannot be assessed).
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• There is a time-interval bias since discrete time-series data are used for
estimating a continuous model (Le., the solution of the differential equa-
tion specification of the Bass model).
To overcome these shortcomings, Schmittlein and Mahajan (1982) have
suggested a maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate the pa-
rameters directly from the solution of the differential equation specification
of the Bass model. This procedure also has limitations, however. For ex-
ample, Srinivasan and Mason (1986) point out that because the maximum
likelihood procedure considers only sampling errors and ignores all other er-
rors such as the effects of excluded marketing variables that influence the
diffusion process, it underestimates the standard errors of the estimated
parameters, resulting in possible wrong inferences about the statistical sig-
nificance of the parameters. To overcome this shortcoming, they suggest a
formulation by means of which estimates of p, q, and m can be obtained by
using any appropriate nonlinear regression package (a similar formulation
has also been suggested by Jain and Rao, 1989). This formulation also uses
the solution to the differential equation specification of the Bass model for
parameter estimation.
From the preceding descriptions, it is clear that both the maximum like-
lihood and the nonlinear estimation procedures offer better choices over the
OLS procedure. An empirical comparison of these estimation procedures
(along with the algebraic estimation procedure suggested by Mahajan and
Sharma, 1986) by Mahajan et ai. (1986) suggests an overall superiority of
the nonlinear estimation procedure, but the maximum likelihood procedure
performs equally well when survey-type diffusion data are used to estimate
the parameters because of the dominance of sampling errors (Mahajan et
ai., 1986; Srinivasan and Mason, 1986).
Parameter estimation for diffusion models is primarily of historical inter-
est; by the time sufficient observations have developed for reliable estimation,
it is too late to use the estimates for forecasting purposes. The estimates can
be used for model testing and for comparison across products. Considered in
such a context, the methods often yield estimates that do not differ greatly.
Time-varying estimation procedures. These procedures are designed to up-
date parameter estimates as new data become available.[4] The updating
of parameters is achieved either with the Bayes procedure or the feedback
filters.
Such procedures have been applied in various diffusion settings by Sultan
et ai. (1990), Lenk and Rao (1989), and Bretschneider and Mahajan (1980).
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All of these procedures have two elements in common: (1) they require an
initial estimate of the diffusion model parameters before the diffusion data
become available and (2) they specify an updating formula to upgrade the
initial estimates as additional diffusion data become available.
In the Bayesian estimation procedure advocated by Sultan et at. (1990),
statistical results of their meta-analysis study are used to develop initial es-
timates for the coefficients of external influence and internal influence for
a new product. For each of these two coefficients, the procedure updates
the initial estimates by taking a weighted sum of its two values, the initial
estimate and the estimate developed from the actual data (by using any
procedure such as the nonlinear estimation procedure of Srinivasan and Ma-
son, 1986). The weights in the updating formula are expressed as a function
of the variation in the parameter estimates from the actual data so that
as these time-varying estimates stabilize, the weight for the initial estimate
based on the meta-analysis goes to zero. A Bayesian estimation procedure
has also been reported by Lenk and Rao (1989). Their procedure explicitly
considers the between-product and within-product variations in establishing
initial estimates for the new product.
An alternative approach to updating the diffusion model parameters
for the Bass model has been demonstrated by Bretschneider and Mahajan
(1980). It estimates the time-varying values of the Bass model parameters
by updating the regression coefficients in the discrete analog of the Bass
model, equation (6.6). The updating formula is based on a feedback filter
suggested by Carbone and Longini (1977). This feedback filter estimates an
adjustment to the current values of parameters at time t based on the error
between the actual and the predicted values of the noncumulative number
of adopters at time t. Though the procedure provides time-varying esti-
mates for the diffusion model coefficients, it has the same shortcomings as
the ordinary least squares procedure.[5]
6.4 Flexible Diffusion Models
The basic structure of a diffusion model can be characterized in terms of
two mathematical properties, point of inflection and symmetry. The point
of inflection on a diffusion curve occurs when the maximum rate of diffusion
is reached. If the diffusion pattern after the point of inflection is the mirror
image of the diffusion pattern before the point of inflection, the diffusion
curve is characterized as being symmetric. For example, as depicted in
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Figure 6.1(b), the adopter distribution for the Bass model peaks at time
T*, which is the point of inflection of the S-shaped cumulative adoption
curve, and is symmetric with respect to time around the peak time T* up
to time 2T*. Furthermore, the Bass model assumes that the maximum
penetration rate cannot occur after the product has captured 50% of the
market potential. In practice as well as in theory, the maximum rate of
diffusion of an innovation should be able to occur at any time during the
diffusion process. Additionally, diffusion patterns can be expected to be
nonsymmetric as well as symmetric.
Easingwood et al. (1983) have suggested that the flexibility in the diffu-
sion models can be achieved by recognizing an important underlying assump-
tion. In most of the diffusion models, the impact of the word of mouth on
potential adopters is assumed to remain constant throughout the diffusion
span. This assumption is tenuous because, for most innovations, the word of
mouth is likely to increase, decrease, or remain constant over time (Hernes,
1976). Easingwood et al. (1983) suggest that the time-varying nature of the
word-of-mouth effect can be incorporated in the Bass model by specifying
the coefficient of internal influence as systematically varying over time as a
function of penetration level. That is,
(6.7)
where a is a constant and w( t) is the time-varying coefficient of external
influence. Substitution of equation (6.7) into the Bass model, equation (6.1),
yields the non-uniform influence (NUl) model suggested by those authors
(in terms of the cumulative fraction of adopters):
d~;t) = [p +qFO(t)][1 _ F(t)] (6.8)
where F(t) = N(t)jm and a + 1 = 6. When p = 0 (Le., coefficient of
external influence is zero), equation (6.8) or (6.9) yields a flexible extension
of the Mansfield model termed nonsymmetric responding logistic (NSRL)
by Easingwood et al. (1981). An interesting alternative interpretation of
the NSRL model in terms of experience curve and price elasticity has been
provided by Sharp (1984).
In addition to the NUl and NSRL models, Table 6.3 reports characteris-
tics of nine other diffusion models. The following observations are warranted
from this table:
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• In addition to the NUl and NSRL models, only two models offer complete
flexibility in capturing diffusion patterns (Le., point of inflection can
occur from 0% to 100% penetration and the diffusion patterns can be
symmetric or nonsymmetric). These are the models proposed by von
Bertalanffy (1957) (an identical model has been proposed by NeIder,
1962 and Bewley and Fiebig, 1988).
• Like the NUl and NSRL models proposed by Easingwood et al. (1981
and 1983), the model by von Bertalanffy expresses the coefficient of in-
ternal influence as systematically changing over time as a function of
penetration level, that is,
q(l - pI»
w(t) = (1 _ F) (6.9)
where </J is a constant. Unlike the NUl and NSRL models, the differen-
tial equation used to specify the diffusion process by the Von Bertalanffy
model has a closed-form solution enabling one to represent cumulative
adoption as an explicit function of time. This model, however, assumes
that the word-of-mouth effect decreases over time. The NUl and NSRL
models can accommodate the word-of-mouth effect that increases, de-
creases, or remains constant over time.
• In comparison with the models suggested by Easingwood et al. (1981 and
1983) and von Bertalanffy (1957), the FLOG (flexible logistic growth)
model suggested by Bewley and Fiebig (1988) expresses the systematic
variation in the coefficient of internal influence as a function of time, that
is,
w(t) = q[(l + kt)l/kt- k (6.10)
where k and J.L are constants. The FLOG model offers a closed form
solution and, like the NUl and NSRL models, can accommodate the
time-varying word-of-mouth effect.
Though some evidence suggests that, in comparison with the basic dif-
fusion models (such as the Bass model), the flexible models provide a better
fit to diffusion data (see Easingwood, 1987 and 1988; Lattin and Roberts,
1989; McGowan, 1986; Rao, 1985), this advantage is obtained by incorpo-
rating additional parameters. Hence these models are more difficult to use
in the absence of diffusion time-series data (using the historical data on
existing products, however, Easingwood (1989) has demonstrated how the
NUl model can be used to develop analogical parameter estimates for a new
product).
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6.5 Refinements and Extensions of the
Bass Diffusion Model
Several assumptions underlie the Bass model. Most are simplifying assump-
tions that provide a parsimonious analytical representation of the diffusion
process. However, recognition of these assumptions is important to prop-
erly understand and interpret the dynamics of innovation diffusion captured
by the Bass model. Table 6.1 lists several of these assumptions that have
been of concern to diffusion modelers in the 1970s and 1980s. Nine of these
assumptions warrant attention.
Market potential of the new product remains constant over time. The Bass
model assumes that the market potential (m) of a new product is deter-
mined at the time of introduction and remains unchanged over its entire
life (Kalish, 1985; Mahajan and Peterson, 1978; Sharif and Ramanathan,
1981). Theoretically, there is no rationale for a static potential adopter pop-
ulation. Instead, a potential adopter population continuously in flux is to
be expected.
Extensions of the Bass model that address this assumption have at-
tempted to relax by specifying the market potential as a function of relevant
exogenous and endogenous variables - controllable as well as uncontrollable
- that affect the market potential. Examining the diffusion of a durable,
Kalish (1985), for example, specified the dynamics of the market potential
as a function of price of the product and reduction of uncertainty associ-
ated with the product with its increased adoption. Assuming full product
awareness in the population, he specified
m(t) = ma exp [ - dP(t) (a a+~)]
+ rno
where a and d are constants, ma is the size ofthe market potential at the time
of production, P(t) is the product price, and the term [(a+1)/(a+N(t)/ma)]
represents the effect of market penetration in increasing the size of market
potential due to the word-of-mouth effect. Other applications have repre-
sented the market potential as a function of growth in the number of house-
holds (Mahajan and Peterson, 1978), population growth (Sharif and Ra-
manathan, 1981), product profitability (Lackman, 1978), price (Chow, 1967;
Jain and Rao, 1989; Kamakura and Balasubramanian, 1988), growth in the
number of retailers making the product available to potential customers
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(Jones and Ritz, 1987), and income distribution, price, and product uncer-
tainty (Horsky, 1990).
Diffusion of an innovation is independent of all other innovations. The Bass
model assumes that the adoption of an innovation does not complement, sub-
stitute for, detract from, or enhance the adoption of any other innovation
(and vice versa) (Peterson and Mahajan, 1978). In reality, however, an inno-
vation is not introduced into a vacuum nor does it exist in isolation. Other
innovations are present in the marketplace and may have an influence (pos-
itive or negative) on its diffusion. Consideration of simultaneous diffusion
of multiple innovations is especially critical if the diffusion of one innovation
is contingent upon the diffusion of another innovation (e.g., compact disc
software and compact disc hardware) or if the diffusion of one innovation
complements the diffusion of another innovation (e.g., washers and dryers).
Following the contingent diffusion model suggested by Peterson and Ma-
hajan (1978), Bayus (1987), for example, conducted an empirical study ex-
amining the diffusion dependence between compact disc software and com-
pact disc hardware. In the contingent diffusion model, the market potential
of the dependent product is contingent upon the diffusion of the primary
product. That is, in the Bass model representation of its growth, equation
(6.1), its market potential is specified as [N1(t) - N 2(t)] where N1(t) is the
cumulative number of adopters of the primary product (e.g., compact disc
hardware) and N 2(t) is the cumulative number of adopters of the contingent
product (e.g., compact disc software).
Nature of an innovation does not change over time. Manufacturers of high
technology products usually achieve diffusion in the marketplace by offering
successive. generations of an innovation. Each generation is positioned to be
better than its predecessors on relevant product attributes. Assessment of
market penetration therefore is critical for successive generations of a high
technology product. In addition to creating its own demand, each generation
of the product cannibalizes the diffusion of its predecessors. This important
application of diffusion models for assessing technological substitution has
been demonstrated by Norton and Bass (1987) for the growth of two basic
types of integrated circuits, memory and logic circuits. If T2 represents the
introduction of the second generation, Norton and Bass suggest that the
word-of-mouth effect within each generation and substitution effects across
successive generations can be represented by the following extension of the
Bass model:
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51(t) = mlFl(t) - mlFl(t)F2(t - T2)
52(t) = m2F2(t - T2) +mlFl(t)F2(t - T2)
(6.12)
(6.13)
where equation (6.12) represents the diffusion equation for the first genera-
tion product and equation (6.13) represents the second generation product,
51 and 52 are their shipments at time t, and Fl (t) and F2 (t) are fractions of
adoptions for each generation and are given by the Bass model [solution of
equation (6.1)]. In equations (6.12) and (6.13), the term mlFl(t)F2(t - T2)
represents the cannibalization or substitution effect.
The geogmphic boundaries of the social system do not change over the dif-
fusion process. Despite the fact that the diffusion of an innovation occurs
simultaneously in space and time, research on these two dimensions of dif-
fusion seldom has been integrated in a marketing context. For example, the
new product rollout is clearly a popular option used by many firms to dif-
fuse their products from market to market over time (in both national and
international markets). Such a new-product launch strategy enables a firm
to capitalize on word-of-mouth communication, referred to as the "neigh-
borhood effect" (Brown, 1981; Gore and Lavaraj, 1987), across markets.
Simultaneous assessment of market penetration within a market and across
markets therefore is necessary.
One application that addresses diffusion from a joint space and time per-
spective has been reported by Mahajan and Peterson (1979). In examining
the adoption of tractors in 25 states in the central agricultural production
region of the United States for the period 1920-1964, they extend the Bass
model by assuming that (1) the innovation is introduced initially in one
market and (2) the relative number of total adoptions is greater in markets
that are closest to the market of innovation origination (Le., the neighbor-
hood effect diminishes with increased distance from the market of innovation
origination, decreasing the size of market potential across markets).
The diffusion process is binary. The Bass model assumes that potential
adopters of an innovation either adopt or do not adopt the innovation. As a
consequence of this assumption, the Bass model does not take into account
stages in the adoption process (e.g., awareness, knowledge, etc.). Some of
the attempts to extend the two-stage models to incorporate the multistage
(or polynomial) nature of the diffusion process include models by Midgley
(1976), Dodson and Muller (1978), Sharif and Ramanathan (1982), Maha-
jan et al. (1984), and Kalish (1985). Most of these extensions tend to
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characterize stages in which positive, negative, or neutral information is
communicated about the product. The implementation of these models is
rather cumbersome as they require detailed information about the customer
flow across the various stages. In empirical applications, the developers of
these models therefore either collapse the various stages (Kalish, 1985 as-
sumes full product awareness), attempt to derive the population in various
stages by decomposing the time-series diffusion data (Midgley, 1976; Sharif
and Ramanathan, 1982) with too many parameters to be estimated with the
limited available data (Silver, 1984), or trace the innovation diffusion with
the panel data (Mahajan et ai., 1984a; Mahajan et ai., 1984b).
Diffusion of an innovation is not influenced by marketing strategies. Since
the pioneering work of Robinson and Lakhani (1975) that incorporated the
impact of price in the Bass model, several efforts have been made to study
systematically the impact of marketing mix variables such as price, adver-
tising, promotion and personal selling, and distribution on product growth
(efforts related to price and advertising are reviewed extensively by Kalish
and Sen, 1986). As the Bass model contains three parameters (coefficients of
external influence and internal influence, and the market potential), the im-
pact of marketing mix variables has been incorporated into the Bass model
by representing these parameters as a function of relevant variables. At-
tempts have been made to represent the market potential as a function of
price (e.g., Kalish, 1983 and 1985) and the distribution growth (Jones and
Ritz, 1987). Other attempts to incorporate marketing mix variables have
been concerned with representing the coefficients of external influence and
internal influence as a function of diffusion-influencing variables. Though
analytically very elegant, most of these modeling efforts lack empirical vali-
dation (Mahajan and Wind, 1986b). However, they can be useful in estab-
lishing working hypotheses to examine the likely impact of marketing mix
variables on innovation diffusion. As these hypotheses are presented in the
next section, we briefly comment here on studies that have provided some
empirical support for their extensions.
Two empirical studies by Horsky and Simon (1983) and Simon and Sebas-
tian (1987), respectively, have examined the impact of advertising on innova-
tion diffusion. Studying the diffusion of a new banking service, Horsky and
Simon argue that because advertising provides information to innovators,
the coefficient of external influence in the Bass model should be represented
as a function of advertising expenditures (with diminishing returns). Their
empirical results provided a good fit to their diffusion data, supporting their
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argument. Studying the diffusion of new telephones in the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG), Simon and Sebastian suggest that, though advertising
may influence innovators (and hence the coefficient of external influence) in
the early stage of the product life cycle, it is more likely to influence the
coefficient of imitation in the intermediate life cycle stage of a new product
because the objective of the advertising content in the intermediate stage is
to influence potential customers through evaluation by customers and social
pressure. Furthermore, the advertising effect is cumulative over time. They
report a good fit to their diffusion data, supporting their arguments about
incorporation of the cumulative effect of advertising into the coefficient of
imitation.
The question of the inclusion of price in the Bass model intrigued diffu-
sion analysts in the 1970s and 1980s. Examining the diffusion of a (unmen-
tioned) durable, Kalish (1985) suggested that price affects the market po-
tential of a product [see equation (6.11)]. However, recent empirical studies
by Kamakura and Balasubramanian (1988) and Jain and Rao (1989), em-
ploying data on several consumer durable products, show that price affects
the rate of diffusion (via the coefficients of external influence and internal
influence) rather than the market potential.
Product and market characteristics do not influence diffusion patterns. The
Bass model does not consider explicitly the impact of product and mar-
ket characteristics on diffusion patterns. Empirical studies reported in the
innovation diffusion literature, however, have found that product and mar-
ket characteristics have a substantial impact on innovation diffusion pat-
terns (Rogers, 1983; Tornatzky and Klein, 1982). Three empirical studies
(Gatignon et ai., 1989; Kalish and Lilien, 1986aj Srivastava et ai., 1985) have
attempted to incorporate product and market characteristics into the Bass
model by expressing the coefficients of external influence and/or internal
influence as a function of these characteristics. Whereas Srivastava et ai.
(1985) and Kalish and Lilien (1986a) examine the impact of product char-
acteristics on diffusion patterns, Gatignon et ai. (1989) study the impact of
market characteristics on the diffusion of a product across markets. Only
Kalish and Lilien (1986a), however, explicitly consider the changing con-
sumer perceptions of the product characteristics as the product is accepted
over time. They define the coefficient of imitation as changing over time due
to changes in the product characteristics.
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They are no supply restrictions. The Bass model is a demand model. If
the demand for a product cannot be met because of supply restrictions,
such as the unavailability of the product due to limitations on production
capacity or difficulties in setting up distribution systems, the excess unmet
demand is likely to generate a waiting line of potential adopters (Simon and
Sebastian, 1987). In such a situation, the adopter distribution is same as
the supply distribution and applying the Bass model to these adoption data
is inappropriate. Therefore the Bass model must be extended to integrate
the demand-side dynamics with the supply-side restrictions.
A model that captures innovation diffusion dynamics in the presence of
supply restrictions has been suggested by Jain et al. (1989). Their model
conceptualizes diffusion as a three-stage process: potential adopters -+ wait-
ing adopters -+ adopters. They have demonstrated the application of their
model for the diffusion of new telephones in Israel.
There is only one adoption by an adopting unit. The objective of a diffusion
model is to represent the level or spread of an innovation among a given set
of prospective adopters. For a great many product innovations, the increase
in the number of adopters may consist of first-time buyers as well as repeat
buyers. The Bass model, however, captures only the first-time buyers.
In recent years, five empirical studies have been reported that capture the
repeat/replacement dynamics of innovation diffusion. Two of these studies,
by Lilien et al. (1981) and Mahajan et al. (1983), include repeat purchase
in the Bass model to examine diffusion of ethical drugs. The other two
studies, by Olson and Choi (1985) and Kamakura and Balasubramanian
(1987), include product replacements in the Bass model to assess long-term
sales for consumer durable products. Norton and Bass (1987) assume that
adopters continue to buy and that the average repeat buying rate over the
population of adopters is constant.
6.6 Uses of Diffusion Models
Innovation diffusion models traditionally have been used in the context of
sales forecasting. However, as pointed out by Mahajan and Wind (1986b)
and Kalish and Lilien (1986a), sales forecasting is only one of the objectives
of diffusion models. In addition to forecasting, perhaps the most useful
applications of diffusion models are for descriptive and normative purposes.
Because diffusion models are an analytical approach to describing the spread
of a diffusion phenomenon, they can be used in an explanatory mode to test
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specific diffusion-based hypotheses. Further, because diffusion models are
designed to capture the product life cycle of a new product, they can be used
for normative purposes as the basis of how a product should be marketed.
6.6.1 Descriptive uses
Table 6.4 is a listing of nine illustrative studies in which the diffusion mod-
eling framework has been used to test hypotheses. Srivastava et al. (1985)
and Rao and Yamada (1988) use diffusion models to test hypotheses related
to the impact of perceived product attributes on diffusion patterns. Kobrin
(1985), Takada and Jain (1988), and Gatignon et al. (1989) use diffusion
models to test hypotheses related to innovation diffusion across countries.
Bass (1980), Olshavsky (1980), and Modis and Debecker (1988) use diffu-
sion models to test hypotheses related to the life-cycle dynamics of a new
product. Finally, Mahajan et al. (1988) evaluate the hypothesis that any
S-shaped curve may not be a result of the imitation process. The preceding
studies clearly demonstrate how the diffusion models can be used to evaluate
hypotheses related to the dynamics of innovation diffusion.
6.6.2 Normative uses
Though diffusion models are concerned with representing the growth of a
product category, that growth can be influenced by the individual or by col-
lective actions of competitors that have long-term effects on the growth or
decline of the market. Alternatively, even if there is only one firm in the
industry, it must consider the life cycle dynamics over time to determine
optimal marketing mix strategy for maximizing its profitability. That is, it
must find out what trajectory (pattern or strategy) of the relevant market-
ing mix variables it should follow to maximize its discounted profits over
the planning period given the constraint that the life cycle of the product
follows a certain growth pattern. It therefore solves the following dynamic
optimization problem:
Maximize 1r = Total discounted profits over the planning period (6.14)
Subject to : A given life cycle growth pattern (6.15)
The dynamic optimization formulation outlined in expressions (6.14) and
(6.15) is the general framework that has been used by several authors in the
1980s to develop optimal marketing mix strategies, especially for price and
advertising. Most of these studies use the Bass model, and its extensions
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incorporating marketing mix variables, in expression (6.15) to represent the
life cycle dynamics over time. They usually consider a single marketing mix
variable, such as price, to isolate its effects on product growth. Before we
comment on these studies, a further elaboration on expressions (6.14) and
(6.15) is warranted.
Note that the determination of trajectory of the marketing mix vari-
able(s) that maximizes expression (6.14) depends on the specification of the
growth model used to specify the life cycle growth pattern in expression
(6.15). Therefore, though most of the studies use the Bass model to capture
the word-of-mouth effect in expression (6.15), different optimal strategies
can be obtained depending on how the relevant marketing mix variables are
incorporated in the Bass model. To highlight this point, we consider here
derived optimal pricing strategies for new durable goods.
When launching a new product, a firm usually can choose between two
distinct pricing strategies, market skimming and market penetration. A
market-skimming strategy uses a high price initially to "skim" the market
when the market is still developing. The market penetration strategy, in
contrast, uses a low price initially to capture a large market share.
Introduction of the impact of price in the Bass model framework gener-
ally has resulted in two types of normative pricing strategies. One derived
pricing strategy posits that price will increase at introduction, peak, and
decrease later (Dolan and Jeuland, 1981; Jeuland and Dolan, 1982; Kalish,
1983; Robinson and Lakhani, 1975). Kalish and Sen's (1986, p. 94) intu-
itive explanation for this pricing strategy is that if early adopters have a
strong positive effect on late adopters, a low introductory ("subsidized")
price should encourage them to adopt the product. Consequently, once a
product is established, price can be raised because the contribution to sales
due to additional adopters decreases over time. Studies deriving this pricing
strategy generally assume that price does not affect the population of po-
tential adopters and produces a multiplicative effect on the rate of diffusion.
That is, from equation (6.1)
d~?) = [p+ ~N(t)](m- N(t)g(P) (6.16)
where g(P) is the price response function for the dynamic price P at time t.
Equation (6.16) assumes that price affects the rate of diffusion.
The second derived pricing strategy posits that price is more likely to
decrease over time, supporting the market-skimming strategy (Kalish, 1983).
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In deriving this optimal strategy, some researchers have assumed that price
affects the market potential. That is:
d~;t) = [p + ~ N(t)] [m(P) - N(t)]. (6.17)
The preceding analyses illustrate that we must be cautious about the
normative policies derived from the diffusion-based dynamic optimization
framework because the derived policies could be simply an artifact of the
underlying assumptions made for analytical convenience. Despite this ob-
servation, the diffusion modeling framework has provided an excellent op-
portunity to develop a "theory" of life cycle analysis for empirical validation.
Table 6.S is a summary of some of the major results from various studies
for optimal strategies for three variables: pricing, advertising, and product
introduction time. We summarize these results for two industry settings,
monopoly and oligopoly. The major results reported for each study reflect
the issue raised in the study.
6.7 Conclusions and Discussion
From our review of the emerging literature on innovation diffusion model-
ing in marketing, we can highlight research issues that must be addressed
to make these models theoretically more sound and practically more effec-
tive and realistic. We discuss such research possibilities related to the five
subareas of recent developments.
6.7.1 Basic diffusion models
Though several assumptions underlying the Bass model have been of concern
in the 1980s (Mahajan and Wind, 1986a), we believe five issues warrant
further investigation.
Adoptions due to internal influence. One of the key features of the Bass
model is that it explicitly considers the influence of internal (word of mouth)
as well as external sources of communication on innovation diffusion. As de-
picted in Figure 6.1(a), the Bass model assumes that adopters whose pur-
chase decisions are influenced by external sources of information are present
at any stage of the diffusion process. Such adopters, however, should not be
labeled "innovators" because innovators, by definition, are characterized as
the first adopters of an innovation (Mahajan et al., 1990). The question now
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are: What are the characteristics of adopters who, despite a large product
penetration in the marketplace, are predominantly influenced by external
sources? How do they differ from innovators and other adopter categories
on those characteristics? Because, within a certain time period in the diffu-
sion process, the Bass model implies the presence of adopters due to both
internal influence and external influence, how do those two groups differ from
each other?
In a recent empirical study, Feick and Price (1987) suggest that in any
social system there are individuals who assimilate and disseminate informa-
tion on products (and therefore influence others) and tend to rely on external
sources of information. They label these individuals "market mavens." On
the basis of their empirical results, however, they conclude that "the con-
cepts of the market maven and the innovative consumer are distinct" (1987,
p. 90). Their findings raise research questions about the linkage in the Bass
model between market mavens and adopters who buy as a result of external
influence.
Multiple adoptions. The Bass model has been developed to represent the
conversion of potential adopters to adopters. It explicitly assumes that each
potential adopter buys only one unit of the product. However, certain in-
novations are bought in multiple units by potential adopters (e.g., multiple
units of scanners by a supermarket and multiple units of personal computers
by a firm). For these innovations, the sales data must be linked with the
number of adopters by using a function that explicitly takes into consid-
eration the multiple-unit-adoption behavior of the potential adopters (see
Norton and Bass, 1987).
Effect of consumer expectations. For certain innovations (e.g., computers),
consumer expectations about an innovation's future characteristics (e.g.,
price) influence purchase intentions (see, e.g., Holak et al., 1987; Winer,
1985). For such innovations, in addition to influencing the nature of the
adoption curve, consumer expectations can also influence the optimal mar-
keting mix strategy used by a firm. For example, incorporating consumer
expectations related to price in the Bass model, Narasimhan (1989) sug-
gests that the optimal pricing strategy for a monopolist cycles over time and
within each cycle the price increases at introduction, peaks, and decreases
later. Given the importance of consumer expectations in understanding dif-
fusion dynamics, we expect future research to incorporate them into the Bass
model.
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Exploration of recent developments in hazard models. The different diffusion
models can be viewed as making different assumptions about the "hazard
rate" for non-adopters as a function of time (the hazard rate being the likeli-
hood that an individual who has remained a non-adopter through time t will
become an adopter in the next instant of time). The Bass model specifies
this rate as a linear function of previous adopters. Since the publication of
the Bass model, however, much work developing and applying hazard models
has appeared in the statistics, biometrics, and econometrics literatures (e.g.,
Cox and Oakes, 1984; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; for possible marketing
applications of hazard models, see Helsen and Schmittlein, 1989; for inter-
pretation of diffusion models as hazard models, see Lavaraj and Gore, 1990).
The key development in hazard models over the last decade has been in the
area of understanding covariate effects on the hazard rate (and consequently
on duration times). This development is particularly important because at-
tempts to incorporate marketing mix variables (and other covariate effects)
in diffusion models have to date have been very limited in scope and ad
hoc in their choice of model specifications for those effects. Exploration of
recent developments in the hazard modeling framework may provide a unify-
ing theme for understanding of covariate/marketing mix effects in diffusion
models.
Understanding of diffusion processes at the micro (individual) level. Diffu-
sion models based on individual-level adoption decisions offer an opportu-
nity to study the actual pattern of social communication and its impact on
product perceptions, preferences, and ultimate adoption. The empirical ev-
idence provided by Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1989) on the development of
aggregate diffusion models from individual-level adoption decisions, though
limited, is encouraging. Further empirical work on such models may assist
in developing the aggregate diffusion models prior to launch.
6.7.2 Parameter estimation considerations
In comparison with the other subareas we review, parameter estimation con-
siderations for the Bass model probably received the most attention in the
1980s. These developments are timely and encouraging, but further empir-
ical work on the validation of meta-analysis procedures (Montgomery and
Srinivasan, 1989; Sultan et al., 1990), Bayesian estimation procedures (Lenk
and Rao, 1989; Sultan et al., 1990), and procedures that capitalize on the
information provided by managers and potential adopters (e.g., Randles,
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1983; Souder and Quaddus, 1982) is important. An emerging body of liter-
ature in the forecasting area suggests that combining parameter estimates
from different estimation procedures can yield better forecasting results (see
Mahajan and Wind, 1988). Empirical studies that explore the feasibility of
such findings for diffusion models are desirable (Lawrence and Geurts, 1984).
6.7.3 Flexible diffusion models
Flexible diffusion models have the advantage of capturing penetration pat-
terns that are symmetric as well as nonsymmetric with no restrictions on the
point of inflection. However, among all the models reviewed in Table 6.3,
only the models by von Bertalanffy (1957) (or NeIder, 1962) and Bewley and
Fiebig (1988) offer closed-form solutions to the differential equations used
to specify the diffusion dynamics (i.e., express the number of adopters as an
explicit function of time, which is desirable for long-term forecasting). Fur-
thermore, these models have a flexibility advantage by requiring estimation
of additional numbers of parameters. However, two important questions re-
main: How much additional long-term forecasting accuracy is provided by
the flexible models, in comparison with the basic diffusion models such as
the Bass model, when controlled for the number of parameters? Given the
parameter estimation considerations discussed here, how can parameters in
these models be calibrated prior to launch for long-term forecasting? Further
empirical work related to these questions is desirable.
6.7.4 Refinements and extensions
We briefly discuss below a number of possibilities for further refinement and
extension of the Bass model.
• A decade ago, Mahajan and Muller (1979) concluded that it was not
clear how marketing mix variables should be incorporated into the Bass
model. The few empirical studies reported in 1980s still do not pro-
vide conclusive guidelines on this question. Despite the arguments made
in the favor of including price in the market potential, empirical stud-
ies on consumer durable products by Kamakura and Balasubramanian
(1988) and Jain and Rao (1989) suggest that price affects the rate of
diffusion (by influencing the coefficients of external influence and inter-
nal influence). Similarly, in relation to the inclusion of advertising in
the Bass model, the two reported empirical studies suggest different al-
ternatives. Horsky and Simon (1983) recommend that it be included in
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the coefficient of external influence whereas Simon and Sebastian (1987)
report better results by including it in the coefficient of internal influ-
ence. Interestingly, though both of these studies examine the effect of
advertising on the diffusion of a service (a banking service by Horsky
and Simon and a telephone service by Simon and Sebastian), they are
conducted in two different markets (USA and the FRG) and under differ-
ent market conditions (there was a supply problem with the availability
of telephones in the FRG). Whether these differences had an impact on
the reported results is an empirical question. Given the importance of
including marketing mix variables in understanding diffusion dynamics,
we expect more empirical work including other marketing mix variables
such as distribution.
• Several of the empirical studies reported in Table 6.5 have incorporated
product attributes in the Bass model. A natural extension of these stud-
ies is to develop procedures to determine optimal product design to ob-
tain the desirable penetration rate.
• For high technology products the time interval between successive gen-
erations of technologies has been decreasing. Norton and Bass (1987)
have shown how diffusion of successive generations interacts within the
context of the Bass model. Forecasting possibilities stemming from this
work appear to be promising. Extensions involving pricing of generations
of technology would be desirable and feasible.
• When should a firm introduce a second generation product? Though
the analytical results of Wilson and Norton (1989) suggest the answer is
"now or never", they exclude the impact of other variables such as price.
Further theoretical and empirical work addressing this question would
be welcome.
• For high-technology products, the product offering of a firm generally in-
cludes both hardware and software, such as Nintendo hardware (keypad)
and Nintendo software (video games) for children. Because of the con-
tingency inherent in the relationship, it is important to develop diffusion
models that examine the diffusion of the entire bundle of product offer-
ings. In addition to forecasting, normative questions may relate to its
optimal pricing and distribution. For example, how should a monopolist
(e.g., Nintendo) manufacture and distribute its hardware and software?
Should it keep a monopoly on both of them? Should it keep a monopoly
on hardware and create an oligopoly for software to increase demand for
the hardware?
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• How do the number of competitors and the rivalry among them influence
the growth of a product category? Does the growth affect the entry /exit
patterns of competitors? Answers to these questions are within the do-
main of the diffusion modeling framework and provide a linkage with the
strategic planning literature. Theoretical and empirical work on these
questions will further enhance the utility of diffusion models.
• Supply restrictions influence diffusion patterns. For certain type of prod-
ucts (e.g., prescription drugs), it may be desirable to retard the diffusion
process by controlling their supply and distribution. Further empirical
and theoretical work, on this linkage would enable managers to control
the life cycle of a product by managing the supply.
• Market interventions (e.g., patent violations) represent externalities that
can influence the growth pattern of a new product. Though the use of
intervention analysis is well established in the time-series analysis lit-
erature, no attempt seems to have been made to conduct intervention
analysis with the diffusion models (Mahajan et at., 1985). Theoretical
and empirical work in this area could assist in assessing the impact (e.g.,
assessing patent violation damages in a legal case) of market interven-
tions on the product life cycle.
• Though integration of the time and spatial dimensions has been of inter-
est to geographers, their integration is equally important in marketing to
evaluate alternative product distribution strategies across markets. Such
extensions of the Bass model could assist in evaluating the impact on the
growth of a new product of how and where the product is made available.
• The diffusion literature has emphasized consistently the importance of
negative word of mouth on the growth of a new product (Mahajan et
at., 1984a). The multistage extensions of the Bass model offer an avenue
for considering its impact on the growth pattern. These extensions lack
empirical validation, however. Data collection and estimation procedures
should be developed to make these extensions practicable.
• Not all new products are accepted by consumers at the time of their
introduction. Some products are much slower than others in being ac-
cepted by potential adopters. That is, they differ in terms of how long it
takes them to "take off." The "takeoff" phenomenon is not considered
explicitly by the Bass model. The Bass model assumes the presence of a
certain number of consumers before "takeoff" (i.e., pm). Extensions of
the Bass model that explicitly consider this phenomenon will be useful
in explaining and predicting the take-off behavior of a new product.
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One of the critical uses of diffusion models has been for forecasting the first-
purchase sales volume curve. In recent years, questions have been raised
about the forecasting accuracy of diffusion models (Bernhardt and Macken-
zie, 1972; Heeler and Hustad, 1980). We sympathize with such concerns and
believe that further empirical work is needed to identify conditions under
which diffusion models work or do not work. For example, recent work by
Jain et al. (1989) suggests that the use of the Bass model is inappropriate in
international settings where the supply of the product is restricted. Further-
more, as the diffusion models capture the dynamics of innovation diffusion
for the first-time buyers, it is not clear that the same diffusion dynamics
are applicable to replacement sales. Therefore the use of diffusion models
for such adoption data may be inappropriate (see, e.g., Bayus, 1988; Bayus
et al., 1989). Finally, diffusion models are imitation models. Any S-shaped
curve, however, may not be a result of the imitation process, and alterna-
tive time-series models may be more appropriate for such data (Mahajan
et al., 1988). Even in the presence of the imitation effect, it may be neces-
sary to examine various diffusion models systematically to identify the one
that best describes the data (Rust and Schmittlein, 1985). There is also a
growing body of literature on "chaos theory" suggesting that for certain pa-
rameter values, diffusion models generate persistent chaotic behavior within
predictable boundaries (Gordon and Greenspan, 1988). Understanding of
such phenomena may be essential to decipher the impact of changes that
affect the diffusion dynamics.
The use of diffusion models to test diffusion-based hypotheses is very
encouraging. The empirical studies documented in Table 6.4 clearly attest
to their potential for such applications. We expect additional empirical work
employing a diffusion modeling framework to test hypotheses related to life
cycle dynamics (for example: How does the number of competitors change
over the life cycle of a product? How does the number of brands available
in a market influence the growth of a product? How does the rivalry among
competitors in an industry affect the life cycle of a product?).
The use of diffusion models to derive normative results for the dynamics
of innovation diffusion received considerable attention in the 1980s. However,
as summarized in Table 6.5, these results are simply working hypotheses.
Furthermore, the nature of these results is contingent on the assumptions
made in their analytical derivation. For most of these studies, the analytical
elegance surpasses the empirical validation of the derived results. Empirical
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evidence is needed to find out if and when the firms use the derived normative
strategies.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that several firms have used dif-
fusion models for forecasting the demand of a new product. By sharing
their experiences, industry users can contribute to the further validation of
diffusion models.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Roger Kerin, Dipak Jain, David Schmittlein, Ra-
bikar Chatterjee, Subatra Sen, Mike Hanssens, and Jon Eliashberg for their helpful
comments.
Notes
[1] Related to the Mansfield model is the model suggested by Fisher and Pry (1971)
and the Gompertz curve. For applications of the Gompertz curve and its com-
parison with the Mansfield model, see Hendry (1972), Dixon (1980), and Ziemer
(1988). Several other growth models also have been proposed in the market-
ing, economics, and technological substitution literatures to depict the growth
phenomenon (e.g., the Weibull distribution). As some of these models either do
not explicitly consider the diffusion effect in their formulation or combine other
models, they are not included in our review. For applications of such models to
new product growth situations, see DeKluyver (1982), Sharif and Islam (1980),
Meade (1984), Lee and Lu (1987), and Skiadas (1985 and 1986).
[2] These expressions are given by:
N( ) - [1-e-(P+.).] ( ) _ [p(p+q)2 e-(P+.).]t - m 1+;e-(P+')' , n t - m (p+q e (P+')')2
n(T*) = ;q(p+q)2, N(T*) =m [~- fg]
T* = -(p~q) In (~)
[3] A brief analytical description of these procedures is given in an appendix in the
unabridged version of this paper which can be obtained from the authors.
[4] The idea that coefficients of a market response model should change over time
is not new in marketing. In fact, several theoretical approaches that assist in
developing market response models when model coefficients have a time-varying
behavior have been applied and documented in the marketing literature (see,
e.g., Mahajan et al., 1980; Wildt and Winer, 1978). Two such approaches also
have been examined in the context of diffusion models: the systematic param-
eter variation methods and the random coefficient methods. The systematic
parameter variations assume a priori the time path of the model coefficients.
These methods have generated a new set of diffusion models termed "flexible
diffusion models" (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985) that are reviewed here.
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In the random coefficient methods, the random parameters are assumed to con-
stitute a sample from common multivariate distribution with an estimated mean
and variance-covariance structure. Following Karmeshu and Pathria (1980a and
1980b), Eliashberg et al. (1987) explored the applicability of these methods to
the Bass diffusion model. They consider the coefficients of innovation (p) and
imitation (q) in the Bass model as stochastic and hence time-varying by assum-
ing that p=P + fp(t) and if = q + fq(t), where p and q denote constant means
and f p and f q denote normally distributed error terms surrounding those means
such that their means are zero and the variances are constant. Their empiri-
cal results suggest that their stochastic formulation of the Bass model does as
well as the deterministic version of the Bass model. There are other types of
stochastic diffusion models, but they are not included in our review. Reviews
of such models are given by Bartholomew (1982), Eliashberg and Chatterjee
(1986), and Boker (1987).
[5] For an application of this approach to the diffusion of robotics in the State of
New York, see Bretschneider and Bozeman (1986). Other feedback filters can
also be used to estimate time-varying diffusion parameters. For example, the use
of the Kalman filter to estimate the time-varying coefficients for the Mansfield
model has been reported by Meade (1985).
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Chapter 7
The Research on Innovation
Diffusion: An Assessment
Giovanni Dosi
7.1 The Role of Innovation Diffusion in Economic
and Social Change
In recent years, innovation diffusion has attracted increasing attention within
the economic discipline as well as from other social sciences, such as sociology,
organization theory, economic geography, and political science.
Some of the reasons for the growing attention are likely to be found
within the internal patterns of enquiry of the various disciplines themselves.
Others are more obviously related to a general awareness of the importance
of innovations and innovation diffusion - in products, processes of produc-
tion, and forms of economic organization - for economic growth and, more
generally, social change.
Certainly, the so-called microelectronics revolution has provided a pow-
erful focus on the widespread economic and social consequences of major
technological innovations. In this respect, fundamental, and still largely
unanswered, questions concern, for example, its impact on employment and
growth, the consequences for business organization, the induced changes in
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the patterns of consumption, the implications for educational requirements,
the possible demand for new public policies, and many others. Moreover, in
addition to microelectronics, other new technologies, such as bioengineering
and new materials raise somewhat different but equally broad interpretative
and normative issues.
The importance of changing patterns of innovation and diffusion has also
emerged as a controversial issue in the interpretation of the trends in produc-
tivity growth within several OECD countries. Can the observed statistical
slowdown be attributed to a parallel slowdown in the rates of innovation?
Or, rather, to a slowdown in the rates of innovation diffusion and, thus,
to an increasing gap between average and best-practice techniques? How
can all this be reconciled with the intuitive evidence on the far-reaching
productivity improvements which apparently the microelectronics revolution
produces?
There is also an international aspect of innovation and diffusion. The
most striking phenomenon has probably been the impressive Japanese ca-
pability of quickly adopting, improving, and - more recently - introducing
new technologies. These capabilities, together with somewhat different or-
ganizational arrangements, have also meant a rapid growth of Japanese in-
ternational competitiveness. More generally, many analysts suggest that the
changing competitive strengths of the USA, the EEC countries, Japan and
the newly industrializing countries, must also be attributed to a differential
promptness of these countries in introducing and/or adopting technological
and organizational innovations.
Another major issue, somewhat related to the previous one, concerns
the relationship between innovativeness and the capability of appropriating
economic benefits from the innovations themselves. This is the subject of
great debat in the USA. To what extent is it necessary to be an innovator in
order to enjoy relatively high per capita incomes? Under what circumstances
is the innovator able to enjoy a quasi-rent on its technological achievements?
From a longer historical perspective, a view with respectable consensus
holds that all the processes of economic growth and social change - at least
since the English Industrial Revolution - cannot be explained without ref-
erence to the introduction and diffusion of major technological innovations
- from the steam engine to electricity, the internal combustion engine, rail-
roads, fertilizers, plastics, jet engines, and uncountable minor innovations.
Finally, very broad interpretative questions which are well beyond the
domain of the economic discipline concern, for example, the relationship
between new technologies and labor processes; the cultural and social
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structures which favor or hinder the introduction and diffusion of new tech-
nologies; the scientific and educational context within which innovation and
innovation diffusion take place.
The list of questions could be much longer. Indeed, all the foregoing
issues highlight the crucial importance of the phenomena of innovation and
innovation diffusion in the interpretation of how economic and social struc-
tures keep together and change, sometimes in a rather orderly manner, and
at other times with more abrupt discontinuities.
In a fundamental sense, the empirical evidence on the permanent pro-
cess of technological and organizational change in contemporary societies
confronts most social sciences such as, for example, economics, sociology,
political science, and psychology, and demands theoretical explanations of
its causes, patterns, and consequences.
The aim of this chapter is simply to sketch an overview of the state of
the art, primarily in the economics of innovation diffusion highlighting some
common themes and (often controversial) issues which underlie most other
chapters of this book (see also, Arcangeli et al., 1990, on whose introduction
this chapter partly draws).
7.2 Invention, Innovation, and Diffusion
One of the contributions of J. Schumpeter's work that is often cited with
reference to technological change concerns his distinction between inven-
tion, innovation, and diffusion. According to his definition, invention con-
cerns the first development of a new artifact or process. Innovation entails
its economic application. Diffusion describes its introduction by buyers or
competitors. It is a rough and "heroic" conceptual distinction, which can
hardly be found in practice, since the empirical processes are usually never
quite like this. The invention is often introduced from the start as an in-
novation by economically-minded research establishments. Diffusion entails
further innovation on the part of both developers and users. All three ac-
tivities are often associated with changes in the characteristics of, and in-
centives for, potential innovators/adopters. However, Schumpeter's distinc-
tion between invention, innovation, and diffusion is still a useful theoretical
point of departure. For example, invention is suggestive of some sort of ex-
ploited potential for technological progress, while innovation and diffusion
hint at the economic, social and organizational incentives and impediments
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to the incorporation of technological advances into economic products and
processes.
What progress has recently been made in the conceptualization of such
phenomena? It is tempting to compare the contributions that follow with
those presented almost thirty years ago at the Conferences of the National
Bureau on Economic Research on The Rate and Directions of Inventive Ac-
tivities (NBER, 1962). Significant elements of continuity as well as further
developments appear.
7.2.1 Inventive opportunities
What is an inventive opportunity? Do all "new opportunities" emerge from
apparently exogenous scientific progress? What shapes the dynamics of their
actual exploitation? The analysis of technology as a quite specific sort of in-
formation characterized by indivisibilities and, at least some, public-good
features in the sense of being able to be potentially transmitted and reused
repeatedly without loss, certainly drew also from the seminal contributions
of Arrow (cf., for example, Arrow, 1962a and 1962b) and a few of the roots of
such an approach are already witnessed by the cited NBER reading. That
approach easily fostered widening streams of later analyses on "the eco-
nomics of R&D" as a subset of the economics of imperfect and asymmetric
information (for reviews of recent developments, see Stiglitz, 1985; Stone-
man, 1990; Tirole, 1988). In an extreme synthesis, all the variegated con-
tributions that can be joined under the "imperfect information" perspective
have explored the properties of innovative worlds whereby notional opportu-
nities are either given or are subject to the exogenous dynamics of scientific
discoveries, but their actual exploitation depends on the particular incentive
structures (related, e.g., to the forms of market competition, etc.) and pos-
sibly also on the past available information on which the agents can draw
(cf. David, 1975; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; Stiglitz, 1987).
Conversely, a somewhat different approach has drawn a sharper distinc-
tion between information and prior knowledge, the latter being the rather
elusive set of cognitive structures, search rules, "tacit" capabilities guiding
inventive activities (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1988; Dosi, 1988),
all implicitly or explicitly linking with Simon's views on behaviors and deci-
sions (see, e.g., Simon, 1965 and 1979). From such a perspective, information
is still imperfect - indeed, largely imperfect - but, in addition, the rates and
directions of inventive activities are shaped and constrained also by specific
skills and heuristics of the searching agents, the activities in which "they are
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good" , their past experiences, etc. The recent attempts to conceptualize the
procedures and directions of innovative activities in terms of technological
paradigms and trajectories clearly fits within this perspective (Dosi, 1988).
Relatedly, significant progress has been made in the empirical under-
standing of the varying balances between private and public aspects of tech-
nological knowledge, between new opportunities that are generated in non-
profit institutions (such as universities, public research establishments, etc.)
and those which are created within the business sector (in private R&D
laboratories, but also through the more informal activities such as experi-
mentation and learning) (on all this, see Nelson, 1988 and 1990).
7.2.2 Invention and innovation incentives
Irrespectively of the specific theoretical representations of inventive oppor-
tunities and their exploitation, the economic discipline has increasingly at-
tempted to understand and conceptualize the effects of different economic
incentives upon the actual rates of invention and innovation. Plainly, the is-
sue goes back to the highly plausible fact that economically-motivated agents
will undertake the costs and risks of innovating only in so far as there is,
or they believe in, some differential economic returns from innovation. In
other words, for whatever notional opportunities, the actual rates of inno-
vation are going to be affected by the appropriability conditions. In fact,
the recent economic literature has increasingly tried to explore the nature
and effects of varying appropriability conditions (see Levin et al., 1985 and
1987); a mainly empirical survey is in Dosi (1988); the review in Kamien
and Schwartz (1982) concerns the relationship between market structures
and incentives to innovate discussed within a relatively orthodox perspec-
tive; a discussion of some of the current theoretical literature is in Dasgupta
(1988).
7.2.3 History and path-dependency
Both the theoretical and empirical literature reflect the growing recogni-
tion that history counts: past technological achievements influence future
achievements via the specificity of knowledge that they entail, the develop-
ment of specific infrastructures, the emergence of various sorts of increasing
returns and non-convexities in the notional set of technological options. On
theoretical grounds, this has led to the development of path-dependent mod-
els (c/. Arthur, 1988; David, 1985 and 1990); for some discussion of the
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general importance of this class of models for economic theory see Dosi and
Orsenigo, 1988).
Certainly, over the last three decades, empirical analyses and theoretical
modeling has made significant advances in the unfolding of the black box
by which the economic discipline had traditionally represented technology
and technological change (Rosenberg, 1982), by unfolding the determinants
and nature of invention and innovation, and the driving forces, patterns
and consequences of innovation diffusion (reviews and some evidence can be
found in Dosi, 1988; Arcangeli et al., 1990).
Below, I shall first sketch some empirical stylized facts and, second, try to
present an overview of the diverse streams of analysis, organized around their
methodological analogies, their basic assumptions on the diffusion process,
and the characteristics of the adopters.
7.3 Some "Stylized Facts" on Innovation
Diffusion
Even after a new product or production process or form of organization is
developed, its economic and/or social significance is still going to depend
on its acceptance amongst potential customers and the degrees to which
it is imitated by competitors. The study of innovation diffusion concerns
these phenomena. Not surprisingly these phenomena have been of interest
to several social disciplines. For example, rural sociology has studied the
circumstances which affect the pace of adoption of agricultural innovations.
Other areas of sociology have investigated the diffusion of social innovations,
such as particular forms of health care, pension funds, etc., and the social
characteristics that influence the acceptance of new products. The latter
have obviously also been the concern of marketing studies. Economic geog-
raphy has studied innovation diffusion in its spatial dimension (somewhat
overlapping with regional economics). A thorough review of these areas of
research is in Rogers (1983). Innovation diffusion studies also have a rel-
atively long tradition in economics, pioneered by the investigation on the
diffusion of hybrid corn by Griliches (1957) and of a few industrial processes
by Mansfield (1961). (For surveys, see Stoneman, 1983 and 1990; Metcalfe,
1988).
One can find in the literature different definitions of diffusion. However,
whatever the definition, one of the basic stylized facts of the diffusion pro-
cess is that it is never instantaneous. Innovation diffusion always takes time
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and occurs at rates that plausibly depend on the features of those technolo-
gies which are to be adopted; possibly on the features of those technologies
which are to be substituted; on the incentives that the economic environment
provides for adoption; on the characteristics of the would-be adopters; on
the information available to them; on their technological competence; possi-
bly, on their size. For example, the evidence from Mansfield (1968), Romeo
(1975), Nasbeth and Ray (1974), von Tunzlemann (1978), and Ray (1984)
show indeed quite a high inter-firm, inter-industry and inter-technology vari-
ance in the speed of diffusion (irrespective of the measures chosen).
7.3.1 Diffusion patterns
In general, as Rosenberg puts it,
in the history of diffusion of many innovations, one cannot help being struck
by two characteristics of the diffusion process: its apparent overall slowness
on the one hand, and the wide variations in the rates of acceptance of
different inventions, on the other [Rosenberg, 1976, p. 191].
Typically, one observes roughly S-shaped diffusion curves, whose precise form
varies condderably across innovations (cf. Davies, 1979; and several contri-
butions to this book). That the empirical curves are S-shaped should not
be surprising: many time-dependent processes with some kind of asymptotic
value present such a form. However, an important interpretative question
concerns the determinants of particular diffusion patterns.
In one way or another diffusion analyses attempt to explain such empir-
ical variety in the observed rates and patterns of adoption of new products,
processes, and forms of organization:
• Why is adoption not instantaneous? Why is adoption distributed over
time?
• What keeps the sequence of adoptions going forward through time, rather
than stopping after the first or n-th firm or household has adopted?
At a more detailed level of empirical investigation, several studies, as
mentioned, highlight the differences in the patterns of innovation diffusion
and, also, in the origins of innovations themselves. For example, some in-
novations are embodied in specific artifacts produced somewhere else in the
economic system (for example by machine or intermediate component manu-
facturers). Other innovations take the form of disembodied knowledge which
diffuses via people's mobility and/or via competitive R&D.
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In general, the speed of diffusion is inherently hard to judge because
there is no precise way to define the ultimate scope of application or use of a
new method of production or a new method of production or a new product
(Rosenberg, 1976; Gold, 1981). In fact, whatever empirical definition of
potential adopters one takes, their number tends to increase over a certain
time after the introduction of the original innovation. At an early stage,
new methods of production and new pieces of equipment "are of necessity,
badly adapted to many of the ultimate uses to which they will eventually be
put" (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 195). Diffusion is generally interlinked with more
or less incremental improvements of the innovation itself which (a) enhance
the technical/economic superiority of the new product or process vis-a-vis
older ones, and (b) enlarge its scope of application (a detailed illustration of
these processes for agricultural machinery is in David, 1975).
7.3.2 Potential adopters
The universe of potential adopters cannot be realistically assumed to be
composed of identical units. One of the clearest cases is that discussed in
David (1975) where the set of potential adopters of agricultural equipment
were farms of different sizes and different configurations of the land. In turn,
this affected the scope and the profitability of the mechanization of agricul-
tural production. So, for example, the larger and on average flatter and
regularly shaped American farms help to explain a faster rate of diffusion of
agricultural mechanization in the USA as compared to, for example, the UK
(of course in these international comparisons, differences in wage rates also
determine differential incentives to the diffusion of mechanized equipment).
Another straightforward case is whenever the incentive of adopting an
innovation is somewhat scale-based, or at least there is a minimum scale
at which adoption is profitable (this general conjecture is argued in Sylos-
Labini, 1967). Hence, the differences in size of potential adopters affect the
incentive to adopt. A wealth of empirical evidence suggests, in fact, that
the size of the firm is positively correlated to the speed of adoption (Mans-
field, 1968; Metcalfe, 1970; Davies, 1979; see also Chapter 14 by Kelley and
Brooks). This is not necessarily the case in inter-industrial, cross-innovation
comparisons: that is, ceteris paribus, an innovation does not diffuse quicker
simply because it is introduced into an industry where the average size of the
firm is larger (Romeo, 1975; Davies, 1979). That the scale of firms matters, is
also shown by the finding that the absolute cost of innovation affects, ceteris
paribus, its rate of diffusion (Mansfield, 1968; Davies, 1979). Of course, from
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a theoretical point of view, one may attribute the phenomenon to various
sorts of imperfections on the financial markets, etc. However, the expense
of introducing and using an innovation does not include only the price tag
on the new equipment, but also the costs of reorganization needed to take
advantage of the new equipment or method. In turn, there is a fixed element
in these costs, which can be spread, according to the size of the firm, over
different volumes of production. More generally, a whole approach to inno-
vation and diffusion studies would argue that it is often the case that the
adopting firms differ in their technological capabilities, and that some of the
potential adopters may not adopt because they do not have the technological
and organizational capabilities to do so. To put it simply, they do not adopt
since they lack the appropriate skills, internal knowledge, or managerial ca-
pabilities. Diffusion processes generally involve learning, modifications in
the existing organization of production, and, sometimes, even modifications
in the products, Le., essentially, diffusion involves innovation for the user
(Freeman, 1982; Rosenberg, 1976 and 1982; Gold, 1981; Lundvall, 1988). In
brief, this second set of factors, which influence the patterns of diffusion,
relates to the nature and distribution of technological asymmetries between
firms. Conversely, each process of diffusion is matched by the development
of skills among users, the solution of specific technical bottlenecks which
hinder adoption, and the development of complementarities with other an-
cillary technologies (for detailed illustrations of these points, see Rosenberg,
1976, Chapter 11).
Over time, post-innovation changes in the price of the innovative goods
(e.g., new machines) affect the incentive to adopt them, in general, and
differentially for different sets of users (see again, Rosenberg, 1976; David,
1975).
7.3.3 Profitability and expectations
It is not surprising that there is robust evidence indicating that the rates
of diffusion of innovation are influenced by the differential profitability of
the new process of equipment as compared to the existing one (Mansfield,
1968; Mansfield et al., 1977; Davies, 1979). It can plausibly be argued
that this is indirect evidence of the disequilibrium nature (or at least a high
degree of uncertainty) of many diffusion processes, since one would expect
that according to most definitions of equilibrium, any firm for which the
innovation is profitable - no matter to what extent profitable - would adopt
it.
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Certainly, part of the explanation of a discrete time lag in the diffusion
of, e.g., a superior (i.e., unequivocally more profitable) machine is a "vin-
tage effect" (Salter, 1969): given the general irreversibility of investment
decisions, adoption decisions are to some extent scrapping decisions, which
in turn depend on the "technological vintage" of the equipment currently in
use.
Moreover, technological expectations matter, in the sense that the ex-
pected stream of future revenues from, e.g., a new type of machine of today's
type, depends also on the expectations about the technical characteristics,
productivity, and costs of future machines. In a way, the rate of adoption
of innovation is implicitly influenced by expectations about future techno-
logical developments and also about the second order (how will that rate
of change vary in the future). On empirical grounds, the evidence suggests
very complex and often hardly formalizable processes of formation of these
expectations: the decision rules of adoption may be highly imperfect in a
neoclassical sense - heavily based on firm-specific and sector-specific institu-
tional traits and animal spirits (for evidence, see Carter and Williams, 1957;
Stoneman, 1976; Kleine, 1983).
7.3.4 Appropriability
The typical process of diffusion discussed so far, fits particularly well the
description of the factors which drive or hinder the purchase and use of, say,
a new type of machinery by a (changing) population of potential adopters.
That is, it concerns primarily the introduction of a process innovation which
is often a product innovation manufactured somewhere else in the economic
system: for example, it can be the decision of a textile firm whether to
introduce an automatic loom which in turn is a new product of a machine-
building firm. However, the symmetric complement to this process is the
diffusion of product innovations amongst potential suppliers (e.g., machine
tool builders, etc.). After all, product-related R&D is estimated to account
for 75 to 90% of total R&D expenditures in manufacturing (see Le Bas, 1981,
for a discussion of the various sources of evidence). What affects the pat-
terns of diffusion in supply (e.g., the number of machine tool builders which
produce numerically controlled machines of a certain type or the number of
drug firms which manufacture a new antibiotic)? Empirical research in this
field is relatively young. However, some important findings emerge from the
works of Gort and Klepper (1982) and Gort and Konakayama (1982) as well
as from industrial case studies.
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First, diffusion in supply - which implies more or less creative imitation
of the original innovative product by other producers - relates directly to the
appropriability conditions of innovations. Of course, a notional innovation
with total appropriability would never be imitated by any other producers.
Conversely, very low degrees of appropriability would allow, other things
being equal, easy imitation and a quick diffusion in supply.
Second, note the double role that appropriability plays in diffusion in
production. On the one hand, it acts as an incentive to imitation and entry
since it is, ceteris paribus, correlated with a differential profitability in the
production of the innovation good. On the other hand, it performs as an
entry barrier, since appropriability is almost by definition based on some
kind of appropriable asset, cumulated experience, differential technological
capabilities or legal devices such as patents (see on these issues, Chesnais,
1990; Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Philips, 1971; Gort and Klepper, 1982;
Dosi, 1984). The net effect upon the rates of diffusion in production (that is,
the rates of entry) are likely to depend on (a) the perceived opportunities of
technical progress (a high opportunity with high appropriability conditions
is likely to be a powerful incentive to enter and make a better product and/or
innovate further along the same technological trajectory); (b) the nature of
the knowledge-base on which a particular technology draws and, relatedly,
the degree of specificity to the incumbent producers of their innovative ca-
pability (see Gort and Klepper, 1982, for empirical evidence).
7.4 Innovation Diffusion: Drawing Together
Diverse Streams of Analysis
Let us first introduce a classification of diffusion models by means of some
underlying dichotomies in the analytical hypotheses and stylized facts which
they assume.
(1) Heterogeneity versus uniformity of potential adopters of innovations. Are
all agents the same? Do they have similar incentives to innovation adop-
tion? Or, conversely, do they differ in some structural characteristics, or
in their capabilities of efficiently acquiring new products and processes
of production, or in their technological expectations?
(2) Perfect versus imperfect information. Can the adopting agents be as-
sumed to have adequate information - at least for interpretative purposes
- about the nature and future developments of anyone technology? Or,
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rather, should we suppose that an essential determinant of innovation dif-
fusion concerns information diffusion about the existence and attribute
of particular innovations?
(3) Non-increasing versus increasing returns in new technological develop-
ments. Under what circumstances can we expect the use and/or the
production of innovations to exhibit constant or decreasing returns? Con-
versely, are there factors which may yield size-related economies of scale,
various sorts of learning processes and, generally, dynamic increasing
returns?
(4) The importance of history for the patterns of diffusion. Clearly, the is-
sue relates also to points (2) and (3). The higher the uncertainty about
the technical and economic characteristics of innovation, the higher the
importance of the learning history of individual agents is likely to be
with respect to their adoption decisions. But does this also affect the
general patterns of diffusion, or can one assume that the final "attrac-
tor" or stationary state of a diffusion process will still be independent
of individual vicissitudes? Most is going to depend on the existence of
dynamic increasing returns [point (3)] and on the feedback processes be"
tween the number of adopters of the technology, on the one hand, and the
changing incentives to further adopt it, on the other. Whenever these
circumstances occur we are clearly in the domain of path-dependent,
non-ergodic processes, briefly recalled in Section 7.2 of this work. In all
these cases, history counts, not only for individual patterns of behavior,
but also in terms of the general long-term dynamics of the system.
(5) The interaction between supply and demand of innovation. When can one
reasonably assume that the innovation to be adopted is supplied once-
and-for-all, and conversely, when is it correct to assume a continuous
process of improvement in its technical characteristics - which also make
adoption easier and enlarges the set of potential users? How important
are changes in supply conditions, in primis prices, for the changing pace
of innovation diffusion?
(6) Diffusion in demand versus diffusion in supply. The way diffusion pro-
cesses are often represented typically concerns a new good (say, a new
type of production machinery) whose manufacturer is keen on selling
to as many customers as possible. However, another side of the diffu-
sion process concerns, as mentioned, the diffusion of the manufacturing
capacity of this new good amongst the producers themselves. The the-
oretical representation of this kind of diffusion in production clearly re-
lates to the conditions of imitation of an innovation and thus with the
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theoretical analysis of technological appropriability, possibly entry- and
mobility-barriers, "tacitness" versus "universality" of technical knowl-
edge. Ultimately, it is an area where diffusion analysis joins with the
economics of innovation and the economics of industrial dynamics.
(7) The forces driving diffusion. Are these forces mainly exogenous to the
context in which the diffusion of a particular innovation takes place,
such as general changes in relative prices and macro demand growth?
Or rather do they mainly relate to factors that are endogenous to
the supplying and adopting industries, such as for example, learning
in the manufacturing of the innovation, learning by using, network
externalities?
In addition to these basic dichotomies on the "stylized facts" that the
analyses assume, some other fundamental alternatives concern directly the
analytical methodology, and in particular:
(8) Behaviors and choice processes of individuals or individual organiza-
tions. At one extreme, one may represent decision processes about
adoption/non-adoption of new technologies as a standard optimization
exercise, whereby the agents explicitly form expectations about the re-
turns on the new technologies, confronts the entire payoff matrix reach-
able through their actions, and choose by maximizing some objective
function. Following an economist's convention, call this "rational" or
"optimizing" behavior. At the other extreme, a few authors attribute
much less "rationality" to individual choice processes, according to a
methodological option grounded in the empirical observation and in some
theoretical reasons for the impossibility ofliterally maximizing behaviors
in environments that are sufficiently complex and nonstationary. Thus,
in this other approach, behaviors are likely to be rather "routinized",
influenced by specific "visions" and norms. Call this "institutionalized
behavior" .
(9) Equilibrium versus disequilibrium dynamics of diffusion. In the follow-
ing, I shall use the convention that diffusion dynamics is an "equilibrium
one" whenever micro decisions are postulated to be reciprocally consis-
tent and "rational" microbehaviors all turn out to be fulfilled in their
objectives. Conversely, I shall call "disequilibrium" diffusion processes
all those dynamics wherein (a) the "attractors" of the process change
themselves as a result of the very actions of the agents - such as when
there are system-level increasing returns to technology adoption and/or
(b) the diffusion process is explicitly represented in terms of the trial-
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and-error efforts of the agents, which exhibit "disequilibrium behaviors"
and deliver "disequilibrium signals" to other agents. (I refer here to equi-
librium and disequilibrium diffusion dynamics as "macro level" analysis
even when it refers to "macro behaviors" of single industries or groups
of forms. The proper meaning of "macroeconomics" will be restated in
the final section.)
As can be easily seen, the foregoing dichotomies in assumptions, in the
postulated stylized facts, and in the theoretical methodologies have a crucial
importance well beyond the area of innovation diffusion. Indeed, issues like
the diversity amongst agents, the access to information that the latter have,
the consequences of increasing returns and non-convexities, the status of
maximization and equilibrium assumptions, and the postulated processes
which bring consistency among a multiplicity of agents, all raise challenging
questions which are at the core of economic analysis in general. In fact,
this is probably one of the reasons for the general importance of innovation
diffusion: it does, after all, concern the processes by which the economy
generates and accommodates "the new", and thus directly touches all those
questions on coordination and change that have puzzled economists since
the beginning of economics as a discipline.
7.5 Diffusion as Information Spread and
Adaptation
Before adding some comments of my own, let me suggest a taxonomical guide
through the state of the art in the field by mapping the various approaches
found in the literature according to some of the earlier dichotomies. In Table
7.1 diffusion analyses are grouped according to their methodological differ-
ences [points (8) and (9), above]. Four broad groups are given based on a
two-dimensional classification based on whether the equilibrium or disequi-
librium approach is used and on whether the particular model deals with
optimizing or institutionalized behavior.
7.5.1 Equilibrium approaches
"Institutionalized" Behavior
The top-right corner of Table 7.1 includes all equilibrium models with in-
stitutionalized behavior, developed with a strong descriptive emphasis, that
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Table 7.1. Methodological classification of diffusion models.
Micro behaviors
Macro level Optimizing behaviors Insti tutionalized behaviors
Traditional models with
adjustment lags, e.g.,
Griliches (1957);
Mansfield (196S)
Davies (1979)a
Marshal/ian models
in Metcalfe (19ss)a
Neoclassical models,
e.g., David (1969);
Stoneman (1983);
Reinganum (19S1)
Equilibrium
Steady-states
Evolutionary models, e.g.,
Nelson and Winter (19S2);
self-organizational models,
e.g., Silverberg, Dosi,
and Orsenigo (19SS)
Disequilibrium
Traverses or
self-organization
processes
Increasing returns
models of diffusion, cum.
innovation, e.g., David
and Olsen (19S4, 19S6);
David (19S5, 19S6);
Farrell-Saloner (19S5)
Arthur (19S3, 19ss)a
aThese models do not make explicit assumptions on microbehaviors and are, in principle,
consistent with either hypothesis.
(7.1)
investigate the empirical relevance of various economic and social variables
as favorable or retarding factors in the adoption of innovation. The starting
point is generally the empirical regularity, mentioned earlier, on diffusion
patterns often presenting an S-shaped profile. Indeed, it is generally found
that time-patterns fit rather well rate equations of the generic form
dXtdI = f(N,Xt)
where Xt stands for the number of adopters at time t and N is the total
number of potential adopters. Hence the analysis primarily concerns the
factors determining the rates of change in adoption and the primary focus
is about how people and organizations become exposed to novelty and react
by rejecting or embracing change. The analysis of the diffusion of new tech-
nologies, in this approach, could in a way be considered as part of the study
of more general behavioral patterns of humans and organizations.
Both in the economic and sociological literatures, primary attention
is given to the propagation of information about novelties, which may
come as stimuli, surprises or threats to individuals and corporations. The
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stimuli elicit responses, which come with varying lags, depending upon
socio-psychological attributes of individuals, their position in the social sys-
tem, or, somewhat analogously, on corporate cultures and organizational
structures.
I classified this approach under "equilibrium" because it still generally
treats diffusion as a process of convergence to some long-term, steady-state
(say X .. = N in equation 7.1) with non-instantaneous adoption primar-
ily accounted by frictions, lack of information, response lags, and "out-of-
equilibrium" behaviors of micro agents. The various studies that come under
this heading are thoroughly reviewed in Rogers (1983). They have certainly
provided rich insights into the empirical variety of socioeconomic determi-
nants of diffusion patterns. However, if one looks for a deeper explanation,
then it does not exist. In particular, economists often consider such a deeper
level to rest in the microfoundations of anyone aggregate process and most
often are only satisfied when, in turn, micro behaviors can be grounded de-
ductively into some "rational" choice procedure. This kind of theoretical
diffidence toward simply descriptive models is probably also one of the ex~
planations for the appeal of the class of models that we are going to consider
next, those at the top-left of Table 7.1.
"Optimizing" Behavior
The top-left corner of Table 7.1 includes "optimizing" equilibrium mod-
els. In many respects equilibrium diffusion models cum micro optimization
represent the extension of neoclassical economic theory to diffusion phenom-
ena. In this class of models diffusion is seen as the outcome of rational
goal-directed choices, made by more or less fully informed firms and con-
sumers, among the set of available technologies - particularly the choice
between new technologies and those previously available. Here the focus
is upon modeling the choice-process, and assimilating innovation-adoption
into the larger corpus of (decision-theoretic or game-theoretic) microeco-
nomic theory. This theory, when it is employed as a positive model (and not
simply as a normative exercise) asserts a correspondence between the central
(average) tendencies in individual behaviors and the (theoretically-derived)
equilibrium.
Given the above, why, then do not all the agents adopt at the same
time? One of the simplest answers is that the agents are "rational", but
less-than-perfectly informed: there are objective costs in information ac-
quisition, adjustment costs, etc. In a way this is the most straightforward
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"rationalization" (in terms of "rational agent" micro theory) of the evidence
put forward by the studies reviewed in the previous section.
Another route is to assume that agents are "rational" and different in
some structural characteristics. P.A. David long ago started exploring this
route whereby thresholds to efficient innovation adoption are determined by
the scale of output of adopters, and consequently, the benefits of adoption
for each agent do not reach a maximum at the same time (David, 1969).
Consider the basic model:
• The users of the innovation belong to a competitive industry.
• They are heterogeneous with respect to output scale.
• There is perfect information about the characteristics and economic ben-
efits of the innovation.
• The innovation is embodied in some fixed, lumpy piece of equipment
(e.g., continuous rolling, annealing machines, tractors, etc.).
• Adopters are "myopic" in that they ignore the future acquisition costs
of the technology.
• The scale of the firms is fixed and does not adjust in response to the
innovations.
This scale-constrained world (as from David, 1969) is depicted in Figure
7.1, where g(z) is the frequency distribution of some agents' characteristics
(z, in our case, size). If we specify a time-path of the threshold level of
the characteristics index z*(t) above which adoption becomes profitable, we
re-map the characteristics distribution into the time domain. We can derive
a so-called "Probit model" of diffusion.
Consider for example lognormal size distributions (as in David, 1969 and
Davies, 1979) and some alternative time patterns of the threshold (for ex-
ample, exponential relative decline in fixed-factor/variable factor price ratio,
as in David, 1969, or linear time-paths with retardation in the decline of the
threshold, as in Davies, 1969). Distributions of heterogeneous agents with
a moving threshold for efficient adoption can generate a sigmoid diffusion
curve. The time-profile of the threshold can obviously be given exogenously,
but can also be derived from the diffusion-dynamics itself: for example,
Stoneman and Ireland (1983) and David and Olsen (1984) derive it explic-
itly by specifying learning effects in the supply of the new technology.
Of course, size is by no means the only source of differentiation amongst
adopters and equilibrium - "rational" models can accommodate other forms
of heterogeneity, such as, for example, location and transport costs, regional
wage levels, information costs, etc. For example, David and Olsen (1984)
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Objective characteristics distributions [g(z)] models:
• Vintage-distribution of fixed capital (Salter).
• Size-distribution of firms (output) (David, Davies).
• "Priors" on benefits (uncertain) (Stoneman, Jensen, Reinganum).
• Risk-aversion distribution.
Figure 7.1. "Equilibrium diffusion" with heterogeneous agents.
move beyond probit-type (or "threshold") models - in which the scale of
output is not influenced by the new technology and the firm size distribu-
tion remains invariant with respect to the diffusion process - and allow for
a competitive firm's choice of output jointly with its technology adoption
decision. Hence, the heterogeneity which determines the time-distribution
of adoptions must come from factors other than output size.
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Equilibrium models with heterogeneous firms have typically assumed
a competitive industry (with competitive or monopolistic suppliers of the
innovation). Conversely, another stream of equilibrium analysis has explored
diffusion in the context of strategic oligopolistic interactions cum homoge-
neous agents (e.g., Reinganum, 1981; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).
A closely related approach describes equilibrium diffusion with homoge-
neous, perfectly forward-looking agents cum non-appropriable learning (Jo-
vanovic and Lach, 1989).
A taxonomy of equilibrium - "rational" models, categorized according to
the heterogeneity versus homogeneity of the agents and endogeneity versus
exogeneity of the driving forces of diffusion is presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2. A taxonomy of equilibrium models of technology diffusion.
Objective characteristics of potential adoptersNature of dynamic
driving process
Exogeneous
Endogeneous
Heterogeneous
Competitive industry
adoption, driven by:
• market demand growth
• output distribution
changes
• input price trends
Competitive industry
adoption, driven by:
• learning in innovation
supply
• learning in use
• network externalities
which are unbounded
or bounded
Homonogeneous
Interdependent adopters
with: pre-commitment
(Reinganum, 1981)
or
strategic interaction
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985)
• exogeneous drivers
Oligopolistic or duopolistic
rivalry with learning
or system-scale effects
One of the general questions addressed by equilibrium models with in-
terdependent adopters is: can one conceive a consistent pattern of adoption
whereby identical agents adopt at different times? Technically, an answer
to such a question generally corresponds to the exploration of the existence
of Nash equilibria in the domain of adoption decisions, thus extending the
application of a methodology increasingly used by mainstream industrial
economics with respect to, e.g., price and quantity variables in oligopolistic
settings.
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Certainly, these various versions of equilibrium-rational analyses have
generated an increasing number of contributions, highlighting the impli-
cation for the diffusion process of different subsidiary assumptions (e.g.,
"myopic" versus "rational" expectations, strategic interactions with or with-
out pre-committed choices, competitive versus monopolistic supply of the
innovations, etc.). (A review of these developments is in Stoneman, 1990.)
It is much harder to assess the heuristic value of this class of models for
the positive interpretation of empirical phenomena of innovation diffusion.
Any evaluation also involves a general judgement on the tool-box of the eco-
nomic discipline as a whole, the status, and interpretative power of method-
ological assumptions such as equilibrium, rationality, etc. It is a judge-
ment which certainly divides the economic discipline. However, irrespective
of disciplinary preferences and the particular beliefs on "how much of the
real world equilibrium-rational models can illuminate", there are phenom-
ena which they can hardly handle, ultimately related to diffusion processes
involving various forms of increasing returns, circular feedbacks between in-
novation and diffusion and environments where "rational behavior" is not
only empirically unlikely but theoretically impossible to define. The models
classified in the bottom half of Table 7.1 try precisely to deal with some or
all of these phenomena. I shall now turn to them.
7.5.2 Disequilibrium approaches
Increasing Returns, Path-dependency, and Evolutionary Processes m
Innovation Diffusion
Many students of technology diffusion processes have arrived at the view,
argued, for example, by Rosenberg (1972); Freeman (1982); Sahal (1981);
Freeman and Perez (1988), that innovation and diffusion are continuously
interlinked. Over time, technology adoption, and the creation of new tech-
nologies are mutually dependent. Moreover, the innovation-diffusion pro-
cess must be seen as "macro-disequilibrium dynamics" (in the meaning of
macro defined earlier), characterized by the exploration of various sorts of
increasing returns along particular "trajectories" of technical progress (Nel-
son and Winter, 1977; Dosi, 1982), and the evolution of various institutions
within the economy (including firms) along with the exploitation of the new
technologies.
Of course, if positive feedbacks between adoption of innovations, their fur-
ther improvements, and the cost of acquiring them are important enough,
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this implies, in technical terms, a source of non-convexity in the technological
opportunities at the level of the firm, the industry or the whole economy. We
leave the world of convergence to macro-level solutions and of equilibrium
paths which can be defined independently of the actual technological and
economic history of particular clusters of innovations. On the contrary, we
are in the path-dependent world of Arthur (1983 and 1988) and David (1985),
wherein the long-term positions of the system may well depend on even mi-
nor initial fluctuations, individual choices, institutions, and policy measures.
(On these issues, c/., in particular, the chapters by David; Amendola and
Gaffard; Dosi et al. in Arcangeli et al., 1990.)
In a different vein, all the models classified in the bottom half of Figure
7.1 deal with diffusion processes that are implicitly or explicitly historical
with multiple notional end-state and endogenously-generated opportunities
(dynamic increasing returns). However, they differ in their approach to
micromodeling.
Those on the bottom-left (e.g., David, 1985 and 1990; David and Olsen,
1990; Farell and Saloner, 1985) maintain a micro "rationality" assumption:
agents still make their optimizing choices which collectively yield some sort
of externality that in turn affects future returns and future options.
Conversely, the "evolutionary" and "self-organization" models on the
bottom-right of Figure 7.1 depart also from the standard micro-rationality
and explicitly represent diffusion as the outcome of diverse behaviors of
agents exhibiting "institutionalized" (so-called "bounded rationality") be-
haviors. Indeed, the supporters of this analytical approach do claim that
the difference between "evolutionary" and "equilibrium" approaches to in-
novation diffusion is much deeper than the difference between the explicit
(but somewhat unelegant) representation of a process and the description of
the final state to which that same process is converging. Rather, evolution-
ary theory claims that (a) only under particular circumstances can "rational
equilibria" be postulated to be the "attractor" or end-states of empirically
more plausible "disequilibrium" trial-and-error processes, and relatedly, (b)
actual end-states may well depend on non-average behaviors, so that an ex-
plicit account of the distributions of specific choice rules and of the specific
mechanisms of competitive selection are theoretically required (these issues
are discussed, in this perspective, in Nelson and Winter, 1982, and Dosi et
al., 1988, in particular the chapters therein by Silverberg, Allen, Dosi, and
Orsenigo.
Broadly speaking, many "rational" and evolutionary/self-organization
models of innovation diffusion overlap in the endeavor to explain theoreti-
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cally open-ended (history- bound) processes. They do also sometimes overlap
in the questions that they ask. For example: are there micro strategies that
are stable in an evolutionary sense? How does dynamic mutual consistency
come about? However, they depart in the relative faith that they place on
the rational power of microagents as an "ordering factor". In a way, all
micro-rational models look for order by investigating the conditions of exis-
tence of consistent rational strategies (whether pure or mixed strategies, in
game-theoretic settings) that could support a diffusion process. Conversely,
evolutionary/self-organization models rest their emphasis on diversity, learn-
ing and environmental selection as the main ordering factors, which ex post,
but not necessarily ex-ante produce recognizable regularities in the diffusion
process.
7.5.3 Optimizing equilibrium compared to
institutionalized behaviors and disequilibrium
The reader may find a vivid illustration of the analogies and differences be-
tween the basic equilibrium and disequilibrium approaches by comparing
Jovanovic and Lach (1989) and Silverberg et al. (1988). Loosely speak-
ing, they could be considered as somewhat extreme archetypes of the two
categories of models. In fact, they both start with quite similar techno-
logical assumptions: adoption of a capital-embodied innovation drives fixed
and variable costs down and, therefore, the efficiency gains are a sort of
collective result of adoption decisions. However, the analogies stop here.
Jovanovic and Lach assume perfect micro technological forecasting and an
ex-ante "equilibrium ordering" of entry decisions which, I must confess, I
keep finding rather obscure in its microeconomic plausibility. (What is the
mechanism generating the proper "queue"? How does one learn that he got
an epsilon-wrong in this queue? What are the collective results of several
epsilon mistakes?) Conversely, Silverberg et al. (1988) assume that people
get it systematically wrong. This is not because they are "more stupid" than
the Jovanovic-Lach (1989) agents. In principle, they form their expectations
the best way they can. However, the end-results are truly collective phe-
nomena, emerging from complex nonlinear interactions amongst all of them.
What difference do the alternative analytical approaches make? In my view,
one of the basic differences is that the "rational-equilibrium" approach loses
interpretative significance the more the diffusion process is influenced by
particular distributions of the expectational and technological characteris-
tics of individual agents. In this sense, "equilibrium approaches" show the
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same limitations, and more so, than so-called rational expectation models in
macroeconomics: "equilibrium paths" - whenever they exist - are not inde-
pendent of the distribution of beliefs, technological capabilities, and learning
processes of individual agents. In fact, one may simply check the robustness
of the properties of a unique equilibrium diffusion path - from Jovanovic-
Lach - allowing for different stochastic disturbances on, e.g., expectations: in
general, one cannot presume the equilibrium path to be even locally stable;
hence also the conclusions based on the properties of "perfect" equilibrium
diffusion processes cannot be presumed to hold. In particular, it seems to me,
equilibrium- "rational" analyses of diffusion must rule out ex hypothesi the
possibility of (imperfect) out-of-equilibrium adjustment and learning from
mistakes, which, I would argue, are an essential part of diffusion processes
and affect also the specific path that is empirically observed.
It is indeed a major methodological difference which cuts across most
fields of economic analysis: it is particularly evident with respect to innova-
tion diffusion probably because, as mentioned, it is a crucial domain where
novelties emerge in the economic system with an intrinsic tension between
economic coordination and change. The supporters of methodological ra-
tionality believe that the calculating and planning powers of the agents can
be stretched to also embrace highly complex, uncertain and non-stationary
environments. Others suggest that for interpretative purposes this is a re-
search program that despite unreasonable demands on individual calculating
powers is bound to end up in rather indeterminate conclusions, and that in-
stitutions, together with more "impersonal" selection mechanisms can be
part of a more promising microfoundation.
Moreover, innovation diffusion obviously bears major implications also
in terms of macroeconomic growth of income, productivity, and employment
(meaning here the proper "macro" level of the whole economy); industrial
structures and organizational forms (including size, degrees of integration of
business firms, etc.), and, finally, public policies. Let me now also briefly
introduce also these broader issues.
7.6 Innovation Diffusion, Economic Dynamics,
and Public Policies
Most diffusion models focus upon the determinants of innovation diffusion.
However, a somewhat symmetric question concerns the effects of innovation
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diffusion upon changes in industrial structures and, more generally, on eco-
nomic development.
In a genuinely dynamic framework, different capabilities, degrees of suc-
cess or simply luck in innovation adoption by the various firms, affect firms'
competitiveness, continuously generate asymmetries among them, and ulti-
mately modify industrial structure (relative firm size, degrees of industrial
concentration, etc.). It is probably a rather uncontroversial claim of "Schum-
peterian" j"evolutionary" economics to have initiated this kind of investiga-
tion, albeit now paralleled by other approaches that rely more on optimizing
microfoundations and equilibrium dynamics (see, for example, Dasgupta and
Stiglitz, 1980a and 1980b).
Yet, irrespective of the specific analytical assumptions, any world where
structural conditions and innovation diffusion are dynamically-coupled, that
is wherein structural conditions influence innovation adoption and innova-
tion adoption changes industrial structures, is going to exhibit nonlinear
dynamics and path-dependency (hence, also multiplicity of dynamic paths
and irreversibilities).
A crucial corollary of all this is that institutions and policies matter
in shaping economic dynamics. Some of the contributions in Arcangeli et
al. (1990) (especially Volume III) go further and conjecture some general
"mappings" between (a) characteristics of diffusing technologies (or clusters
of them), (b) institutions also shaping their adoption (and economic coor-
dination, in general), and (c) patterns of economic growth. For example,
Freeman and Perez (1988) argue that it is the "matching" or "mismatching"
between broad "techno-economic paradigms" (such as electromechanic au-
tomation, microelectronics, etc.) and forms of socioeconomic organization
which accounts for long-term historical regularities in economic growth in-
tertwined by significant periods of instabilities and crises. On a somewhat
similar level of analysis, contributions like Boyer (1988a and 1988b), Boyer
and Coriat (1990), Coricelli et al. (1989), attempt some sort of explanation
of the changing macrocoefficients (e.g., in the rates of change of income, em-
ployment, labor productivity, etc.) also in terms of plausible changes in the
underlying trends in innovation and diffusion.
It is a formidable task, still at a very early stage of development, but
it hints at the possibility of "microfounding" macrodynamics cum non-
stationarity (at the very least in the available technologies, and most likely
also in institutions and "preferences"). Some are keener on searching
for these microfoundations through multiple equilibrium-rational dynamics.
Others prefer to explore evolutionaryjself-organization processes. Still, there
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seems a common quest for a micro-macro link that withholds (indeed, en-
dogenously generates) non-stationarity in the so-called "fundamentals" and
accommodates micro-diversity.
Another major consequence of differentiated patterns of innovation and
diffusion concerns its regional and international dimensions. If regions and
countries innovate and adopt at different rates, first, that very phenomenon
must be explained, which in principle is a task of some sort of diffusion model
cum heterogeneous adopters. Second, its implications for regional growth,
international trade, and development must be explored. Several works have
started to address these issues (see again, Volume III of Arcangeli et al.,
1990). Some increase the understanding of the "microcircularities" between
technological advantages, patterns of international location, and interna-
tional trade (such as the chapter by Cantwell and Dunning in Arcangeli et
al., 1990). Others (e.g., Cimoli et al., 1990; Dosi et al., 1990) link interna-
tional diffusion with international institutional differences and "technology-
gap" trade theories. Still a few others develop the tradition of regional
economic studies in a fruitful parallelism between those models where time
is the dimension of diffusion (such as, typically, in industrial economics), and
those where it is space. Finally, all these complex and intertwined features
of innovation diffusion have equally crucial normative (policy) dimensions.
Path-dependency and irreversibilities of diffusion patterns also imply the
fundamental role of (plausibly less-than-perfectly informed) policies in the
choice of major technological trajectories. But one side of the dilemma is
that with local increasing returns, markets could most likely be more "my-
opic" and dynamically inefficient than approximate policy measures. How-
ever, somewhat symmetrically, it is hard to define the circumstances under
which public policies can plan with more foresight toward notionally superior
technologies. Prima facie, all this is a powerful argument for technological
pluralism or at least for economic set-ups which allow for a sufficient di-
versity at the beginning of any new technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982 and
1988; David, 1990; Nelson, 1988). It remains also a major area of historical
and theoretical exploration.
Micro-macro links add further complexity to the normative puzzles. If
there are "multiple possible macro worlds" and institutions count in the de-
termination of the one which finally emerges, then also very subtle questions
come out concerning how individual agents, social groups, and public policies
can influence such outcomes. Putting it another way, no matter whether one
represents the world as multiple equilibrium dynamics cum non-convexities
or as multiple open-ended evolutionary processes, one is still left with the
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questions on how and in which direction should the initial conditions be
influenced - in one case - or how and in which form should micro diversities,
selection processes, and economic institutions be shaped - in the other case.
All this, in our view, is another major frontier of research, which brings
history, social disciplines, and policy analysis somewhat nearer to each other.
Needless to say, it is an enormous task, but I believe, worth the endeavor.
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Chapter 8
Adoption and Diffusion of
Technology as a Collective
Evolutionary Process
Gerald Silverberg
8.1 Introduction
Innovation diffusion occupies a special place in the economics of techno-
logical change. On the one hand it is empirically the best established and
most intensively studied phenomenon in this area, and the logistic and other
S-shaped curves have provided a sound mathematical, if somewhat phe-
nomenological, inroad into a diverse range of applications. On the other,
it still remains somewhat divorced from any microeconomically founded,
overarching theory of the determinants of technological change which might
constitute a central component of a general approach to economic dynamics
and social evolution.
Why is this the case after many years of diffusion research and a vast
accumulation of case studies, and a diversity of mostly ad hoc theoretical
models? The reason appears to be twofold. First, most diffusion research
has proceeded on the basis of a number of implicit assumptions which have
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inevitably narrowed the focus of inquiry and prevented a link-up with other
aspects of the economics of technological change. Second, a number of fea-
tures of the economic history of modern technology, which must be obvious
to even the most casual observer, have failed to become part of the diffusion
literature. As I shall argue below, these represent two sides of the same
coin. Once they are brought together a new perspective opens up which, in
my opinion, may lead to a fruitful generalization and integration of present
work.
The study of technical change has been dominated in this century by
what I call the linear model, which undoubtedly goes back to Schumpeter
(1912): there is a linear progression from invention to innovation to imita-
tion/diffusion. Each of these three stages is distinct, and a technology passes
unidirectionally from one to the next, in the course of which the dominant
economic factors and the nature of the actors change character significantly.
The technology itself, however, remains more or less the same (once it has
been invented) - it is simply passed along this pipeline (perhaps undergo-
ing in the process some slight modifications and adaptations) to reveal its
economic potential and be exploited until its innovative strength has been
exhausted like a squeezed-out lemon. The diffusion literature has naturally
embraced an analogous perspective: an innovation arrives at time zero as a
consummated creation, like Venus from Zeus' brow. The problem is then to
explain why it takes so long for it to be completely adopted by its (a priori
clearly defined) potential adopters. Nonadoption is taken as self-evidently
irrational, the (Schumpeterian) heroes being the inventors and innovators,
the imitators being ambiguous figures obviously necessary to the process but
somehow unseemly and undeserving, while a remnant remains of conserva-
tive stick-in-the-muds doomed to economic obscurity. The only questions to
be examined are what determines the rate of diffusion, what distinguishes
early from late adopters, and to what extent is forecasting (of the rates and
ultimate level of saturation) possible. Implicit in this viewpoint is the notion
that the faster the better, the earlier the timepoint of adoption the better,
the higher the level of diffusion the better.
Another peculiar lacuna in the diffusion literature is the fact that, al-
though the influence of profitability on adoption and diffusion rates has been
extensively studied since Mansfield, the inverse - the effect of the timing of
adoption on profitability, relative competitiveness and market structure -
has surprisingly been largely neglected. In all of the concern to find an eco-
nomic explanation for technological change, the economic implications of the
latter have been left out of the picture, or relegated to the by now familiar
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implicit assumption that the earlier the better. It is almost as if decisions
with respect to technology, although influenced by economic considerations,
themselves had no economic repercussions, in particular in terms of the abil-
ity to compete. Thus studies which simply note the number or size of firms
which adopt over time overlook the fact that the sizes, profitabilities, and
strengths of these firms do in fact change, sometimes quite significantly, dur-
ing the diffusion period, and in part at least precisely due to the adoption
decisions implemented. In part this neglect is justified by the argument that
most diffusion processes concern innovations which are themselves of sec-
ondary importance to the overall performance of a firm. But if this were
so universally true, then there would seem to be little point in devoting so
much scientific attention to questions of diffusion in the first place.
Of course this characterization is unfair to quite a number of writers
on diffusion. The probit and other equilibrium traditions have argued that
diffusion proceeds according to a pace consistent with some predetermined
distribution of agents' characteristics (e.g., David, 1966; but see Olmstead,
1975, for a counterargument on precisely David's case study of the diffusion
of reapers which reinforces the thesis of this chapter). Other writers (in
particular Rosenberg, 1972; Sahal, 1981) have emphasized that the technical
characteristics of an innovation develop simultaneously and interdependently
with its diffusion. Yet none of these questions seem to have been dealt
with systematically, and above all fitted into the overall pattern of technical
change, of which diffusion is only a part, albeit an essential one.
The mirror image of these sins of omission are a number of observations
which seems almost too obvious to have to be stated. The point of recol-
lecting them here, however, is that they may serve as an entryway into a
new perspective on the role of diffusion per se in the process of technical
change, and thus bring into focus a number of previously disparate elements
of the picture. The first observation is that technologies improve and de-
velop considerably during the diffusion process. In fact, in many cases a
new technology may actually be inferior in performance to an established
one, and only overtake it later (Enos, 1962, e.g., gives a number of examples
taken from petroleum refining). This is at variance with the implicit as-
sumption noted above that a technology arrives full blown before diffusing,
and that development and diffusion can be separated from each other. This
adds an element to the adoption decision which until now only the probit
models have incorporated, albeit in a very static sense: when to invest in a
new technology given that its technical performance characteristics are both
uncertain and changing, and that its future potential is poorly known. The
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fact that, in general, decision makers are conscious of the changing nature of
technologies in their investment decisions and modify their criteria accord-
ingly enables us to connect up with the considerable literature on durable
investment under technical change and the role of technological expecta-
tions (e.g., Terborgh, 1949, on optimal replacement, and Rosenberg, 1976,
specifically on expectations).
But we can go a step further with this observation to make the claim that
one reason technologies develop considerably during the diffusion process is
precisely due to this process itself. One obvious reason is learning by doing
and learning by using on the part of producers and users, respectively (there
is a large literature on this subject, but the classical references in economics
are Arrow, 1962a, and Rosenberg, 1982). The more a technology is adopted
and employed the faster producers can go down their learning curves due to
increased cumulative investment and production, and the better users can
exploit it due to their own accumulated experience. Moreover, user/producer
interactions playa critical role in the development and adaptation process, as
has been pointed out by Lundvall (1988) and Vall Hippel (1988) in particular.
This process of incremental innovation, which quantitatively can be much
more significant than the original act of invention, itself can take on the
character of invention, not in the sense of the solitary inventor or pioneering
firm still secretly cherished by most writers on technology, but what Robert
C. Allen has labeled "collective invention" (Allen, 1983).
Allen defines collective invention as a fourth form of the generation of
new practices and technological knowledge alongside non-profit university
and governmental research, firm R&D, and individual inventors. In this
process nonpatentable incremental inventions, Le., explorations of possible
technological practice, operating conditions, procedures, designs, etc. are
more or less freely exchanged within an industry:
The essential precondition for collective invention is the free exchange of
information about new techniques and plant designs among firms in an
industry .... Thus, if a firm constructed a new plant of novel design and
that plant proved to have lower costs than other plants, these facts were
made available to other firms in the industry and to potential entrants.
The next firm constructing a new plant could build on the experience of
the first by introducing and extending the design change that had proved
profitable .... In this way fruitful lines of technical advance were identified
and pursued [Allen, 1983, p. 2].
Whereas Allen restricts his concept of collective invention to a form of tech-
nical change in which firms, essentially noncollusively, build on each others'
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individual experience without committing resources to what we would now
call R&D (and thus, he argues, was more significant in the nineteenth cen-
tury), there are several aspects of the phenomenon which seem to be reievant
to a more general evolutionary perspective on technical change in decentral-
ized economies. First, much incremental technical change is incidental to
more normal activities of firms such as investment, scaling up, and routine
problem solving. Second, technology is to some extent a form of information
and thus partakes of some of the peculiar economic properties of this elusive
concept. It can be both private and public at different times, tacit or codifi-
able, reproducible, and transmissible at low cost but exploitable only if the
recipient has already attained a certain technological level him/herself, and
nonadditive. However, complementary pieces of information can be syner-
getic, allowing much larger advances to be achieved when combined than if
they were used in isolation.
In dynamic terms these properties are the preconditions for the well-
known Schumpeterian interaction between innovator and imitator. The im-
plicit (linear) assumption ofthis picture is that the innovator enters with the
new information, which eventually leaks out and is copied by others, enabling
them to gradually catch up with his superior technological level and whittle
away his superprofits. In view of our brief discussion of collective invention
above, however, we may be emboldened to break with this one-way concept
of innovation causality and advance the hypothesis that imitation, copying,
and diffusion themselves contribute significantly to the further technological
maturation of the original innovative idea through a complicated, two-way
process of interaction and collective exploration. Almost any economic his-
tory of the development of technology which goes beyond the Samuel Smiles'
exaltation of the heroic inventor will confirm that most innovations pass
through many hands and strange byways before they attained the dominant
design by which we now know them. Rare is the example of the Edison
light bulb and electric power system which was single-handedly developed
to market maturity by one research laboratory under one man's direction (c/.
Friedel et al., 1986). But even here, the original idea is much older, Edison's
original inspiration (an electromechanical solution based on telegraph tech-
nology) was a dead-end, and crucial ancillary equipment (such as vacuum
pump technology) came from outside. Furthermore, the important further
advances on this technological trajectory such as high-voltage AC generation
and transmission, came about through a multitude of partly complementary
and partly competing international contributions totally outside of Edison's
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control and against which he actually fought a vain rearguard action for a
time (see Hughes, 1983; David and Bunn, 1988).
Many of these factors and feedback channels have been recognized in the
literature, though usually in isolation. From the economic point of view the
discussion has focussed on their influence on the appropriability of techni-
cal change to the individual agent, that is, the agent's ability to capture a
private economic reward for his inventive exertions and exclude free riders.
The information character of technology is what puts this appropriability in
doubt, of course. The classical solution is the legal institution of the patent.
But it has become clear in recent years that patents are suitable protection
for only certain classes of innovations. And in areas of very rapid tech-
nical change and concomitant rapid obsolescence of ideas, secrecy or first-
mover advantages can be more cost effective forms of protection than the
time-consuming and expensive process of patenting, which moreover man-
dates disclosure (cf. Levin et al., 1985). Furthermore, patents can often be
designed around, another example of the peculiar forms information inter-
change can take. The appropriability issue, even in a neoclassical setting,
also leads to the well-known justification for government-sponsored R&D
due to the discrepancy between social and private rates of return on R&D
investment (Arrow, 1962b).
Appropriability is a fascinating issue for the economist because it is an
example of an externality, and thus poses a challenge to the optimum wel-
fare implications of those styles of general equilibrium analysis which, at
least in theory, fully reconcile individual and social interests. This has led
to a sophisticated literature on whether too much or too little R&D will
be done compared to some posited social optimum, due to either the in-
adequate private incentive or the danger of redundancy and duplication of
research efforts. From the perspective of this chapter I think these questions
are somewhat besides the point. As I shall try to demonstrate in the follow-
ing, both externalities and (near) duplication can be very useful, perhaps
even necessary, components of technical change when seen as a collective
evolutionary process. The key concept in this regard is learning, which can
take place within the individual, the organization, and collectively through
a network of feedbacks unfolding over time between both cooperative and
competitive agents.
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8.2 A Self-Organizational Approach to the
Modeling of Technology Diffusion
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I want to draw on the above observations to indicate some of the features
of an appropriate modeling framework for the analysis of technical change,
based on some of my own previous work (Silverberg, 1987; Silverberg et
al., 1988; Silverberg, 1990), and the literature reviewed in Silverberg (1988
and 1989). To begin with, it is clear that if technical change is an ongoing
process, albeit proceeding in fits and starts, then the decision procedures
of participants must eventually take this into account, and thus cannot be
rooted in purely static analyses. This is one of the chief reasons (though cer-
tainly not the only one) in my opinion for discarding the production function
approach for anything but rough indexes of total factor productivity (c/. Sil-
verberg, 1990). In particular, investment and choice of technique decisions
must be predicated on expectations about the future rate at which present
commitments become technologically obsolete. Fortunately, there exists a
considerable literature under the name of optimal replacement theory deal-
ing with precisely these questions, if under certain simplifying assumptions,
and insufficiently known to most students of technical change (Terborgh,
1949; Masse, 1962; Smith, 1961; Malcomson, 1975). The essence of a careful
optimization treatment of the replacement decision is that the most com-
mon rule of thumb in practice, the cutoff (undiscounted) payback period,
is theoretically valid, with the payback period determined by the longrun
(expected) rate of future technical change and, to second order, the cost of
capital.
This conclusion is only really valid, however, for fairly routine forms of
capital-embodied incremental technical change and abstraction from prob-
lems of market power strategic rivalry. Given that entrepreneurs do employ
the payback criterion (though with somewhat varying values of the required
payback), one may ask how they collectively learn what the correct payback
for any given historical epoch of technical change should be. [1] To this end
I have constructed a simple evolutionary model of market competition and
incremental technical change which is dynamic, rooted in bounded rational-
ity and plausible decision rules, and displays the properties of cumulative
causation and selection (Silverberg, 1987).
One pathway of diffusion is already incorporated in this kind of model:
the vintage effect (whose pedigree goes back to Solow, 1959; Salter, 1960;
Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962). A rational investor will only gradually replace
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installed equipment once the gain in performance satisfies certain criteria.[2]
This does not explain, however, why different agents first adopt a new tech-
nology at different times, only why diffusion through the aggregate stock of
"machines" takes time. An obvious reason is that different entrepreneurs
employ different payback periods, as many surveys of business practice have
repeatedly confirmed. Moreover, their assessment of cost savings and the
appropriateness of a technology to their line of business may differ (much
as in the probit-type models). The variance in payback periods is not unex-
pected, given that these should depend in the first instance on expectations
about the (necessarily uncertain) rate of increase of the cost advantage of
new techniques over old ones, as well as the cost of capital. But it is also
clear that systematic differences exist in the customary values in general use
in different countries (see Silverberg, 1990), something which probably can-
not be explained by reference to differences in the national costs of capital
(about which there is considerable definitional and measurement confusion
in any case) alone, as Flamm (1988) for example argues.
If we assume that the rate of change of best practice productivity is ex-
ogenously given, then the "optimal" payback period will allow a firm to track
technical change by continually incorporating new equipment into its capital
stock at a rate which just balances average unit cost advantages against the
financial costs of capital turnover due to acquisition and scrapping. In con-
trast to the usual derivations of optimal replacement policy, however, this
model critically turns on the dynamics of oligopolistic competition. Experi-
ence with simulation experiments seems to indicate that a unique "optimal"
payback period may not exist independent of market structure and pricing
strategies (as markups on units costs). In particular, collective effects may
be at work which may lock an industry into alternative combinations of lo-
cally "evolutionarily" stable payback periods and markups. This is the focus
of my current research and is a topic I cannot go into further here.
Since the thesis of most recent work in the economics of technical change
is that the creation of best practice technology itself must be seen as en-
dogenous to the system, this sort of model can only be a stepping stone
to further work. This is particularly the case given that the thesis of the
present chapter is that this process is endogenously intertwined with and
inseparable from the process of diffusion as well. Thus the question is: How
are we to model these feedbacks, and at what level must they be situated?
The concept of technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter,
1982; Sahal, 1985) comes to our rescue at this point, enabling us to generalize
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the previous model in the direction of bona fide diffusion. As Griibler points
out in Chapter 18 of this volume,
... should we not attempt to define the object of diffusion research prior
to analysis by some sort of "evolutionary tree", spanning the whole di-
verse domain into which any particular case is embedded? Improvements
and add-on innovations, which result that a particular technology would
become competitive within a given market segment, could be represented
as "branchings" along an evolutionary "tree" and allow for classification,
taxonomy and rigorous definition of technologies in competition ...
A practical example of the utility of this morphological approach is also
provided by Foray and Griibler's (1990) work on casting technologies (see
Chapter 16). Technological trajectories enable us to distinguish, at some
hierarchical level, between true branchings and incremental advances along
well-defined technological "chreods" (to borrow a biological metaphor from
Waddington, 1976). But what does a true branching, which seems to be what
we really want to focus upon in diffusion studies, imply for the economist,
as opposed to everyday technical change?
A change of technological trajectory entails, first of all, a quantum jump
in uncertainty, not so much with respect to the relative merits of competing
technologies at a given time, but rather concerning the rate and extent of
future developments, since extrapolations from past experience, which may
have been specific to the old trajectory, lose their validity. (In fact, even
the further development of the old trajectory may be radically influenced
by the advent of the new one, as the often remarked sailing ship effect
seems to indicate.) Furthermore, the nature of these developments may well
depend on the expectations and commitments of others, i.e., have a strong
bandwagon element, such as has often been observed about the standards
setting problem and network externalities (cf. Arthur, 1988).
We can go a step further, however, by recognizing that technologies are
not just blueprints or collections of artifacts, but also require complementary
skills, tacit and codifiable knowhow, and proficiencies of agents at various
levels of involvement with them, from management and engineers to foremen,
skilled, and unskilled workers. These skills, organizational structures and the
like, may often be highly specific to a particular trajectory (one need only
think of the myriad of organizational differences between job-shop skilled
worker production and the Fordist assembly line). They are created in ways
which are still poorly understood, as a generalized form of individual learning
so to speak, but with specific team, organizational, and cultural components
which still very much elude scientific analysis. Phenomenologically we can
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often represent them by means of the familiar learning-by-doing power law
relationships. The other side of this coin is the fact that learning which
takes place in one organization can leak out (or be stolen) to the benefit of
another. Crucial in this regard is the dynamic aspect: the rates at which
skills can be acquired through own activity versus the lags in their more
general diffusion through formal and informal networks of communication
and exchange.
Whereas the adoption/investment decision could be reduced to an ap-
plication of the simple payback method in the previous model (albeit with
some uncertainty as to the appropriate payback period to use), adoption
decisions with respect to genuine changes of technological paradigm present
some novel aspects which may generalize to other instances of the basic prob-
lem of innovation. First, decisions in the present have to be made on the
basis of no more than hunches about the development potential of a technol-
ogy in the future. This is as true of invention as of the adoption of a rapidly
changing new technique [such as numerically-controlled (NC) machine tools
or computer-aided design (CAD)]. We may even view these as being phases
along the path from idea to actuality in which dimensions of uncertainty are
reduced while the standard design(s) gradually comes into being. Second,
the presence of both internal and interagent learning leads to the following
dilemma. Should one adopt early/commit R&D to preemptory innovation,
in order to secure a competitive lead (or, in the ideal but rare case, a water-
tight patent) via technological accumulation internal to the firm? Or should
one keep one's powder dry, so to speak, and wait for the technological smoke
to clear a bit (primarily due to the resource-intensive efforts of others in dif-
fusing and developing) before entering the fray? Kleine (1983), Rosenberg
(1976), and Stoneman (1976) provide good examples of this reasoning from
different industries. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) go a step further and argue
that much R&D itself is not undertaken primarily to realize own innovations
so much as defensively, in order to allow the firm to keep up with the progress
of others in the field.[3] This confirms once again my hypothesis that R&D
and innovation on the one hand, and adoption/diffusion on the other have
very many more structural features in common than has usually been re-
marked. The hard and fast Schumpeterian distinction between innovation
and imitation may thus have outlived its usefulness.
In Silverberg et al. (1988) these stylized facts find expression in a simple
but dynamic generalization of my model of incremental technical change.
The productivity of a vintage of new technology at any point in time is
posited to be the product of an underlying embodied maximum value and
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the efficiency at which it can currently be exploited within the economic
organization due to cumulative learning. To each technological trajectory
is associated a skill level internal to the firm and a public skill level avail-
able to new entrants, which lags behind the average of internal levels and
results from the spillover externality. Firms express their assessment of the
relative advantages of early entry into the new trajectory by augmenting
their standard payback period by some factor, which I term the anticipation
bonus.
On the assumption of a diversity of firm anticipations it can be shown
that the dynamic appropriability of an innovative strategy is very much a
function of the rates of learning, both internal and public. Thus for high
enough values of the rate parameters governing each form of skill accumula-
tion, first movers do derive the largest net benefit, in terms of ultimate gains
in market share, from the introduction and diffusion of the new technology.
This is of course the classical Schumpeterian picture. For intermediate val-
ues, however, a second-mover or imitator may be able to capture more of the
benefits by letting early innovators bear an excessive share of the develop-
ment costs. For even lower values of these parameters, an innovation will fail
to reach maturity and its diffusion will spontaneously reverse, even though
some firms are willing to commit to it and it is indeed potentially superior.
Given that an unbiased survey of innovation prospects would seem to show
that a large if not major share of all innovations fail to diffuse successfully,
it is reassuring to find a theoretical model which can also yield this result,
though this eventuality did not playa role in its original formulation.
Why then do firms differ in their assessment of and commitment to a new
technological trajectory, and what implications does this fact have for the
rate and direction of technical change? First, our results, while superficially
paradoxical, are really self-consistent. Firms do not know whether in any
particular case a first-in or a wait-and-see attitude is superior in terms of
appropriating permanent gains from technological investments. Those that
are sufficiently aggressive will secure first-in status, but at the risk of not
having the staying power to see an innovation to maturity (on the assumption
that it indeed does have potential). But even in this worst case for them,
they may serve as the essential trigger to subsequent adoption decisions
of other firms who do eventually see the innovation through to profitability.
This is by no means uncommon in the history of technology, as Marx already
remarked. The lure of the (Schumpeterian) innovative laurels is what sparks
this process in sufficiently entrepreneurial economies, but the model provides
no rational guarantee for the appropriateness of this stance. Finally, too
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Figure 8.1. Time to diffuse from 10% to 90% of industry capacity as a
function of the internal and public learning rates.
conservative an adoption strategy may lead to the inexorable elimination of
the firm from the market and preclude any possibility of ever catching up,
due to the cumulative causative forces at work in the model. Thus a certain
amount of innovativeness becomes almost compulsory for everyone once it
has become at all widespread among competitors.
The mesolevel manifestations of these contending considerations are also
quite intriguing. If we plot diffusion speed (measured e.g., as the time to
go from 10% to 90% of the saturation share) as a joint function of these
two learning rates, then we find that they both contribute to more rapid
diffusion (see Figure 8.1). Moreover, for a given rate of internal learning, an
increase in the rate of "leakage" or public learning does not undermine the
appropriability of an innovative strategy, as one might expect, provided one
is indeed already in the Schumpeterian regime (see Figure 8.2). Thus higher
rates of public learning are always socially desirable if the rate of internal
learning is sufficiently high to guarantee economic incentives to innovation,
if only risky ones.
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Figure 8.2. Diffusion winner: first versus later adopters, for a given distri-
bution of strategies, as a function of the learning rates.
This state of affairs confronts innovation and industrial policy with a cu-
rious, two-handled instrumentarium. On the one hand, at least in a private
capitalistic economy, it is necessary to ensure that technological investments
are at least in part (and then only temporarily) appropriable. On the other
it is highly desirable to encourage information flows, quick diffusion of ex-
perience, and formal and informal cooperation and sharing. The example
of collective invention investigated by Allen reveals the spontaneous, one is
tempted to say self-organizational, forms this can take which at first glance
seems to run contrary to the principles of economic self-interest. An industri-
alist would gradually extend the technological frontier by building blast fur-
naces which were slightly taller, slightly larger, and operated at higher blast
temperatures. This clearly produced fuel economies, but too large jumps
along this technological trajectory often resulted in conspicuous failures. By
pooling the accumulated experience of different furnaces it was possible to
avoid mistakes and direct efforts in the right directions. This was possible
because engineers quite willingly published and exchanged operations data
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on new furnaces. Allen rightly asks why firms would disclose this highly use-
ful proprietary information to competitors and potential entrants. In this
case they seemed to have little to lose from disclosure, a bit of prestige to
gain from technical publicity, and significant mutual benefit to be derived
from collective invention in terms of reaping production returns in relation to
other iron-producing areas. Von Hippel (1988) also provides contemporary
examples of engineers from different, sometimes competing, firms informally
and unofficially exchanging information.[4] Saxonhouse (1974) relates how
Japanese textile manufacturers pooled operating and equipment experience
through their trade association during the early industrialization period. All
ofthese examples hinge on the quid pro quo nature ofthe ongoing interaction
between the agents which is reminiscent of the kind of emergent informal co-
operation analyzed by Axelrod (1984). From a myopic rationality standpoint
this may appear paradoxical, but seen in the long term when agents repeat-
edly interact and come to terms with one another, it may well be in the
interests of competing agents to engage in certain forms of tacit cooperation
and give and take. Industrial policy has begun to recognize this fact by en-
couraging and legalizing certain forms of precompetitive joint R&D, such as
is exemplified by Sematech and other projects in the USA. The Japanese ap-
pear to have been singularly successful in reconciling economic competition
with R&D cooperation and technology targeting.[5] Moreover, this synergy
is potentiated when the rates of both forms of learning are high, for diffusion
of knowledge and cooperation alone is relatively ineffectual. It is necessary
for it to be accompanied by a correspondingly high ability to assimilate and
internally storm the internal learning curves of the firms themselves in order
to reap all the benefits. Thus the appropriability issue does not necessarily
lead to a contradiction between public and private exploitation of technolog-
ical innovations, for they can still be made socially and privately compatible
if the learning rates are both sufficiently high.
If we want to descend from the Olympian heights of this sort of analysis
to the actual determinants of what we have labeled public and internal learn-
ing then we are forced to confront a wide range of sociological, institutional,
and even cultural issues. Thus a major difference between the innovation
systems of the USA and Japan relates to the very different (wo)manpower,
training, and employment traditions of the two countries. The turnover of
skilled personnel in the USA is quite high, it being quite common for even
top executives and engineers frequently to take jobs with rival organizations.
This has been seen as a certain disincentive for firms to invest in human cap-
ital formation in the USA, since they are not assured of the appropriability
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of this investment in terms of employee loyalty. In the context of our model
this could be interpreted as lowering the rate of internal learning. Japan, on
the contrary, with its system of lifetime employment at least for the leading
export firms, has evolved a unique system to build up internal skills, loyalty,
and shop-floor cooperativeness. There are of course two sides to this is-
sue, the high mobility of entrepreneurially-minded labor in the USA leading
to frequent innovative company spinoffs (the semiconductor and computer
industries being prime examples, where dissatisfaction with established com-
panies' technology policies has lead to several generations of new foundings).
While this may increase the rate of public learning, it may not guarantee a
sufficiently high rate of internal learning (which, as we have seen, it quite
crucial) to be socially desirable in terms of firm and national levels of tech-
nological appropriability. In particular, the Japanese may be enjoying the
best of both worlds due to their very successful system of precompetitive
cooperation and coordination.
Henry Ergas (1987) has introduced the distinction between innovation
and diffusion oriented technology policies. While I do not quite find his
choice of labels apposite (as Giovanni Dosi suggested at the conference, mis-
sion oriented versus generic broad-based might be more appropriate), this
distinction is not without relevance for our purposes. A case in point is
numerically controlled machine tools, a major innovation dating back to the
early 1950s and the desire of the US Air Force to automate certain involved
operations in aircraft manufacture.[6] The technology which resulted was in-
deed very sophisticated, in fact too sophisticated for anything but subsidized
government work. It was not until over a decade later that the technology
was increasingly tailored to the needs of general industry and became eco-
nomically viable, but then American firms, which had specialized in the
expensive and sophisticated varieties, were no longer in the forefront. This
example reinforces my contention that innovation and diffusion are never
entirely separable. The filling of different market niches, itself a form of
diffusion, is very often contingent on a sequence of subsequent innovations,
both major and incremental. The casting example analyzed by Foray and
Griibler (1990), in which a new process eventually spread from the batch to
the mass production segment of the industry precisely because of the learn-
ing economies realized during the initial diffusion phase, is also in this vein.
A technology policy that does not take the interdependence of these two
aspects into account will always be inherently flawed.
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8.3 Theoretical Outlook and Conclusions
The concepts employed in our model have many points of tangency with
other modeling approaches in the literature. The question of internal learn-
ing and spillovers in R&D and diffusion has also been examined in a neo-
classical, equilibrium framework by Spence (1984) and Jovanovic and Lach
(1989), for instance. While I cannot go into the technical issues which sepa-
rate our approach from theirs here, I would only point out that we come to
much less pessimistic conclusions regarding the disincentives and limitations
to appropriability than they generally do for systems in the high internal
learning regime. This is due primarily to the more dynamic, disequilibrium
formulation we have opted for, which represents innovation advantages as
being only temporary but potentially leading to cumulative divergences in
development paths.
Our work of course is very much in the modeling tradition established by
Nelson and Winter (1982) and further extended by Winter (1984) and Iwai
(1984a and 1984b). An important distinction is the insistence on the embod-
ied nature of much technical progress, i.e., that it can only be realized when
new investment is taking place. This has not been emphasized sufficiently
in the past in evolutionary modeling (although it should not be overempha-
sized, as in the pure vintage modeling tradition). Investment can influence
the rate of technical progress through yet another pathway, however. If
innovation is collective in the sense of Allen, then further exploration and
extension of the technological frontier will only take place if new investment
is kept up on a broad front. Allen argues that the demand stagnation of the
last quarter of the nineteenth century in Britain brought investment, and
thus this form of productivity-enhancing technical change, to a halt, which
eventually led to an undermining of Britain's technological competitiveness
and a further fall in her world market share.
The endogenization of the innovation frontier is the preeminent need in
this area. I believe new analytical constructs will have to be introduced
to deal with this problem, since, contrary to conventional wisdom, true in-
vention and innovation are more analogous to a semi-blind, semi-stochastic
exploration of a rugged landscape than an optimization problem with well-
defined choice sets and payoff matrices. The application of analytical and
simulational tools from mathematical biology and artificial intelligence, such
as genetic algorithms, evolutionary stable strategies, and classifier systems,
although bearing the danger of misplaced analogy, may hold the key to fur-
ther progress.[7]
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[1] This assumes of course that they have in fact discovered the correct value. One
could argue, however, that these technological expectations might under certain
circumstances be collectively self-fulfilling, so that a multitude of (possibly)
suboptimal technological regimes could exist. This is the object of current
research I am conducting which I cannot go into here.
[2] The simple criterion that total (current plus amortized capital) costs of the
new investment equals current costs of the old is widely applied in the litera-
ture. Thus the very provocative discussion of the rationality of late Victorian
entrepreneurs is usually couched in this framework (cf. McCloskey, 1974; Allen,
1981). This is all the more remarkable as this is definitely not the rational so-
lution to this problem, as a glance at the optimal replacement literature would
immediately reveal. We seem to be confronted here with another instance of
academic economists presuming to have a claim to superior rationality over the
practitioners (whose rationality, ironically, they are attempting to vindicate).
[3] Thus they write (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, pp. 569-570): "... we argue that
while R&D obviously generates innovations, it also develops the firm's ability to
identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment - what we call
a firm's learning or absorptive capacity ... the exercise of absorptive capacity
represents a sort of learning that differs from learning-by-doing .... Learning-
by-doing typically refers to the automatic process by which the firm becomes
more practiced, and hence, more efficient at doing what it is already doing. In
contrast, with absorptive capacity a firm may acquire outside knowledge that
will permit it to do something quite different."
[4] I am very grateful to Harvey Brooks for bringing this example to my attention
during the conference.
[5] Thus Flamm (1987, p. 151), for example, on computers: "Joint research, a major
element in the rapid development of Japanese computer technology, has created
a unique mix of cooperation and competition. In general, Japanese authorities
have worked to preserve competition in downstream applications and commer-
cialization of new products. But the results of more basic, precompetitive joint
research have been shared quite widely to eliminate wasteful duplication and
increase productivity of R&D spending."
[6] See Noble (1984) for a somewhat polemical and contradictory but valuable
account.
[7] On genetic algorithms see Goldberg (1989) and Holland (1975), on classifier
systems Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986). One application path-
way to technology has been explored by Kwasnicka and Kwasnicki (1986) and
Kwasnicki (1989). The original Nelson and Winter model of course can also
be viewed as a kind of evolutionary algorithm which tries quite deliberately to
argue by economic and not biological analogy.
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Chapter 9
Diffusion of Innovations
Under Conditions of
U ncertaiIlty: A Stochastic
Approach
Sergei Yu. Glaziev and Yuri M. Kaniovski
9.1 Introduction
The diffusion of innovations is at the core of the pattern of technological
change. Many attempts to explain and describe this process have been un-
dertaken during the last decade and a vast bibliography of publications on
this subject is presented in Rogers, 1962 and 1983; and Rogers and Shoe-
maker, 1971. The theory of innovation is an important part of economic and
social science, and is both conceptual and formal. Their unity is a necessary
premise for the success of any scientific theory.
Currently, researchers are aware of some mismatch between the con-
ceptual and formal sides of innovation theory. The conceptual part draws
increasing attention to the hidden mechanisms of technological change. The
problems of uncertainty and unevenness of innovations are at the center
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of current conceptual discussions. Economists argue about the relation-
ships between ruptures and continuity in long-term technological change,
and instability and consistency of technological trajectories during the dif-
ferent phases of an innovation's life cycle. A classification of innovations
and some important new concepts, which reflect the technological pattern of
change [technological and techno-economic paradigms, technological trajec-
tories (Dosi, 1984; Perez, 1983; Freeman, 1987), radical, basic, incremental,
process, and product innovations, having different diffusion regularities] were
recently introduced into economic theory. These conceptual innovations have
not yet been adopted by the formal side of innovation theory.
The majority of the present mathematical models treat the diffusion of
innovations in a traditional way as a deterministic process, which can be de-
scribed by means of differential equations or logistic curves. This approach
has been quite successful as many studies have shown. Without question-
ing the usefulness of this approach, we must emphasize that the hypothesis
about the deterministic character of innovation diffusion is appropriate only
for the growth and maturity phases of the innovation life cycle under stable
conditions. In this chapter we present another approach to innovation diffu-
sion modeling which considers uncertainty and random fluctuations within
the process. We consider a simple model that enables us to trace the in-
fluence of innovators and imitators on the final market share. It is worth
mentioning that this approach for describing competing technologies, based
on the generalized urn scheme, was proposed by Brian Arthur (1983).
We concentrate our analysis here on the early stage of innovation dif-
fusion, when the costs and benefits of a new technology are not clear and
the trajectory is fluctuating. This phase is not considered by the traditional
deterministic approach because of the uncertainty and instability.
The early phases of radical innovation diffusion are characterized by the
two important features which are often missed in diffusion models: (1) the
instability of the present development and the uncertainty of the future evo-
lution trajectory, and (2) the existence of different alternative technologies,
which compete for the potential adopters. The random fluctuations play an
important role in this phase and must be taken into consideration.
9.2 Formulation of the Problem
According to the Schumpeterian theory of innovation, innovation diffusion is
a process of cumulative growth of imitators, which introduces the innovation
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into the market (after its exposure by entrepreneurs) with expectations of
high profits (Schumpeter, 1939). We assume that several alternative (from
the point of view of their expected profitability and possibilities for adop-
tion) technologies were simultaneously introduced into the market by various
entrepreneurs. The relative advantages of these technologies are not clear
for the imitators, who must make their choice in order to survive in the
changing economic environment.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider two new technologies (say, A and
B), introduced into the market by a corresponding number of innovators.
The difference between our approach and the traditional approach con-
cerning the classification of the participants of the diffusion process is ap-
parent. According to the latter, all of the participants can be divided into
the following groups: innovators, early adopters, early majority, later major-
ity, and laggards. All groups except the first are considered to be imitators
(Rogers, 1983; Bass, 1980). The difference between innovators and imitators
is based on the characteristic features of their behavior, "imitators unlike in-
novators are influenced in the timing of adoption by the decisions of other
members of the social system" (Bass, 1980). From our point of view, we
aggregate these groups into two wider ones.
Starting with nA A-technology innovators and nB B-technology innova-
tors we study how technologies are shared by the imitators in the market.
We assume that for each time instant t ~ lone new imitator appears on
the market (we consider a time scale connected with the appearance of new
firms in the market). Technology A is chosen with probability Pt(Xt) and
technology B with probability 1- Pt(Xt). Here Xt is the proportion (relative
concentration) of the adopters that use technology A at time t:
nA
x - t
t- A+ B 'n t nt
where nf is the number of adopters that use technology A at time t and
nf is the number of adopters that use technology B at time t ~ 1. The
probabilities of technological choice are considered to be a function of the
relative concentration of the alternative technologies in the market. Accord-
ing to the premises of the model we assumed that the number (and share)
of adopters of this or that technology is the indicator of the accumulated
experience of its utilization. Also Pt is a function which maps R(O, 1) on
[0,1], where R(O, 1) is the set of rational numbers from the interval (0,1).
As far as nf +nf = nA + nB + t - 1 and nf = (nA + nB + t - l)xt our
probability of additions of new adopters depends on both the total number
234 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
(9.1)
of units of the technologies in the market nf +np at time t and the number
of the adopters that use technology A (nf) and technology B (np).
We are interested in finding the final ratio of the adopters that use tech-
nology A and technology B under the assumption that the market has an
infinite capacity. Formally speaking we shall study the limit behavior of the
value Xt as t - 00.
Let us consider (3n(x),n ~ 1,x E R(O, 1), independent with respect to n
random values which have Bernoulli distributions. Assume that
P{{3t(X) = 1} = Pt(x).
Then the process Xt, t ~ 1, follows the dynamics (Arthur et ai., 1987):
1
Xt + {/3t(xt) - xt} = Xt +
nA + nB + t
1 1
+ + + t{Pt(Xt) - Xt} + + + tZt(Xt),
nA nB nA nB
nAt~1,Xl=---
nA + nB
Consequently our process is driven on average by the term Pt(Xt) - Xt (at
time t).
The study of the asymptotic behavior of the process Xt, t ~ 1, may be
done by means of the methods shown by Arthur et ai. (1987 and 1988), but
we will not consider it in detail. Here we are interested in the formation
of probabilities Pt under different premises. We shall study the asymptotic
behavior of the innovation diffusion process according to the different prob-
ability functions, inferred from the conceptual premises.
As was mentioned above participants of the real innovation diffusion pro-
cess usually do not have sufficient information about the relative advantages
of new technologies. According to the premises of the model, imitators when
making their decisions, take into account the experience of earlier adopters.
The information about this experience is not easily obtained because it is
related to the competitive position of adopters (firms) in the market. As
usual each firm can be acquainted with the experience of a limited sample,
which is far less than the whole range. This is the main source of uncertainty
in decision making and innovation diffusion that must be taken into consid-
eration in a market economy. It can be eliminated only by accumulating
experience about innovation adoption. But with decreasing uncertainty in
the utilization of a new technology and the risk associated with its adoption,
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the profitability also decreases with the saturation of the market during in-
novation diffusion. The supernormal profitability of a successful innovation
is temporal - it declines with the market shift towards a new equilibrium
level while innovation diffuses according to well-known empirical laws.
We shall take into account both of the above-mentioned points. First,
we shall consider the case of new technology uncertainty where imitators
have no means to compare the expected profitabilities of the competing
technologies, accompanied by information uncertainty about the real mar-
ket situation (this case is typical of the early stages of radical innovation
diffusion and for technological change during the turbulent phase of techno-
logical paradigm substitution). Second, we shall consider the case in which
imitators have enough information to compare the expected profitability of
competitive technologies, but they still do not have sufficient information
about the market (it is typical for the growth phases of innovation diffusion
and technological change within a consistent technological trajectory).
9.3 Diffusion of Innovations with Uncertain
Probabilities (Imitative Behavior)
According to the above-described premises of the model, imitators make
decisions to introduce a new technology according to the accumulated expe-
rience of its utilization by previous adopters. This is a traditional assump-
tion made for diffusion innovation models (see Rogers, 1983). It is natural to
suppose that among alternative, uncertain new technologies they will choose
those that were successfully introduced by the majority of previous adopters
from the known sample. In the case of two technologies this decision-making
principle can be formulated strictly in the following way:
Rule 1. Ask an odd number r of the users of alternative technologies. If the
majority of them use A, choose A. Otherwise choose B.
The probability of choosing technology A at time t under the above rule
of decision making is given by the following formula:
r
L
i-!.±!
- 2
Here CqP = ~)I is the number of combinations from q to p. Alsop!(q-p)!
q! = q(q - 1) ... 1. Let us designate this probability p{(xd, where Xt is
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the proportion of technology A in the market. Then p[(x) equals to pI(x)
with the accuracy of the order 0(1) as t ----t 00 (uniformly with respect to
x E [0,1]). Here
r
pI(x) = L C;xk(l- xr-k.
k=~
When r = 1 we have p~(x) = pI(x) = x for all n ~ 1. The graphics of the
function pI for different r are given in Figure 9.1. The function f whose
zeros determine all possible limits for values of Xt (see Arthur et aI., 1987)
is gi ven now by the following formula:
Let us consider the case when r > 1. The corresponding set Bf ([0,1]) of the
zeros consists of three points: 0, !' 1. It may be shown that both 0 and 1
are attainable, but! is unattainable (see Arthur et aI., 1988). Consequently
Xt converges as t ----t 00 to 0 or to 1 (and to both points with positive prob-
ability). This means that finally we shall have only one of the alternative
technologies in the market. But each of them has the probability of being
the winner.
Let us study the relationship of the probability of being the winner
PnA,nB (1) (starting with nA innovators of A and nB innovators of B) of
technology A to the proportion of initial adopters. Then
PnA,nB(O) +PnA,nB (1) = 1.
As far as p~(x) = 1 - p~(1- x), we have that
PnA,nB(O) = PnB,nA(l)
and
PnA,nB(l) = PnB,nA(O).
With equality (9.2) we obtain
PnA,nB(O) +PnB,nA (0) = 1
and
(9.2)
(9.3)
(9.4)
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Figure 9.1. Probability of choosing (according to Rule 1) technology A as
a function of its market proportion.
Combining equalities (9.3) and (9.4) with nA = nB = n one has
Pn,n(O) = Pn,n(1) = !. (9.5)
Let nA < nB. Then all trajectories Xt, t ~ 1, that lead to 1 should at
least once exceed the value !. Let us show that the process Xt, t ~ 1, takes
this value. Indeed, suppose that for some k, m(1 ~ k < m) there will be
kim < 1 and .til. > 1 (9.6)2 m+l 2
(this means that the process does not take this value), If m is an odd number,
i.e., m = 2p +1 for some P ~ 1, then the smallest k that ensures the second
one of the inequalities (9.6) is k = P+1. So we have
kl ..tl!... 1m = 2p+l > 2'
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what contradicts inequalities (9.6). Similarly we obtain a contradiction in
(9.6) when m is an even number. Consequently one of the inequalities (9.6)
is indeed an equality. It means that the process Xt, t ~ 1, when crossing the
middle of the segment [0,1] takes the value !. Taking into account the above
and (9.5) we obtain
(9.7)
As far as
PnA,nB{ Xt < !,t ~ 1} = l-/nA ,nB
and
we have that /nA,nB < 1. Consequently [because of (9.7)] PnA,nB(1) < ! and
[because of (9.2)] PnA,nB(O) > ! for nA < nB.
This implies that the probability of being the winner is greater for the
technology with the larger number of innovators.
For r = 1 we can use the results of Polya (1931) and Athreya (1969)
to find that the limit of Xt has a Beta distribution with parameters nA and
nB. We designate this limit random variable x. Then x has a density (with
respect to the Lebesgue measure in R 1 ) of the following form
This means that at the limit both of the technologies can exist in the
market in all possible combinations. However, each individual combination
has zero probability. We have for the following events non-zero probability
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"the final combination belongs to the interval (0:, (3)" , where (0:, (3) ~ (0,1) is
arbitrary. The case r = 1 corresponds to the situation in which each imitator
only has sufficient information about a single previous introduction of an
alternative technology. This reflects a situation of extreme high uncertainty
in the market. A negligible share only is known by the followers. According
to the results of this model, one can expect here instability in the final
sharing of the market by alternative technologies.
To summarize the above argument we can make the following conclusion.
When there is uncertainty about innovations, sharing the market depends
on the strategies of the imitators (dependence of the final market share
on the number r and numbers of innovators). In the case where followers
make their choice according to the knowledge of their predecessors (if they
know more than one case of previous innovation adoption) innovators can
essentially affect the final sharing of the market. In particular the probability
of dominating the market is greater for the technology with the larger number
of innovators at the beginning of its life cycle. It is necessary also to mention
that according to the premises and results of the model, innovators can
only influence the market sharing tendency, but cannot predetermine (in a
deterministic way) the domination of one of the alternative technologies. In
addition, this model illustrates a very important regularity in the formation
of new technological trajectories: the earlier phases of innovation diffusion
playa relatively more important role in this process than later ones. As a
result, the structure of the innovation diffusion process is formed in the very
early stages.
9.4 Diffusion of Innovations with Expected
Profitability and Uncertainty of Current
Market Sharing
Now we shall consider the case in which the decisions of imitators are de-
termined by the expected probability of alternative technologies. We as-
sume that imitators have enough information about alternative innovations
to estimate the expected dynamics of their relative profitabilities. This case
corresponds to the diffusion of new technologies in stable environments in
which the trajectories of evolution have already been formed and are stable.
At the same time, as in the previous case, the main source of information for
the followers of new technologies is the experience of earlier adopters. They
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make decisions based on their estimation of the dynamics of innovation prof-
itability and the market situation. We assume that imitators interpret the
apparent sharing of the market sample between alternative technologies as
the sharing of the whole market. We must emphasize once more that accord-
ing to the premises of our approach, imitators make their decisions based
on limited information about market structure - it is an important source
of uncertainty in the decision making and in the randomness of innovation
diffusion.
As was mentioned above, the profitability of a new technology usually
decreases with the increase in the number of adopters and later saturation of
the market. Therefore it is natural to suppose that imitators will recognize
the decreasing profitability of a technology as the number of its adopters
increases.
Let us introduce positive functions gA and gB which describe the depen-
dence of the proportions of the A and B technologies in the market sample
and the imitators expected profitability. These principles of decision making
can be formalized in the following way:
Rule 2. Ask an odd number r of the previous adopters. Let N of them
use technology A. (Consequently r - N use technology B.) Calculate the
values 9A(~) and 9B(1 - ~). If the first of these values is greater, choose
A. Otherwise choose B.
According to the premise that a decrease in the proportion of a tech-
nology corresponds to an increase in the expected profitability, functions 9A
and 9B should be nonincreasing. If they are decreasing there can be only
one solution of the equation
9A(X) = 9B(X),X E [0,1]. (9.8)
To ensure that the solution exists, one requires continuity of the func-
tions, and that 9A([O,1]) = 9B([0, 1]) for example. (This last condition
means that values of the expected profitabilities change in the same inter-
val.) Now we suppose that the solution of the equation (9.8) exists. Fi9ure
9.2 demonstrates one of the possible situations.
Here x corresponds to the proportion of technology A in the market.
Functions 9A and 9A demonstrate two possible ways in which the expected
profitability can decrease. One can see that if 9A(X) ::; 9A(X) for every x,
then i* < x*.
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Figure 9.2. Expected profitabilities of the technologies as functions of a
proportion of technology A.
Consider T > 1. Let N (T) be the smallest N such that N / T ~ x*. Then
in the same manner as in the previous case, the probability of choosing
technology A at time t is given by the formula
N(r)-l Ci C r - i
L nA n Bt tCri=O n~+np
and corresponding function p[I(x) equals pII(x) with the accuracy of the
order o(1) as t -+ 00 (uniformly with respect to x E [0,1D. Here
N(r)-l
pII(x) = L C; x i (l - xr- i .
i=O
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Figure 9.3. Probability of choosing (according to Rule 2) technology A as
a function of its proportion on the market.
If T = 1 then p[I(x) = pII(x) = 1- x for all t 2: 1. Function pII is given in
Figure 9.3.
The function f whose zeros determine all possible limit values for Xt
(Arthur et al., 1987) is given by the following formula:
f(x) = pII(x) - x.
The corresponding set Bf ([0,1]) of zeros is singleton. As it follows from
Arthur et al. (1987) Xt goes to () with probability 1 as t ---+ 00. It is easy to
see that () = ~ for T = 1 and for T > 1 there will be
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() >! when N(r) > !.±.!
() = I when N (r) = ~
() < ~ when N(r) < ~.
These results then have the following conceptual interpretation:
(1) When imitators make their decisions according to the expected proba-
bility dynamics, final sharing (namely, the position of the point ()) of
the market by the new alternative technologies is determined by the
strategies of the imitators. In contrast with the previous case, imitators'
strategies influence the domination of one of the alternative technologies
in the market in a deterministic way.
(2) Under the given circumstances, both of the technologies will exist when
the market reaches the limit.
(3) For the given function of the reduction in the expected profitability for
technology B (say gB) and two given functions (say gA and 9A) of the
reduction in the expected profitability for technology A, the limit share
of technology A will be smaller for the faster decreasing function (this
means that 9A(X) ~ gA(X) for all x E [0,1]).
The results show that the final sharing of the market depends upon
changes in the imitators' expectations of the profitability of new technolo-
gies. Figures 9.2 and 9.3 illustrate the dependence between changes in the
expectations of the imitators and shifts in the final structure of the market.
The decrease in the rate of technology-expected profitability means that
imitators estimate their chances of gaining profits by the introduction of
technology A as greater than by the introduction of technology B. Therefore
the changes in the expectations of imitators lead to a corresponding change
in the limit structure of the market. Within this framework we can deal
with a situation where one ofthe technologies (say B) is a conventional one.
This means that gB(X) = const for all x E [0,1].
To illustrate this let us consider the simplest examples. Assume that
gA(X) = a+b(l- x),gB(l- x) = c +dx. Here gA(O) = a +d is the expected
profitability of technology A when nobody in the market sample uses it.
Also g( 1) = a is the expected profitability of technology A when all adopters
in the sample us it. Consequently a ~ 0, b ~ O. Similarly c ~ 0 and d ~ O.
These functions are given in Figure 9.4.
If a + b > c and d +b > 0 there is only one solution x· of the equation
gA(X) = gB(X). It is easy to check that
a+b-c
x· = ----
d+b
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Figure 9.4. Linear (with respect to the proportions on the market) expected
profitabilities of the technologies.
and x'" belongs to (0,1) if and only if a +b > c and a < c +d. As one can
see in Figures 9.2 and 9.3, if aj"t"bc > ~ then technology A will dominate
the market.
Thus, under this dependence of the expected probability and share of
alternative technologies, the final structure of the market is determined by
both the initial and final expected profitabilities of the alternative technolo-
gies or by the relation between initial expected profitabilities and rates of
change. In the case when gA(O) = gB(O), i.e., a +b = c + d, technology A
will dominate in the market if, and only if, the rate at which its expected
profitability will decrease is smaller (i.e., b < d). If the rates coincide (i.e.,
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b= d) then x* = ~ + a2i,c = ~ + (a+b);(c+d). Consequently technology A will
dominate in the market in this case if and only if its initial profitability is
larger (Le., a +b > c +d or a > c).
9.5 Conclusions
With the help of this model we can simulate the diffusion of alternative
innovations under different assumptions about the influence of predecessors
on the technological choice of followers so-called path-dependent processes
of innovation diffusion. In this chapter we have considered the case of the
diffusion of two new alternative technologies under different assumptions. It
is not difficult to consider the general case with n alternative technologies.
But some conceptual conclusions about the innovations diffusion can already
be inferred from the results of this 2-technology model.
The interesting results concern the role of innovators (entrepreneurs) and
imitators in innovation diffusion at the stage when the market share is de-
cided. The model showed that imitators determine the trajectory of this
process and the results of innovation competition. Entrepreneurs open up
new technological possibilities, but their realization is determined by the im-
itators' choice of technologies. With uncertainty of technological choice, the
probability of dominating the market is greater for the technology with the
larger number of innovators. Of course, newcomers can change the situation.
The result of technological competition is determined by the choice of all ac-
tors in the market. But the influence of earlier adopters on the formation of
a technological trajectory is higher than those who adopt later.
These results describe important features of the alternative innovation
diffusion. Both in market and centrally planned economies it is difficult to
estimate the relative advantages of alternative innovations in the early phase
of their diffusion or in the periods of technological paradigm substitution.
In this case followers make their choice according to information about pre-
decessor choices, and the trajectory of innovation diffusion is determined
by the innovators. The technological trajectory is formed during the early
phase of innovation diffusion.
The role of innovators become less important when imitators have enough
information to estimate the dynamics of the expected profitability of new
technologies. In this case followers make their choice according to their own
estimations of future profits. These expectations determine the trajectory of
innovation diffusion and the final share of alternative technologies. With the
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help of this approach one can simulate the formation of new technological
trajectories under different types of imitator behavior.
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Chapter 10
Temporal Diffusion and
Population Dynamics:
A Systems Model
Ove Granstrand
10.1 Introduction
New technologies emerge, diffuse, and develop in many time- and space-
related dimensions, thereby substituting for and/or coexisting with old tech-
nologies. This chapter presents a systems model of this process in terms of
ordinary physical time, and of an organizational space rather than a physical
space. In the organizational space, a new technology diffuses both among
different organizations and among different locations or units within the
same organization. In principle this could be looked upon as a special kind
of spatial diffusion since the organizational space could be endowed with a
topology, for instance a metric, that expresses the important characteristics
of organizational neighborhoods and distances in terms of communication
and decision-making structures.
This chapter considers two fundamentally separate populations of orga-
nizational units among which a new technology diffuses; organizational units
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as users of the new technology (with households as a special case), and or-
ganizational units as producers. It is important to note that a technological
innovation (for example, as defined by Freeman et al., 1982, p. 201) diffuses
among both those who use it and those who produce it, regardless of whether
or not there is a market that separates them.
These two dimensions of organizational diffusion apply to both product
and process innovations, although in process innovations the using and pro-
ducing units may sometimes be the same, implying that separability breaks
down. In case any market mechanism separates users and producers, we will
equate them in this chapter with buyers and sellers respectively, although in
large organizations buyers and users may be quite distinct from each other,
just as sellers and producers may be. For the sake of clarity, we can think
of a new technology in the form of a product innovation that diffuses among
buyers and sellers in a market.
An empirical example would be the electronic image-processing tech-
nology of the video cassette recorder (VCR) for consumer use, which was
introduced into the Japanese market in 1975 by Sony and shortly afterwards
by JVC. The VCR diffused rapidly among consumers, thereby substituting
for movie cameras based on old chemical image-processing technology. At
the same time more and more producers entered the market, such as Philips,
Zenith, Hitachi, etc., which corresponded to a diffusion process among sell-
ers/producers.
The rates of buyer and seller diffusion depend upon each other. For ex-
ample, if the diffusion among buyers is profitable and rapid, diffusion among
sellers will speed up (unless patent protection slows it down). Similarly, rapid
diffusion among sellers may strengthen their marketing efforts and speed up
the diffusion among buyers. The common factor behind the rates of diffu-
sion is that the innovation generates an extra return over costs in both its
use and its production. However, a slow seller diffusion does not necessarily
slow down buyer diffusion unless capacity problems arise. If the innovator
holds a strong patent and does not want to sell licenses, it is generally in
his interest to promote buyer diffusion, while halting seller diffusion. On the
other hand, a firm may sel1licenses and thereby use rapid seller diffusion as
a means to increase buyer diffusion in order to outcompete alternative sub-
technologies. A case in point here is the licensing of JVC/Matsushita's VHS
technology for video cassette recorders, which finally outcompeted Sony and
its Betamax technology.
Thus the diffusion processes in the buyer and seller populations interact
just as demand and supply factors interact in general. In fact it is a primary
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purpose of this chapter to present an explicit model of the interdependence
between the demand and supply sides as characterized by buyer and seller
diffusion processes generated by a stream of technological innovations. As
will become clear, an equilibrium in the chosen state space will not be at-
tained unless technological changes disappear.
10.2 What Happens to the New Product and
Technology During the Diffusion Process?
The product and its technology continue to change and develop during its
diffusion. On the buyer side, adaptations to different users are made, new
applications are found and new ideas arise, often from the users themselves
(von Hippel, 1976). On the seller side, imitations are rarely true copies, but
both modifications and significant changes occur as a result of adaptations
to the different production equipment of the makers, inventing around the
patents of others, product differentiation and new ideas (Rosenberg, 1976).
During the diffusion processes such changes often take the form of minor
piecemeal improvements which accumulate, but radical changes also occur.
Thus an innovation is never a one-shot affair, but triggers a swarm of mostly
minor changes, occurring partly as a result of diffusion. Hence, the common
innovation/imitation dichotomy easily becomes less useful for descriptive
purposes.
Taken together, the subsequent changes and innovations mostly lead to
gradual increases, with some jumps in the technical performance of the prod-
uct (in a broad sense) along some of its performance parameters (weight,
efficiency, durability, etc.). These increases in performance are sometimes
correlated with cumulative production as well as with the cumulative stock of
products in use, and thus can be interpreted as a result of learning -learning
by producing and learning by using - as demonstrated by Sahal (1981). An
important question relates to exactly what factors account for this learning;
whether learning takes place predominantly at the buyer or at the seller side
at different points in time, and who appropriates the benefits of learning.
However, it may be argued that the really important point is not whether
technological change, based on learning, is user-driven or producer-driven,
but what makes the whole intra- and inter-organizational system of actors
function as a learning system. Technological changes may take place among
producers as well as among users with different applications, and among
other producers and users connected to the producer-user environment.
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All in all, the conceptual boundaries of a technology cannot be taken
as fixed and the basic dichotomy between old and new technology becomes
difficult to use empirically. Nevertheless, both empirical work and analyti-
cal tractability suggest that the distinction can be used, at least as a first
approximation.
10.3 What Factors Govern the Buyer/Seller
Diffusion Process?
Adoption decisions by users and imitation decisions by producers can be
viewed as decisions to enter the new technology. The exit of an old technol-
ogy is part of this process, although several technologies may coexist, at least
temporarily, within a buying as well as a selling organization. These entry
and exit decisions are largely governed by information about the new tech-
nology and its associated long-run profitability expectations among buyers
and sellers. These expectations are formed on the basis of many more factors
than short-run price signals. Each innovation means an increase in the tech-
nical performance of the product, which represents an increase in the value
or utility to the buyer who is using the product in his production process
(as an intermediate good - a new material, a new component, a new piece
of machinery, a new ancillary product, etc.). The price of the new product
distributes this value increase between the buyer and the seller. Thus, we
can distinguish between two profitability measures, one for the buyer and
one for the seller (cf. Metcalfe, 1981).
For each product innovation, profits are generated for buyers and sellers
during the corresponding diffusion of the innovation among them. While
the profit for an individual buyer essentially depends on the price and the
product's technical performance (or the price-performance ratio), the profits
for the innovator and the subsequent imitators depend on price, cost charac-
teristics and the combined effects of the diffusion pattern among both buyers
and sellers. Typically a high buyer-diffusion rate and a low seller-diffusion
rate benefit the innovator. An efficient patent is sufficient to delay seller
diffusion but it is not a necessary condition.
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10.4.1 Notation and assumptions
Let us first briefly take a broader view and consider a techno-industrial sys-
tem (K, A, R), composed of a time-dependent countable set of technologies
K(t), a time-dependent countable set of economic agents A(t) and a set
of relations R on K X A. Typical relations between technologies would be
substituting, contingent upon and complementing. Typical relations between
economic agents would be buying, selling, owning, competing, and cooper-
ating. Each economic agent is linked at each point in time to a subset
of K, which represents the technology base of that agent, namely the set
of technologies that agent has entered into but from which it has not yet
made an exit. Empirically the multi-technological character of firms is of
increasing importance (see Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990). Technology i
is characterized by a performance vector Ti(t).
Now let the technology set K more specifically be composed of a stream
of technologies, where each new technology is substituting for an older one,
and the set of agents A be decomposed into one set B of agents buying and
another set S of agents competing and selling. The state variables to be
used to describe this system will be the number of buyers and sellers that
have entered into each technology, the number of buyers and sellers that
have exited from each technology, the price of the product based on each
technology, and finally Ti(t) for i = 1,2, ....
The modeling is simple in the sense that only numbers of buyers and
sellers are used as state variables; that is, the populations are assumed to be
unstructured. (In more refined models, demand and supply variables could
be used which incorporate intra-firm diffusion, and dynamic models could be
built, based on the theory of structured populations.) We will first model the
processes of entry of buyers and sellers into each new technology (diffusion),
and next link these entry processes to exit processes (substitution). Then the
interdependence between the buyer and seller diffusion processes which arise
will be modeled, as well as technological development and price dynamics.
Finally, the model will be assembled into an optimal control model, using a
macro-performance criterion for the whole techno-industrial system.
Another way to look at it is as follows. Consider first the two primary
populations of economic agents on a market: buyers/users (B) and sell-
ers/producers (S) of a product, say a camera. (We assume that the popula-
tions are disjoint and finite, possibly also time-independent.) This product is
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subjected to a stream of technological innovations over time, each innovation
causing, in each time period, some buyers to switch over to using the new
camera and some sellers to switch over to producing the new camera. If we
assume that pure switching takes place, Le., the old camera is scrapped at
the same time (you don't keep your old movie camera once you buy a video
camera), we have at each time point four disjoint subpopulations: users of
the old product, users of the new product, producers of the old product, and
producers of the new product. Thus an innovation splits up the original two
populations (B) and (5). In the case of two subsequent innovations we get
six subpopulations, etc. What is of interest now is to model the dynamics of
these (unstructured) subpopulations and their interactions which altogether
result in diffusion, substitution, and technological and economic change.
Let us now use the following notations:
t
ti
bi( t)
Si(t)
b(t)
s(t)
k1 , k 2 , •••
Ti(t)
Pi(t)
Cvi(t)
time variable, t ~ 0;
time point for innovation i (a simple arrival stream of radical
innovations is assumed); i = 1,2, ... ;
cumulative number of buyers (firms) that have adopted the ith
innovation by time t;
cumulative number of buyers that have made an exit from the
market for the ith innovation as buyers by time t;
cumulative number of sellers (firms) that have taken up pro-
duction of the ith innovation by time t;
cumulative number of sellers that have terminated production
of the ith innovation, i.e., withdrawn from the market as pro-
ducers;
net number of active buyers on the market for the ith innova-
tion at time t;
net number of active sellers on the market for the ith innovation
at time t;
total number of actual and potential buyers at time t;
total number of actual and potential sellers at time t;
positive scalars or vectors incorporating profitability expecta-
tions and decisions at the firm level;
vector of technological performance parameters realized (for
technology i) at time t;
market (average) price of the product based on technology i at
time t;
industry (average) variable unit cost at time t for the product
based on technology i.
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Continuous, differentiable variables are assumed to be adapted to the
counting variables above, using the same notation.
The following relations (balance equations) now hold:
If we assume that no "technological leap-frogging" occurs, that is, no
buyer or seller can jump from technology i-I to technology i +1 or further,
the general dynamic laws of the system could be modeled as (with arbitrary
functions I, g and h):
Ibn(bni , Sni, Ti' Pi)
Isn(bni' Sni, Ti' Pi)
Ibe(bni; bn,i+t; Sn; Sn,i+l; Ti,Ti+l; Pi,Pi+d
Ise(bni; bn,i+l; Sn; Sn,i+l; Ti' Ti+l; Pi,Pi+l)
g(bni' bei' Sni, Sei)
h(Sni, Sei, Pi)
(10.2)
(10.3)
In the following sections this general model will be further specified and
simplified on empirical as well as on analytical grounds.
10.4.2 Entry processes
Buyer Side
Traditional research on diffusion processes (see, e.g., Mansfield, 1968; Mans-
field et al., 1977; Sharif and Ramanathan, 1984; Mahajan and Peterson,
1985) provides us with several models of bni(t), e.g.:
bni(t) = k1[b(t) - bni(t)],k1 > 0, t ~ ti
bni(t) = 0 for t ~ ti
(Linear diffusion model. Total market growth is proportional to the
number of non-adopters.) or
bni(t) = k2 [b - bni(t)]· bni(t)/b, k2 > 0,
bni(ti) = 1; bni(t) = 0 for (10.4 )
(Logistic diffusion model, b(t) = constant b. Total market growth is
proportional to the number of non-adopters, times the fraction of adopters.)
Note that in these traditional models, technological diffusion among buy-
ers is not explicitly dependent upon actions among sellers. Moreover, such
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models are sometimes applicable to diffusion among users in a planned econ-
omy, or to intra-organizational diffusion in a market economy (see Astebro,
1989, for an example of the latter).
Seller Side
With regard to diffusion on the seller side, there does not seem to be much
empirical research available. There is a great deal of research on innovation
processes, but not on imitation processes and the aggregate diffusion process
that various economic agents' imitation processes give rise to. There are
strong reasons to believe that the dynamics of seller diffusion in many cases
differ from buyer diffusion. For example, the patent system gives rise to a
principal difference. However, in the absence of empirical research we will
simply assume that we can model seller diffusion in a similar way to buyer
diffusion. In case an efficient patent protection leads to a delay in the seller
diffusion process, we could use a time lag. Thus, in simple logistic seller
diffusion we have
(10.5)
and
Sni(t) = 1 for ti ~ t ~ Lpi + ti; Sni(t) = 0 for t < ti
where Lpi 2: 0 is the length of time the corresponding patent (if any) provides
efficient protection of innovation i from imitation on the market.
In case the innovating firm sells patent licenses freely, the Lpi could be
dropped (or modified). In this case there is a buyer diffusion process for the
license market.
10.4.3 Exit processes
Regarding exit decisions at the firm level and exit processes on the market,
there seems to be almost no empirical research available yet for modeling
purposes. We then have to deal with special cases and assumptions to arrive
at model specifications.
Buyer Side
One possibility is to assume that diffusion of a new technology i +1 instantly
causes substitution for technology i:
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In other words the exit process is directly driven by the entry process
into the next technology, Le., we have a case of pure switching from the
old to the next new technology, while neither technologicalleap-frogging nor
technological coexistence is possible.
Seller Side
Similarly, we could bluntly assume that the exit process on the seller side
could be modeled in the same way. However, as is well known, some manu-
facturers exit forever, while some new entrants are either entirely new firms
or old firms outside the basic market, diversifying into it. Also, a seller
mostly has to offer products based on both old and new technologies, since
there are usually buyers who have not yet switched to the new technology.
For example, in public telephone switching the old crossbar technology will
be offered for more than a decade ahead by some sellers, that is, they will
produce both crossbar and computerized switches in parallel for perhaps
20-25 years. This could be modeled by introducing a positive time lag, Lsi,
which in fact would partly depend on the pattern of buyer diffusion generally.
Thus:
(10.7)
10.4.4 Interdependence between buyer and seller diffusion
By viewing an innovation as giving rise to diffusion processes among both
buyers and sellers, we are able to model that part of the interactions be-
tween buyers and sellers which results in interdependence between the buyer
diffusion process and the seller diffusion process. As already mentioned,
traditional diffusion research considers only buyer diffusion. Path-breaking
exceptions are Metcalfe (1981), Stoneman and Ireland (1983), and Metcalfe
(1988) who consider variants of simultaneous buyer and seller diffusion pro-
cesses, although without any explicit modeling of their interdependence in
terms of interactions between buyer and seller populations subjected to a
stream of innovations. Several types of interdependences are conceivable
and could be introduced without explicit reference to pricing and profitabil-
ity considerations. For example, by viewing the sets of buyers and sellers
as two interacting sets of subpopulations, some analogies with studies of
population dynamics could be used. (The classic predator-prey interaction
leading to the Lotka-Volterra type of equations is not applicable, however.)
256 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
In order to illustrate below, we may simply assume a logistic buyer diffu-
sion model and a linear seller diffusion model with linear interdependences.
Thus, we could assume that the entry rate at the buyer side is propor-
tional not only to the number of non-adopters multiplied by the fraction of
adopters but also to the number of sellers operating on the market, and that
the contributions are additive. Similarly, the rate of entry of sellers could
be assumed to have additive components, one proportional to the number of
potential imitators and one proportional to the number of potential buyers
on the market. Finally, there will be no buyers if there are no sellers and
vice versa.
The rate of buyer diffusion could also be assumed to be additively rein-
forced by a factor proportional to the performance-to-price ratio (or more
generally to a linear combination of such ratios in case several technological
performance parameters are considered). Similarly the rate of seller diffusion
could be assumed to be additively reinforced by a factor proportional to the
price. As shown in the general model, equation (10.2), both performance
and price depend on both buyer and seller diffusion and substitution, which
creates a complex interdependence. This will be explicitly modeled in the
following sections.
10.4.5 Technological development and substitution
It is far from clear how technological change in general should be repre-
sented. As mentioned, we will represent changes within technology i by
a vector Ti(t) of realized best-practice levels of technological performance
at time t (e.g., the number of elements per chip, chip size, and line width
in the semiconductor field at time t). We then assume that the overall
technological change is the combined result of a revolutionary process and
an evolutionary process (c/. Nelson and Winter, 1982). The revolutionary
process is represented by a stream of radical innovations occurring at time
points ti, producing large jumps in at least some component of the overall
best-practice T. The evolutionary process is represented by a continuous
upgrading of T between the time points ti. The rate of change in the evo-
lutionary process is further assumed to depend on the amount of learning
that takes place among buyers and sellers. Sahal (1981) has demonstrated
empirically how evolutionary technological progress in certain areas could
be interpreted as the combined result of learning by producing (measured as
cumulative output) and learning by using (measured as the stock of products
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in use). Thus, it is reasonable as a first approximation to use a model as
follows:
(10.8)
The coefficient vectors ks and k6 reflect the relative importance oflearn-
ing by using and learning by producing. Generally speaking these coefficients
depend on the industry and the technology. For some technologies learning
by using is a dominant source of incremental technological advances (cf.
von Hippel, 1976); in some technologies learning by producing (learning by
doing) is more important (see Dosi, 1988).
Note that, modeled in this way, technological evolution is closely related
to the integral of total sales over the product life cycle. The often observed
S-shape of technological evolution then derives from the unimodality of the
product life cycle curve.
10.4.6 Price and cost dynamics
Pricing of new products is an intricate decision on behalf of the innovator
and could be done by using various strategies (e.g., skimming price or "price
low - gain share"). For simplicity we will assume here that the innovator
for technology i uses mark-up pricing and that the imitators and close-to-
imitators are price takers. Thus Pi = (1+k)Gvi(t), where Gvi is the industry
average variable unit cost at time t for the product based on technology i
and k is a constant.
According to empirical studies, learning by producing results in cost
reductions which often takes the following form:
Gvi(t) = [Gvi(O) - Gvi(OO)] exp [-kglt si(u)du] +GVi(OO)
Here we have assumed that the rate of production is proportional to the
number of producers and that learning effects are industry-specific rather
than firm-specific.
Differentiation gives
and thus
Thus the rate of price reduction is proportional to the number of com-
petitors times the price gap to a floor price F.
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1004.7 Optimal control of diffusion through investments
During buyer and seller diffusion, gross incomes and profits are generated at
the seller side, while benefits through increased technological performance of
the product are generated at the buyer side together with costs for the prod-
uct equal to the gross incomes of the sellers. According to empirical studies
of R&D budgeting practices (see, e.g., Granstrand, 1982), R&D investments
at the firm level are often made as a fraction of gross income, the size of the
fraction being determined by comparison with competitors. At each point
in time, both a seller and a buyer face the options of investing in the old
technology, investing in the new technology, investing in both the old and the
new technology, or not investing at all (leap-frogging still excluded). Also,
based on empirical studies, one can assume a strong (although lagged) cor-
relation between R&D investments and inventive output. R&D investments
moreover constitute an industry-specific proportion of the total investments
needed in production and marketing for a new product (see, e.g., Eliasson,
1987). Through the feedback into R&D of resources that essentially are
fractions of sales, technological change is speeded up and thereby buyer dif-
fusion, thus increasing physical volume of sales, and possibly also monetary
volume and profit unless prices are reduced and margins are competed away
too swiftly.
From the above, one may conclude that ks and k6 in Section 1004.5 could
also be considered as aggregate control variables reflecting the R&D invest-
ment behavior on the seller side, which is influenced by the buyer diffusion,
and which through seller diffusion adds up to aggregate R&D investments,
causing (actually with some delay) continued technological change. Thus
equation (10.8) represents one feedback feature of the system.
It is also possible to at least partly endogenize the stream of radical
innovations occurring at time points ti by letting them be influenced by
government supported R&D investments, typically basic research in univer-
sities. These investments are financed in turn through taxing the profits of
buyers and sellers, profits which are influenced by the state variables of the
buyer-seller system.
If a buyer's utility (flow) function U(T / P) of the performance-to-price
ratios is finally introduced, a (macro) performance index J of the system
could be specified in the following way (using continuous discounting with
impatience):
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where r = average rate of return, assumed> O. The optimal control problem
is then to maximize J for admissible ks and k6 subject to equation (10.2)
as specified above and below.
10.4.8 Example of a full model summarized
Thus, a full system of equations for innovation i (i = 1,2, ...) in the case of
only one technological performance parameter, logistic buyer diffusion, and
linear seller diffusion with a linear coupling term looks like:
for t = ti
for 0 :S t < ti
for bn,iH < bni , otherwise = bni
for Si > 0, otherwise = 0
B
kl(b - bni)' bni/b + k2 sni +k7Ti/Pi, for t ~ ti,
o :S bni :S b
bni = 1
bni 0
bei = bn,i+l
bi bni - bei
(10.11)
(10.12)for t = tifor 0 :S t < ti
for Sn,i+l < Sni, otherwise = Sni
for bi > 0, otherwise = 0
Sn,i+l
Sni - Sei
k3(s - snJ +k4 (b - bnJ + kg Pi, for t ~ ti,
o :S sni :S S
1
os
ksbi + k6 si for ti :S t
1 (assumed w.l.o.g.)
P [ Pi = -k9Si(Pi - Pi) for ti :S t, Pi const. > 0
Pl(tl) = 1 (assumed w.l.o.g.)
System performance index:
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100 00J = L bi(t) U [Ti(t)/ Pi(t)] e-ridto i=1
where U = the utility (flow) of performance-to-price for a buyer, and r =
average rate of return.
Control variables: ks and k6 •
Unfortunately, as soon as nonlinearities are introduced, solutions rapidly
become difficult to find or know if they even exist. In principle the solutions
for different i give a family of trajectories in the state space, describing in
this framework the continuous evolution of market structures driven by inno-
vation processes. As new technologies arrive and entries into them drive exit
processes (possibly lagged) from old technologies, the corresponding trajec-
tories will eventually return to the origin. A dynamic (periodic) equilibrium
could be imagined but not a static one, unless technological developments
stagnate. An illustrative simulation run is given below.
10.4.9 An illustrative simulation run
For the sake of illustration, a simulation of the preceding model has been run
in the absence of sufficient data and analytical tractability. Figures 10.1 to
10.3 present the run for the case of a stream with four radical innovations.
The parameters in the model are:
Number of innovations = 4; total number of buyers b = 100; total number
of sellers s = 50.
Constant k1=0.3, k2=0.05, k3=0.15, k4=0.005, ks=2, k6 ==2, k7==0.0002,
ks==0.02, k g=0.002.
Time t1 =0, t2==20, t3==40, t4==45.
Time lag Lp1 ==5, L p2 ==8, Lp3 ==8, L p4 ==12.
(All time constants in years.)
The Ti-curves have been linked together to the curve T(t) through defin-
ing T(t) == Ti(t), ti ~ t < ti+1 and Ti+1(ti+d == Ti(ti+1 - 0).
Similarly the Pi-curves have been linked together to the curve P( t)
through defining
P(t) == Pi(t), ti ~ t < ti+1
Pi+1 (ti+d == Pi (ti+1 - 0).
Finally P1 == 50, F2 == 45, F3 == 10, F4 == 5.
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Figure 10.1. Buyer diffusion b(t), technological performance T(t), and price
development P(t).
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Figure 10.2. Seller diffusion s(t), technological performance T(t), and price
development P(t).
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Figure 10.3. Buyer and seller diffusion (phase diagram, time t parameter-
ized). Note: (s;, b;) = [s;(t), b;(t)] as above.
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Chapter 11
Diffusion Through
Interfirm Cooperation:
A Case Study[l]
Gerhard Rosegger
11.1 Introduction
The last two decades have seen a remarkable growth in the number of coop-
erative agreements among large, multinational enterprises (MNE). Why, and
under what conditions, would these vertically and horizontally integrated or-
ganizations choose to give up a part of what has often been cited as their
main raison d'itre, Le., secure control over firm-specific technical and market
information, in favor of sharing such information with rivals?
This chapter examines how the interplay between international rivalry
and cooperation has affected the diffusion of technology in the automobile
industry, with the focus on manufacturers' reactions to changed conditions
in the American market and on their active efforts to shape these conditions.
For this purpose, technology is defined as including not only knowledge em-
bodied in capital equipment and products but also knowledge concerning
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the organization of production, management systems, and operational con-
trols. The rapid spread of interfirm, cooperative arrangements can of course
itself be interpreted as the diffusion of an institutional innovation, although
it would be difficult, conceptually and empirically, to describe it in terms of
standard diffusion curves!
While the consensus among observers seems to be that the trend to-
ward cooperation has been technology-driven, and that it has accelerated
the global diffusion of product and process innovations, a more specific an-
swer to the question posed above would have to distinguish among at least
three different types of arrangements, each deriving from a different set of
motives:
• Multifirm consortia concerned primarily with the development of generic
(pre-competitive) knowledge about newly emerging technologies.
• Joint projects, frequently encouraged by government policies and gov-
ernment financing, aimed at major technological innovation.
• Bilateral cooperation ("strategic partnering") between MNE in estab-
lished industries with mature basic technologies.
Of these, strategic partnering is especially widespread in the motor ve-
hicle industry. As Figure 11.1 shows, the world's major manufacturers are
linked in a large number of bilateral relationships, ranging from formal joint
ventures and the acquisition of equity positions by one partner in the other,
to contractual agreements covering specific aspects of their operations.[2]
Whatever their form and content, these arrangements occupy the middle
ground between arm's length transactions and the full internalization of an
activity within a single firm's administrative structure, which may of course
include an outright merger between two corporate entities.
In addition to the connections shown in the figure, many of the large
MNE also have partnership links with minor manufacturers as well as with
suppliers of parts and components (see, for example, Sekaly, 1981; Wom-
ack, 1988). Thus, even though agreements to cooperate are typically bilat-
eral, networks of partners have in fact evolved around the major producers.
The American Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) are among
the leaders in the cooperation game, even while maintaining a higher de-
gree of integration in their worldwide operations than most of their foreign
competi tors.
In the next section, data are presented reflecting changes in the Ameri-
can market, still the world's largest; these changes were triggered by import
competition but have assumed a momentum of their own. As a consequence,
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a technology gap developed between the Big Three and their ri vals from
Japan and Western Europe. Drawing on some, admittedly anecdotal, em-
pirical evidence for the gap, the US producers' and their partners' motives in
establishing cooperative relationships are examined. In a concluding section,
the more general lessons concerning the diffusion of innovations in mature
industries that might be drawn from the American experience are speculated
upon.
11.2 The Transformation of the US Market
Had the American manufacturers continued to dominate their home market
as they did in the 1950s and through the middle 1960s, they might have
had little reason to engage in major product innovation. After a flurry of
entries (and more or less rapid exits) induced by the pent-up demand of
the immediate postwar decade, the domestic industry had settled into a
three-firm oligopoly with a small competitive fringe (Rosegger and Baird,
1987). The "standard American car", huge and unwieldy by the standards
of other markets, had become the dominant product. What little demand
there existed for vehicles deviating from the preferred size and configuration
was met by imports amounting to a small fraction of total sales.
Figure 11.2(a) indicates how this situation changed, starting in the late
1960s. Imports began to capture increasing shares of what had become
an essentially stagnant, albeit cyclically fluctuating, market. Subsequently,
Japanese producers took over from the Europeans as major suppliers of
foreign-made cars, especially at the so-called entry level, in the process even-
tually forcing the exit of some large rivals (like Fiat and Renault) from the
American market.
The effects of these developments on the market shares of the Big Three
can be traced in Figure 11.2( b): General Motors saw its lead position eroding
steadily, as did Ford. Chrysler experienced a dramatic drop in sales and
entered the last decade on the brink of bankruptcy; the company was saved
only through massive infusions of government-guaranteed loans. By the
middle 1980s, all of the domestic fringe producers had left the market. Their
places were taken by a rising number of foreign-owned operations in the
United States and Canada.[3]
Explanations of the domestic industry's (relative) decline have focused
on virtually every aspect of market structure, managerial behavior, and tech-
nology. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is at least a kernel of truth in
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Figure 11.2. Total sales of domestic products and imports; market shares
of major domestic producers and imports, 1951-1987. Panel (a) - new car
sales. Panel (b) - market shares. (Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association, Annual Statistical Report, var. vols.)
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most of the accusations levelled at Big-Three strategists as well as at wrong-
headed government policies. The list of failures is irrelevant for the purposes
of this chapter. What matters is that product characteristics and consumer
tastes were changing, that a number of innovations made abroad were dif-
fused through imported vehicles, and that the American manufacturers' ca-
pacities for product and process innovation apparently proved inadequate to
the task of meeting these challenges. Not surprisingly, they turned to the
government for relief and received it in the form of a "voluntary" export
restraint program negotiated with the Japanese.[4] Quotas did little to im-
prove conditions for the Big Three; in fact they probably increased the range
of competitive pressures by motivating Japanese firms to de-emphasize the
entry-level market and to meet their American and European rivals head-on
in the higher priced market segments.
It is worth noting that the contours of a changing market had emerged
well before the first oil crisis of 1973-1974. Although the rise in fuel prices
triggered a burst of consumer interest in energy-efficient cars, as well as
the promulgation of government-mandated corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) standards, these developments merely accelerated the trend towards
vehicles quite different from the standard American car.
As a consequence, competitive strategy called for the offering of a much
wider range of models by each of the mass-market competitors. The re-
sulting increases in the spread between the lowest-priced and highest-priced
products are illustrated in Figure 11.3. Also clearly observable is the fact
that two of the European competitors, Audi and SAAB, pursued a different
strategy, moving up market rather than facing the rising pressures of rivalry
in the medium-price range.
11.2.1 Changing product characteristics
The effects of the developments sketched above on the US firms have been
dramatic. Most significantly, domestic manufacturers have had to adjust
their production programs to accommodate the trend away from the stan-
dard car and its luxury variants. Figure 11.4 shows the decline in these
mainstays of their business and the concomitant rise in the shares of sub-
compact, compact, and intermediate-size cars in Big-Three output between
1971 and 1987; the market share of all imported cars is indicated as reference.
The implications of these changes were manifold, ranging from the need
to develop entirely new capabilities in development, design, and engineering
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Figure 11.3. Price ranges of models of major sellers in the Uni ted States, as
multiples of the lowest-priced domestically produced passenger car for 1977
and 1987. (Source: Rosegger, 1989.)
to the redirection of marketing efforts that for several decades had empha-
sized the alleged advantages of standard-size vehicles. The greatest diffi-
culties, however, stemmed from the fact that the new production programs
required new types of capital equipment as well as new approaches to the
organization and control of manufacturing operations.
This section examines briefly how successful the Big Three were in bring-
ing off what amounted to a catch-up strategy on the product side. While it
is impossible to determine the extent to which their success is attributable
to cooperative agreements with their foreign rivals, there can be no doubt
that the existence of an obvious technology gap helped to motivate their
pursuit of selective cooperation.
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Figure 11.4. Market shares of US-made automobiles, by size class, and
market share of all imports, 1971-1987. (Source: Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association, Annual Statistical Report, var. vols.)
There are numerous dimensions along which one could, in theory, com-
pare the objective, technical characteristics of American-made and imported
vehicles. [5] For purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to concentrate on
arguably the most important parameter, engine performance. Just how rev-
olutionary the required adjustments turned out to be is indicated, first and
foremost, by the shift in engine types produced (Figure 11.5). In the early
1970s, over 80 percent of all American-produced cars were equipped with V-8
engines. Note, however, that in 1960 the 6-cylinder engine had still been the
dominant type and that the V-8 more than doubled its share during the sub-
sequent decade, when the Big Three were engaged in what became known as
as horsepower race. This was a period of booming demand for big engines,
and it would be difficult to claim that the US producers made a strategic
error in meeting this, highly profitable, demand. From 1970 onward, cars
with 4-cylinder engines became increasingly popular. By the early 1980s
they had become the most common type.
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Figure 11.5. Shares of engine types in US-made automobiles, 1960-1987.
(Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Annual Statistical Re-
port, var. vols.)
As the mix of American-made engines began to approach that of the
imports (though few of the latter were offered with engines of eight or more
cylinders), their average displacement declined. As Figure 11.6 demon-
strates, convergence of average sizes lasted until 1982, when US engines
once again increase in displacement. Fuel prices were dropping, and buyers
of domestic cars once more were beginning to show a preference for larger
and more powerful vehicles. The average displacement of import engines
increased only slightly from 1976 to 1989; however, this average is the result
of two offsetting trends: on the one hand, small, entry-level cars (supplied
by the Japanese as well as by new manufacturers in South Korea and Yu-
goslavia) had once again managed to increase their market shares; on the
other hand, several Japanese firms raised their engine sizes as they moved
into the higher-priced end of the market (see also Rosegger, 1986).
With the convergence of American and foreign engine types, one would
expect measurable performance to follow. As panels (a) and (b) in Figure
11.7 suggest, however, a substantial gap remained. The average horsepower
of domestic cars dropped sharply with the decline in engine displacement and
then rose again during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the average power output of
imports surpassed that of domestic cars in the same period. Demonstrably,
many of the foreign-made cars had successfully shed their "economy" image
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-----
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Figure 11.6. Average displacement, engines of US-made and imported
automobiles, in liters, 1976-1989. (Source: Automotive Industries, 1989.)
and had stolen much of the "performance" thunder from the American-made
products.
In specific power output (brake horsepower per liter of displacement), the
average 1989 American-made model had reached roughly the performance
level of the 1976 imports. In the meantime, performance of the latter had
increased substantially, so that, by this measure, there was little in the way
of convergence. A Japanese study (Marumo, 1984) ranked American cars
third, behind Japanese and European products, in acceleration, top speed,
and weight/horsepower ratio. There are long-standing historical reasons
for the European emphasis on the development of low-displacement, high-
horsepower engines, but the same does not hold for the Japanese producers.
In fact, their first foray into the American market during the early 1960s had
failed mainly on account of inadequate engines. This handicap was more
than overcome in about fifteen years of intensive technical development.
Despite their higher average performance, imported cars also continue to
lead in fuel consumption (see Figure 11.8). American efforts have tracked
the government's changing CAFE (corporate average fuel economy) stan-
dards. This should be no surprise to students of the effects of regulation on
technical performance; nor is it surprising that intensive lobbying by General
Motors and Ford (though not by Chrysler, which had managed to "beat"
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the standard) resulted in a lowering offuel-economy requirements from 1986
onward. Of course, certain imported luxury and sports vehicles have also
failed to meet the CAFE standard by wide margins and have had to pay
substantial gas guzzler taxes.
All of these data suggest that American manufacturers' strategies,
whether they involved technical cooperation with foreign rivals or stand-
alone efforts, have not yet succeeded in closing the performance gap. Ac-
cording to mostly impressionistic evidence, the same appears to be true
with respect to product quality, an issue that has received public attention
since the years when US manufacturers had fallen far behind their European
and Japanese competitors (see, for example, Subcommittee on Trade, 1980).
Here again, however, there is general agreement that the Big Three have
made substantial strides toward improvement.
11.2.2 Process technology and manufacturing capability
Why has it been so difficult for American manufacturers to match the ob-
jective and subjective advantages of foreign producers? On the face of it,
any company with long-standing experience in a mature-technology indus-
try should be able to adopt and adapt incremental innovations readily. Yet,
G. Rosegger 277
the Big Three appear to lag behind their competitors in the technical arena,
despite having returned to profitable operations in the middle 1980s.
As has been pointed out in a number of studies (e.g., Womack, 1988;
Albernathy, 1978; Altshuler, 1984; Cusumano, 1985), a good part of the
answer has to be sought in the realm of process technology, Le., in the
American firms' plant and equipment, in the degree of vertical integration,
and in operating techniques.
Equally significant, however, is a set of attitudes and ways of doing things
that is often subsumed under the vague notion of corporate culture. Nelson
and Winter (1982) have endowed this notion with some technical and eco-
nomic substance by introducing the concepts of routines and organizational
capabilities.
The relevant point here is that gaps in process technology may be closed
through the adoption of innovations generally available via the conventional
mechanisms of diffusion, albeit with the technological specificity of exist-
ing facilities as a constraint on their effectiveness in particular situations
(Rosegger, 1976). On the other hand, it seems obvious that a transfer of at-
titudes, routines, and standard operating practices requires channels other
than those through which individual, capital-embodied techniques are dif-
fused. Langenfeld and Scheffman (1986) make a useful distinction between
discrete innovations and systems innovations, defining the latter as collec-
tions of disembodied advances yielding major performance gains even within
the context of a given set of hardware. As a consequence, one would expect
to be able to observe and measure gaps in discrete process technology, while
systems technology clearly escapes such neat quantification.
Nothing reflects the interacting effects of all these factors more persua-
sively than the standard comparisons of productivity (Figure 11.9). First
and foremost, data on output per employee are determined by the extent of
a firm's vertical integration, which of course has nothing to do with conven-
tional concepts of productivity but is the result of past strategic decisions.
Thus, for example, approximately 75 percent of a General Motors vehicle's
value is added by internal operations, with 25 percent coming from outside
suppliers; these proportions are almost exactly the reverse for Toyota, the
largest Japanese manufacturer. One would expect the degree of integration
to change only very gradually, even in response to a radical reorientation
of strategies. Second, productivity comparisons have to take into account
differences in capital intensity at various stages of production as well as
structural relationships among these stages in geographically dispersed mul-
tiplant firms. And third, differences are no doubt explained in part by the
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Figure 11.9. Output per employee, selected Japanese and US firms, 1983
and 1988. (Source: Automotive Industry, 1989.)
sizes and role of various staff functions within enterprises and by the work
rules governing the assignment of factory-floor labor.
When all these differences are taken into account, however, experts still
agree that Japanese firms produce vehicles more efficiently and more effec-
tively than do their American competitors. Hard data on the matter are
difficult to come by. Table 11.1 shows the results of a Japanese evaluation,
made several years ago.
While average estimates of this kind should not be taken too seriously,
one striking observation emerges: the degree of automation, usually taken to
be the prime mover toward higher labor productivity, apparently cannot ex-
plain differences in output per man-hour. One may surmise that advantages
in "systems technology" give Japanese producers an edge even in situations
where embodied techniques are similar.
Some aspects of this advantage have been widely discussed: labor rela-
tions, worker attitudes, quality circles, just-in-time inventory systems, life-
time employment, and so on. Their transfer to the American setting has been
equally widely advocated, and their adoption has brought some beneficial
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Table 11.1. Comparison of process technology, Japan and USA (produc-
tion of passenger cars, 1800-2500 cc.).
Criterion
Capital intensity
Unit of
evaluation
10,000 Yen/worker
Japan
70
USA
30
Automation
Casting
Machining
Stamping
Welding
Painting
Productivity
Stamping
Welding
Painting
Assembly
Source: Marumo (1984).
Percent of output
80 80
90 85
90 70
95 50
80 80
Units/man-hour
0.91 0040
0040 0.15
0.52 0.25
0.20 0.07
results. Yet there remains a conviction that there is more to "the Japanese
approach to manufacturing", and that this approach cannot be copied but
must be learned in context. If this is so, then neither the licensing of tech-
niques nor a straightforward know-how transfer is likely to be sufficient for
a catch-up program.
11.2.3 Changes in research, development, design,
and engineering
The fragmentation of the automobile market referred to earlier has controlled
all mass producers with new problems in the research, development, design,
and engineering (RDD&E) work required to bring new models into produc-
tion. One reason is that large firms have to offer a full range of products,
from entry-level cars to luxury and sports vehicles, or they run the risk of
having competitors take over profitable segments. A second reason is that
the same strategy requires them rapidly to adopt new technical features,
such as turbocharging, multivalve engines, four-wheel drive, and automatic
braking systems.
Two developments have affected the cost of RDD&E:
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• Changes in the technical complexity of motor vehicles, which increasingly
require a "systems integration" approach to design.
• There is a more intensive link between RDD&E and manufacturing in
an effort to minimize production problems at the design stage instead of
having to solve them later on. According to the estimate of one expert,
this means that between 50 and 70 percent of a vehicle's manufacturing
costs are already determined when the "layout" of the car (i.e., the first
complete cross-section drawings) is completed (Eaton, 1987).
For these and other reasons related to the increase in capital intensity
of RDD&E work, current estimates for the cost of developing and putting
into production an entirely new model go as high as US$3 billion. As a
consequence, RDD&E also has the potential for considerable economies of
scale and scope. Thus, while the last three decades have seen reductions in
the efficient scale of assembly operations for mass-market cars from around
600,000 to 250,000 units per year, minimum efficient scales for RDD&E have
been rising steadily. One recent (and probably exaggerated) estimate puts
them at 5 million units/year (Rhys, 1988). But even if this figure were too
high by a factor of two, it would still exceed minimum unit cost capacities in
all other distinctive operations that go into the production of an automobile.
To some degree, mass producers have always been able to extricate them-
selves by the practice of "badge engineering", i.e., equipping identical basic
models with differentiating add-on features and selling them under different
brand names. But there are limits to this approach, especially since it is
constrained by its nature to one particular size class. Besides, as systems
integration requires increasing cooperation at the RDD&E stage between
manufacturers and component suppliers, badge engineering tends to run
into diminishing returns unless these suppliers can serve several assemblers
with essentially identical products.
These problems are accentuated to the extent that innovations from other
fields of technology, with which auto makers have little experience, have
begun to be diffused into mass-produced vehicles. The growing application
of sophisticated electronic devices and the substitution of more or less exotic
materials for ferrous and other metals are but two examples of this trend.
Here, too, the Japanese are generally conceded to have a lead over their
American and European competitors. While the latter typically require
five years to develop a new model and bring it to market, Japanese do
the job in less than four years (A utoweek, 1984). They are reported to
accomplish this by dealing coherently with all design alternatives before
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beginning actual development work, instead of making modifications after
that work has started, and by keeping senior management from interfering
with the process once certain milestones have been passed.
Between 1982 and 1988, US producers introduced one-third fewer new
models than the Japanese. Some of their efforts at radically new designs,
like the Pontiac Fiero, proved technically flawed and were withdrawn from
the market after a few years of disappointing sales (and, it has been claimed,
at about the time when most technical problems had been corrected). Gen-
eral Motors' Saturn project, which was intended to incorporate all of best
practice in RDD&E, plant design, and production operations, has been mod-
ified several times, its ambitions scaled down, and completion dates pushed
forward.
Advantages are not entirely one-sided, however. American manufactur-
ers are generally conceded to have enjoyed a substantial lead in the design
and production of automatic transmissions, air-conditioning systems, and
other passenger-comfort features. In addition, during the last decade the
Big Three, led by Chrysler, have managed to pioneer in the introduction
of an entirely new product, the mini-van, which has proved to be a ma-
jor market success. Foreign producers, including the Japanese, have rushed
to market their own versions, but so far the Americans have maintained
their lead positions. They registered similar successes in the manufacture
of innovative light trucks, which increasingly have become substitutes for
conventional passenger vehicles, especially among young and rural buyers.
11.3 Cooperating to Compete
Although the acquisition or exchange of technological knowledge (in the
broad sense outlined earlier) are not the only motives for forming strategic
partnerships, the evidence adduced in the preceding sections offers ampIe
reasons why American manufacturers should have been interested in coop-
erating with foreign firms. More generally, the global network of partnerships
shown in Figure 11.1 , above, suggests that such arrangements are regarded
as advantageous whenever firms possess asymmetric capabilities for dealing
with rapidly changing technologies and markets.
Historically, the Big Three have been reluctant to establish permanent,
cooperative relationships with other firms, domestic or foreign. In their
home market, they were no doubt sensitive to the antitrust implications of
any kind of formal cooperation among themselves or with large component
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manufacturers. Fusfeld (1986) attributes the failure of the Carter adminis-
tration's Cooperative Automotive Research Program (CARP) to this sensi-
tivity. Only in 1988 did they break the pattern of (domestic) independence
by forming the Automotive Composites Consortium, within the new, per-
missive legal framework provided by the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984. Aimed at hastening the development of generic automotive plas-
tics technology, this is the first such venture among American auto makers
(Automotive News, 1989).
In foreign markets, the Big Three relied heavily on their subsidiaries.[6]
There seemed to be little point in impairing the decision-making autonomy of
these operating divisions by establishing long-term relationships with foreign
partners.
11.3.1 The development of cooperative networks
Attitudes toward international cooperation changed radically under the im-
pact of accelerating import competition. Chrysler pioneered the new strat-
egy with its 1971 acquisition of a 15 percent equity stake in Mitsubishi.
Although the initial arrangement was narrow in scope, involving primarily
the marketing of a Mitsubishi model (the Colt) under Chrysler brand names,
it has grown to full-fledged technical and production cooperation, culminat-
ing in the creation of Diamond-Star Motors, a fifty-fifty joint venture for
the manufacture of a new range of models to be sold under Chrysler and
Mitsubishi labels.
The now-defunct alliance between American Motors and Renault fol-
lowed in 1978. This venture, for production of Renault models in the United
States, collapsed mainly because of the French firm's image (it had failed and
been withdrawn from the American market once before) and its American
partner's old-fashioned plant and inadequate distribution network. Ameri-
can Motors' exit from the industry was eased by Chrysler's purchase of all
remaining assets, including the small but profitable Jeep operations.
In 1979, Ford acquired its interest in Toyo Kogyo (Mazda). Again, co-
operation evolved gradually, leading to the recent formation of an assembly
joint venture in the United States. In this, as in the Chrysler case, RDD&E
and plant operations were left largely to the Japanese partner; however, the
arrangement has resulted in many other forms of cooperation, such as the
joint development and use of components across a range of models.
In 1980, General Motors began discussions with Toyota that led to the
1983 formation of a joint venture for the production of cars to be sold under
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the Toyota and Chevrolet names. The New United Motor Manufacturing
Inc. (NUMMI) was established in an abandoned GM plant in California.
This case is of particular interest because from the outset it was the an-
nounced objective of the American partner to facilitate the acquisition of
Japanese "systems technology" through the undertaking. A program for ro-
tating American engineers and managers through the NUMMI plant was set
up, and other mechanisms for transferring technical knowledge were put in
place. It was reported that, after four years of operation, "running the plant
with a Japanese management system and American workers has resulted in
the highest quality of any GM-sold car" (Langenfeld and Scheffman, 1986).
In the meantime, each of the Big Three has extended its network of part-
nerships, to include not only Japanese and South Korean companies but also
a number of European firms. Figure 11.10 shows these direct linkages be-
tween American and foreign producers. Not included are the numerous con-
nections among European producers, nor is it possible to trace the complex
networks of manufacturer-supplier agreements that have grown up around
the core groups. Development of the latter has been hastened by the estab-
lishment in the United States of subsidiaries of Japanese suppliers to Toyota,
Nissan, Mazda, and Honda operations in this country.
11.3.2 Strategies and motives
In contrast to the joint benefits expected from multifirm cooperation in the
development of generic technologies, the establishment of a strategic part-
nership involves a direct quid pro quo. Transferring technical knowledge to
a competitor without some expected compensation is not a viable objective
for a profit-oriented firm! The point would be trivial, were it not for the
fact that some supporters and critics of international, interfirm cooperation
(see, for example, Reich and Mankin, 1986), have focussed entirely on the
advantages and disadvantages of these arrangements as though they involved
a one-way flow of benefits.
From the foregoing it seems clear that the American manufacturers'
strategic objective was to move toward parity with their foreign rivals in
product and process technology, and to match, if not surpass them in the
range of models offered. It seems equally clear, however, that partnering is
only one of a number of strategies whereby they could achieve this objective.
Table 11.2 presents a classification of these strategies which is intended to
suggest the options available to mass-producers in their four main areas of
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Figure 11.10. Major cooperative relationships of US manufacturers.
(Source: see [2].)
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Table 11.2. Taxonomy of automotive mass producers' strategies.
Research,
development,
design, and
engineering
Stand-alone
RDD&E
Arm's length
acquisition of
technology
(licensing)
Long-term
agreements for
interfirm
exchanges of
technical
information
Joint support,
with other
manufacturers
of third party
RDD&E
J oint ventures in
RDD&E, joint
projects for
development
of models
Acquisition of
parts and
components
Vertical
integration
Spot transactions
with outside
suppliers
Long-term
contractual
relations with
suppliers
Acquisition of
equity interest
in suppliers
Joint supply
ventures with
other
manufacturers.
Exchange of
components
with partners
Manufacturing
and assembly
Production in
and for home
market
Production in
home country,
exporting
Stand-alone DFI
in country of
sale or third
country
Joint ventures for
production, in
home country
or third country
Merger with
domestic or
foreign
manufacturer
Marketing and
distribu tion
Sales under own
name, through
own dealers
Sales of partner's
products
through own
dealer network
Sale under own
name of
partner's
products,
through own
dealers
J oint distribution
system with
partner
Merger of existing
distribu tion
systems
Source: Rosegger (1989).
activity: RDD&E, the acquisition of parts and components, manufacturing
and assembly, and marketing and distribution.
Given these options, it is not surprising that large MNE like the Big
Three would pursue a mix of strategies, of which cooperation is at present far
from the most important aspect. The tradition, after all, has been to "go it
alone" whenever possible. There is no better indicator of the American firms'
ambivalence than the fact that, even while establishing an increasing number
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of partnerships with their major rivals, they also continued their advocacy
of protectionism. But this would be a subject for a separate investigation.
Consideration of the reasons for the Big Three establishing each of the
partnerships shown in Figure 11.10 would go well beyond the scope of this
survey. One can, however, identify three basic sets of motives:
• The partnerships with the Japanese mass producers obviously have as
their objective the acquisition of all the knowledge that seems to give
the latter their technical and commercial advantages. Given the nature
of systems technology and know-how transfers, joint RDD&E and pro-
duction joint ventures are the optimal arrangements.
• Partnerships with smaller manufacturers are motivated mainly by the de-
sire to extend the range of products offered under one of the Big Three's
nameplates. At one end of the market, firms like Suzuki and Isuzu pro-
vide small cars for GM to sell as "Geo" models, while the South Korean
partner, Daewoo, actually manufactures a car (the Pontiac LeMans, de-
rived from the German subsidiary's Opel Kadett) for GM. Kia performs
a similar function for Ford, supplying it with the entry-level Festiva. At
the other end of the market, European specialist producers like Aston
Martin, Maserati, and Pininfarina enable their American partners to of-
fer luxury and sports vehicles at a cost lower than that of a stand-alone
effort at developing such products. In addition, small specialists possess
the technical resources and the flexibility required for the execution of
major innovation projects. The work of Lotus on an active suspension
system, financed by GM, is an example.
• Some linkages are established not so much for technical reasons as by
opportunities for the joint development of emerging markets. Autolatina,
the Brazilian joint venture between Ford and Volkswagen, as well as
several partnerships in the Far East can be interpreted in light of this
objective.
The history of strategic partnering is still relatively young, but every
indication seems to be that, whatever the motives which triggered their ini-
tial establishment, they inevitably evolve in the direction of closer technical
cooperation, frequently accompanied by a division oflabor between the part-
ners. A further consequence seems to be a growing vertical disintegration of
production. To the extent that joint product development involves increas-
ing reliance on long-term cooperative arrangements with outside suppliers,
common parts are no longer being produced by the final assemblers them-
selves. As suggested above, however, in the case of the Big Three this trend
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has slowed down because of the traditional high degree of vertical integra-
tion, as well as by the now-fading convention of selecting suppliers annually
on the basis of competitive bids.
On the whole, then, the move of American producers toward strategic
partnering can be understood in terms of some reasonably well-defined short-
term and medium-term gains. Whether the same holds true for the long run,
is a question that will be addressed in the concluding section.
What are the motives for the foreign partners? Here the answers are
more complex; nevertheless, one can discern some general patterns:
• The fact that technological advantages were not tilted entirely in favor of
the foreign firms has already been alluded to. The acquisition of knowl-
edge concerning the production of automatic transmissions, comfort fea-
tures, and certain electrical systems was a sine qua non for success in
the American market at all but the entry level.[7] In a similar vein, the
Japanese manufacturers were aware of the fact that their American part-
ners were more attuned to the special requirements of designing products
for this market. The need to pay attention to these requirements was
certainly demonstrated by the disastrous results of the first Japanese
foray into the United States, in the early 1960s.
• Given their strategy of setting up independent, direct foreign investment
(DFI) operations in the United States, joint-venture production enabled
Japanese managements to acquire experience in dealing with uniquely
American conditions, including labor relations, supplier systems, and
governmental affairs. Perhaps the first stand-alone DFI venture in this
country, the Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, plant of Volkswagen, served
as an example of how not to proceed: it failed to reach profitable levels
of operation and was shut down.
• To the smaller foreign manufacturers, American partners had something
to offer that they themselves could not obtain, given their resources:
market knowledge and a marketing and distribution network that pro-
vided countrywide access to potential customers. While the concept of
the minimum efficient size of a dealer system is elusive, it seems clear
that the entry of smaller-scale and specialty producers is eased greatly
by the opportunity to rely on a partner with an established network.
Here again, as in the case of joint-venture production, some firms - like
Suzuki and Isuzu - followed up on partnering by beginning to build up
their own dealerships.
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• There can be little doubt that the major Japanese producers also sought
ties with American partners in order to mitigate the possible effects of
further protectionist legislation. In particular, their experience with the
local-content controversies that have hampered their European-market
strategies would convince them that cooperation in the United States
might avoid some of these troubles, should such local-content require-
ments be imposed here.
• In the case of the up-market European specialty producers, partnerships
with the Big Three provided welcome infusions of capital. Although
they were successful developers of high-technology products, most of these
firms had faced continuous financial difficulties. Partnering brought them
a measure of stability they had not previously known.
• Finally, firms in the newly industrializing countries, chief among them
South Korea, were motivated by the need to acquire manufacturing
know-how in an industry with which they had scant experience. While
there is little in the way of cooperation in RDD&E at this time, for these
companies partnering represents a first step toward independent entry
into the global automobile market. It is interesting in this connection
to compare the experience of two recent, entry-level "independents" in
the American market: the South Korean Hyundai, relying heavily on de-
sign and production cooperation with Mitsubishi and Chrysler, has been
successful as a stand-alone exporter to the United States and Canada,
whereas the Yugo, derived from an obsolete Fiat model and produced in-
dependently by the Yugoslav Zastava firm, failed in the American market,
mainly on account of quality and service problems.
Although any kind of conclusive assessment of partnering would be pre-
mature, one may surmise from the evolution of these arrangements that, on
the whole, they have met partners' expectations of strategic gains. Except
for the failure of the American Motors-Renault venture, firms appear to have
reaped sufficient benefits to continue support and expansion of their cooper-
ative managements. In particular, there can be little doubt that new foreign
product and process technologies have been diffused more rapidly among
American manufacturers through the medium of the strategic partnership.
11.4 Concluding Observations
Little more than a quarter-century ago, visions of a "world car" dominated
forecasts of the global automobile industry's technological evolution. This
I
I
I",!I,[
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was predicted to be a relatively unsophisticated vehicle, incorporating state-
of-the-art technology in some highly standardized form, with but minor
adaptations to the requirements of different markets. Prices would be low
because of the resulting economies of scale in production. No doubt the
remarkable, worldwide success of the Volkswagen Beetle stood at the cradle
of these forecasts, which were based on an essentially technocratic notion of
how efficiently to satisfy growing demand for private transportation.
Actual developments went precisely in the opposite direction: in order
to remain competitive, mass producers had to cater to the market's increas-
ing preference for product diversity, and a succession of innovations put into
question the concept of a "standard technology" sufficiently stable to build a
mass-production system around it. As a consequence, rapid changes in pro-
cess technology and in management systems resulted in a sharp reduction
in the benefits of large-scale assembly, conventionally assumed in strategic
thinking about plant design and production programs. On the other hand,
minimum efficient scales in RDD&E increased as vehicles became integrated
technical systems, rather than assemblies of more or less standard compo-
nents, and as the closer linking of design and manufacturing made greater
demands on all functions involved in bringing a new product to market.
Although diversity and flexibility became essential if firms wanted to
capitalize on first-come or fast-second advantages, the conditions outlined
above also produced a growing interest in interfirm cooperation. In the
case of the American manufacturers this interest was motivated primarily
by the recognition of a technology gap between themselves and their for-
eign, especially Japanese, competitors. Revolutionary as these cooperative
arrangements may be in terms of the global industry's organization, it is
important to recognize that they did no more than to accelerate the diffu-
sion of new technology by providing yet another channel. Convergence of
technical capabilities in an industry is inevitable, unless the lead firms can
sustain a long-run rate of innovation that is higher than the rate at which
these innovations are diffused to the industry's other members. To the best
of my knowledge, the history of technology life cycles offers no examples of
this possibility.
In this view, then, interfirm cooperation represents an institutional inno-
vation induced by fast-changing technical and market conditions. It would be
difficult to argue that, whatever may be meant by the often-cited globaliza-
tion of the auto industry, the existence of strategic partnerships has changed
the underlying pattern of rivalry. This observation gains additional weight
if one recognizes the extent to which the struggles by national industries
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for a share in the world market have been supported by their governments'
policies.
There exists, of course, another interpretation of strategic partnering:
that it represents but a first move toward the reconstitution of the interna-
tional manufacturers' cartels which, in the interwar period, were notorious
for the"... restricting of production, withholding of new products, and fenc-
ing in and blocking off new developments" (Berge, 1944). While conceding
that, so far, cooperation has not produced any of these results, proponents of
what might be called the "conventional industrial-organization view" could
point out that the true test will come only during a prolonged slump in the
world market for motor vehicles. Will the networks of partners be tempted to
allocate market shares, fix prices, or retard the introduction of innovations?
Two arguments speak against a repetition of this pattern, one encour-
aging and the other less so. First, virtually all students of cooperative ar-
rangements in mature industries agree that these arrangements have not
only accelerated the diffusion of technology among existing firms but also
lowered entry costs and thus contributed to a worldwide dispersion of man-
ufacturing capabilities. In the absence of radical governmental intervention,
the resulting, irreversible interpenetration of markets has created a situation
in which successful collusive action has become highly improbable.
The second argument would recognize that, for better or for worse, many
of the control functions that may have been exercised by cartel-like arrange-
ments in the past, have been taken over by governments in the name of
industrial policy. Whatever restrictions on entry, on the spread of innova-
tions, and on pricing are likely to inhibit global competition today stem from
governmental or intergovernmental policies rather than from the efforts of
an industry's member firms. In the strategies of the latter, rent-seeking has
taken the place of collusion.
Even here, however, globalization of technology may have salutary ef-
fects. In order to survive in worldwide competition, firms have to find the
proper mix in the integration of activities, arm's length transactions, and
cooperation. National boundaries may become increasingly irrelevant as the
members of strategic alliances draw on information, physical assets, and pro-
duction systems that are dispersed across the globe. Once an industry has
reached that stage, unequivocal definitions of a national interest on which
to orient industrial policies may become difficult, if not impossible.
Against this sanguine view we must set one final question: what are the
likely long-run consequences of cooperation for an individual firm's techno-
logical capabilities? There can be little doubt that firms have benefitted
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from the more rapid transfer of technology and the enhancement of know-
how resulting from the strategic partnering. If the principles of compara-
tive advantage and specialization apply to the production of new technical
and market knowledge, long-run efficiency will also be enhanced by the in-
evitable division of labor among partners. If, on the other hand, a firm's
success in all forms of innovation hinges on a full range of capabilities, from
widely-dispersed basic and applied research to more narrowly-focussed work
involving all products in the firm's output mix, cooperation could in the long
run impose a considerable cost.
Given the developments outlined in this chapter, such skepticism would
seem out of place; however, the history of technology suggests that the well-
established concept of learning by doing may well have an opposite, "forget-
ting by not doing". Capabilities given up instead of honed, and redundancies
of technological effort eliminated in the interest of short-run efficiency, may
be hard to regain in the more distant future. This is a truly strategic issue,
to which neither business decision makers nor academic observers seem to
have paid much attention.
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Notes
[1] This chapter is an extension of work reported in Rosegger (1986 and 1989).
The points raised in the "Concluding Observations" have since been elaborated
in "The Benefits and Costs of International Technical Cooperation in Mature
Industries: An American Perspective, International Journal of Technology Man-
agement (in press, 1990).
[2] There exists no single, authoritative source on cooperative arrangements. The
data presented in Figure 11.1 were assembled from the trade and technical
press as well as from business publications; therefore, they can make no claim
to completeness.
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[3] As of 1989, direct foreign investment operations in the United States included
the following stand-alone facilities: Honda (Marysville, Ohio), Nissan (Smyrna,
Tennessee), Toyota (Georgetown, Kentucky); in addition, Honda and Toyota
had assembly subsidiaries in Canada. Production joint ventures included: Gen-
eral Motors/Toyota (Fremont, California), Ford/Mazda (Fiat Rock, Michigan),
Chrysler/Mitsubishi (Bloomington, Illinois), General Motors/Suzuki (Canada),
Subaru/Isuzu (projected).
[4] The initial (1981) agreement restricted Japanese export to the United States to
approximately 1.7 million units/year; this limit was subsequently raised to 2.4
million units.
[5] The emphasis on objective characteristics is necessary because less easily doc-
umented images of quality, reliability, and pleasing design also played a major
role in the success of imports in the American market.
[6] One of the puzzling aspects of the case is that the European subsidiaries of
Ford and GM had consistently managed to match their competitors in technical
features, design, and quality. What factors retarded (or prevented) the transfer
of this knowledge to their American parent organizations?
[7] In this connection, it is interesting to note that one of the earliest joint ventures
was formed in the 1960s, between Borg Warner, an American transmission pro-
ducer, and Aisin Seiki, a transmission supplier to Toyota (Womack, 1988).
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Chapter 12
Some General Regularities
of Techno-Economic
Evolution*
Sergei Yu. Glaziev
12.1 Introduction
One of the most exciting phenomena of the modern world is the fundamen-
tally homogeneous direction of the overall techno-economic development tra-
jectory in practically all regions of the world. The existing economic systems
in different countries are collapsing one after another under the pressure of an
expanding industrial culture and are becoming drawn into the international
division of labor. Simultaneously, their economic development is influenced
by the general regularities of the world techno-economic system, the rhythm
of which is set by the industrially developed countries. These general regu-
larities of long-term techno-economic development, invariant under different
sociopolitical systems, are the subject of this chapter.
·We gratefully acknowledge permission to use parts of the original verSlOn of
this paper which appeared in Communist Economies, Volume 2, No. 2 (1990),
© Carfax Publishing Company.
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12.2
Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
Regularities of Technological Change
The key factor that directs the overall techno-economic development trajec-
tory is technological change. During the last few decades the problems of
technological change have been the focus of interest in economics. A new
concept has evolved which views economic dynamics as an uneven and uncer-
tain process of evolutionary development (Dosi et al., 1988). From this point
of view technological change is a complex interaction of various technologi-
cal alternatives, carried on by competing and collaborating economic agents
in similar institutional environments. The selection of techno-economic de-
velopment alternatives and their implementation in technological shifts and
structural changes take place as a result of learning processes (which are
determined by various nonlinear feedbacks - positive and negative) that in-
fluence the dynamics of the interaction of technological and social change.
The concept of economic growth as a complex, nonlinear and uncertain
process involving permanent changes, allows us to develop a new approach in
studying the regularities in long-term techno-economic development and the
management of technological change. Feedbacks stipulate the interaction of
various elements in the socioeconomic system in the course of technological
shifts and determine the directions and rates of evolution of the economy.
The modeling of these feedbacks becomes a priority task of economics.
This new approach predetermines a new vision of economic structure.
It is important to select a view of the economic system that can ensure
the stability of its components and of interrelations between them in the
process of technological change. Such a vision of economic structure assumes
a corresponding choice of its primary element. This element should not
only preserve integrity in the process of technological change, but it should
be a carrier of corresponding innovations, Le., it need not necessarily be
disaggregated to describe and measure them.
The changing driving forces of the form and direction or of the overall
techno-economic development trajectory have recently been summarized by
Freeman and Perez (1988). In a Schumpeterian tradition, they distinguish
four successive modes of growth (or techno-economic paradigms) since the
onset of the industrial revolution. These modes of techno-economic develop-
ment are driven by the growth of leading branches and growth sectors which
involves a synergetic aggregate of key factor industries, technologies, and
infrastructures.
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Thus, as an element for the analysis of the overall techno-economic de-
velopment we suggest a totality of technologically connected production pro-
cesses preserving its unity in its evolution. Such totalities are united into a
stable self-producing unity - a technological wave (TW). The latter covers a
macroeconomic production cycle - from the extraction of natural resources
and labor force education to final consumption.
The production sections contained in a single TW develop more or less
simultaneously because of their technological interconnection. Any change
in one of the elements of the TW initiates a corresponding change in other
elements in the chain of production units. The broadening of each tech-
nological process is conditional on the development of the whole group of
interconnected production systems.
The primary element of technological change is the innovation. The de-
velopment of any technological system begins with the introduction of a
basic innovation which is then followed by others. Basic innovations are
usually radically different from their traditional technological surroundings.
The effective functioning of a new formation can be achieved only through
an adequate technological chain. The inclusion of new technological sys-
tems in traditional technological chains does not, as a rule, lead to signifi-
cant technical progress, because their advantages are not always recognized.
Techno-economic development takes place through the establishment of new
technological chains based on clusters of technologically connected innova-
tions which are combined in new TWs. Technological change does not pro-
ceed with the more or less smooth introduction of new technologies, the
elimination of the old, and the gradual raising of the overall technological
level of production. It is, in essence, a sequential process of long periods
of evolutionary development of TWs, broken up by occasional revolution-
ary changes in the technological base of the economy through replacement
of the dominant TWs. The replacement of one dominant TW by another
is accompanied by the reconstruction and elimination of a large number of
technological processes which form the base of the previous TW, and by the
disintegration of the corresponding production links with the rapid diffusion
of new technological processes and production systems.
It makes no sense to ask what is the main driving force in the genesis
of each TW - technological possibilities or consumer needs - or in which
sector of the economy does the original impulse for the technological break-
through arise. Research shows that innovations and shifts in different sec-
tors (machinery, raw materials, energy sources, construction, transport, and
communications) are interdependent. They stimulate and complement each
298 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
other. Radical discoveries and inventions relating to one of these sectors are
not put into practice, or at the very least do not receive adequate diffusion,
without the appearance of corresponding innovations in other sectors.
Each period of domination of a particular TW is characterized by a set
of base technologies, a group of leading branches, a type of consumption
and labor qualification, dominant energy sources, materials, and modes of
transport and communications. There is a continuity between the consec-
utive stages of development and the corresponding TWs, i.e., the material
and technical base for a particular stage emanate from the development of
the previous stage. The birth of a new TW occurs within the old one, and
in further development it adapts the production units that existed in the
previous stage to the needs of its evolution.
The results ofthe research done in recent years into the long-term trends
of technical and economic evolution in the industrially developed countries
(see, for example, Dosi, 1983; Freeman, 1983; Griibler, 1990; Mensch, 1979;
Piatier, 1984; Nakicenovic, 1986; Vasko, 1987) allow us to conclude that since
the first industrial revolution five technological waves have been observed,
based successively on the mechanization of the textile industry (first TW),
machine technologies connected with the use of the steam engine and rail-
ways (second TW), electrotechnical machinery and the electrification of the
economy (third TW), comprehensive development and the use of chemicals
and motor vehicles (fourth TW), and telecommunications and microelec-
tronic technologies (fifth TW).
The evolution of each technological wave can be schematically repre-
sented by two pulsations. The first pulsation (the formation phase) takes
place in an unfavorable economic and social environment which is deter-
mined by the previous technological wave (still predominating at that time).
In the second stage the technological wave expands rapidly after it over-
comes the social and economic barriers as a result of institutional changes.
In this stage the TW becomes the main carrier of economic growth. With
the exhaustion of technical improvement possibilities in the industries that
constitute the predominant TW, and with the saturation of corresponding
consumer needs, the predominant TW expansion becomes inefficient and the
period of institutional change comes round again. The successive substitu-
tion of predominant TWs generates low-frequency variations (long waves) in
world economic development.
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12.3 Technological Change in Different
Economic Systems
In a market economy the discontinuities of economic growth associated with
the TW substitution appear empirically to have become more established,
albeit interpreted from a number of different theoretical perspectives (see,
for example, Delbeke, 1983; Freeman, 1983; Mensch, 1979; Vasko, 1987,
among others). Such discontinuities in economic development can be ex-
plained with the help of known regularities of capital reproduction. With
saturation of the corresponding type of consumption demand and exhaus-
tion of the possibilities of further technological improvement in the life cycle
of each TW, a phase of decay sets in, when the marginal efficiency of in-
vestment in that group of technologies and industries falls sharply. Further
growth of national consumption and production, in addition to maintaining
the profitability of the latter, requires new investment to be channeled to
the radically new technologies of the next TW. The latter, as a rule, already
exist in the form of inventions, R&D results, and design documentation.
However, their pervasive diffusion is restricted by inadequate socioeconomic
conditions: the common interests of workers (unwilling to lose their jobs
and see their skills devalued), shareholders (interested in a return on capital
invested in traditional TW industries), and corporations (interested in the
expansion of conventional technologies). A high level of inertia in socioeco-
nomic institutions leads to prolonged depression. During this period a large
part of the available capital can find no profitable investment application
and is partially lost in speculative operations. Simultaneously, the growth
rates of all macroeconomic indicators decrease, including the real income of
the population. It is only with the implementation of corresponding insti-
tutional changes and organizational and social innovations (it takes time to
realize that they are necessary) that possibilities for the rapid growth of the
new TW industries appear. Surplus capital is gradually spent, large-scale
redistribution of resources takes place, and the economy embarks on a new
expansion path of economic growth.
During the TW growth phase in a market economy stable circuits of re-
source distribution are formed, which determine the expansion of production.
Private and public organizations, official regulatory bodies, and other eco-
nomic institutions become connected with the technologies of the given TW.
This prevents the redistribution of resources into new technologies, leading
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to overaccumulation of capital in traditional TW industries which are sat-
urating. The economy enters a stage of long-term recession, characterized
by low investment, underused capacity, and high unemployment. With the
aggravation of social tension a search for new directions of economic activity
begins. Government and corporations start to introduce social, organiza-
tional, and technological innovations, making way for the new TW.
In a world market economy the above mechanism works on a global scale.
Facing falling demand in the local market, corporations start to export goods
and capital, thus diffusing the corresponding technological wave throughout
the world economic system. It reaches the limits of its diffusion in a number
of countries, connected by intensive trade flows, more or less simultaneously,
leading to worldwide overaccumulation of capital. The country that is the
first to introduce the necessary social and technological innovations in order
to make way for the next TW initiates a new long growth phase, frequently
attaining a leading position in the world.
The substitution of technological waves in market economies is deter-
mined by the regularities in the way the capital market functions. In modern
centrally planned economies there is no capital market, therefore technolog-
ical wave substitution takes other forms.
Centrally planned economies are characterized by a high degree of stabil-
ity in industrial relations (Le., relations between enterprises, ministries, state
authorities, etc.) and institutions that determine the flow of resources. The
result of this is an inertia in technological evolution which leads to difficulties
for structural change in the economy. The reasons for this great stability
and inertia in centrally planned economies can be found in the regularity in
the functioning of large economic organizations which form the basis for its
economic mechanism.
The natural tendency of any organization to strive for stability, both
internally and externally, produces an internal resistance to innovation.
Any serious innovation will inevitably disrupt existing communications and
management processes, which obviously results in resistance among those
affected.
Usually management introduces a radical innovation only if it is necessary
for its survival in a changing environment. Consequently, in a stable exter-
nal environment one can hardly expect a high degree of innovative activity.
The reverse side of a high degree of stability is the absence of independence.
Enterprises concerned with introducing significant innovations do not as a
rule have the capacity to do so independently. Decisions on important inno-
vations are made at the top level of the economic hierarchy. The enormous
I
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scale of its subordinate estates and the solid management power of the min-
istry apparatus give a high degree of stability to its work and consequently
result in a low degree of innovation.
The stability of the enterprises' economic environment under a certain
ministry is complemented by a system of relevant interbranch relationships
and central planning institutions. Its basic components are: the practice
of planning by means of extrapolation, the allocation of capital investment
according to production growth objectives, the provision of supplies to en-
terprises according to schedules set in advance by Gossnab (the State Supply
Administration), and the preparation of plans on the basis of the national
economic need as set by Gossnab - which in practice is a simple compilation
of the orders of enterprises, usually calculated (with annual planning and
a lengthy interval between putting in orders and receiving plan tasks) by
proportionally increasing the orders of the previous year. Yet other compo-
nents include the budget financing of capital investment plus a soft credit
system, cost-based prices which guarantee the covering of any production
costs regardless of the social utility of the resulting product, and the ac-
tivity of Gosstandart (the State Standards Administration) which prevents
any changes in the technology of production, whether for better or for worse.
The organization of R&D also forms part of this mechanism of stable ex-
tensive production across different (unchanged) technological trajectories.
The subordination of most scientific organizations to the ministries and the
management of science by mass production methods promote an incremental
style of technological changes.
Thus extremely stable industrial relations arose in the centrally planned
economy, providing stable conditions for the extensive reproduction of ex-
isting technological processes. Its basic features were formed before the
Second World War, serving as a powerful means for the rapid expansion
of production typical of the third TW. Today it continues to provide un-
changing flows of resources and products. The technologies of a new TW
are introduced along with the old, by the formation of new branches and
sub-branches, which receive resources for expanded production. As a conse-
quence of their technological incompatibility with conventional technologies,
however, the management bodies responsible for their development try as
much as possible to create their own technological base. Thus, the new TW
develops autonomously, but such reproduction, based on internal accumu-
lation, proceeds extremely slowly. The expansion of the new TW requires
redistribution of resources and the adaptation of conventional technologies.
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This presupposes the breakdown of old technological chains and the corre-
sponding economic information flows, which in turn is impossible without
the reorganization or liquidation of many institutions serving the traditional
technological systems. Until this happens the new technological structures
develop parallel to the expanding reproduction of the old. With time a
number of autonomous TWs form, functioning within a stable regime of
expanded production.
In the system of management of the centrally planned economy there
was no mechanism of automatic redistribution of resources from obsolete
industries to new ones. Resources were distributed by stable circuits of in-
dustrial relations, according to the interest of ministries. For that reason
development of new industries was very slow, with simultaneous excessive
expansion of the established ones. The result is a specific situation of si-
multaneous diffusion of the consecutive and parallel existence of multiple
TWs. It is followed by a number of negative consequences; overproduc-
tion of obsolete products, superfluous economic activity, the overexpansion
of resource-producing industries, considerable national economic losses, and
generally low efficiency of production.
12.4 Measurement of Technological Wave
Substitution
In order to obtain evidence supporting the above hypotheses, we have un-
dertaken empirical research on the formation and substitution of TWs dur-
ing the last century. During this period one can see three successive TWs
or techno-economic paradigms replacing their predecessors in industrial-
ized countries (see, in particular, Freeman and Perez, 1988, for a detailed
account ).
The formation of the first, which we refer to here as the third TW, began
in Russia in the last quarter of the 19th century, slightly later than in the
leading industrialized countries. Its nucleus was electric power and electrical
machinery. The diffusion of the technologies of this TW was accompanied
by the mechanization of the basic technological processes and corresponding
changes in the quantity and skill level of labor. The most important indus-
trial material was steel, including rolled steel. The energy source was coal,
while the main form of land transport was rail. Production was oriented
toward high-volume resources, universally applicable machinery, and labor
with low qualifications (by today's standards). The development of this TW
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was accompanied by rapid urbanization and radical changes, not only in the
structure of consumer demand, but also in the lifestyle of the population.
By the beginning of the 1930s the mechanization of production, the im-
provement in the qualifications of the labor force, shifts in the fuel-energy
balance toward liquid fuel, the growth in total energy consumption, as well
as the establishment of new systems of mass communications and a new
transport infrastructure (roads), created the conditions for the growth of a
new (the fourth) TW in the developed market economies. Research into the
rate of change in the use of traditional industrial materials, as well as the
production of types of products characteristic of the third TW, shows that
the technologies contained in it continued to be used in the leading market
economy countries right up to the mid-1960s.
However, the basic engine of technical and economic development in the
post-war years was the fourth TW. Its nucleus was the chemical industry
and associated machine-tool production industries (chemical engineering)
and the motor industry, which underwent further development, while road
vehicles became the major mode of transport. Characteristics of this stage
were the mechanization and automation of many basic technological pro-
cesses, the growth in the specialization of production, and its reorientation
from the use of high-volume resources and universal machinery to quality
raw materials and specialized equipment. Electric power consumption grew
at very high rates, while the shift in the fuel-energy balance toward oil con-
tinued until it finally replaced coal as the leading source of energy. The use
of new industrial materials greatly increased, including plastics and high-
quality steels. Secondary education became the norm, while the skills of the
labor force and the production culture moved to qualitatively higher levels.
In the mid-1970s the fourth TW reached the limits of its growth in the devel-
oped capitalist countries, which can be seen in the dynamics of the indicator
(see discussion below) of its life cycle (Figure 12.1). At this stage in the
major capitalist countries, the relative consumption of basic materials, en-
ergy sources, and non-production consumption items for this TW stabilized,
while the diffusion of its basic technologies peaked. Further technical and
economic development is instead connected with a new stage of technological
change, based on microelectronics and telecommunication technologies (the
fifth TW).
The nucleus of the fifth TW includes electronics, robotics, and micro-
processor technology. This TW is characterized by computer integrated
manufacturing technologies, new systems of mass communication based on
computer networks and satellite links, among others.
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Figure 12.1. General indicator of the evolution and intensity of the fourth
TW based on a two-step analysis of principal components of 50 indicators
of technological change.
A conceptual analysis of the technological waves successively predominat-
ing in the technological structure of the developed countries in this century
will make it possible to build systems of indicators reflecting the evolution
of these waves, Work with available statistical data revealed about 50 initial
indicators, They were presented as time series for the period 1951-1986,
reflecting technological changes connected with the diffusion of the fourth
TW in the following economies: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG), German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Japan,
Poland, Romania, USSR, UK, and USA.
The information sources used in this work were publications of the UNO
statistical services, as well as those of CMEA, OECD, UNESCO and other
international organizations, data from national statistical sources, and sep-
arate research works. A list of the initial indicators is given in the Tables
12.Al to 12.A8 of the Appendix. Principal component analysis was used
for aggregating a large number of initial indicators into general indicators.
The justification for its use was shown by the high correlation of the initial
I
I
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indicators (see Appendix), reflecting a single process - the diffusion of the
fourth TW.
The initial indicators used in this research reflect technological change
connected with the diffusion of the fourth TW in seven economic spheres:
in construction materials, the chemical industry, electric power generation,
the fuel-energy complex, the agricultural complex, transportation, and fi-
nal consumption. Different economic sectors are represented in the system
of initial indicators by a different number of indicators. Direct application
of principal component analysis to them would give, however, a distorted
picture of techno-economic development in the general index, because sepa-
rate economic spheres would then bear weights proportional to the number
of indicators which reflect them, but not to their actual economic value.
Therefore the initial data were aggregated step-by-step. First, general in-
dicators of technological change in each economic sphere were constructed
by principal component analysis (Tables 12.A1 to 12.A 7 in the Appendix),
then these general indicators themselves were subject to component analysis
(Table 12.A8 in the Appendix).
The structure of the corresponding principal components is given in the
Appendix. As can be seen from the coefficients of factor utilization with
the first principal components, the latter not only aggregate the overwhelm-
ing majority of information contained in the initial indicators, but reflect
the main direction of mutual variability of the initial indicators of techno-
economic development. Therefore, they may be used as general indicators
of the technical evolution of the corresponding economic spheres. Similarly,
as the results of component analysis show, the principal component of the
second level may be used as a general indicator of the technical evolution of
the economy as a whole.
The results of the principal component analysis of the second level are
presented in Figure 12.1. The period under consideration covers the matu-
rity stage of the fourth TW in developed market economies and its growth
stage in the USSR. The results of measurements show that the TW is
more prolonged in a centrally planned economy in comparison with market
economies: technological shifts are more even and slower. This phenomenon
reflects the less intensive redistribution of resources from conventional tech-
nologies to new ones in a centrally planned economy. As a result, its tech-
nological development is more inert.
As one can see from the results of empirical research, the general direc-
tion and intensity of techno-economic development can vary depending on
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the peculiarities of economic relations. Despite the fact that the general di-
rection and historical succession of technological shifts in both socialist and
capitalist countries were the same, their rates, methods of realization, and
manifestations were essentially different. Certain differences are also char-
acteristic of countries within the same socioeconomic system. Thus, rates of
technological change were substantially higher in Japan than in other devel-
oped capitalist countries. Thanks to an efficient national policy of long-term
techno-economic development, the fourth TW life cycle was reduced to a
quarter of a century, and growth in production capacities of the third TW
were curtailed promptly as soon as they proved unpromising from the point
of view of long-term trends in technological change. Simultaneously, at the
growth stage of the fourth TW the government and corporations in Japan
made great efforts to form basic industries for the fifth TW, which had been
identified in the long-term forecasting of Japan's techno-economic develop-
ments. As a result, along with the growth of the industries in the fourth
TW, large-scale resource redistribution into the industries of the fifth TW
took place in Japan. The consequence was rapid advancement with Japan
becoming one of the leaders in technological development during the process
of technological wave substitution in the world economy.
In the USSR the third TW was formed during the industrialization of the
1930s. The formation of the fourth TW began in the second half of the 1950s.
At this stage production units, typical of the third TW, had not yet reached
their limits of diffusion and the material and technical base needed for the
fourth TW had not been formed. The dynamics of the relative consumption
of traditional industrial materials, the production of universal metal-cutting
machinery, and a number of other indicators of the life cycle of the third TW,
indicate its continued growth right up to the mid-1970s and its reproduction
up to the present day in the USSR. The allocation of an enormous amount of
economic resources to the continuing reproduction of the third TW resulted
in an inadequate allocation of resources to the development of the fourth
TW. Therefore the diffusion of its technological systems has occurred at rates
and levels considerably below those demonstrated by a range of industrially
developed market economies.
At present the formation of the fifth TW is beginning. Research shows a
comparatively high rate of diffusion of robotics, computer-controlled machine
tools, and other CIM technologies in the USSR. However, it must not be
forgotten that as yet this TW is still in the initial phase of its life cycle.
Therefore high rates of diffusion of technologies can be achieved without
large allocations of resources, because of their insignificant weight in the
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technological structure and in the economy as a whole. For these high rates
to be maintained in the longer term an ever-increasing redistribution will
be necessary. The problems of organizing such a redistribution are apparent
from the experience of the development of the fourth TW. High rates of
growth at the beginning of the life cycle of the fifth TW declined sharply after
expansion began. Our measurements revealed a decline in diffusion of the
fifth TW-technology over that last decade in the USSR and an increase in the
technological gap between the Soviet and Western economies. A qualitative
analysis of the reproduction of the technological structure of the economy in
the USSR, and individual calculations, indicate the parallel presence of three
TWs, all at different stages of their life cycles (we refer to this phenomenon
here as technological multi-modeness).
Technological multi-modeness is normal in periods of TW substitution.
In the course of interwave interactions that take place at that time, the ob-
solete TW is destroyed, forming the prerequisites for the growth of the new
one. Coordinated actions of government and industrial and social organi-
zations can significantly accelerate this process and minimize social costs of
technological wave substitution. However, when there are no incentives for
resource redistribution from obsolete industries into new ones, the growth of
the new TW may take place at the same time as the extended reproduction
of the obsolete TW. If this happens, the possibilities of the new TW are re-
stricted by the previous TW, which is still expanding and if structural policy
is inadequate the parallel existence of several TWs may easily be reproduced.
This is accompanied by a stratification in the economic structure.
Reproduction of each TW is autonomous. Interwave interactions are not
directed at the replacement of obsolete TWs in order to meet the demands
of new ones, but at the elimination of bottlenecks which restrict their simul-
taneous reproduction. Under these circumstances the tightest bottleneck is
satisfying the demand for primary resources. Consequently, excessive efforts
are concentrated in mining industries and the resource base of the econ-
omy becomes overloaded. With the prolongation of the obsolete TW, the
formation of a new TW is restricted by general resource limitations - and
missing links are provided through foreign trade. Owing to the deficit of
high-quality resources, mass-produced resources are exported in exchange
for high-quality imports. As a rule, the exports are raw materials that have
undergone a low degree of processing, so that this exchange is non-equivalent
and leads to an intensification in the structural crises.
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One more negative consequence of technological multi-modeness is the
stratification of the system of economic values, reflecting the peculiar struc-
ture of the economy. As a result, economic estimations cease to act as
reliable reference points in making economic decisions - new technologies
look inefficient in systems reflecting the conditions of the obsolete TW and
economic agents turn out to be interested in the preservation of an obsolete
technological structure. The reproduction of different TWs in the economy
is supported by a multitude of positive feedbacks, exacerbating the losses
connected with its preservation. An inadequate technical policy thus brings
the economy into a permanent structural crisis with the country becoming
increasingly impoverished.
12.5 International Comparisons of
Techno-Economic Evolution
One can assess the technological structure of a country by comparing varia-
tions in the structural evolution of the technological and infrastructural base
to the international level or to that of the leading country in a particular
TW development. Below we discuss some long-term technological changes
in the transport and energy systems of the USSR in comparison with a
similar analysis performed for the USA (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979;
Nakicenovic, 1986 and 1987). In the case of the changing mix of transport
infrastructures in the USA and USSR, the comparison shows that techno-
logical shifts in the Soviet transport infrastructure took place a quarter of a
century later than in the USA. They also occurred more slowly, which is due
mostly to slower curtailing of obsolete transport technologies (see Chapter 19
by Nakicenovic). For instance, the slow decrease in the share of railways in
the general transport infrastructure and also in intercity passenger transport
are explained by the continuing reproduction of the third TW, characterized
not only by active railway construction (as opposed to decommissioning in
the USA), but also by a strong demand for rail transport. The high resource
consumption of third TW industries means high demand for raw materials,
which places great pressure on the transport system. This pressure is sub-
stantially enhanced by the demand of the fourth TW industries for oil and
energy in general, and also by the fifth TW demand for imported equipment
(satisfied by exporting ores and fuels). The result of this is a hypertrophied
transport structure in which the role of rail transport is exceptionally high.
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Comparative analysis of the structure of energy consumption in the
USSR and the USA yields interesting conclusions (note that the dynam-
ics of structural change in the US economy are close to those of the world
economy). After the protracted predominance of coal in the consumption
of primary energy carriers in the 1950s (compared to the peak in market
dominance of coal in the USA some forty years earlier) technological shifts
in the fuel-energy complex in the USSR speed up. The period from when
the share of coal in primary energy consumption was at its maximum up to
its replacement as the predominant energy carrier by oil took more than two
decades in the USSR, compared with three-and-a-half in the USA. However,
the peak market share of oil in the primary fuel mix of the USSR attained
a significantly lower level than in the USA (where the market share of oil
peaks above 50 percent of primary energy consumption). Even more rapid
was the development of gas technology, which took only a decade and a half
to become predominant in the USSR, starting from a 10 percent share in
energy consumption.
The relatively rapid development of oil and gas technologies in the Soviet
economy are explained by three major interrelated reasons. First, the rapid
formation of the fourth TW from 1950 to 1960 caused a sharp increase in
demand for oil, which had held a relatively large share in energy consumption
even before (for a long period coal consumption was complemented by oil
consumption - oil technology was separated from coal technology later).
Second, a large share of oil consumption was a substitute for coal in industries
of the third TW, the expansion of which had exerted equal pressure upon oil
and coal consumption. Its predominance in the technological structure of the
economy up to the period 1960-1970 also contributed to the prolongation of
the coal technology life cycle. Third, the development of the fourth TW in
the Soviet economy involved considerable use of imports for the production
process, which in turn required the export of energy resources. This was
an important incentive for the rapid expansion of oil production, and, also
partially, for gas production, and this in turn influenced the structure of
internal energy consumption.
The appreciation of the long-term trajectories of technology diffusion
and their distinctive variations in different socioeconomic conditions makes
it possible to put interstate comparisons on a more scientific basis. At the
same time it is necessary to note that one must be very careful when using
interstate comparisons in scientific research, and, even more, in practical
economic decisions, in view of structural peculiarities and goals of techno-
economic development. In particular, in the calculation of technical lags and
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technological gaps one must not rely on absolute levels of techno-economic
indicators. As a rule, these values are determined not only by the level of
techno-economic development but also by a number of social, geographical,
political, and other factors specific to each country. What is far more impor-
tant is the dynamics of such indicators and their structural evolution over
time. Thus, the gap in the level of production diffusion of the fourth TW
between the USA and West European countries is largely explained by geo-
graphical peculiarities such as population and consumption. More important
is the almost parallel movement of the general indicator of the fourth TW
development in the USA, the FRG, the UK, and Japan. This is confirmed by
the synchronization of the saturation level of the given indicator (see Figure
12.1), despite substantial differences in the absolute value ofthis level. The
fact that West European countries reach saturation of the given indicator
only two to three years later than the USA reflects the small technological
lag.
It must be noted also that, as a rule, the leading country in the devel-
opment of a particular TW develops on a somewhat larger scale than the
countries that follow it. This is explained by the relatively high stability of
economic structures developed over a relatively long period. Such structures
tend to promote the reproduction of the technologies connected with the
country's earlier successes in the world market.
12.6 Economic Policy Implications
To concentrate on the absolute levels of US techno-economic indicators, as is
usual in measurements of national techno-economic development, is scarcely
justified. By orienting the economic policy of a country to the technological
level and structure of a leading country condemns that country to permanent
lagging behind and to the reproduction of the leading economy's development
trajectory. Such an orientation does not allow the country concerned to
benefit from the advantage of the backward in the organization of overtaking
techno-economic development.
The advantage of the backward is the opportunity to use the experience
of advanced countries, and forecasts for their future techno-economic devel-
opment, in determining the optimal strategy for closing the technological
gap. This advantage becomes most acute during the periods of large-scale
structural change in the world economy connected with the substitution of
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overall TWs. At such a period in time the backward country has an opportu-
nity to take a short cut, establishing the principal directions of technological
shifts and concentrating resources in the key industries of a new technological
wave.
The economic structure of the countries that were leading during the
life cycle of the previous TW is closely connected with obsolete technologies
and this leads to a high degree of sluggishness in their economic systems.
Backward countries, on the other hand, find themselves in a comparatively
better position, having no need to break the powerful old production machin-
ery and to overcome the resistance of the people and organizations involved.
This opens up possibilities for making a technological push with the aim of
leap frogging or surpassing without overtaking. This was exactly how Japan
made its remarkable push during the last two decades (see Freeman, 1987),
followed by the new industrial countries of southeast Asia. They did not
develop industries of the third and fourth TWs (and still less the second and
first TWs) but put all available resources into the fifth TW.
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Indicators and factor matrices used for principal compound analysis of techno-
economic change in selected market and centrally planned economies for the period
1951 to 1986.
Table 12.Al. Factor matrix for construction materials.
Factor coefficients
II III
Share of steel in consumption of
construction materials -0.3505 0.1739 0.0558
Share of plastics in consumption
of construction materials 0.3602 -0.2342 0.0875
Share of aluminum in consumption
of construction materials 0.2371 0.5553 -0.3332
Share of copper in consumption
of construction materials -0.3492 -0.0150 0.0723
Consumption of steel per unit
of national income -0.1751 0.2558 0.8396
Consumption of plastics per unit
of national income 0.3540 -0.1389 0.2654
Consumption of aluminum per unit
of national income 0.3214 0.3750 0.0772
Consumption of plastics per capita 0.3693 0.0014 0.0191
Consumption of steel per capita 0.2550 0.5083 0.1575
Consumption of aluminum per capita 0.3290 0.3497 -0.2574
Dispersion of factors 65% 15% 10%
Table 12.A2. Factor matrix for electric energy.
Factor coefficients
II III
Share of primary electric energy in
consumption of energy resources 0.2338 -0.5816 0.3606
Share of electric energy in
consumption of energy 0,4181 -0.2802 -0.0309
Consumption of electric energy per
unit of national income 0.3861 0.2580 -0.1424
Consumption of electric energy
per capita 0.3964 0.3334 -0.0770
Consumption of electric energy for
lighting and household needs
per capita 0.3932 0.3408 -0.1120
Consumption of fuel by combined heat
and power electricity plants per
unit of national income -0.3634 0.0496 0.5329
Electricity consumption per worker
in industry 0.2635 -0.5165 -0.1964
Share of atomic electricity plants
in production of electric energy 0.3335 0.1411 0.6721
Dispersion of factors 59% 17% 8%
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Table 12.A3. Matrix structure of energy consumption.
Factor coefficients
II III
0.0098
0.1172
-0.2260
-0.0712
-0.3277
0.2376
0.2537
-0.0458
-0.6952
0.6032
0.4707
-0.4897
0.4678
0.3117
0.3273
Share of coalQ
Share of oilQ
Share of natural gasQ
Share of primary energyQ
Share of electric energy in
energy consumption
Share of atomic electricity plants
in production of electric energy 0.3395 0.1065 0.9014
Dispersion of factors 61 % 18% 10%
QShares of coal, oil, natural gas, and primary energy are the shares of corresponding energy
resources in the total consumption of energy resources for energy production.
Table 12.A4. Factor matrix for the chemical industry.
Factor coefficients
II III
Consumption of plastics per unit
of national income
Consumption of synthetic fibres and yarns
per unit of national income
Consumption of plastics per capita
Share of synthetic fibres and yarns in
consumption of chemical fibres and yarns
0.4991
0.4921
0.5039
0.5046
0.5189
-0.5814
0.4693
-0.4150
-0.5338
-0.5461
0.3570
0.6145
Dispersion of factors 85% 8% 2%
Table 12.A5. Factor matrix for agriculture and related industries.
Factor coefficients
II III
Share of employees in agriculture
Consumption of mineral fertilizers
per 1,000 hectares of arable land
Number of tractors per 1,000
hectares of arable land
Milk yield per cow
Grain harvest
0.4288
-0.4609
-0.3887
-0.4825
-0.0685
0.4818
0.2067
0.7897
-0.2987
-0.1099
0.5827
0.4438
-0.4261
-0.0788
0.5257
Dispersion of factors 72% 12% 9%
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Table 12.A6. Factor matrix for transport.
Factor coefficients
Length of railways
Length of roads
Length of oil pipelines
Length of natural gas pipelines
Number of cars
Share of containers in goods turnover
Dispersion of factors
I
0.4198
0.4396
0.4380
0.4425
0.2660
0.2660
83%
II
-2.2871
-0.1151
-0.1459
-0.0075
-0.0376
0.9392
16%
III
0.1444
-0.3227
-0.3048
-0.2859
-0.8365
-0.0205
3%
Table 12.A7. Factor matrix for private consumption.
Factor coefficients
I II III
Consumption of national income used
for non-productive consumption
per capita
Consumption of energy used for lighting
and household needs per capita
Number of students per 1,000 inhabitants
Number of TV sets per 100 inhabitants
Consumption of paper per capita
Share of employees in public services
Number of telephones per 100 inhabitants
Dispersion of factors
0.4008
0.4005
0.2477
0.4073
0.4016
0.3523
0.4075
80%
0.1494
-0.2324
0.9136
-0.0138
-0.1548
-0.2299
-0.1086
11%
-0.2883
-0.1490
0.1961
-0.2079
-0.0496
0.8794
-0.1924
5%
Table 12.A8. Factor matrix of the second level (seven main components of the
first level).
Factor coefficients
Construction materials
Chemical industry
Energy consumption
Electric energy
Agriculture and related industries
Private consumption
Transport
Dispersion of factors
I
0.3295
0.3772
0.4402
0.3467
0.0335
0.4749
0.4378
64%
II
0.3327
0.4648
0.3416
-0.3437
-0.4216
-0.0621
0.5616
32%
III
-0.0193
-0.3885
0.9000
0.6347
-0.1486
-0.3239
-0.3026
2%
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Chapter 13
The Adoption of
Applications of Information
Technology for Process
Development: A Regional
Case Study
Charlie Karlsson
13.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns the determinants of innovative activities at the plant
level in the engineering industry in two peripheral regions in Sweden. More
precisely, its purpose is to attempt to determine the characteristics of those
establishments in these regions that are early users of applications of infor-
mation technology, i.e" innovations, for the development of their production
processes. In general, profit-seeking enterprises will plausibly allocate re-
sources to the adoption of innovations if
• they know or believe in the existence of some as yet unexploited technical
opportunities;
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• if they have at their disposal the human skills necessary for adopting the
innovations; and
• if they expect some economic benefit, net of the incurred costs, deriving
from the adoption of the innovations (cf. Dosi, 1988).
Thus, we postulate that enterprises possessing certain characteristics at
the time a new technique becomes available will introduce that technique
fastest. Of course, this idea is not new but has been the basis of a number of
studies by economists and other social scientists. One method employed in
the literature, which ever since the pioneering analysis by Mansfield (1963)
has become the dominant approach among economists, is to present and
empirically test a number of separate a priori hypotheses regarding the eco-
nomic characteristics which the authors expect early adopters of innovations
to possess. This exercise has usually been performed on an ad hoc basis.
The characteristics considered in the economics literature can be organized
into four groups (Karlsson, 1988):
• The size of enterprises.
• The economic and financial characteristics of enterprises.
• The human capital characteristics of enterprises.
• The internal and external communication networks of enterprises.
A rather limited number of empirical studies analyze the characteristics
of those enterprises which are relatively quick to introduce new techniques.
It is no easy task to evaluate the empirical results not only because they are
often contradictory or non-significant, but also because:
• The theoretical foundation is often weak or even non-existent.
• The data used often contain few observations.
• The samples are sometimes non-representative, and may, for example,
include only large enterprises, and countries.
• Questions can be raised concerning the statistical treatment of the data
in at least some of the studies.
• The variance explained in these studies is often quite small (cf. Karlsson,
1988).
Hopefully, the results presented here will provide another small piece of
evidence that together with the results from earlier studies will give us a
better understanding of the characteristics of those enterprises that adopt
innovations early and also of how an efficient technology and innovation
policy at the regional level might be formulated.
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The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 13.2 a conceptual frame-
work for analyzing process development by means of the adoption of inno-
vations is presented. On the basis of this framework a number of hypotheses
concerning the characteristics of those enterprises that tend to adopt innova-
tions early is then derived. These hypotheses are presented in Section 13.3.
In Section 13.4 the data is presented and the methods used in this study
for characterizing early adopters of innovations are discussed. The empirical
results are presented in Section 13.5 and the main empirical conclusions as
well as the policy conclusions can be found in Section 13.6.
13.2 A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing
Process Development
The empirical part of this chapter deals with the adoption of new tech-
niques (innovations) in process development at the level of the individual
establishment (plant). We define an establishment as a production system
consisting of a number of cooperating but partially separable subsystems
with great differences in durability. Examples of such subsystems are the
employees with their technical, management, marketing, etc. skills; building
capital; machine equipment and production techniques; a set of products;
distribution systems and market organization; and administrative systems.
It is expected that every establishment goes through a life cycle that
can be summarized in the following way (Johansson and Stromqvist, 1980):
Under theoretically ideal market conditions a new establishment will be born
with a set of products that is well adapted to demand conditions, and a
production technique that gives the best possible conditions for competition
during the lifetime of the investment.
However, market conditions change over time and the production tech-
nique available for new production systems becomes more efficient. Hence,
a production system ages much more rapidly in the economic and technical
senses than in a physical sense. The productive skills of labor and the capital
equipment often have a durability that is longer than the economic lifetime
of the production system. Aging in the economic sense is caused, among
other things, by the fact that the technique that is determined by the exist-
ing capital equipment and the production skills of the employees successively
becomes more and more inferior to that in new production systems.
The different subsystems of an establishment can also be thought of
as production systems that develop according to a life cycle with an
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introductory phase, a longer period of increasing efficiency due to learn-
ing economies and an increasing volume of production, i.e., a growth phase,
a maturity phase, and lastly, a phase of decline when productivity decreases
in comparison with the productivity in new production systems. By means
of investment, the starting point for the decline phase can be delayed. This
means that an old production system could be renewed. As the different sub-
systems within an establishment age at different speeds, certain subsystems
will have to be renewed faster than others. The result of such a gradual re-
newal process will be that every establishment, except the newest, will have
a mixed vintage structure. One observation to note is that the life cycles of
the different subsystems are interdependent, which means, on the one hand,
that the situation in one subsystem may be an impediment to renewal in
other subsystems and, on the other hand, renewal in one subsystem may
necessitate or encourage renewal in other subsystems. Thus, the interde-
pendence may delay the adoption of a given technique first but then, after
adoption, increase the speed of adoption of the same or other techniques in
other subsystems of the establishment.
The life cycle position of an establishment as a whole as well as of its
different subsystems, together with its competitive situation and the com-
petitive strategy chosen, determines the need for the establishment to engage
in the renewal of its different subsystems, such as, for example, its machine
equipment and production technique, and thus its need to adopt new tech-
niques. Its capacity to meet this need is determined by:
• What it has learned in the past about the use of new techniques in the
relevant subsystems.
• The skill profile of its employees.
• The level of affinity between techniques already in use and the technique
that is to be adopted.
• The amount of resources available for investments, including R&D, etc.
In deciding whether to engage in development activities or not, the estab-
lishment will weigh its need against its capacity in the light of information
about available techniques and their characteristics, and about the actions
of competitors.
The interdependence between different subsystems within an establish-
ment means that the exploitation of most new techniques requires changes in
many subsystems of the establishment. The introduction of a new technique
into the production system of an enterprise produces imbalances that must
be redressed dynamically. Irrespective of the subsystem into which the new
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technique is introduced, it may nonetheless lead to a dynamic connective
reorganization of several (all?) other subsystems. The micro units in our
study are machines with their attached software which, by means of invest-
ments, are used to renew the technique used within the production processes
in establishments, which are our units of observation.
By means of the framework presented here, we want to emphasize the
active role played by the establishments themselves in the adoption of new
techniques. They spend R&D resources on the specific adaptation of the
new technique itself to the specific characteristics of the subsystem(s) in
question or on the specific adaptation of the subsystem(s) to the specific
characteristics of the new technique. In-house R&D seems in many cases to
be a necessary ingredient in the process of adopting new techniques made
available by suppliers.
However, an establishment does not act in a vacuum. Rather, it acts as
part of a complicated network system. It is the network system that conveys
information about those changes in the market situation that determine the
need to engage in renewal activities, about available techniques and their
characteristics, about the possibilities of recruiting skilled personnel, etc.
13.3 Formulation of Hypotheses
In this section, we develop the hypotheses that will be tested later in the
chapter. The first hypothesis concerns the role of the knowledge level, Le.,
human skills, for the adoption of applications of information technology (IT)
in the production process, Le., for process development. We expect the early
utilization of new IT-applications, i.e., innovations, in an establishment to
be critically dependent upon the knowledge level within the establishment.
H 1: The capability of an establishment to adopt new applications of
information technology early for process development is positively
dependent on the knowledge level of its employees.
It seems, however, possible to qualify this hypothesis. In Karlsson (1988)
it is emphasized that it is the ability to model production activities and
production systems theoretically that matters. This suggests that the level
of theoretical education is the skill factor or central knowledge.
H 2: The capability of an establishment to adopt new applications of
information technology early for process development is positively
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dependent on the number of university graduates and, in particular,
the number of graduates from technical universities, it employs.
The employment of a large number of university graduates may, of course,
merely reflect the total size of the establishment. We suggest, however, that
the number of university graduates employed has a significant effect on the
propensity to adopt innovations for process development and also when we
take the size of the establishments into account.
H 3: Considering the size of establishments and the number of univer-
sity graduates employed simultaneously it is still expected that the
number of university graduates employed has a positive influence on
the propensity to adopt new applications of information technology
early for process development.
In Section 13.2 above, we assumed that the information and communication
networks of the individual establishments have a central role in the inno-
vation adoption process. Here we make a distinction between specialized
information channels, and nonspecialized information channels. Specialized
information channels imply channels to machine producers and to agents
working as intermediaries between the machine producers and the potential
adopters.
H 4:
H 5:
H 6:
Regarding the role of specialized information channels in the adop-
tion of innovations for process development, we expect adopters
and, in partioular early adopters to have more developed special-
ized information networks than non-adopters.
Well-developed specialized information channels are expected to
have a positive influence on the propensity to adopt innovations
early for process development for establishments of all sizes.
Considering the influence of specialized information channels and
the knowledge level simultaneously we expect both to have a posi-
tive influence on the propensity to adopt innovations early for pro-
cess development.
Nonspecialized information channels imply channels to major owner(s)jhead
office and to the market. In a spatial perspective, we expect the location
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of the major owner(s) /head office function to be a variable that is critical
for an early adoption of innovations. The location of major owner(s) should
indicate whether or not an establishment belongs to an enterprise (corpora-
tion) with a rich network of information channels while the location of head
office is a factor that merely reflects intra-enterprise information networks.
H 7: The location of major owner(s)/head office outside the region favors
process development by means of the adoption of innovations.
H 8: Considering the simultaneous effects of the location of major
owner(s)/head office and the knowledge level, we expect both to
exert a positive influence on the propensity to adopt innovations
early for process development.
The market networks of an establishment are reflected in its trade patterns.
The characteristic market extension measured by the share of total sales
going to exports is an important indicator of the flow of information that
reaches an establishment from different markets. Customer dependence,
measured by the share of total sales going to the four largest customers, on
the other hand, indicates the number of extensions in the market information
network.
H 9: Market extension, i.e., a large export share, is expected to be
positively related to an early adoption of innovations for process
development.
H 10: Market extension is expected to have a positive influence on the
propensity to adopt innovations early for process development in
enterprises of all sizes.
H 11: Considering market extension and the knowledge level simultane-
ously, we expect both to have a positive influence on the propensity
to adopt innovations early for process development.
H 12: High customer dependence, i.e., a large share of total sales going
to the four largest customers is expected to have a negative in-
fluence on the propensity to adopt innovations early for process
development.
(13.1 )
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13.4 Statistical Methods for Characterizing
(Early) Adopters of Innovations
In an earlier study (Karlsson, 1988), the results from a number of empirical
studies that had tried to simultaneously assess the characteristics of (early)
adopters of innovations were surveyed. The use of regression analysis to
characterize early adopters of new techniques dates back to Mansfield (1963).
The Mansfield approach has been used in several more recent studies. In
some of these studies the authors had to deal with a problem - the censored
data problem - which Mansfield did not have to contend with, namely that
the innovation(s) had not diffused to 100%, Le., their material contained
enterprises which were classified as potential adopters but which had not yet
become adopters at the time of investigation (Nabseth, 1973; Hakansson,
1974; Smith, 1974). In this situation there are at least four options available
(Karlsson, 1988):
(a) To ascribe a hypothetical adoption date to the non-adopters (the Nabseth
approach) (Nabseth, 1973).
(b) To base the assessment on adopters only and thus leave out the informa-
tion available about non-adopters.
(c) To use logit analysis (Oster and Quigley, 1977; Oster, 1982).
(d) To use tobit analysis (Oster, 1982).
Each method is afflicted with certain weaknesses. We have chosen here
a modified Nabseth approach as our main approach. The best explanations
found by the Nabseth approach are then tested on the group of adopters
only [option (b) above].
OUf modified Nabseth approach can be described as follows: We start
by constructing an introduction index or speed indicator. To do this, we
estimate for each individual type of application a function with the following
logistic form:
InZ(t) = ao+a1t+E;t=1,2, ... al>O
Z(t) = f(t)/[1 - f(t)]
where f(t) is the share of all production units which have introduced a
given type of application in year t and E is a random error term, which is
assumed to be normally distributed. Now, let T be the year of observation
and consider the variable !::,.f:
!::,.f = [1 - f(T)]/2 (13.2)
I
I
I
I
I
Ii
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where f(T) is the share value obtained from the estimated equation in (13.1).
To all units which at year T have not adopted the application studied
we assign an artificial introduction date t* such that
f(t*) = f(T) + fj.f (13.3)
Using equations (13.1) and (13.3) we can, for the actual type of IT-
application i and production unit k, attach an introduction year tf. Let
k = 1 be the first adopter of application i, and let t} = 1. Then we can
define the following introduction index, yf, for each type of application.
yf = 1/t7· (13.4 )
From equation (13.4) we can construct a compound or average introduc-
tion index, yk, based upon the introduction index yf, for the n different
applications of a given category.
n
yk = :Eyf/n.
i==l
(13.5)
Consider now a set of characteristics of establishments, Xl, X2 ••• , and let
y signify the introduction index oOT-applications in the production process.
Then we can use OL8 to estimate regression equations of the following form,
where 131 is an estimate of the elasticity, bj can be transformed into an
estimate of the elasticity and E is a random error term, with an assumed
normal distribution:
lny = a + :E13ilnxi + :EbjXj + f.
J
(13.6)
The main reason for choosing this as our main approach was that we felt
it important to be able to make a distinction between early and late adopters.
We employ the logistic function as the simplest and most widely used of a
number of possible alternatives. As Hernes (1976) and 8ahal (1981) note,
it is not possible to discriminate between alternative models on empirical
grounds. Hence we have not found it worthwhile for our purposes to provide
a theoretical basis for specifying a precise functional form.
We also use equation (13.6) for making OL8 estimations on adopters
only. In that case we use the above procedure for constructing our intro-
duction index except we do not assign any artificial introduction year to
non-adopters.
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There are several examples in the literature of how contingency table
analysis has been used to investigate the connection between adoption rates
or speed of introduction and establishment characteristics (Rees et al., 1983).
We also use contingency analysis to investigate how the speed of introduc-
tion is associated with single characteristics as well as pairs of characteristics
of individual establishments. Unfortunately our material is too small to en-
able us to include more than two characteristics at a time in the contingency
analysis. Of course, the contingency analysis only serves as a simple hypoth-
esis test of somewhat limited value. We have, however, found it valuable to
include the contingency analysis in the empirical part of our study because
it also serves to describe our data.
In the contingency analysis, an introduction index is obtained simply
by dividing users of applications of information technology into two equally
large groups: early users and late users. If we include the non-users, we
can then form the following simple introduction index: ZO = non-users, Zl
= late users, and Z2 = early users. Forming analogous classes of the char-
acteristics of each establishment, we construct contingency tables in which
the Z-classification is matched with those other classifications. For each ta-
ble we also calculate the pertinent x2-value. The contingency analysis has
obvious relations to the logit model. In particular, the contingency investiga-
tions describe the statistical material without using any assumptions about
functional forms (Goodman, 1971; Bishop and Fienberg, 1969).
13.5 Empirical Results
The purpose of this section is to try to determine the characteristics of those
establishments that are early users of applications of information technology
for process development. The statistical investigation in this section is a
study of the adoption of applications of information technology (IT) in the
engineering industry in two Swedish counties - Varmland and Alvsborg. The
industries included in the study are engaged in the manufacture of metal
products, machinery and equipment, electrical equipment and components,
transport equipment, and instruments.
The study is based on a postal survey of all engineering establishments
with more than four employees. Some information has been collected from
approximately 95% of the total number of establishments and full informa-
tion exists for about 75% of the total number of establishments. The coverage
of the total number of employees in the pertinent industries is approximately
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the same. The results presented here are based on the statistical analyses of
approximately 350 establishments.
This section is organized as follows: In Subsection 13.5.1 we illustrate
the process of diffusion of IT-applications for process development. Subsec-
tion 13.5.2 is devoted to a contingency analysis of the connection between
human skills and the adoption of IT-applications for process development.
In Subsection 13.5.3 we investigate, by means of contingency analysis, the
importance of different specialized information channels for the adoption of
IT-applications for process development and in Subsection 13.5.4 we make
a similar investigation as regards nonspecialized information channels. The
simultaneous effect of human skills and specialized and nonspecialized infor-
mation channels, respectively, on the speed of introduction ofIT-applications
for process development is examined in Subsection 13.5.5. Finally, we present
the results of a simultaneous assessment of the influence of different variables
on the speed of introduction by means of regression analysis.
13.5.1 The diffusion process
To illustrate the process of the diffusion of IT-applications for process devel-
opment, we have estimated the logistic curve of equation (13.1). In formula
(13.7) we present the estimated equation for process development. The t-
values of the estimated parameters are given in brackets.
In Z(t) = -21.12
(-40.9)
+ 0.245t, R2 (adj.) = 98.5.
(35.8) (13.7)
We can see that the logistic function approximates the diffusion process
quite well (Figure 13.1). However, our main interest is not attached to the
diffusion process as such but to the characteristics of those establishments
that are early adopters. In the next section we investigate those character-
istics.
13.5.2 Human skills and the adoption of IT-applications
In this section we will examine the role of the knowledge level, i.e., human
skills, for the adoption of IT-applications in production processes. We mea-
sure the knowledge level by means of the basic educational variables we have
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Figure 13.1. Introduction of IT-applications in the production process.
distinguished. In Table 13.1, we present a contingency table for the vari-
ables Z, the introduction index (defined in Section 13.4); and E, the number
of university engineers employed, showing that for production processes the
speed of introduction of IT-applications seems to be influenced by the size
ofE.
The influence factor in Table 13.1 is the most significant of the basic edu-
cation variables shown in Table 13.2, where we summarize the significance of
the influence of three variables as regards the introduction ofIT-applications
in the production process.
Table 13.1. Employment of university engineers and IT-applications in the
production process (%).
Speed of introduction
Non-adopters (ZO)
Late adopters (Zl)
Early adopters (Z2)
Total
E=O
60
26
14
100
31
31
38
100
E>4
11
26
63
100
N = 319; x2 = 50; df = 4; significance level: 0.001.
I
I
I
I
I
I'i'I
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Table 13.2. Basic education variables
applications in the production process.
Speed of introduction against X2
University engineers (E) 50
College engineers (CE) 45
Other university graduates (U) 41
329
and the introduction of IT-
df Significance level
4 0.001
4 0.001
4 0.001
Table 13.3. Size, basic education, and the introduction of IT-applications
in the production process (%).
Speed of introduction
4<S<20
E=O E>l
20~S<50
E=O E>l
S>50
E=O E>l
52 53
34 20
14 27
Non-adopters (ZO)
Late adopters (Zl)
Early adopters (Z2)
Total
68
22
10
100
33
48
19
100 100 100
33
29
38
100
16
26
58
100
N = 319; X2 = 77; df = 10; significance level: 0.001.
We now turn to a discussion of the combined effect of size and knowl-
edge level upon the speed of introduction. Table 13.3 gives a contingency
table in which the size S, measured in terms of the number of employees,
and basic education effects are examined simultaneously for IT-applications
in the production process. We see here that for establishments not employ-
ing any university engineers, the probability of adoption of IT-applications
increases as the size of the establishment increases. For establishments em-
ploying university engineers, we find, somewhat unexpectedly, the lowest
adoption rate among the medium-sized establishments. Thus, we have clear
(but somewhat mixed) size effects. This is quite in line with the product life
cycle theory, which postulates a relationship between process development
and increasing scale of production. However, the dependence on the employ-
ment of university engineers for an early adoption of IT-applications in the
production process increases in proportion to the size of the establishment.
13.5.3 Specialized information channels and the adoption
of IT-applications
In this section we continue our study by investigating the role of specialized
information channels in the adoption of IT-applications. In the survey a
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distinction was made between the following six types of specialized informa-
tion channels:
C = consultants;
CC = courses and conferences;
F = fairs and exhibitions;
MP = producers and sellers of IT-equipment;
J = journals;
01 = other information channels.
In the case of IT-applications in production processes we found that
consultants together with courses and conferences (X2 = 5.4; df = 2, in
both cases) are the only specialized information channels which seem to
influence the introduction speed significantly. If we reduce the introduction
speed variable to a simple yes/no variable, we obtain the results shown in
Table 13.4. The table shows that while adopters have consultants, courses
and conferences, and other information sources as important information
channels, non-adopters seem to read journals, visit fairs and exhibitions, and
have contacts with machine producers and sellers as frequently as adopters.
Table 13.4. Specialized information channels and the adoption of IT-
applications in the production process.
Adoption (yes/no) against X2
Consultants (C) 5.4
Courses and conferences (CC) 4.5
Other information channels (01) 3.3
Journals (J) 2.2
Fairs and exhibitions (F) 1.8
Machine producers and sellers (MP) 0.0
Note: e, ee, 01, F, and MP are coded yes and no.
df
1
1
1
1
1
1
Significance level
0.025
0.05
0.10
We now focus on the simultaneous influence of size and specialized in-
formation channels. In Table 13.5 we present a contingency table in which
we examine the simultaneous effects of the strongest specialized information
channel, consultants, and size on the introduction speed of IT-applications
in the production process. We notice that consultants as an information
channel seem to have a definite effect on the adoption propensity in all three
size classes.
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Table 13.5. Consultants as an information channel, establishment size,
and the introduction of IT-applications in the production process (%).
Speed of introduction
4<S<20 20<S<50 S>50
-=------
C=No C=Yes C=No C=Yes C=No C=Yes
Non-adopters (ZO)
Adopters (Zl + Z2)
Total
43 31 32 17 15
57 69 68 83 85
100 100 100 100 100
9
91
100
N = 220; X2 = 45; df = 5; significance level: 0.001.
13.5.4 Nonspecialized information channels and the
adoption of IT-applications
In this section we investigate the role of nonspecialized information channels
in the adoption of IT-applications in the production process. A general
observation is that the strongest influence on the speed of introduction seems
to come from market extension (M) and the location of the major owner (K).
We start by examining the influence of market extension on the speed
of introduction of IT-applications in production processes. Table 13.6 is a
contingency table for M and Z showing that the speed of introduction of
IT-applications in the production process seems to be strongly influenced
by the market extension of the establishments. There is a clear positive
effect on the speed of introduction in those cases where exports account for
both a high- and a medium-sized share of total sales. This is in line with
what we have reason to expect. In the product life cycle theory, process
development is connected with extended markets. Customer dependence,
on the other hand, does not seem to have any significant influence on the
speed of introduction (X2 = 6; df = 4).
Table 13.6. Market extension and IT-applications in the production
process (%).
Speed of introduction
Non-adopters (ZO)
Late adopters (Zl)
Early adopters (Z2)
Total
63
26
11
100
45
35
20
100
Ma
29
19
52
100
N = 313; X2 = 52; df = 4; significance level: 0.001.
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Table 13.7. Market extension, size, and IT-applications in the production
process.
4<5<20 20<5<50 5>50
Speed of introduction M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 Ma
Non-adopters (ZO) 65 67 55 63 48 44 46 19 10
Late adopters (Zl) 24 28 25 27 35 28 39 44 12
Early adopters (Z2) 11 5 20 10 17 28 15 37 78
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N = 313; x2 = 104; df = 16; significance level: 0.001.
Table 13.8. Location of major owner(s) and IT-applications in the pro-
duction process (%).
N = 328; x2 = 38; df = 2; significance level: 0.001.
Speed of introduction
Non-adopters (ZO)
Late adopters (Zl)
Early adopters (Z2)
Total
58
26
16
100
27
27
46
100
We now turn to a simultaneous examination of the effects of market ex-
tension and size on the introduction speed (see Table 13.7). We see that
the influence of market extension is very clear in the case of the large es-
tablishments. At the same time it is clear that size alone has an important
influence on the speed of introduction.
We continue by examining how the speed of introduction is influenced
by the location of the major owner(s) of the establishment. The location
of the major owner(s) indicates mainly whether or not an establishment
belongs to an enterprise with a rich network of information channels. Being
part of a larger enterprise means that an establishment can take advantage
of information gathered or generated by other establishments within the
enterprise. We also expect that establishments located in a peripheral region
like the Varmland-Alvsborg region while having their major owner(s) located
in another, more central region, will be able to adopt new techniques earlier
than locally owned establishments, as a result of the process of relocation
when products become standardized.
The contingency table presented in Table 13.8 illustrates the effects of
the location of the major owner(s) on the introduction of IT-applications in
the production process. We see that the speed of introduction is positively
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stimulated when the major owner(s) is (are) located outside the region but
within the country (K2 ) or abroad (1(3). Establishments where the ma-
jor owner(s) is located within the region (county) (K1) lag behind in the
adoption process. The location of the head office shows the same influence
pattern as the location of the major owner(s) but the significance level is
lower (X2 = 20; df = 2).
With regard to the influence of the location of the major owner(s) on
the speed of introduction, we see a clear influence in Table 13.8. This can
be interpreted within the framework of the spatial product life cycle theory,
according to which the relocation of production and the introduction of new
process techniques can be seen as simultaneous processes. In this context,
we assume that the existence of a major non-local owner indicates that the
production is likely to have been spatially relocated at an earlier stage.
13.5.5 Human skills, information channels, and
the adoption of IT-applications
In this section we examine the simultaneous effect of skills and specialized
and nonspecialized information channels, respectively, on the speed of intro-
duction of IT-applications. In the case of specialized information channels,
the main purpose is to examine the relationship between flows of external
information and the capability to generate internal information. In par-
ticular, we are interested in seeing whether the two kinds of information
sources substitute or complement each other. In Table 13.9 we present a
contingency table showing how the speed of introduction of IT-applications
in the production process is influenced by the simultaneous effects of the
strongest basic education variable, the number of university engineers, and
the strongest of the specialized information channels, consultants. The table
shows that both variables seem to have a powerful influence on the introduc-
tion speed but that the influence of consultants is limited to those enterprises
which employ no university engineers. Thus, we may assume that, to a cer-
tain extent, consultants function as a substitute for staff skills and internal
knowledge in the enterprise.
According to the spatial version of the product life cycle, we expect the
introduction oflT-applications for process development to be related to a re-
location of production in later phases. At this stage, production mainly takes
place in large-scale establishments which need extended markets to be able to
sell their total output. Extended markets provide a lot of information about
the IT-applications for process development used by other establishments.
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Table 13.9. Skills, information, and IT-applications in the production
process (%).
E= a E> 1
Speed of introduction C=No C=Yes C=No C=Yes
Non-adopters (ZO) 41 16 15 18
Late adopters (Zl) 37 60 30 29
Early adopters (Z2) 22 24 55 53
Total 100 100 100 100
N = 220; X2 = 31; df = 6; significance level: 0.001.
Table 13.10. Education, market extension, and IT-applications in the
production process.
E=O E> 1
Speed of introduction M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Non-adopters (ZO) 67 57 42 37 24 20
Late adopters (Zl) 24 33 15 44 36 22
Early adopters (Z2) 9 10 43 19 40 58.
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N = 309; X2 = 104; df = 10; significance level: 0.001.
However, we also expect the early adoption of IT-applications by an estab-
lishment to depend upon its knowledge stock. Thus, we expect both market
extension and knowledge stock to have a positive influence on the speed of
introduction of IT-applications in the production process.
In Table 13.10 we examine the simultaneous effects of skill and market
extension on the speed of introduction of IT-applications in the production
process. The table indicates that both the employment of university engi-
neers and market extension have clear effects on the speed of introduction.
Thus, our expectations are confirmed.
For establishments located in a peripheral region like the Varmland-
Alvsborg region we expect a major owner(s) located in another region to be
a major source of information on new techniques for process development.
However, at the same time, we expect that the adoption of new product tech-
niques by an establishment, irrespective of where its major owner(s) is (are)
located, to depend upon its knowledge stock. Thus, we expect the location
of the major owner(s) outside the region and skill level to have a powerful
influence on the speed of introduction of IT-applications for process develop-
ment. Table 13.11 is a contingency table which illustrates the simultaneous
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Table 13.11. Education, location of major owner(s), and IT-applications
in the production process (%).
E=O E> 1
Speed of introduction
Non-adopters (ZO)
Late adopters (ZI)
Early adopters (Z2)
Total
65
23
12
100
36
38
26
100
31
42
27
100
20
18
62
100
N = 319; X2 = 72; df = 16; significance level: 0.001.
influence of the number of university engineers and the location of a major
owner(s) on the speed of introduction of IT-applications in the production
process. We see how the education variable exerts strong influence on the
speed of introduction, as does the owner variable.
13.5.6 Establishment characteristics and the adoption
of IT-applications
Here we try to make a simultaneous assessment of the influence of different
establishment characteristics on the speed of introduction of IT-applications
in the production process. As far as possible, we will also try to interpret
our results within the framework provided by the product life cycle theory.
The empirical results are presented in Tables 13.12 and 13.13. In both
tables, we present different estimations of equation (13.6). Equation (1) in
Table 13.12 is presented here because this model had the best explanatory
power measured by the R2 (adj.)-value. We may note that early use of IT-
applications in the production process is positively associated with a large
number of employees and with the major owner(s) located within Sweden but
outside the region. This fits very neatly with the product life cycle theory,
which stresses that process development is associated with an increasing scale
of production and a relocation of production to more peripheral locations.
Actually, we cannot prove that there has been a relocation of production.
It might be the case here that we have the effect of production units being
bought by external owners but we still have a significant positive effect on
the propensity to adopt IT-applications for process development within the
production processes. We also see that early use is positively associated
with the appreciation of fairs and exhibitions as an important information
channel. Early involvement with IT-applications in the production process is
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Table 13.12. Establishment characteristics and IT-applications in the pro-
duction process.
(1) (2)
Characteristic Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Intercept
-3·4330 (-265.0) -3.2556 (-89.5)
IT-investment share (HP) 0.0043 (12.0) 0.0021 (3.8)
Number of employees (S) 0.0012 (13.1) 0.0010 (8.4)
Number of employees with IT-
training for administrative
applications (AE) -0.0032 (-4.2) -0.0018 (-1.8)
Fairs and exhibitions are impor-
tant information channels (F)a 0.0924 (4.7) 0.0561 (1.6)
Major owner(s) located in Sweden
but outside the region (K 2 )a 0.0804 (3.3) 0.0514 (1.3)
N 308 143
R 2 (adj.) 74.8 68.2
QDummy variable.
Italic type indicates significance at the 5% level.
also positively associated with a high share of total investments in machines
and equipment going to IT-equipment for the production process. There is
also a negative association between our speed indicator and the number of
employees who have received IT-training for administrative applications.
Equation (2) in Table 13.12 shows the result when model (1) is applied
to the set of adopters only. We can see that the parameters for total employ-
ment and the IT-investment share are still significant while the parameters
for Oul: three other variables have now become insignificant. In the models
presented in Table 13.12 there is no sign of the positive influence of any
skill variable. This is not in line with our expectations so we now go on to
test the influence of one skill variable - the number of university engineers
employed. The results of this test are presented in Table 13.13. We still use
equation (13.6) for our estimations.
Equation (1) in Table 13.13 is a reestimation of equation (1) in Table
13.12 with the number of employees replaced by the number of university en-
gineers employed. We can see that the R2 (adj.)-value only decreases slightly
and that our skill variable is highly significant. In equation (2) in Table 13.13
we present the result of estimating model (1) for adopters only. Our skill vari-
able continues to be highly significant. In equation (3) we present the model
which showed the highest explanatory power when estimated for adopters
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only. We may note once again that the skill variable is highly significant.
Given the results presented in Table 13.13, we feel that we have shown that
our skill variable, the number of university engineers employed, is certainly
not unimportant. Model (3) in Table 13.13 indicates that the early use of
IT-applications in the production process among adopters is positively as-
sociated with an early use of IT-applications in administration and a large
export share, but negatively associated with a head office location outside
the country. As before, we see that early users devote a large share of their
total investments in machines and equipment to machines and equipment
containing IT-applications.
13.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have determined by means of analysis what establishment
characteristics are associated with an early adoption of new applications
of information technology (IT), i.e., innovations, in production processes,
Le., for process development, in two peripheral regions in Sweden. The
analysis has been conducted by means of contingency and regression analysis.
In particular, a number of hypotheses concerning the role of human skills
and different types of information channels have been tested. By means of
regression analysis we have shown that an early use of IT-applications for
process development is positively associated, among other things, with the
following:
• The establishment is large in terms of number of employees.
• Fairs and exhibitions are an important information channel.
• Having the major owner(s) located in Sweden but outside the region.
The number of university engineers employed also seemed to be an im-
portant explanatory variable, in particular, if we consider the characteristics
of early adopters within the group of adopters only.
What relevance do these results have for a regional technology and inno-
vation policy? Our research has, in this respect, been based upon the idea
that the renewal of the technology used within the manufacturing industry
at a general level can be related to three categories of capital formation:
• Investments in production units (including investments in new produc-
tion units).
• Investments that lead to the transformation and/or expansion of the
production milieu.
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• Investments in transformation conditions such as R&D systems including
educational systems for production, reception, and distribution of new
knowledge; and marketing systems for the establishment of new buying
and selling channels.
If we consider the decision systems for these three types of investments,
it may be observed, that decisions can be taken within the single production
unit but also in the surrounding system and at different regional levels. This
means, for example, that some of these investment decisions are taken by
governmental bodies at different levels. Our empirical results above indicated
the importance of direct and indirect information channels as well as the
knowledge level of the labor force for an early adoption of innovations -
in our case applications of information technology to be used within the
production processes in the engineering industry. The existence, capacity,
and efficiency of information channels as well as the knowledge level of the
labor force in a region are to a large extent a function of governmental
decisions to invest in the production milieu and in transformation conditions,
i.e., to invest in the infrastructure of the region. Hence, we suggest that
our results indicate that a regional technology and innovation policy should
have the character of infrastructure investments, such as airports, roads,
universities, R&D-institutions, fair centers, etc. This may also mean that
the traditional regional technology and innovation policy with information
campaigns, isolated technology centers, casual advice campaigns, etc. is not
the most efficient way to achieve a sustained and continuous improvement
of the technology level in a region.
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Chapter 14
External Learning
Opportunities and the
Diffusion of Process
Innovations to Small Firms:
The Case of Programmable
Automation
Maryellen R. Kelley and Harvey Brooks
14.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are concerned with explaining which types of firms have
failed to adopt well-known improvements in process technology. This prob-
lem has, of course, been the underlying concern of all studies of diffusion
"to rationalize why, if a new technology is superior, it is not taken up by all
potential adopters" (Stoneman, 1983). Drawing on various theoretical per-
spectives, we identify a number of different barriers to adoption. With data
collected from a 1987 nationally representative sample of US establishments
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in 21 metal-working and machinery manufacturing industries, we then con-
struct a multivariate logistic regression model to empirically test for the
effects of these factors on the likelihood of adoption of a particular process
innovation, namely programmable automation (PA) machine tools.
A widely accepted tenet of contemporary analyses of the diffusion of in-
novations is that certain types of organizations are better positioned than
others to generate and to adopt innovations (David, 1969 and 1975; Mans-
field, 1968; Mansfield et al., 1977; Nabseth and Ray, 1974; Stoneman, 1980;
Utterback, 1988). With respect to process innovations in particular, eco-
nomic research on technology diffusion has demonstrated the importance of
differences, or heterogeneity in what Dosi (1989) has termed the incentive
structures of firms to explain why some firms are quick to adopt a process
innovation while others fail to do so. For example, some firms are price
leaders in labor markets, willing to pay a premium in order to attract the
best quality labor; other firms are willing to accept somewhat lower quality
labor in order to keep their wages at or below the average paid by their
competitors. Unless the expected labor savings from a new technology are
greater than the capital costs of purchasing the equipment, a firm is apt to
delay making that investment (Metcalfe, 1990; Salter, 1960). Thus, at any
one point in time, high-wage firms are apt to have a greater incentive than
low-wage firms to adopt a labor-saving technology. Moreover, there may
be some minimum threshold scale (Le., volume of output), below which the
labor savings are too small for it to be profitable for the small firm to invest
(David, 1975). In addition, there may be scale requirements that make it
technically infeasible for small firms to adopt it. For example, Mansfield
(1968) found that for certain innovations, there is a minimum scale at which
a technology can be profitably used in particular industries. Hence, where
the scale of investment necessary for a new process technology is very large,
it can only be undertaken by large firms; small firms will simply lack the
financial resources or size of revenue stream to make such an investment.
From this body of research, we learn that the failure of small firms to adopt
an innovation may be attributable to the heterogeneity of firms with re-
spect to relative factor prices (of labor and technology), profitability, and
the lumpiness of capital investment.
A second stream of research on the economics of innovation emphasizes
differences in firms' technological and organizational competencies, which de-
velop or accumulate over time (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dosi, 1988; Free-
man, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1977 and 1982; Rosenberg, 1972 and 1982).
In this line of inquiry, the problem of imperfect information for learning
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about new technologies and the importance of accumulated knowledge and
expertise are given prominence in explaining why some firms are more likely
to adopt a new technology or to be sources of innovation themselves. Since
information about the possible uses and relevance of a new technology to
the firm is difficult to assess (Rosenberg, 1972), firms with more resources
to devote to scanning the technological environment are likely to be better
positioned than less well-endowed organizations to identify and exploit a
new technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Moreover, firms differ in their
experience with related technologies. These technological competencies can
be expected to enhance a firm's capability to make use of other related in-
novations. With respect to process innovations, we would therefore expect
to find adoption rates to be higher among firms that have demonstrably
greater technological competencies and resources for scanning the external
environment.
A third set of factors identified in some studies are special features of
economic institutions and inter-firm relationships which explain why - in
some regions, nations, or among certain groups of firms - the pace of dif-
fusion was found to be more rapid and the rates of adoption much higher.
For example, with respect to the adoption of hybrid corn among American
farmers during the 1940s and 1950s, Griliches (1960) observes that the more
rapid pace of diffusion in certain regions could be attributable to agricul-
tural extension services in a number of different states which were a source
of innovation for additional improvements. As Nelson and Winter (1977)
point out, extension service agents have been an especially reliable source of
information to farmers in these regions. As such, they may very well have
contributed to the faster speed of adoption observed by Griliches. Similarly,
Saxonhouse (1974) attributes the rapid rate of diffusion of new techniques
among Japanese textile manufacturers both to the importance of business
trade associations serving as a conduit for information and to the accepted
practice of sharing technical know-how among these firms. The importance
of information exchange or know-how trading for achieving improvements
in utilizing a new technology among steel mini-mill producers has also been
demonstrated by von Hippel (1988). In a world of imperfect information and
considerable uncertainty about whether and how best to deploy a new tech-
nology, these extra-firm economic institutions and networks of relationships
among firms can be expected to be particularly important for explaining
differential rates of adoption.
In this chapter, we attempt a synthesis of these various theoretical per-
spectives, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms with respect to the
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cost incentives or profitability of adopting a particular process innovation,
their organizational capacity for learning and technological competencies,
and their external linkages to resources for learning about new technological
developments. With detailed survey data on the technical, economic, and
organizational characteristics of a large sample of US manufacturing estab-
lishments - all of which are potential adopters of the new technology - we
are able to operationalize a model for predicting the likelihood of adoption
of this new technology that simultaneously takes into account all three types
of influences.
After accounting for the influence of differences in cost incentives and
organizational capabilities, we find that a small firm's propensity to adopt
a process innovation is particularly enhanced by the nature of its linkages
to external resources for learning about technological developments. These
results suggest that the well-known scale and size disadvantages of small
firms for engaging in the risky learning-by-doing process necessary to the
adoption of new productivity-enhancing technologies may, at least in part, be
overcome when there are well-developed social networks for sharing expertise
and acquiring new knowledge among economic actors and institutions. In
regions or sectors where linkages to such external learning opportunities are
particularly well-developed, we would expect to find a more rapid rate of
diffusion of productivity-enhancing process innovations to small firms.
14.2 The Implications for Small and Large Firms
of Radical Shifts in the Technological
Trajectory
Productivity increases arise both from radical shifts to a new, more efficient
technology, and from continued, incremental improvement in the way in
which an existing technology is utilized (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Ettlie et
al., 1984). Indeed, for some period of time when both emerging and mature
process technologies coexist, additional improvements in the mature tech-
niques also occur and frequently accelerate (Harley, 1973). Whether emerg-
ing or mature, every technology has its own associated trajectory (Dosi,
1982). Incremental learning about how best to use a particular configura-
tion of equipment is the basis for productivity improvements which proceed
under the same technological regime. Moreover, each firm has its own as-
sociated learning curve. The knowledge derived from marginal adaptations
of the organization and the technology accumulate over time and becomes
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part of the informal or tacit know-how - the craft art recognized by many
observers as a key ingredient that distinguishes high from low productiv-
ity operations employing the same technology (Bohn and Jaikumar, 1986;
Kusterer, 1978; Pavitt and Patel, 1988; Skinner, 1986).
New process technologies always involve a change in the ways in which
products are made - a change in the allocation of tasks, a change in machin-
ery, a change in work methods which may imply retraining, or a change in
organization. For the firm, there is always some uncertainty about how much
new knowledge will be necessary and how drastic a change the new config-
uration of equipment and people will entail (Bohn, 1987; Rogers, 1983). If
these changes require substantially new skills and expertise, then a displace-
ment of the learning curve results, Le., a discontinuity arises between the
organizational learning accumulated under the previous production regime
and that which is needed for the new technology. This could even result in a
short-term decline in productivity until a certain portion of the new learning
curve has been traversed as the organization develops the additional exper-
tise needed to more fully exploit the potential advantages inherent in the
new technological trajectory.
Certain changes in technology involve such a radical shift away from
existing techniques that traditional competencies and skills are made obso-
lete (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In the
case of information technology's application to manufacturing in the form
of programmable automated (PA) machine tools, the shift to this new tech-
nological regime requires the integration of new science-based knowledge
of electronics, computers, and software engineering with the accumulated
tacit knowledge of metal-cutting practices acquired through years of practi-
cal experience; PA also makes some traditional skills obsolete (Kelley, 1989a,
1989b, 1989c, and 1990a). In order to make this shift to the new trajectory
successfully, firms have to buy, borrow, or somehow internally develop that
expertise and integrate it with the relevant traditional practices to match the
requirements of the emerging system. Because of their size, and hence very
limited base of resources available to absorb mistakes, small firms are likely
to face more severe consequences from underestimating the displacement of
their learning curves.
Small firms have little organizational slack and, over the long term, are
more vulnerable to business failure than large firms (Hage, 1980; Hage et
at., 1989; Scott, 1987). In small manufacturing companies, engineering and
management resources are limited to a few individuals per plant. For small
firms to engage in an experimental learning-by-doing process requires the
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diversion of existing resources from production activities. That may have
a high opportunity cost. The time that one engineer spends assisting with
the break-in of any new piece of equipment is time spent away from solving
other design or production problems. The diversion of this scarce resource
can cause delays in production which increase costs and may lead to delays
in shipment and possibly lost orders from customers, contributing to lower
profits and possibly lower sales.
By contrast, large, relatively resource-rich organizations can afford to
embark on a number of experiments with process innovations, only some of
which may turn out to be successful, without risk to the firm's survival and
profitability (March, 1981). Related to size is the tendency of large firms to
have developed specialized capabilities in production engineering and man-
agement. By devoting some specialized resources to improving production
techniques, large firms have an experience advantage in the kind of "learning
by doing" that Arrow (1962) identified as a key generator of continued pro-
ductivity improvements under any technological regime. Moreover, because
of their size advantage, large firms are less vulnerable to any severe conse-
quences (such as their own demise) from making a strategic error (such as
underestimating start-up time and cost or training time) in deploying any
single piece of new equipment that does not achieve its expected savings.
14.3 Economic Limitations on the Technology
Choices of Small Manufacturing Firms
As part of a strategy to attain or maintain leadership in one market, the large
firm may seek to develop proprietary technology which provides a unique cost
or quality advantage over its competitors. Moreover, when a firm operates in
a number of markets for which there is a shared technical basis and sufficient
scale of operations, there is the possibility of achieving a greater synergy from
exploiting advances in process technology. Hence, being relatively quick to
use new production techniques can provide such a firm with multiple cost or
quality advantages over its competitors in several markets at once.
By contrast, because of the small scale at which they tend to operate,
small firms have less opportunity to achieve and exploit such technical syn-
ergies. Moreover, even when the incentive to cut costs is great - as is likely
to be the case with the small manufacturing firm that has expertise in a ma-
ture technology operating in industries where the prospects for sales growth
are poor (Le., where sales trends are flat or only growing slowly), and profit
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margins are slim - the small business owner/manager is of necessity focused
on the short-term. To him/her, the adoption of a new process technology is
viewed as being outside the realm of rational choices.[l] Instead, as March
and Simon (1958) have suggested, management is likely to focus its atten-
tion on familiar problems, attempting to adapt by gaining greater control
over variable production costs in order to make more efficient use of existing
equipment and labor within the declining technological paradigm.
In the short run, such small manufacturing firms' aspirations are mod-
est, being concerned simply with survival. Management may forestall wage
increases or actually reduce wages. Equipment may be operated more con-
tinuously, sacrificing downtime for preventative maintenance and further de-
pleting the useful life of the capital stock. The manager/owner may be will-
ing to accept lower revenues and even profits in order to be more certain of
staying in business.[2]
We might further plausibly assume that there are barriers to exit. Small
manufacturing firms whose prior success depended on their capacity to ex-
ploit their accumulated experience within an increasing obsolete technolog-
ical paradigm may lack the human or financial resources to absorb the one-
time effort and cost of entering a new line of business. At the same time
poor growth prospects in their present market niche may not attract en-
try of technologically more advanced firms. Thus, technologically backward
firms may survive in narrow market niches for protracted periods of time by
lowering wages and deferring investment, thus retarding the diffusion of new
production technology and productivity growth.[3]
14.4 The Importance of External Learning
Opportunities to the Diffusion of New
Process Technologies
Whether or not a firm will adopt a new technology is generally believed to
be determined by some combination of the relative importance of economic
incentives for doing so (e.g., to lower costs) and its internal capability to
undertake an experimental learning-by-doing process. However, with the
exception of Nelson (1990) and von Hippel (1988), little attention has been
given to examining how various kinds of linkages with other economic orga-
nizations and institutions matter to the adoption and implementation of in-
novations. The conventional wisdom evident in economic models of diffusion
is that late adopters learn about the experience of early adopters through
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osmosis, that is, through informal contact and exchange of know-how among
managers and engineers employed in different firms. The importance of the
social context, or the set of linkages the firm has (or has somehow devel-
oped) to external learning opportunities, has hardly been considered in these
models.
The proposition that the economic actions undertaken by management
of a particular firm need to be understood as being affected by its network
of relations with other firms and economic institutions has long been rec-
ognized by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and historians
(cf. Granovetter, 1984). Membership in trade associations, relationships
with equipment vendors and customers are part of a social nexus in which
the economic decisions of individual firms are embedded. Moreover, even
among competitors, inter-firm relationships may take on a special character
that is of particular importance to the success of a region or to the diffusion
of innovations. For example, a number of studies on the industrial districts in
Northern Italy attribute the success ofthese regional agglomerations in large
measure to long-established relationships of trust and cooperation among
technically inter-dependent small and medium sized firms whose economic
ties are sometimes rivalrous and at other times collaborative - as suppliers
to or customers of one another (Becattini, 1987 and 1989; Bellandi, 1989;
Brusco, 1982 and 1986; Lorenz, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1989).
With respect to the learning opportunities that such external resources
present, some firms are better connected than others, belonging to active,
service-oriented trade associations, having collaborative relationships with
their customers, and being part of an industrial community in which know-
how trading with other firms is an accepted practice. We would expect these
opportunities to be unevenly distributed among firms of different sizes, in-
dustries, and locales. Some firms are poorly linked to external resources as
a matter of management policy. More commonly, we believe, the presence
or absence of such linkages reflects historical differences in the evolution of
economic institutions in particular locales (as seems to be the case of the
Italian industrial districts) or particular sectors, and in the relative impor-
tance of leading firms in shaping orderly relationships with large networks
of supplier-firms.[4]
If learning is the product of experience as Arrow (1962) has argued, then
for firms to learn about the capabilities of new technologies, they must have
access to opportunities for gaining trustworthy information about others'
experience with them. For this to happen, there must be trustworthy insti-
tutions or forums which facilitate the exchange of useful information, help
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filter out erroneous or irrelevant news, and promote the accumulation oftacit
know-how within the firm. External resources on which a firm may depend
to learn about new advances and the experience of others with technology
include: informal contacts with production managers or engineers in other
firms; direct contacts with sales representatives of equipment vendors and
distributors; participation in trade and professional associations; sharing in-
formation with the firm's customers; and reading trade journals, marketing
newsletters, and brochures for general knowledge about the potential of new
technologies. Firms may not be persuaded by such published information,
however, because they have no way of assessing its trustworthiness, but gath-
erings at professional associations or industry trade shows may enable users
and potential users of a new technology to meet and examine the latest
equipment offered by vendors and exchange practical tips with other users
about a new technology's limitations as well as its capabilities. Such linkages
may be particularly important for explaining why some small firms adopt
a process innovation while others with apparently similar characteristics do
not.
Through their service activities, capital equipment manufacturers and
distributors are also an agency through which best-practice techniques for
utilizing a new technology may be taught (Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1980;
Leonard-Barton, 1988).[5] These equipment manufacturers have been known
to sometimes customize the design of new systems for lead users, adapting
the innovation to the customer's specific production requirements and pro-
viding intensive follow-up support services during the initial implementation
phase (Collis, 1988; von Hippel, 1988). They do so in anticipation of win-
ning a large, loyal customer or as part of an experimental developmental
effort which will result in improvements in the design of future generations
of the technology. When this user dedicates some of its own organizational
resources toward that collaborative effort, then it is also likely to engender
organizational expertise within the user-firm as a result of close interactions
of key personnel involved in such working relationships. These types of con-
tacts are known to occur particularly in the early phases of the development
of a new technology, are sometimes reserved for customers that purchase ex-
pensive systems, or are made available to large users from which the vendor
expects a hefty order.[6]
Another important learning opportunity may arise from a firm's rela-
tionships to the businesses that purchase its products. Kelley and Har-
rison's (1990) research on subcontracting relationships suggest that many
firms choose suppliers because of their specialized capabilities. Such business
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customers with which a small firm has some special relationship could be an
important source both for learning about new technological developments
and about how to use an innovation.
Previous studies have documented the ebb and flow of relations of trust
and collaboration between firms and their business customers (Cusamano,
1985; Dore, 1986; Kenney and Florida, 1989; Minato, 1986; Sato, 1983;
Trevor and Christie, 1988). Close relations between a firm and a few cus-
tomers can be both beneficial and inhibiting to the adoption of new produc-
tion technology. On the one hand, a close collaborative relationship to one
or a few customers may open up the possibility of gaining favored status,
and the benefits of technical and financial assistance that flow from that
relationship. On the other hand, too close a dependence on a few customers
may make small firms more vulnerable to price-cutting pressures and to fluc-
tuations in customers' demands. Under pressure to cut costs, or faced with
greater volatility in orders for its products, firms caught in such close rela-
tionships could have such small profit margins as to lack the resources and
incentive to invest in new technology.
14.5 Programmable Automation: A Comparison
of Adopters and Non-adopters of New
Process Technology
Programmable automation (PA) in the form of numerically controlled (NC)
and computerized numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools and flexi-
ble manufacturing systems (FMS), interconnecting such tools by automatic
transfer, has been hailed as signalling a fundamental techno-economic para-
digm shift which promises to greatly reduce the economies of scale that have
driven the design and organization of manufacturing since the beginning
of the industrial revolution (Freeman and Perez, 1986; Hirschhorn, 1984;
Kaplinsky, 1984; Perez, 1986; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Since instructions
controlling the operation of programmable machines can be incorporated
into easily altered software rather than unalterable hardware, one piece of
manufacturing hardware is adaptable to many different products which can
be made in both small and large volume in a wide variety of industries that
require the shaping and cutting of metal parts.
To date, PA has been applied mainly to the precision metal-cutting op-
erations of turning, milling, grinding, and boring - operations important
in the manufacture of a diverse range of products, from aircraft engines
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and industrial machinery to coffee grinders and lawn mowers. Machining
is a "batch" production process, in which products are made in small to
medium-size lots - too small to benefit from the earlier form of fixed-cycle
hard automation. By 1982, the combined output of NCjCNC machines from
six of the major machine-tool producing countries (USA, Japan, Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG), France, Italy, and the UK) comprised two-thirds
of the total value of production of all metal-cutting machines (Edquist and
Jacobsson, 1988, p. 26).
This technology is not unique to particular product lines and appears to
be equally technically and economically feasible for large and small firms.
Single machines can be installed one at a time and used alongside conven-
tional, non-programmable machines. Since the mid-1970s, improvements in
the technology - particularly the incorporation of microprocessors - have
made it easier to use, while machine productivity has increased at the same
time as purchase costs have come down (Edquist and Jacobsson, 1988).
In what follows, we draw on a national survey of US manufacturing
establishments completed in 1987 to examine adoption rates of PA in a
range of establishment and firm sizes and to evaluate the significance of three
sets of factors for distinguishing how adopters differ from non-adopters of
the technology: cost and profitability incentives, organizational resources
and technical capabilities, and linkages to external resources and sources for
learning about technological developments.
14.5.1 Data description and methods
The data we employ come from a national sample of establishments be-
longing to twenty-one manufacturing industries, at the 3-digit level of the
US Standard Industrial Classification scheme. Following the convention of
the US Census of Manufactures, establishments in the sampling frame were
grouped into the following size categories: fewer than 20, 20 to 49, 50 to
99, 100 to 249, and 250 or more, employees. In order to ensure a sufficient
number of cases within each size stratum, establishments were dispropor-
tionately randomly sampled by strata in order to yield a data set with an
equal number of establishments from each stratum. Since the distribution
of establishments by employment size is highly skewed, with fewer than 10
percent of all plants employing 100 or more workers in the industries studied,
this procedure guarantees a sufficient number of large size plants to allow
for variation among them in the use of technology, type of product market.
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All population estimates are weighted averages, which were constructed
by weighting each observation by the inverse of the probability of selection
from its sampling stratum. The production managers in these plants were
surveyed between October of 1986 and March of 1987 (Kelley and Brooks,
1988). All told, 1,015 plant managers were successfully interviewed by mail,
yielding a 50 percent response rate. Half of the non-respondents were then
contacted by telephone and asked questions which, apart from their substan-
tive value, confirmed the absence of response bias in the mail survey.
The twenty-one industries were chosen because they account for the great
majority of machining activity in the US economy.[7] Twenty-five percent of
all US manufacturing workers in 1986 were employed in these industries. The
data base includes information on the size of the parent company (as mea-
sured by corporate-wide employment in the USA) and considerable detail
on organizational, technical, and economic characteristics of each plant.[8]
All sample establishments use machine tools for some aspect of production
operations in their plants. Hence, they are all potential adopters of PA
technology.
At the time of the survey, fifty-seven percent of the sample plants had
not yet installed even one programmable machine. As of 1987, most firms
that had failed to adopt programmable automation seem unlikely candidates
for doing so at some time in the near future. Despite improvements in
the technology that have made it easier to use and less costly to install,
two-thirds of non-adopters perceive the payback period associated with the
introduction of PA as being too long to justify any investment.
These firms' unwillingness to invest in programmable automation seems
to be related to a general reluctance (and possibly lack of financial resources)
for making investments to improve their capital stock. The average invest-
ment in new equipment of any kind for firms that had not purchased any PA
at the time of our survey was less than one-third the amount invested per
employee by PA users in the same year.[9] Over the previous five year period
(from 1982-1986), during which time more than half of all programmable ma-
chine tool installations presently in use in the United States were purchased,
less than one-third of the enterprises that made no such purchases ever even
considered that alternative. Moreover, in 1987, only 18 percent of those
that had not invested in PA said that they had any plans for purchasing this
equipment in 1988 or 1989.
In the previous section of the chapter we described how three different
sets of factors could be expected to affect the likelihood of a firm adopt-
ing a new process technology such as PA: cost and profitability incentives,
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organizational resources and technical competencies, and external linkages.
The majority of PA users (71 percent) have some programmable machines
that were first installed more than five years ago, with 10 percent of PA-
users having at least some programmable machines still in use that were
purchased more than 10 years ago. However, eighty-five percent of PA-using
plants have at least one machine from the latest micro-processor generation
of the technology - with computerized numerical controls - which was first
introduced only in the late 1970s. We cannot know from these data the
changes in firm and establishment characteristics that may have accompa-
nied or followed the adoption of programmable machines.[lO] Our analysis
is thus limited to a comparison of the ways in which PA adopters differ from
non-adopters at what must be understood to be an intermediate stage in the
diffusion of this technology.
We estimated a binomial logistic regression model, with the dependent
variable, PA, defined equal to 1 if the production manager at the establish-
ment reported there were any programmable machines in use, and equal to
o if no programmable tools were present. Technical definitions for all inde-
pendent variables can be found in Appendix Table 14.Al. Complete data
on all variables needed to estimate the model were available for 75 percent
of the cases in the sample.
14.5.2 Factors distinguishing PA adopters from non-adopters
Cost and profitability
Five variables representing cost and profitability factors were hypothesized
to be important inducements to the firm to adopt programmable automa-
tion. Relative labor costs, the degree to which production operations at a
plant were dependent on machining skills, the presence of a union, the scale
of machining operations at a plant, and product markets with a high re-
quirement for "flexibility" are all expected to be important economic factors
favoring the adoption of PA.
In previous research on programmable automation, managers have re-
ported that reductions in direct labor costs or increased productivity are
the major expected gains from adopting this process innovation (Ayres and
Miller, 1982; Hicks, 1983; Parsons et al., 1984; Rosenthal, 1984). As a form
of automation that is expected to lead to productivity gains (i.e., increases
in output per person hour), we would expect the cost-cutting impetus for
adopting PA to be the greatest in establishments where machining labor
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costs are relatively high. Thus, PA is more likely to have been adopted in
plants with relatively high wages for machining occupations.
Another economic factor expected to favor PA adoption is the relative
importance of machining skills to the overall production activities of the es-
tablishment. The greater the share of all production workers in occupations
requiring these skills, the more likely it is that management will seek ways
of reducing costs and improving productivity within that operation. Where
machining skills are of minor importance to the overall production activities,
management is less likely to make an effort to automate that process with
computer-controlled machinery.
There is some disagreement in the literature as to how we might expect
unionization to affect investment in a labor-saving process innovation such
as programmable automation. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that when
a plant is unionized, management is more likely to pay attention to weed-
ing out inefficient practices and to streamline production, suggesting that
PA might be adopted more rapidly in unionized establishments. Similarly,
Clark's comparison (1980) of union and non-union firms in the cement in-
dustry suggests that management is more likely to introduce labor-saving
technology in order to improve productivity when collective-bargaining gov-
erns the firm's relationship to its employees. However, research by Kochan
(1985) and Schmenner (1982) suggests that when a unionized plant is part
of a multi-plant enterprise, corporate management's investment decisions are
apt to be informed by other industrial relations policy considerations. In his
analysis of Conference Board data on corporate patterns of investment in
plant and equipment, Kochan finds that unionized establishments received
much less investment from the parent company than their non-union sister
plants (controlling for age of the plant). Schmenner's research on the For-
tune 500 shows a similar pattern of withholding investment from unionized
plants. If corporate (multi-plant) strategic considerations are found to domi-
nate the union effect, we would expect to find the adoption of PA technology
to be less likely to occur when a plant is unionized, or for there to be no
significant impact from unionization at all.
The concept and measurement of scale is somewhat ambiguous in studies
of innovation.[ll] In this analysis, we include a variable that controls for the
effect of scale in the sense of size of machining operations at a plant. With
respect to machine tools, we would argue that the smaller the number oftools
in use at a plant (and thus the smaller the scale of machining operations),
the more risky it would be for the firm to adopt even one programmable
machine. The potentially disruptive consequences from introducing the new
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technology are greater, the fewer the number of machines in use. Moreover,
for firms with a plant that has few tools, the cost of replacing anyone of
them represents a much larger share of its total capi tal investment in machine
tools than would be the case for firms having plants with larger stocks of
machines. Similar to David (1975), we would argue that the cost of adopting
a single programmable machine may be too high for firms operating at too
small a scale of machining. Thus, for smaller scale machining operations,
management may find the adoption of PA to be a much more risky and
lumpy investment and therefore be unwilling to adopt it, even though it
may be profitable to do so. For that reason, we would expect the chances
that management will have adopted PA to be less, the smaller the scale of
machining operations at a plant.
A number of students of industrial change (Carlsson, 1989; Piore and
Sabel, 1984; Kern and Schumann, 1984 and 1987) have argued that manu-
facturing firms face increasingly volatile and uncertain product markets for
their goods. In discussions of the advantages of programmable technologies
for small firms, PA has been touted as being especially well-suited to meet
the high technical flexibility requirements of firms operating in such environ-
ments, specializing in manufacturing a diverse array of parts or products in
very small batches (Dosi, 1988; Kern and Schumann, 1984; Piore and Sabel,
1984). Because programmable machines can be re-instructed for each change
in product, a firm that operates in such product markets will have a greater
incentive to adopt the technology since it lowers the costs of switching from
one product to another. Hence, establishments with high flexibility require-
ments should find PA a more attractive investment than plants without such
high switching costs.[12]
Internal resources and technical competencies
Firm size is a proxy measure for the extent to which an organization may
be said to be resource-rich. Large firms have multiple production sites and
a larger base of experience with various technologies that can be brought to
bear in adopting any particular process innovation. The larger the firm, the
more likely it is to employ professional staff at the corporate level with re-
sponsibility for providing technical expertise to production managers at any
one of its plants. At anyone point in time, larger firms can marshal greater
resources more rapidly than smaller firms to deal with unexpected problems
in implementing a new technology. Because of this superior adaptive capac-
ity, we would expect that the larger the firm the more capable it is (in terms
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of resource capacity) to make the necessary adjustments in its operations to
accommodate to a process innovation such as PA, and the more likely it will
be to have adopted PA in plants for which the technology is suitable, Le.,
those using machine tools in production operations.
Information technology has many applications. In manufacturing, com-
puters are used for monitoring and planning functions, such as process plan-
ning and production scheduling, quality control and materials flow monitor-
ing, and inventory control. That a plant has adopted any of these informa-
tion technology applications would indicate greater formalization of man-
agement systems of information and control. Such a change may involve
only a shift from written record-keeping and inventory procedures to com-
puterization, or it may involve a more radical shift from an informal organic
organizational structure to one with a more formal structure and system of
control. In either case, the use of information technology in these functions
suggests a greater technological sophistication (and by implication, an en-
hanced organizational capacity) to exploit PA. Although there may be no
technical interdependence between the use ofIT in these applications and PA
(as there would be wi th compu ter-ai ded design), it is a complementary tech-
nological competency that should facilitate the adoption of programmable
machines. \Ve would therefore expect an establishment with such advanced
information technology capabilities in monitoring and planning functions to
be more likely to have adopted PA.
Linkages to external resources
As mentioned earlier, there are multiple external resources by which a firm
can acquir~ knowledge about a new technology's capabilities. These can be
distinguished by the type of linkage (whether it has a social or interpersonal
dimension or not) and by the source of information.
Stories in trade journals and mailings from equipment vendors and their
distributors are external sources for learning about technological develop-
ments in the form of written media. Thirty-eight percent of all production
managers surveyed considered linkage to this channel of information flow to
be very important for learning about new technology. Nevertheless, by itself,
we do not expect this kind of linkage to external resources to be a sufficiently
reliable means for learning about technology. \Ve would therefore not expect
to find any difference between PA users and non-adopters with respect to
their reliance on such written sources of communication.
I
I
II
Ii
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Know-how trading in the form of informal exchanges of information
through conversations with production managers and engineers outside of
the establishment (Le., in other companies or in other plants of the same
company) was the most common external resource cited by respondents as
a very important way to learn about new technology. This type of exchange
is of course recognizable as the casual individualized form of learning by
osmosis which Stoneman (1980) assumes to be the major channel through
which new technological expertise diffuses. In our formulation of the set of
inter-firm linkages that distinguish PA adopters from non-adopters, we have
the opportunity to test how important this kind of informal exchange is rel-
ative to other, more structured, collective forms of information exchange.
Following Stoneman and von Hippel, we do expect to find a positive effect
of know- how trading on the likelihood of adoption of PA, ceteris paribus.
Trade associations and professional technical societies provide an avenue
for managers and engineers from member organizations to meet and discuss
problems of common concern. In contrast to individualized know-how trad-
ing, demonstrations of new equipment at meetings of such associations is a
highly structured, collective way of learning about technological problems
and capabilities. At such evcnts, groups of managcrs and engineers with
common problems and issues have an opportunity to exchange information
with each other and to compare the features of equipment offered by different
vendors. We would expect that being connected to such organizations and
participating in such events affords members a more intensive and compar-
ative learning experience than may occur through individualized know-how
trading. Managers and engineers of firms who participate in such activities
are likely to be better informed and to have a broader set of knowledge-
able contacts to whom they can turn to discuss technological issues. For
these reasons, wc would expect firms with such linkages to have a higher
propensity to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies such as PA.
Direct contact with sales representatives from equipment vendors or their
distributors (independent of contact through trade shows) is another struc-
tured way of learning about new technology. Unlike the case of consumer
products, where sales persons are not expected to know much about the
products they sell, sales representatives for industrial equipment products
such as PA are expected to have some expertise wi th the technology, if only
to be capable of explaining how it can be used and what the expected bene-
fits are from using it. Hence, they may be an additional source of expertise
that managers can draw upon in deciding to adopt and use new technology.
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Another way in which expertise is transferred from one firm to another is
through a firm's contacts with its customers. Eighty-eight percent of all US
metal-working establishments make products using machine tools for sale to
other manufacturing firms. More than three-fourths of these say that they
have business customers for whom they make machined parts or products on
special order and from whom they receive technical information and engi-
neering assistance in making these special parts or products. Such a transfer
of technical information suggests a degree of dependency between the two
firms that could provide the occasion for other exchanges of technical ex-
pertise that may be particularly important in augmenting the capabilities of
small firms to adopt a new technology. More generally, we hypothesize that
firms with such close connections to their business customers are also more
likely to be able to draw on these customers for assistance in implementing
a new technology. For these reasons, firms that have such an information
sharing relationship with their customers will (we expect) be more likely to
adopt PA.
14.6 Findings
The results of our estimating procedure are shown in Table 14.1. Ten of
the thirteen variables in the model are significant in predicting which es-
tablishments are likely to have adopted PA by 1987. As expected, cost
and profitability incentives are important. In addition, plants that are part
of firms with greater technical and organizational resources are much more
likely to be PA users. Finally, establishments with certain kinds of linkages
to external learning opportunities have an enhanced chance of adopting PA
technology that can permit the small firm to overcome the liabilities of small
scale and its lack of adequate internal resources.
Cost incentives
Both the cost of labor and the degree to which the overall production pro-
cess at a plant is dependent on machining skills are significant predictors of
PA adoption. Independent of wages, we do not find that unionization has
significantly affected management's deployment of programmable machines.
Figure 14.1 shows a simulation of the predicted probabilities of adopting
PA for the typical US machining establishment for different wage rates, with
all other variables in the model held constant at their sample means.[13]
At more than twice the average wage for machining occupations (about
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Figure 14.1. Probability of PA adoption by average hourly wage for ma-
chining occupations at the plant.
US$20.00 per hour), the probability that there will be at least some PA
tools in a plant is quite high (p > 0.66). At less than one-half the average
hourly wage (about US$5.00 an hour), fewer than 3 out of 10 such low-wage
employers will have introduced any PA.
The degree of machining skill dependency is a technical attribute of pro-
duction that is expected to vary with the kinds and mix of products be-
ing manufactured at a plant and the extent to which machining operations
needed for these products are performed in their entirety within the plant
or, in part, contracted out to other firms.[14] The typical manufacturing
establishment engaged in machining activity is very dependent on the skills
of workers specializing in these operations. On average, about 77 percent of
all production workers in the manufacturing plants studied are employed in
machining occupations. In Figure 14.2, we see that the less the manufactur-
ing process at a plant depends on a work force with specialized machining
skills the lower the probability of PA adoption. For example, as the degree
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Figure 14.2. Probability of PA adoption by degree of machining skills
dependency at the plant.
of skill dependency falls from 75 to 50 percent of all production workers, the
predicted probability of PA adoption is reduced at about the same rate, by
one-third, from p = 0.45 to p = 0.30 (again with all other variables held
constant at their sample means).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that when management
faces higher labor costs and has a greater dependency on particular skills,
there will be a greater incentive to adopt such a labor-saving technology
as programmable automation. The higher wages we find associated with
PA use may in part reflect an increase in the skill demands of machining
occupations associated with the introduction of the new technology. Such
cause and effect relationships cannot be sorted out with the available data.
Hence, we cannot determine the magnitude of the incentive effect that high
labor costs may have served to initially induce management to adopt PA.
More than one-third of all machining establishments have high flexibility
requirements, making a diverse (50 or more) array of parts/products in very
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small batch sizes (with 50 percent or more of total machining output in
batches of fewer than 10 units). Although the direction of the effect of
high flexibility requirements is as predicted (indicating a tendency to adopt
PA), these demands are not sufficiently strong, in and of themselves, to
significantly affect the firm's propensity to use PA tools.
Scale (or the size) of machining operations across the wide range of indus-
tries studied varies from plants that employ only one machine tool to those
utilizing up to 1,500 different machines. Our results show that plants with
smaller scale machining operations (as measured by the number of tools)
have thus far been deterred from adopting PA. This is illustrated in Figure
14.3, which also shows that the marginal effect of differences in scale on
the probability of PA adoption are relatively small. For example, establish-
ments with 50 tools have 5 times the scale of machining operations as plants
in which only 10 tools are deployed, yet the change in predicted probabilities
of adopting PA increases from p = 0.44 for plants with 10 tools to only p
= 0.54 for plants with 50 tools, an increase of less than 25 percent. Even
for very small scale machining operations, the probability of PA adoption is
quite high, ceteris paribus. A plant with only 20 tools is nearly as likely to
have at least one PA tool as it is to rely exclusively on non-programmable
machine tool technology (p = 0.49).
Internal resources: the importance of firm size
At plants where information technology is utilized to support a system of
control and production planning, there is a significantly greater probabil-
ity that PA will also be deployed. Independent of the scale of machining
operations, cost incentives, and the technological sophistication in related
IT applications at a given plant, we find the size of the parent company's
organizational resources to be a significant predictor of PA adoption.
As shown in Figure 14.4, for the very small single-plant firm with fewer
than 20 employees, the chances that there will be even one programmable
machine are no better than about 40 percent. For firms with more than
10,000 employees nationwide, we are practically certain (p ~ 0.96) of finding
at least one programmable machine in its plants (all other things being
equal). Even for the plants belonging to moderately large firms with about
500 employees throughout the United States, the chances of there being no
PA tools at the plant are quite low (p = 0.17).
Small firms may be invariably small scale, but the converse is not al-
ways true: large firms do not invariably have large scale operations.[15]
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Figure 14.3. Probability of PA adoption by scale of machining operations
at the plant.
When we compare the predicted probabilities for the marginal effects of firm
size to that of machining scale at a plant (Figure 1.,1.5), it is apparent that
differences in firm size (taken as indicative of differences in organizational ca-
pabilities) are far more important than differences in machining scale per se
in explaining differential adoption rates among establishments. Small firms
with invariably small scale machining operations are, as expected, least likely
to have adopted any PA tools.
How much do external learning opportunities affect the chances of PA adop-
tion for small firms'?
When the production manager reports that he has linkages - which sup-
port learning about new technology - to equipment vendors, to industry or
trade associations, and to his customers, we are more likely to find some
programmable machines in use at the plant he manages. But the causality
is more complex than we had imagined.[16]
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Figure 14.4. Probability of PA adoption by size of parent company.
Informal, individualized know-how trading may be the most common
sort of linkage to external resources, but it is not a statistically significant
predictor of PA adoption. Moreover, relying solely on written sources of
information independent of any personal contact with equipment vendors,
distributors, other users, or in isolation from trade shows and demonstrations
at professional associations actually reduces the likelihood of PA adoption.
In addition, when a firm sells its machining output to other firms but has no
special order customers willing to share technical information, it's chances
of adopting PA are significantly reduced. Linkages that actually reduce the
chances of PA adoption have a passive and asocial character to them.
The kind of highly structured and social linkage to other potential adopt-
ers and new technology manufacturers that occurs in meetings of industry
and professional associations is a significant predictor of PA adoption. More-
over, independent of the contacts that are made at such group settings, fur-
ther direct contacts with sales representatives from equipment vendors and
their distributors are another external linkage that significantly increases the
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Figure 14.5. Probability of PA adoption by machining scale at plant and
by size of parent company.
likelihood of PA adoption. Firms with special-order customers who provide
detailed technical information about their orders have significantly greater
chance of adopting PA than firms without such close relationships to their
customers. Along with informal know-how trading - with it's positive but
insignificant impact on the likelihood of adoption - this set of linkages can
be best described as having an essentially social and active quality, involving
direct interpersonal interchange or contact with outside resources.
In order to evaluate the combined effects of those various external link-
ages that we have identified as active and social from those we have identified
as largely passive and asocial in nature on the likelihood of PA adoption for
firms of different sizes (and hence different internal resources and capabilities
for undertaking technological change), we computed the predicted probabil-
ities for the average plant in each of four different firm size categories: firms
with fewer than 20; 20 to 99; 100 to 499; and over 500 employees. The
scenario identified as indicative of a "passive/asocial" set of external link-
ages refers to the case in which reliance on external resources is limited
to written media, Le., brochures, ads, and newsletters, and to firms that
sell their machining products to some other firm but have no special order
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Table 14.2. Estimates ofthe importance of external learning opportunities
to the probability of PA adoption in plants of different size firms.
Estimated probability of PA adoption
Size of
parent company
Firms with <20 employees
Firms with 20-99 employees
Firms with 100-499 employees
Firms with 500 or more employees
Passive/asocial Active/social
linkages linkages
0.18 0.65
0.29 0.77
0.42 0.83
0.94 0.99
+256.5%
+167.7%
+105.4%
+5.6%
Notes:
(1) For both scenarios, the plants of these firms are assumed to sell output from the ma-
chining process to some other firm.
(2) "Passive/asocial linkages" refers to those situations in which management depends
only on written media (newsletters, brochures) as an outside source of information about
technological developments, is not an active participant in industry or professional asso-
ciation meetings, does not rely on know-how trading with managers or engineers outside
the plant, does not depend on contacts with sales representatives from equipment vendors
or their distributors to learn about new technology, and does not have business customers
who share any technical information or expertise.
(3) A plant with "Active/social linkages" is one where management is an active partic-
ipant in industry or professional association meetings, relies on know-how trading with
managers or engineers outside the plant, depends on sales representatives from equipment
vendors or distributors to learn about new technology, and has special order customers
who provide technical information and expertise.
(4) Probabilities are estimated by setting variables measuring one type of linkage (e.g.,
"active/social") equal to one and those measuring the other type of linkage (e.g., "pas-
sive/asocial") equal to zero. For each estimate, all other variables in the model are set
equal to the group mean for establishments in that firm size category.
customers who share technical information with them. To have "active" and
"social" linkages means that plant management does not rely solely on writ-
ten media independent of various personal contacts with sales representatives
from equipment vendors or their distributors, and with other users. More-
over, management with "active/social" linkages participates in meetings of
trade and professional associations where demonstrations of new technology
occur, has additional direct contacts with vendors, and has sufficiently close
relationships to some of its special order customers, such that some technical
information sharing regularly occurs between the two.
The results of these simulation are shown in Table 1..1.2.[17] For all
plants but those attached to the largest firms (2:: 500 employees), we find
that when management has "active/social" linkages to external resources for
learning about new technological developments the chances of PA adoption
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are substantially higher than those plants with only "passive/asocial" types
of linkages. "Active/social" linkages raise the chances of PA adoption the
most among plants belonging to the smallest size firms. For the very smallest
firms with fewer than 20 employees that have only "passive/asocial" linkages
to various external resources, the chances of PA adoption are quite low, less
than 1 in 5 (p = 0.18). With "active/social" linkages through which the
exchange of technical expertise and learning among firms is facilitated, the
conditional probability of PA adoption increases by more than 250 percent
(to p = 0.65). For small firms with 20 to 99 employees, "active/social"
linkages to external resources outside the firm increase the chances of PA
adoption over firms with "passive/asocial" linkages from less than 3 in 10 (p
= 0.29) to more than 3 in 4 (p = 0.77). Even for medium-sized firms with
100 to 499 employees, we find that such "active/social" linkages to resources
external to the firm augment the chances of PA adoption by a substantial
margin.
When the very smallest size firms (with fewer than 20 employees) are
very well-connected to all four of the "active/social" linkages for which we
have identified a positive impact on PA adoption, these external economic
advantages compensate for much of the diseconomies of small size and scale.
Indeed, the chances of PA adoption for such well-connected small firms actu-
ally exceed those estimated for the typical plant of medium-sized firms that
are nearly 10 times as large (with between 100 and 499 employees) but have
only "passive/asocial" linkages to external sources of expertise.
14.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have argued that a combination of three sets of fac-
tors explains which establishments are likely to have adopted programmable
automation. Cost and profitability incentives (or deterrents), the internal
resources and accumulated technical competencies of the firm, and the firm's
linkages to external sources of expertise for learning about the new technol-
ogy's capabilities and limitations are all important in predicting PA use.
As of 1987, we find that small-scale, small-size firms are the least likely to
have introduced any PA tools. Small firms lack the internal resources and
operate at too small a scale of production to generate the kind of internal
synergies across a number of product markets, that is, the economies of
scope, enjoyed by large diversified companies. Yet as we have shown, the
deterring effect of small scale and the lack of internal resources (small size)
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for engaging in the kind of experimentallearning-by-doing process necessary
to make the shift to the new technology's learning curve can be overcome
when certain external resources are available to supplement the small firm's
limited capabilities. Without the kinds of connections to trade associations,
to equipment manufacturers, and to special order customers - which help to
transfer technical know-how and therefore underwrite the risks of adopting
a new process technology - our results would suggest that the isolated small
firm (Le., characterized by passive/asocial linkages to external resources)
that relies wholly on traditional techniques is not likely to even attempt the
necessary retooling of machines and people. Instead, we would expect such
firms to pursue a strategy of lower wages and more intensive use of aging
capital for the short to intermediate term. That strategy may permit these
firms to continue to exist for a while longer as long as they do not face much
of a threat from new entrants to their markets who are more techhologically
advanced.
There are two ways to consider the implications of these findings for pol-
icy. One could argue that the greatest obstacle to diffusion is simply the
tradition-bound firms' tenacity, Le., their stubborn commitment to continu-
ing to do business as usual as long as they can. Hence, a policy designed to
more aggressively drive them out of business would presumably hasten the
process of diffusion. If there is no alternative use for the capital of such firms
and if the work force would need to be substantially retrained in order to be
productively employed elsewhere in the economy, a policy designed to force
the closure of these plants could result in a net social welfare loss. Even
though the firms that remained in business would be more efficient than
those that were encouraged to close, such a policy may be more costly to so-
ciety than allowing these firms to continue to produce, albeit less efficiently.
Alternatively, one could argue that the absence of strong "active/social"
linkages to external resources for learning about new technology develop-
ments among small firms in different sectors and locales is what is limiting
the more widespread and rapid diffusion of new manufacturing technologies
such as programmable automation.
In certain other national economies, the most well-known example being
that of Japan, these linkages are reported to be far more common, helping
to diminish the disparities in technological sophistication between large and
small firms that might otherwise prevail.[18] National economies with in-
stitutional arrangements that are generally supportive of such ties among
many manufacturing firms may thus be more successful in sustaining their
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technological leadership in various markets in this period of transition to a
new techno-economic paradigm.
In the Uni ted States, technology assistance programs to manufacturing
firms now operate in more than thirty states (Shapira, 1990). Such programs
can provide a trustworthy source for connecting potential PA users to equip-
ment vendors or their distributors. But technology assistance programs that
emphasize one-on-one assistance to small companies are in danger of ignor-
ing the problem of weak linkages. These activities cannot substitute for the
collective learning experience that is more likely to occur through interac-
tions among members of the same trade or professional association. Nor can
these agencies substitute for the absence of special customers with whom
a small business can develop a collaborative relationship that not only is a
resource for learning about technology but may also provide some degree of
stability of demand for its products. The creation of these kinds of strong,
supportive linkages of an "active/social" character should be an objective of
public policies designed to foster modernization among small manufacturers.
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Notes
[1] For the small firm, the economic environment so conditions these choices,
that as Simon (1957) put it, the firm's "planning horizon" becomes "sharply
limit[ed]."
[2] Howland's research (1988) on plant closings provides some support for our view
of small manufacturing firms as facing a severely constrained set of investment
alternatives and strategic choices. For example, she finds that when faced with
the same poor economic prospects, small, single-plant firms are much less likely
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than branch plants of large firms to close, preferring instead to stay in business
at a reduced level of operations and profits.
[3] Insofar as large firms that may themselves be quite sophisticated in their use of
advanced manufacturing technologies continue to rely on suppliers with these
characteristics, their ability to compete against firms with a technologically
advanced supplier chain is also diminished.
[4] For example, nearly all researchers see the collaborative production networks in
Japan as being led by great industrial conglomerates (Cusamano, 1985; Dore,
1986; Florida and Kenney, 1989; Freeman, 1988; Johnson, 1982).
[5] See Guile (1986), for a discussion of the possibility that distributors, rather
than manufacturers of the new technology themselves, will play an increasing
role in disseminating such knowledge and the possibility of market failure when
the conditions for appropriating returns from such marketing activity are very
weak.
[6] Such close connections to equipment vendors may not be equally available to all
potential adopters of a process innovation. There is little incentive for vendors
or distributors to provide individualized tutoring to the myriad of small firms
that have not adopted any new technology and are individually likely to make
only a small investment. Services available from makers of new equipment or
their distributors may thus be a very imperfect mechanism for accommodating
many small, weakly linked firms to a new technological trajectory.
[7] The industries surveyed include: nonferrous foundries (SIC 336), cutlery, hand
tools, and hardware (SIC 342), heating equipment and plumbing fixtures (SIC
343), screw machine products (SIC 345), metal forgings and stampings (SIC
346), ordnance and accessories, not elsewhere classified (SIC 348), miscella-
neous fabricated metal products (SIC 349), engines and turbines (SIC 351),
farm and garden machinery and equipment (SIC 352), construction and related
machinery (SIC 353), metalworking machinery and equipment (SIC 354), spe-
cial industrial machinery, excluding metalworking (SIC 355), general industrial
machinery and equipment (SIC 356), miscellaneous machinery, excluding elec-
trical (SIC 359), electrical industrial apparatus (SIC 362), motor vehicles and
equipment (SIC 371), aircraft and parts (SIC 372), guided missiles and space
vehicles (SIC 376), engineering and scientific instruments (SIC 381), measuring
and controlling instruments (SIC 382), jewelry, silverware, and plateware (SIC
391). Fifty percent of the sample establishments were in SIC 354 and SIC 359.
[8] These data have been analyzed to examine the morphology of subcontracting
relations (Kelley and Harrison, 1990; Harrison and Kelley, 1990), productivity
in the use of PA (Kelley, 1990b; Kelley and Xue, 1990), and the determinants
of skill-upgrading approaches to job design and training opportunities (Kelley,
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, and 1990a).
[9] In 1986, an average of US$6,265.51 per employee was invested in new equip-
ment among establishments with programmable machines, compared to the
US$I,972.40 per employee in establishments that had no PA technology.
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[10] However, from responses to questions asked of those who were planning to in-
stall PA in 1988-89, it seems clear that the introduction of this new technology
is associated with an expectation of greater requirements for flexibility, that
is, an expansion in the line of products the firm plans to manufacture. In
seventy five percent of the plants where managers say they plan to introduce
PA in the next two years, they expect to increase the variety of products being
manufactured, which suggests that plans to diversify away from product lines,
or new customers, may be an important stimulus to technology adoption.
[11] To David (1975), for example, scale implies both size and volume of production.
Scale economies in the use of the reaper permitted larger size farms (in terms
of acreage and hence volume of output) to amortize the cost of purchasing a
reaper over its greater expected use in harvesting more acreage. With respect
to scale as size, he finds that for farmers operating at a very small scale, only
when the relative costs of labor rose above some threshold, were new harvesting
machines likely to be purchased. For a detailed review of the different measures
and concepts, see Gold (1981).
[12] Appendix Table L{.A2 shows averages of selected characteristics of establish-
ments, grouped by size of firm and by whether or not any programmable ma-
chine tools have been installed as of 1987. Larger firms (and larger scale facil-
ities) are often assumed to specialize in fewer products and longer production
runs, and hence to be less flexible. We do not find support for this assumption.
As shown in the table, establishments with high technical flexibility require-
ments are as prevalent in plants of large as in plants of small-size firms.
[13] The estimates of the predicted probabilities ofPA adoption displayed in Figures
14.1 to 14.5 and Table 14.2 were derived using the following method: For each
variable Xj of value V,
13
(1) Zj=LbiXi+bj(Xj); if-j
i=1
(2) Prob (Adopt PA = llXj = V) = (e Zj )/(1 + eZj ).
[14] For an analysis of subcontracting behavior, see Harrison and Kelley (1990) and
Kelley and Harrison (1990).
[15] Appendix Table 14.A2 shows the mean values of selected characteristics of
establishments belonging to firms of different sizes. An inspection of the group
means shows that among large firms (with greater than 500 employees) there
are great differences in the scale of machining operations related to PA use,
but for the smallest size firms (with fewer than 20 employees) there are no
differences in scale and skill dependency related to PA use.
[16] We cannot know from these data whether some of these linkages - especially
to equipment vendors - existed before or were developed after purchasing the
technology. However, when we compare the differences among non-adopters
between those firms that are planning to purchase PA in the next two years
and those that have no such investment plans, we find that well-linked firms
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are more likely to have plans to introduce PA. Reliance on other users, active
involvement in trade associations, and ties to business customers willing to
share technical expertise are all significant factors, positively related to plans
to purchase PA. However, firms with a tendency to rely more on equipment
vendors or distributors as a source of information, independent of their con-
tacts through trade shows and professional association meetings, are no more
likely to be planning to introduce the new technology. These findings provide
additional evidence for our contention that in political-economic environments
where networks of relationships among economic actors for transferring techni-
cal know-how flourish, there will be a more rapid diffusion of new technologies
to small firms.
[17] The details on average characteristics by PA use for plants grouped by these
firm size categories can be found in Appendix Table 14.A2.
[18] In a recent report of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(Gorte, 1990), entitled Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing,
firms in Japan were described as having business customers that are nearly 1.5
times as likely to provide engineering support as we find among US firms. The
higher incidence of such close relationships among Japanese firms may explain
the higher rate of adoption of PA technology by very small Japanese subcon-
tractors (to that of US firms of similar size) reported in a recent unpublished
survey of such firms undertaken by the Shoko Chukin Bank in 1988.
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Appendix Table 14.Al. Variable definitions.
Variable table
Hourly wage
Dependency on
machining skills
Union
Machining scale
High flexibility
requirements
Firm size
Complementary IT
application
Brochures, ads,
newsletters
Equipment
vendors' sales rep.
Informal
know-how
exchange
Trade & prof.
association mtgs.
Customers
Customer-provided
tech. assistance
Definition
=loge average hourly wage of workers employed in machining
occupations at the plant.
=% of all production workers in the plant employed in machining
occupations.
=1, if production workforce is unionized;
=0, if non-union
=loge (total number of machine tools).
=1, if 50 or more different parts or products manufactured with machine
tools and if 50 percent or more of that machining output is produced in
batch sizes smaller than 10 units;
=0, otherwise.
=loge (total company employment in the USA).
=1, if computers are used for any of the following purposes: process
planning / scheduling, quality assurance, process monitoring, materials
flow /inventory control, materials/parts planning;
=0, otherwise.
=1, if plant manager considered any of the following sources of
information to be very important for learning about new developments
in machining technology: advertisements, direct mail
(catalogues/brochures), articles in publications;
=0, otherwise.
=1, if plant manager considered either of the following sources of
information to be very important for learning about new developments
in marketing technology: sales representatives from manufacturers or
sales representatives from distributors;
=0, otherwise.
=1, if plant manager considered conversations with individuals at other
companies or conversations with individuals at other plants of this
company to be a very important source of information about new
developments in machining technology;
=0, otherwise.
= 1, if plant manager considered presentations at technical society
meetings or exhibits at trade shows to be very important sources of
information for learning about machining technologies;
=0, otherwise.
=1, if plant manager reported that the output of machining operations
was sold to customers outside this company;
=0, if output of the machining process used solely internally by the firm.
=1, if plant managers reported that products or parts were made to
special order for customers who provided any of the following technical
information: blueprints or drawings, written specification sheets
detailing how each operation is to be performed, direct assistance from
the customer's own manufacturing engineering or prograrruning staff or
other types of technical assistance;
=0, if no technical assistance provided by special order customers.
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Appendix Table 14.A2. Selected establishment characteristicsa by firm
size and by PA use.
Firm size: <20
Variable names No PA Any PA Total
Total machine tools (scale) 13.00 16.00 14.00
Plant employment 8.00 9.00 8.00
Company employment (firm size) 8.00 10.00 9.00
Company/plant employment 1.09 1.11 1.10
Hourly wage (U5$) 8.92 11.14 9.69
Dependency on machining skills (%) 82.67 97.07 87.66
Union 0.048 0.057 0.051
Complementary IT application 0.205 0.336 0.250
Customers 0.885 0.992 0.922
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.679 0.914 0.760
High flexibility requirements 0.295 0.430 0.342
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.348 0.373 0.357
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.219 0.406 0.284
Informal know-how exchange 0.527 0.619 0.559
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.256 0.357 0.291
% of total 65.40 34.60 100.00
Unweighted N 96.00 56.00 152.00
Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued)
Firm size: 20-99
Variable names
Total machine tools (scale)
Plant employment
Company employment (firm size)
Company/plant employment
Hourly wage (U5$)
Dependency on machining skills (%)
Union
Complementary IT application
Customers
Customer-provided technical assistance
High flexibility requirements
Brochures, ads, newsletters
Equipment vendors' sales reps.
Informal know-how exchange
Trade & prof. association mtgs.
% of total
No PA
30.00
35.00
41.00
1.28
9.94
51.95
0.131
0.801
0.841
0.625
0.381
0.345
0.305
0.396
0.227
40.70
Any PA
30.00
37.00
42.00
1.22
9.46
78.57
0.113
0.671
0.818
0.689
0.350
0.433
0.493
0.550
0.491
59.30
Total
30.00
36.00
41.00
1.25
9.66
67.74
0.120
0.724
0.827
0.663
0.363
0.397
0.416
0.487
0.383
100.00
Unweighted N 90.00 145.00 235.00
aMeans weighted by the reciprocal of the probability of selection in the sample stratum.
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Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued)
Firm size: 100-499
Variable names No PA Any PA Total
Total machine tools (scale) 22.00 46.00 38.00
Plant employment 126.00 115.00 119.00
Company employment (firm size) 211.00 190.00 197.00
Company/plant employment 4.33 3.13 3.55
Hourly wage (US$) 10.22 10.45 10.37
Dependency on machining skills (%) 24.24 61.38 48.54
Union 0.340 0.317 0.325
Complementary IT application 0.862 0.853 0.856
Customers 0.736 0.851 0.811
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.512 0.607 0.574
High flexibility requirements 0.245 0.327 0.289
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.270 0.434 0.377
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.219 0.511 0.410
Informal know-how exchange 0.283 0.446 0.390
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.318 0.447 0.402
% of total 34.60 65.40 100.00
Unweighted N 60.00 114.00 174.00
Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued)
Firm size: ~500
Variable names No PA Any PA Total
Total machine tools (scale) 19.00 121.00 102.00
Plant employment 230.00 595.00 530.00
Company employment (firm size) 57,862.00 23,627.00 29,807.00
Company/plant employment 673.19 85.60 191.67
Hourly wage (US$) 10.91 10.74 10.77
Dependency of machining skills (%) 16.17 53.67 46.90
Union 0.492 0.493 0.493
Complementary IT application 0.881 0.946 0.934
Customers 0.533 0.778 0.734
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.260 0.445 0.412
High flexibility requirements 0.414 0.298 0.319
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.304 0.560 0.513
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.371 0.483 0.462
Informal know-how exchange 0.444 0.528 0.513
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.356 0.615 0.568
% of total 18.10 81.90 100.00
Unweighted N 38.00 162.00 200.00
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Ch.apter 15
Material Substitution: The
Role of New Technology
John E. Tilton
15.1 Introduction
Material substitution has for centuries reduced the costs and enhanced the
quality of the tools, weapons, shelter, and other material objects of use to
society. It has pushed back the cost-increasing effects of resource deple-
tion while expanding man's horizon of opportunities. In recent years, the
pace of material substitution has quickened. Many new materials have been
introduced, and old ones improved.
In analyzing material substitution, and the forces behind this important
activity, economists and others have traditionally emphasized the role of
relative material prices. In recent years, however, an alternative view has
surfaced suggesting that technological change is the dominant force behind
material substitution.
This study examines these two views - the traditional view and the alter-
native view - of material substitution. It also attempts to determine which
is the more useful in explaining changes over time in the mix of materials
used in the production of particular goods.
384 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
Since it is not feasible to analyze substitution in all material applications,
we will focus here on one industry, the US beverage container industry. The
industry, as is well known, has experienced intense material competition over
the last several decades. In addition, a particularly thorough investigation of
material substitution in this industry has been carried out by Demler (1980
and 1983), which we can draw on.
The results indicate that new technology is the primary cause of change
in the composition of materials consumed, at least in the US beverage con-
tainer industry, and so support the alternative rather than traditional view
of material substitution. The implications of this finding for the nature
of material substitution and for our understanding of this phenomenon are
examined at the end of the study.
15.2 The Traditional View
Economic theory considers the substitution of one material for another to
be part of the broader more general process by which firms determine the
particular factors of production they use and the quantities of each. Ac-
cording to the theory of the firm, that branch of microeconomics concerned
with this process, the potential for one material to substitute for another -
or more generally for one factor of production, such as capital, to substitute
for another, such as labor - is captured by isoquant curves.
These curves indicate the various combinations of any two factors of pro-
duction required to produce a certain output of final product given existing
technology. For example, the isoquant curves QI, Q2, and Q3 shown in Fig-
ure 15.1 could reflect the various tonnages of steei and aluminum required
to produce one, two, and three thousand automobiles of a particular model.
Normally, isoquant curves have a negative slope, indicating that the two
factors are substitutes and that increasing the amount of one reduces the
need for the other. Isoquant curves are also usually drawn convex to the
origin, as in Figure 15.1, on the assumption that as more of one factor is
used in place of the other, greater quantities of the first are required per unit
of the second. In our automobile example, for instance, this assumption
implies the first substitutions of aluminum for steel involve trim or other
applications where a little aluminum can replace a pound of steel. As the
use of aluminum is increased, however, steel parts that carry heavier loads
and rely on the greater strength of steel have to be replaced. For this and
J.E. Tilton
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Figure 15.1. Material demand determined by conventional isoquant and
isocost curves.
other reasons, these substitutions require much more aluminum per pound
of steel replaced.
After the firm determines its desired level of output (that is, the par-
ticular isoquant curve on which it wishes to operate), it must choose the
factor input mix it will use. This entails selecting a particular point on the
desired isoquant curve, which according to the theory will be the point that
minimizes the cost. It is determined by imposing on the relevant isoquant
curve a series or map of isocost curves.
Isocost curves, such as the curves C1 , C2 , C3 , and C4 in Figure 15.1,
indicate the various combinations of two factors of production, such as steel
and aluminum, that can be acquired for a given cost or expenditure. Their
negative slope reflects relative factor prices, or the amount of one factor that
must be given up to purchase an additional unit of the other. Normally iso-
cost curves are assumed to be linear and are drawn with invariant slopes, on
the assumption that the firm can vary its factor purchases over the range of
quantities covered by the curve without affecting factor prices. The further
an isocost curve is from the origin, the larger the quantities of factor inputs
represented and the greater the costs. Consequently, to minimize produc-
tion costs, a firm must operate at that point on its desired isoquant curve
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that intersects the lowest isocost curve. In Figure 15.1, for example, if the
isoquant curve Ql reflects the desired output, production at point E where
the isocost curve Cl is just tangent to Ql results in the lowest possible pro-
duction costs. Any other point on Ql requires a mix of steel and aluminum
with higher combined costs since it lies on an isocost curve further from the
origin. For this reason, the firm will produce its desired level of output Ql
with Al tons of aluminum and SI tons of steel.
Now let the price of steel increase, for simplicity, by 100 percent. The
quantity of steel the firm could purchase for any level of expenditure would
fall by half, causing the isocost curve Cl to rotate to C2 • Such an increase in
steel costs would likely cause the firm to raise the price it charges for its final
product, automobiles, which in turn presumably would reduce demand and
the desired level of output. If the isoquant curve Q2 reflects the new desired
level of production, point F on that curve represents the firms' new demand
for steel and aluminum. As expected the demand for steel has fallen, from
SI to S2 tons.
This decline in steel demand can be separated into two parts. The first,
the output effect, is the reduction in steel demand that occurs because the
production of automobiles is now lower. Had the price of steel remained the
same and automobile production fallen for some other reason, the slope of the
isocost curves would not have changed and the firm would have minimized
its cost of aluminum and steel by operating at point G (where the isocost
curve C3 with the same slope as Cl is just tangent to the isoquant curve
Q2)' Consequently, the reduction in automobile output is responsible for the
fall in steel demand from SI to S3'
The second, the substitution effect, is the result of the shift in relative
factor prices. The rise in the price of steel causes the slope of the isocost
curve to rdtate encouraging the firm to move along the new isoquant curve
from point G to F. This in turn causes a further decline in steel demand,
from S3 to S2.
For aluminum, the output effect also reduces demand, from Al to A3.
The substitution effect, however, increases demand, as one would expect
since the price of aluminum has fallen relative to that of steel, from A3 to
A2. In Figure 15.1, the substitution effect more than offsets the output
effect, so the rise in the price of steel produces an increase in aluminum
demand. This, though, does not necessarily have to be the case.
The output effect may be substantial, or it may be negligible. The latter
is the case, for example, if the demand for the firm's final product is totally
insensitive or inelastic to price changes, or iflittle or no change in the price of
I
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the final product occurs. Little change in the price of the final good is likely
when the change in steel price is small or when the cost of steel constitutes
a negligible portion of the costs of the final product.
This description of the traditional view of material substitution is to some
extent an oversimplification. Economists have long known that production
isoquants are not always the nice continuous convex curves pictured in Figure
15.1 and in most introductory microeconomic textbooks. Technology may
require that factor inputs be used in fixed proportions, especially in the short
run when it can be difficult to modify or replace existing equipment on a
production line. In such cases, a given output of final product requires one
specific combination of factor inputs, and the isoquant curve collapses into
a point, as illustrated in Figure 15.2(a).
Alternatively, there may be two or three, mutually exclusive production
processes that a firm may use to produce a given output, each requiring
fixed, but different, factor proportions. Here the isoquant curve is replaced
by two or three points.
Even where a continuous isoquant curve exists, it does not have to be
convex. Aluminum and plastic are both used as sliding in the construction
of houses in the United States. As plastic is increasingly substituted for alu-
minum, however, there is no reason to believe the amount of plastic required
per pound of aluminum replaced has to increase. The isoquant curve in this
situation is linear, as shown in Figure 15.2( b), rather than convex, and firms
typically operate at one end or the other.
The conventional theory of the firm also recognizes that the shape and
location of isoquant curves is determined by existing technology, and that
these curves may rotate or shift inward over time as a result of the creation
and diffusion of new technology. Such shifts can also cause changes in the
optimal mix of input factors including materials.
This traditional view of factor substitution provides the theoretical ra-
tionalization for the more common demand functions encountered in applied
economic analyses of material demand, functions that typically assume de-
mand depends on gross national product (GNP) or some other activity vari-
able, the material's own price, and the prices of close substitutes. The
activity variable affects the optimal level of final product output and hence
the desired isoquant curve, while own and substitute prices determine the
optimal mix of material inputs for producing the desired output.
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Figure 15.2. Material demand determined by point (a) and linear (b)
isoquants and isocost curves.
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15.3 The Alternative View
While the traditional theory of the firm recognizes that isoquant curves
may possess discrete breaks, may be linear rather than convex, and may
shift over time as technology changes, these possibilities are not emphasized
or built explicitly into its analytical framework. They are raised more as
afterthoughts, or as caveats and exceptions that in some instances may alter
or undermine the theory's usefulness. The traditional theory views factor
substitution, of which material substitution is a subcase, as a movement
along a stable production isoquant made in response to changes in relative
factor prices. The role of technological change is largely ignored, and in this
sense the analysis is static.
The alternative view of material substitution, in contrast, emphasizes
technological change and downplays material prices. In doing so, it does not
reject the basic tenets of the theory of the firm, the existence of isoquant
and isocost curves for example. Rather it postulates that in most cases the
driving force behind material substitution is a shift in the isoquant curve, the
result of new technology, rather than a shift in the isocost curve produced
by changes in material prices.
New technology, it contends, is more important than changes in material
prices for two reasons. First, in many applications material prices can vary
over a broad range without producing any movement on the isoquant curve,
and hence any change in the mix of materials. This is the case, for example,
whenever the relevant isoquant is not a nice continuous convex curve, but
instead is a point, a series of points, a straight line, or a series of linear
segments, as Figure 15.2 illustrates. Even with a continuous convex curve,
changes in relative material prices may not produce any movement along the
curve if production is currently taking place at one or the other ends. For
example, solder, an alloy of lead and tin, is widely used in the automobile
industry in smoothing over body joints, in filling dents, in manufacturing
brass radiators, and in other applications. As Canavan (1983) has pointed
out, the typical solder used for such purposes is about 98 percent lead and
2 percent tin, the latter being the minimum amount of tin required for the
solder to retain needed physical properties. While there are no technical
problems substituting in the other direction, that is, more tin for lead, it
would require a tremendous change in the relative prices of these two metals,
as tin is normally five to ten times more expensive per pound than lead.
Second, tremendous advances in material technology have taken place
over the last few decades. New metal alloys, polymers, ceramics, composites
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have been created in the laboratory and introduced into the marketplace.
New innovations have simultaneously enhanced the strength, corrosion re-
sistance, and other physical properties of steel and the more traditional ma-
terials. As a result, design engineers in all material consuming industries -
construction, automobile, aerospace, packaging, consumer durables, capital
equipment - face a choice of materials that their predecessors a decade or
two ago would greatly envy, and a choice that every year is richer and more
extensive.
In contrasting the traditional and alternative views of material substitu-
tion, it is important to note that the two are not mutually exclusive. The
real world is sufficiently complex and diverse that material substitution in
some instances is driven entirely or largely by changes in material prices and
in other instances by technological change. In still other situations, both
may be important.
In addition, the influence of these two variables cannot always be cleanly
separated. Changes in material prices causing a shift in the material mix be-
ing used may themselves be the result of new innovations in mining or metal-
lurgy. Alternatively, the R&D efforts behind new resource-saving technology
may originally have been prompted by shifting material prices.
Despite such complications, it is still worthwhile to inquire whether firms
most often alter their material mix in response to a change in material prices
or a change in technology. The answer to this question determines which
of the two views of material substitution is the more realistic, and hence
most useful. The section that follows investigates this question for material
substitution in the US beverage container industry.
15.4 US Beverage Container Industry
The beverage industry produces beer and soft drinks, which it then ships in
bulk containers, such as kegs, and in packaged containers, such as bottles
and cans. In the United States, packaged containers are the more important,
accounting for between 75 and 90 percent of the volume of both beer and soft
drink shipments since 1950, and it is on material use in packaged containers
that this section focuses.
Packaged containers can be further separated into glass bottles (both
returnable and nonreturnable), plastic bottles, and metal cans. There are,
in turn, four major types of metal cans - the three-piece tinplate can, the
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three-piece tin-free steel can, the two-piece aluminum can, and the two-piece
tinplate can.
The three-piece tinplate can, first used for beer in 1935 and for soft
drinks in 1953, was the original metal can. Composed of three pieces (a top,
a bottom, and a cylindrical side), it was for a number of years made entirely
of tinplate, or steel sheet covered with a thin layer of tin. In the 1960s,
aluminum replaced tinplate in the top of this can and tin-free steel replaced
tinplate in the bottom.
The three-piece tin-free steel can, introduced in the beer and soft drink
industries in 1967 and 1969, is similar to the tinplate can. However, in place
of tinplate it uses tin-free steel, a chromium-coated steel sheet. The top of
this can is also made of aluminum.
The two-piece aluminum can is composed entirely of aluminum. The
bottom and side are made from one piece; the top from another. First used
for beer containers in 1958, the bottom and side were at that time formed by
an impact extrusion process. This technology was never very successful, and
five years later was replaced by the more effective drawn-and-ironed (D&I)
process. In 1967 the two piece aluminum can was first used for soft drinks.
The two-piece tinplate can has a bottom and side made from one piece
of tinplate, and shaped by the D&I process. Its top, the second piece, is
made of aluminum. It was introduced into the beer and soft drink markets
in 1971 and 1973.
These six different types of packaged containers and the materials they
use - steel, tin, chrome, aluminum, glass, and plastic - are summarized in
Table 15.1. Substitution among these materials has been examined in con-
siderable detail up to 1977 by Demler (1980 and 1983). Drawing heavily on
his work, this section looks next at the 1950-1977 period. It then examines
more recent trends in material use in this industry.
15.4.1 The 1950-1977 period
The tons of steel, tin, chrome, aluminum, and glass consumed annually in
the United States for every million barrels of beer and soft drinks shipped in
packaged containers is shown in Figures 15.3 and 15.4 for the years 1950-
1977. The use of plastics is not shown. First introduced into the soft drink
industry in 1976, its consumption was negligible over this period for soft
drink containers, and zero for beer containers.
These figures highlight an important and striking aspects of material use
in the US beverage container industry, its variability. Steel consumption
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Figure 15.3. US material use in tons per million barrels of packaged beer
shipments, 1950-1977. (Source: Demler, 1980, Tables A-I, A-16, A-17, and
A-18, and the sources cited there.)
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Table 15.1. Materials used in beverage containers.
Material
Container Tin Steel Chrome Aluminum Glass Plastic
Three-piece x x x x
tinplate can (bottom end) (top end)
Three-piece x x x
tin-free steel can (top end)
Two-piece x x x
tinplate can (top end)
Two-piece x
aluminum can
Glass bottle x
Plastic bottle x
Source: Demler (1980).
per million barrels of beer (Figure 15.3), for example, rises from 6,000 to
10,000 tons during the 1950s, and then enters a long period of decline. By
1977 it is less than 3,000 tons. The use of steel per million barrels of soft
drinks (Figure 15.4), in contrast, starts at zero in 1950, and grows almost
continuously until the mid-1970s.
Tin and chrome, each used with steel, follow their own individual pat-
terns. The use of tin in beer containers is one of continuous decline, very
rapid in the early 1950s, very gradual in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and
then again more swiftly. For soft drinks, tin consumption rises until about
1970, and then declines. Chrome experiences a sharp but brief jump in usage
both in beer and soft drink containers following the introduction of the tin
free steel container in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s its use is already
in decline.
The story for aluminum again is different. Following its first use for tops
in three-piece tinplate cans in the early 1960s, aluminum consumption per
million barrels of packaged shipments expands rapidly for both beer and soft
drinks.
The use of glass, the final material examined, remains fairly constant
during the 1950s for both beer and soft drinks, rises during most of the
1960s, and then declines somewhat toward the end of this decade. During
the 1970s, this downward trend continues for soft drinks but is reversed for
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beer. For both beverages, there is a notable shift in favor of one-way glass
bottles over the 1950-1977 period.
The total tonnage of all materials consumed per million barrels of pack-
aged beverage shipments rises quite consistently over the entire period for
beer, and rises for soft drinks until the 1970s. It is not surprising that these
trends follow more or less closely those for glass. Glass bottles are heavy
compared to metal cans, and glass consumption largely determines the com-
bined weight of all the materials consumed.
Returning to the views of material substitution discussed in the preceding
section, two explanations are possible for the substantial changes over time in
the mix of materials used per million barrels of beer and soft drink shipments.
The first is that rather dramatic shifts along stationary production isoquants
have occurred in response to changes in material prices. The second is that
technological change has caused the production isoquants themselves to shift
inward over time.
Demler's analysis identifies two factors, or what he calls apparent deter-
minants, principally responsible for changes in material use over time. The
first is the mix of container types - the three-piece tinplate can, the return-
able glass bottle, the aluminum can, and so on - and changes in that mix.
The second is the material composition of individual container types, and
shifts in that composition over time.
Trends in market share for individual container types are shown in Fig-
ures 15.5 and 15.6 for beer and soft drinks. The beer market (Figure 15.5)
appears to be particularly competitive and volatile. While the returnable
bottle, the three-piece tinplate can, and the tin-free steel can all had their
day as the industry leader, their fortunes by the 1970s were on the wane. The
one-way bottle and the aluminum can, on the other hand, were expanding.
In the soft drink market (Figure 15.6), the returnable bottle managed
to remain the leader over the entire 1950-1977 period. However, during the
latter half of this era, it faced increasing competition from first the three-
piece tinplate can, and then the returnable bottle and the aluminum can.
Since these changes in market share contribute significantly to the trends
in material use portrayed in Figures 15.3 and 15...1, it is important to under-
stand why they occurred. Here a variety of factors can be identified. Some
consumers, for example, favor cans because they are lighter and easier to
handle, and do not break. Others favor glass bottles because glass is inert
and has no effect on taste. Deposit laws, now found in a number of states,
encourage the use of (returnable) glass bottles. Among the cans, they favor
aluminum, which is the easiest to recycle.
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Figure 15.5. Percentage of packaged beer shipments by container type,
1950-1977. (Source: Demler, 1980, Table A-3 and the sources cited there.)
Perhaps most important, however, are the relative costs of different con-
tainer types. Of concern are not just the costs of the glass, steel, tin, and
the other materials used in making a containers, but the costs of producing,
filling, and transporting containers as well.
As Figure 15.7 shows, a close correlation does not exist between the
market shares of various container types and the prices of their constituent
materials. The sharp rise in the real price of tin in the early 1970s occurred
after the peak in market share of the three-piece tinplate can, and is incon-
sistent with the rise in market share of the two-piece tinplate can that began
just as the tin price began its ascent. The modest decline and then rise in
the real price of glass is not very helpful in explaining why the market shares
for the returnable and one-way glass bottle have moved in the opposite di-
rection. While the aluminum can was rapidly penetrating both the beer and
soft drink market, its real price changed very little.
While material prices influence the relative costs of different containers,
they are not directly responsible for most of the shifts in market shares over
the 1950-1977 period. These shifts are instead often identified with specific
technological developments. Earlier, it was noted that the first aluminum
can was made in 1958 using an impact extrusion process. However, it was not
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types, 1950-1977. (Source: Demler, 1980, Table A-4 and the sources cited
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until the D&I process was introduced five years later that relative container
costs shifted significantly in favor of the aluminum can, and its dramatic
market penetration began. The steel industry responded by developing first
the tin-free steel can and then the two-piece tinplate can. These innovations,
coupled with the aluminum can, caused the demise ofthe three-piece tinplate
can, which up to that time had been increasing its market share in both
the beer and soft drink markets. The major innovations in the beverage
container market, a number of which have produced new container types or
enhanced the competitiveness of existing containers, have been identified by
Demler and are shown in Table 15.2.
The second important factor affecting material use that Demler identifies
is the change over time in the material composition of individual container
types. This is most dramatically illustrated in the use of tin in tinplate
cans, as shown in Figure 15.8. In 1950, some 2.77 pounds of tin were used
to produce a thousand tinplate cans of the standard 12 ounce size. By 1977
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Year of
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Major innovations in the beverage container industry.
comrner-
cialization
Before
1935
Nature of innovation and sector of industry in which it occurred
Glass Steel Alum..inum Comment
Returnable First beverage
bottle container
Early in
1935
Later in
1935
1935
to 1958
1946 to
mid-1950
1958
1959
1961
1963
1965
One-way
glass
bottle
Glass
container
light-
weighting
"Handy"
glass
containers
Three-piece hot-
dipped tinplate
can
Hot-dipped
tinplate to
differentially
coated tinplate
to 0.25 lb.
electrolytic
tinplate
Double-reduced
steel
First alum..inum
beverage can
Reynolds
Alum..inum
two-piece can
Reynolds
Alum..inum
"necked-in"
can
Steel and canrnaking
industry penetrate the
beverage market
Glass industry
introduces a one-way
container to compete
with can
Competition to regain
lost market share to
metal can
World War II and
Korean War and
economics are the
determining factors
Manufactured by
Hawaii Brewery and
Coors brewery
Glass industry's
competitive container
to metal can (weight
efficiencies, strength,
cost)
Steel and canrnaking
industry switch
beverage can over to
cost-efficient DR steel
Alum..inum industry
enters beverage
container market and
increases market share
Improves container &
competes more
effectively with DR
steel
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Continued.
Nature of innovation and sector of industry in which it occurred
Glass Steel Aluminum Comment
1967
1969
Late
1960-1976a
1970
1971
1972-1974
1974
1976
Plastic
coatings
Kerr-Heye
glass
Tin-free
steel can
Two-piece
tinplate cans
Miraform II
Aluminum can
from H19
alloy
H19 alloy more
efficiently
utilized
Miraform II
Steel and canmaking
industries attempt to
maintain beverage
market
Aluminum industry
competes with TFS
and increases market
share
Plastics enter the
beverage container
market
Glass industry
maintains market
share by threat
from plastic
containers
Steel competes directly
with aluminum can
and attempts to regain
lost market
Aluminum industry in
direct competition
with steel
Press-and-blow
technique, lighter
and stronger
glass container
to compete with
cans and plastics
New bottom-profile
can which both steel
and aluminum use to
compete with each
other
After ban on AN
resins, plastic
industry attempts
to gain market share
with PET resins
aplastics emerged in the form of AN-Resins.
bPlastics emerged in the form of PET containers.
Source: Demler (1983, pp. 34-35).
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Figure 15.7. Trends in real prices for steel, chrome, tin, aluminum, and
glass, 1950-1977 (1950 = 100). (Source: Demler, 1980, Tables A-19, A-20,
and A-21.)
this figure has dropped to 0.16 pounds for the most metal efficient 12 ounce
tinplate cans being produced, a drop of over 90 percent.
This decline was produced by a number of innovations. The substantial
drop recorded in the early 1950s was largely the result of the widespread
adoption of the electrolytic tinning process. Compared to the older, hot
dipped process it replaced, electrolytic tinning provides a more uniform tin
coating, which as a result can be much thinner.
In the 1960s two additional innovations - the introduction of the alu-
minum top and tin-free steel bottom on the three-piece tinplate can - further
reduced the use of tin per tinplate can. Finally, during the 1970s research
on the use of enamels which had been going on for years led to further
reductions.
Declines in the weight of steel, aluminum, and chrome in the cans in
which they are used, though less spectacular, also occurred, and again were
largely the result of new technological developments. For example, the
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(Source: Demler, 1980, Figure IV-6.)
introduction of the more efficient R19 alloy substantially reduced the amount
of aluminum needed per aluminum can in the late 1960s.
So technological change - the introduction and diffusion of new inno-
vations - appears as the dominant force driving changes in both the mix
of containers and the material composition of individual types of contain-
ers. These, in turn, as Demler shows, are the two principal determinants of
trends in material use and substitution in the beer and soft drink container
industries.
15.4.2 Recent trends
No study similar to Demler's has been published covering the years since
1977. As a result, estimates of the steel, tin, chrome, aluminum, glass,
and plastic in packaged beverage containers comparable to those used to
construct Figures 15.3 and 15.4 are not readily available for recent years.
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Still, from the work of Nappi (1986) on metal demand for the US packaging
industry as a whole and other available information, it is clear that the
important factors Demler identifies - the mix of containers and the material
composition of container types - have continued to playa major role in
shaping material usage in beverage containers.
Particularly dramatic shifts in market shares of individual types of con-
tainers have taken place in the soft drink industry. As Figure 15.9 indicates,
the market penetration of the aluminum can has continued unabated. In the
early 1980s it became the most popular soft drink container. The plastic bot-
tle whose market share was negligible in 1977 has also enjoyed very rapid
growth. Used widely in the manufacture of large, two-liter containers, the
plastic bottle by 1985 accounted for over 25 percent of all packaged soft
drink shipments. The returnable bottle, the three-piece tinplate can, and
the tin-free steel can were the big losers. The returnable bottle saw its share
of the market shrink from 40 to 16 percent, while the three-piece tinplate
can and the tin-free steel can, which together held nearly a fourth of the
market in 1977, disappeared almost completely. These changes stimulated
the substitution of aluminum and plastics for glass, steel, tin, and chrome.
In the beer industry, significant shifts in the mix of container types also
occurred. The aluminum can increased its share of the packaged container
market from 41 percent in 1977 to about 70 percent by 1985. The three-piece
tinplate can, the tin-free steel can, and the two-piece tinplate can ceased to
be used. The historical decline of the returnable bottle continued, while
the rising share of the one-way bottle peaked in the early 1980s and then
reversed itself. By 1985 these two glass containers held 30 percent of the
beer market compared to 40 percent eight years earlier. The plastic bottle,
despite its success with soft drinks, has yet to penetrate the beer market.
So material substitution resulting from the changing mix of container usage
has in recent years stimulated the consumption of aluminum at the expense
of glass, steel, tin, and chrome.
The material composition of container types has also been changing over
the last decade. A recent study of the beverage container industry by Chase
Econometrics (1986, p. 4.41), for example, reports that the average gauge of
the aluminum sheet used in the body of aluminum cans declined from 0.016
inches in the late 1970s to 0.0126 inches by 1986. The same study (p. 6.14)
also notes that the PET (polyethylene terphthalate) resin used to produce
a standard two-liter plastic soft drink bottle fell on the average from 60 to
around 50 grams between the late 1970s and 1985. Such developments affect
both the level and mix of materials used in beverage packaging. They also
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affect the competitiveness of the different types of containers, and are in
part responsible for the growing market shares of the aluminum can and the
plastic bottle.
Looking behind these changes in the mix of container types and the
material composition of individual containers in an attempt to identify their
determinants, one again finds little evidence that changes in material prices
are of great importance, except perhaps through the indirect influence they
have on R&D and the subsequent course of new technology. As Figure 15.10
shows the substitution of aluminum and plastics for steel, tin, chrome, and
glass in recent years cannot be accounted for by a drop in their real prices,
either in absolute or relative terms.
While the overall costs of various containers, which as noted earlier in-
clude the costs of manufacturing, filling, and transportation as well as the
costs of materials, are significant, major shifts in these costs are typically
the result of new technological developments. The first commercial use of
the plastic bottle in the soft drink market, for example, was made possible
by an innovation. Its subsequent rapid penetration of this market, in turn,
hinged in part on improved technology that reduced resin requirements, and
increased the number of plastic bottles filled per minute.
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sand, and assumes one part soda ash is used for every three parts of silica
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Price shown for PET resins, used for sides of plastic beverage bottles, is for
thermoplastic resins in general. Since data prior to 1980 are not available,
for this series 1980 = 100.
Price shown for HDPE resins, used for the bottoms of plastic beverage
bottles, is for high density polyethylene resins (blow molding) in general.
Figure 15.10. Trends in real prices of steel, chrome, tin, aluminum, glass,
PET resins, and HDPE resins (1977 = 100). (Sources: American Metal
Market, various issues; US Bureau of Mines, various issues; US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, various issues.)
15.5 Implications
The experience of the US beverage container industry suggests that mate-
rial substitution generally is the result of technological change and inward
shifts in production isoquants, rather than changes in material prices and
shifts along stationary isoquants. This, as noted earlier, does not mean that
materials prices are unimportant. Some of the R&D efforts generating new
innovations and producing shifts in isoquant curves presumably are moti-
vated by material prices and the desire to cut materials costs. In such cases,
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however, material prices influence substitution indirectly by affecting the
rate and direction of technological change. Material substitution, itself, is
largely the product of technological change.
Beverage containers, of course, are but one of the many material markets,
and one should be cautious in drawing general conclusions on the basis of one
case study. Still, the strong support the fluctuating fortunes of glass, steel,
tin, chrome, aluminum and more recently plastics in the beverage container
market provide for the alternative view of material substitution, raises the
question, does it matter? What are the important applications, if any, that
follow from this finding?
One implication, discussed more fully elsewhere (Tilton, 1983, Chapter
1), is that our understanding of the relationship between material prices and
demand, at least as conventionally portrayed in the theory of the firm and
economics in general, is flawed. This relationship is described by the down-
ward sloping demand curve, which is normally drawn as stable, continuous,
and reversible. If, however, material prices primarily affect material demand
indirectly by shaping the level and direction of R&D and the resulting flow
of new technology, and if material substitution in turn is an important de-
terminant of material demand, these assumptions are no longer likely to be
valid. A rise in price over a limited range may have little or no effect on
demand, but once beyond some threshold may stimulate new technology
that shifts the demand curve downward. After the new technology has been
introduced, it is unlikely the process can be reversed. A fall in price to its
original level will not recapture the lost demand.
Perhaps of even greater importance, the traditional view of material sub-
stitution may impede our efforts to learn more about this important eco-
nomic phenomenon. In examining material substitution, it encourages us
to concentrate on changes in material prices and the factors responsible for
these changes. It predicts we will find material substitution mostly in those
uses experiencing significant changes in the prices of competing materials.
The alternative view, in contrast, urges us to focus on new innovations and
the important factors behind their generation and diffusion. It anticipates
material substitution will be the most pervasive in those applications experi-
encing rapid technology change even if the prices of competing materials are
relatively stable. So the two views suggest quite different research agendas
for future investigations into the nature and causes of material substitution.
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Chapter 16
Morphological Analysis,
Diffusion, and Patterns of
Technological Evolution:
Ferrous Casting in France
and the FRG
Dominique Foray and Arnulf Griibler
16.1 Introduction
The historiography of technical change has demonstrated that the process
of technological diffusion is in itself also a developmental process. In other
words, it is in its diffusion throughout the economy that a technology ac-
quires its industrial and economic properties, transforms itself, and widens
the initial market in which it was adopted. On the basis of these dynamic
properties of the diffusion process, some authors have been hasty in inferring
the theoretical impossibility of formal representation, since the objective of
the diffusion is not the same at the beginning, in the middle, and at the
end of the process. It appears to us, however, that the interest in a formal
408 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
representation resides precisely in the possibility of periodizing the diffusion
process, with the aid of criteria that can take into account the principal
transformations of the technology under consideration. The diffusion pro-
cess can thus be considered as a series of competitions at given times between
a technology A, which is in the middle of a transformation, and other tech-
nologies (B, C, and D) with respect to those functions that A is successively
able to assume. Generally these successive competitions will occur in ever
larger markets as A progressively enlarges its initial functional characteris-
tics. It is therefore possible to interpret the characteristics of the diffusion
pattern of a given period on the basis of the manner in which competition
developed throughout a previous period.
The first part of this chapter consists therefore in a complete and com-
prehensive morphological analysis (MA) of a set of (process) technologies for
a particular industrial activity, in this case ferrous casting. Through the MA
approach proposed, we will be able to define the criteria of the periodization
of the diffusion process for the technology under consideration. More gen-
erally, we intend to show the importance and fruitfulness of an explicit and
formal methodology in defining the technologies competing/diffusing in a
particular market, which by its comprehensive nature, is not time-dependent
or results simply from the aggregation level available in industry statistics.
In the second part we use the results of our MA of the technological
trajectories in the casting industry to analyze their diffusion in two countries,
France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). We first describe the
very different patterns of the technological trajectories in the two countries.
We then continue to discuss the possible driving forces behind the locking-
out of the gasifiable pattern process technology (GP process) in France and
its diffusion in the FRG, followed by a quantification of the diffusion process
based on standard diffusion methodology. This will be based on a simple
Fisher-Pry (1971) type of technological substitution model. On the basis
of the MA we describe the diffusion of the GP process as proceeding by
successively filling two market niches: first, smaH batch-size production and
later, following improvements in the technology, also mass production of
ferrous castings. In the case of the FRG we point out the extreme importance
of the early start of the diffusion process of the GP process technology inside
a small initial market niche, which generates a process of accumulation of
knowledge and learning (this was not the case in France) leading to the
widening of the initial market niche.
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The study of the diffusion trajectories (Section 16.3), which develop
within a well-defined morphological space (Section 16.2), allows us to propose
in the final section the historical pattern of evolution of casting technology.
Thus our approach moves from a morphological arborescence to an evolu-
tionary tree[1] with the help of the analysis of the diffusion and selection
mechanisms for the technologies under consideration.
With respect to the results of this work, we can make one analytical and
one methodological observation. First, this case study provides insights into
the conditions for exit from a lock-in situation.[2] Second, the MA helps
avoid misinterpretation and provides a clear theoretical rationale concerning
the asymmetrical character and the discontinuities of the diffusion trajectory
of the GP process.
Finally, it is our contention that the suggested three-step (morphological,
standard diffusion, and evolutionary) analysis permits a better understand-
ing of the historical pattern of evolution of a given technology.
16.2 Morphological Analysis of Technological
Trajectories
In this section we propose a complete MA in order to construct the morpho-
logical space for the technological evolution of ferrous casting. The MA also
permits us to define the relevant relations of rivalry between the technologies
under consideration,
The Morphological Space of Casting Technology
MA is a technique for identifying, indexing, counting, and parameterizing
a collection of all possible devices (processes) to achieve a specified func-
tional capability. An MA is made up of the following steps: existence of a
well-structured problem, identification of the parameters of the (technical,
functional) characteristics, subdivision of each parameter into cases or states
p1k, p2 k, pnk, and identification of the various combinations. In addition,
we use the following definitions:
Morphological space (pi k) consists of a set of discrete points or C007'-
dinates, each corresponding to a particular combination of parameters.
The space has as many dimensions as parameters.
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Morphological distance between two points in the space is the number
of parameters differing from one another in two configurations.
Morphological neighborhood is a subset of points, each of which is
morphologically close to the other.
Technological breakthrough is achieved when a new configuration is
obtained.
An MA starts with the construction of a morphological space for a partic-
ular set of technologies or products in order to understand comprehensively
the whole environment into which they are embedded, and thus not to miss
a technological route of possible future development. The morphological
space is defined by any number of dimensions and subdivided into elemen-
tary spaces which show the state of the technology considered.
Firstly, the functional capabilities of the technology must be stated pre-
cisely. In this case, the problem consists of realizing ferrous metal products
by a casting process (molding technology). Then in connection with this
definition, four characteristic parameters are identified and subdivided:
PI: The nature of the pattern (Pl: permanent, Pi: lost);
P2 : The nature of the mold cavity (Pi: hollow, Pi: full);
P3 : The stabilization force (Pj: chemical, Pj: physical);
P4 : The bonding method (pl: simple, Pl: complex).
Finally, a hierarchy of these parameters is defined in order to take into
account the compatibility constraints between the various states of the dif-
ferent parameters. For example, in our case, a permanent pattern (Pl) is
not compatible with a full cavity mold (Pi) which in turn implies the use
of a physical stabilization force (Pl). This hierarchical relation between
the parameters (PI> P2 > P3 > P4 ) leads to the morphological space of
the molding processes, being represented as an arborescent structure (Figure
16.1), which gives a systematic representation of all possible alternatives to
the casting problem.
In terms of graph theory, an arborescent structure is a tree with an
original node [that is a point (a), where each other vertex can be attained
by a part coming from (a)]. A graph which possesses an original node is
quasi-strongly connected [for all pairs x, y, there exists a vertex z (:z:, y) from
which a path to x and a path to y begins].
The properties of a quasi-strongly connected graph will be used in the
following to define the relevant relation of rivalry between technologies in
the morphological space with which we are concerned.
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Figure 16.1. The morphological space of molding processes (with 4 param-
eters) and realizable (non self-contradictory) technological solutions suitable
for mass production (a, b, c, d, m, n).
Let us now introduce some precisions:
• The 31 vertices of the tree do not represent the technical processes. These
processes are located above the final branches of the graph. Thus, each
process corresponds to a given combination of the states of the four
parameters of the morphological space.
• The MA applied to molding technology results in 16 distinguishable com-
binations for four parameters (a to p in Figure 16.1), although some of
them are self-contradictory: some states of one parameter are not com-
patible with some states of another parameter. Therefore, the combina-
tions (e, I, g, h) are impossible, given the incompatibility between the
permanent nature of the pattern and the full nature of the mold cavity.
(p) is also a self-contradictory combination. When the impossible solu-
tions are eliminated eleven solutions remain which must be considered.
• We are not yet capable of formulating any conclusion concerning the
economic value of each combination, or their relative contribution to
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the output (Le., their market shares) of the sector. The goal of the
MA is instead to provide a comprehensive definitional structure of the
process technologies available and a taxonomy of their evolution. The
second interest of the MA lies in the possibility of defining rigorously the
competing technologies.
Morphological Neighborhood and Breakthrough: The Relation of Rivalry
The specification of rival technologies includes two notions:
• A notion of substitutability; two technologies that do not have the
same basic function cannot be considered as being in competition. This
basic function refers both to a dimensional criteria (for example, mass
production) and to a qualitative criteria (for example, a given degree of
complexity of products). According to this first constraint, we can con-
clude that five solutions (i, j, k, I, 0) are inadequate for mass production
and consequently not in competition. But, the solutions (a, b, c, d, m,
n) are substitutable.
• A notion of morphological distance (MD); it is essential to define
theoretically a technological change, either as an improvement of an ex-
isting technology, or as the emergence of a rival technology. We argue
that competing technologies are separated by a given morphological dis-
tance which is estimated below. The MD will be calculated on graph G
(Figure 16.2), from which the self-contradictory solutions are eliminated,
as well as the solutions which are inadequate for mass production.
G = (X, U), is the couple; constituted first by aset X = (Xl, X2,"" x n ),
and second by a family U = (Ul, U2," ., um) of elements of the cartesian
product X X X = [(x, y)/uX, yEX].
This graph displays the properties of an arborescent structure as dis-
cussed above. In order to estimate the MD between two points in the space
(Le., the number of parameters differing from one another in two configura-
tions), we use the notion of path.
A path oflength q > 0 is a chain of a particular type: IL = (Ul, U2, ••• uq ),
such as for each arc Ui (with i < q) the terminal extremity of Ui coincides
with the initial extremity of Ui+l' The MD between two terminal vertices
(two processes) is the length of the corresponding path IL, Le., the number
of arcs of the sequence:
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Figure 16.2. Representation of graph G defining process technologies for
mass production of ferrous metal castings.
MD(a,b)
MD(a,c)
MD(a,m)
(U4' us)
(U4' U3, U6, 1t7)
(U4' U3, U2, Ul, Ug, UlO, U12)
(16.1 )
On account of the hierarchical character of the graph, the estimation
of the value of each arc should take into account a weighting coefficient
reflecting its proximity to the original node.
We must then define a critical distance. Concurrent with this definition
some technological changes occur inside a morphological neighborhood while
others occur outside and can thus be defined as an emerging rival technology.
According to the theory of the quasi-strongly connected graph, this critical
distance is given by the radius of graph G.
The directed distance d( Xi, X j) is the length of the shortest path from
Xi to Xj' The "associated number" of a vertex Xi is e(xd = max d(Xi,Xj)
with XjfX and X j ::f:. Xi. The "center" is a vertex Xo with a minimum
associated number. e(xo ) is called the "radius" of graph G and is denoted
as p(G). In Figure 16.2, p(G) = 4. Thus, (MD ::; 4) defines a morphological
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neighborhood and (M D > 4) defines a technological breakthrough (Le., the
emergence of rival technologies).
This morphological procedure results in the identification of two com-
peting technologies: the sand molding (8M) process, corresponding to the
combination of parameters (a, b, c, d) and the gasifiable pattern (GP) pro-
cess, corresponding to the combination (m, n). Technological competition,
which will generate a macrostructure in the industry, occurs therefore at the
level of the parameter PI (permanent or lost pattern, Figure 16.1). Indeed,
that is the level where the choice of firms can be analyzed in terms of continu-
ity (Le., technical change within a morphological neighborhood, for example
from a to b) or of a morphological breakthrough (for example, changing from
a to m). While technical change within a morphological neighborhood im-
plies only a change of artifacts (incremental innovation), the incorporation of
a rival technology (Le., the commitment in another technological trajectory)
implies both changes in artifacts and in the knowledge base.
Let us now discuss some of the aspects concerning the economics of
technological competition for the case of molding technology.
Economics of Technological Competition
From an economic point of view, we attempt to characterize the technologies
in competition (8M process versus GP process) at two complementary levels.
• Technical complexity and simplification of the operating methods. This
first level refers to one of the characteristics of technical evolution (Foray,
1985): as technological processes become more complex, operating meth-
ods tend to become more simplified. The main steps of production used
in both the 8M and GP process are shown in Figure 16.3.
Thus, the GP process enables an extreme simplification of the oper-
ating methods:
The GP process involves investing an injection molded foamed poly-
styrene pattern in a free flowing magnetizable molding material. Im-
mediately prior to pouring, the molding material is rigidized by a
powerful magnetic field. During casting, the polystyrene pattern
volatilizes in the face of incoming metal stream which occupies the
void left by the gasified pattern. Shortly after the casting has solid-
ified, the magnetic flux is switched off and the flask containing the
casting is taken to the knock-out station [Gupta and Toaz, 1978].
But this simplification of operating methods is associated with in-
creased technical complexity: a low level of complexity (8M process)
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Figure 16.3. The mam production operations used In the 8M and GP
molding processes.
corresponds to more complicated operating methods, while a high level
of complexity (GP process) corresponds to more simplified operating
methods. The history of the casting industry's technical progress clearly
shows a process of increasing technical complexity and a corresponding
simplification of operating methods.
• Structure of costs and economies of scale. The importance of learning in
the finishing processes plus the relatively minor level of learning in the
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Figure 16.4. Evolution of the cost structure and two successive steps of
market penetration for the gasifiable pattern (GP) process: (a) the GP pro-
cess grows in a limited market (small batch-size production); (b) the GP
process diffuses into mass production.
preparation and pouring processes, are features which affect the condi-
tions for economies of scale in both 8M and GP technologies. However,
the problem as to whether pattern costs are included in the initial costs
or not, represents a key-discriminatory feature between the competing
technologies: in the case of 8M processes one of the main economies to
be achieved by increasing output of individual castings is the distribu-
tion of pattern costs. The higher the relative importance of pattern costs
(the cost of a wooden pattern would be about 25% of the cost of a metal
pattern) the more crucial is the search for mass production.
On the contrary the cost of a lost pattern cannot be included in the
initial costs. Given that a lost pattern can be utilized for a unique cast-
ing, it is necessary to produce as many patterns as products. Therefore
there is no direct relationship between the pattern cost per unit and the
importance of the run, so that the decrease of the pattern cost per unit
produced can be achieved only by the rationalization of the production
of patterns. Until such rationalization efforts are effected, the GP pro-
cess is thus inadequate for mass production [Figure 16.4(a)]. This flat
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pattern of the costs per number of castings explains both the limits of the
GP process and its competitive advantage over the SM process for the
production of small batch sizes: in this period the GP process diffused
inside a small market niche only where it was in competition with the
SM process for the unit production of very complex and large products.
After the rationalization of the production of patterns [Figure 16.4(b)],
the GP process also became economic for mass production: competition
between the SM and GP processes becomes more and more important.
Thus, the evolution of the cost structures for the GP process implies
a periodization of the diffusion process, the formal analysis of which is
presented in the following section.
16.3 Diffusion Trajectories in France
and the FRG
In Figure 16.5, which shows the output ofthe foundry industry in France and
the FRG, two important features can be observed and documented. First,
the evolution of the foundry industry follows a very similar path in terms of
output volume both in France and in the FRG. A period of saturation and
contracting markets followed the period of growth and expanding markets
and in each case the turning point occurred in the early 1970s. Second, since
1960, the GP process started to diffuse in the FRG while in France it was
locked out, and remained in a very minor market share position.
Figure 16.5 also shows that in the case of the FRG, the diffusion pat-
tern of the GP process was not influenced by the contraction in the global
market (Le., decline in output volume) of the industry. Furthermore, the
output figures of the GP process were apparently not affected by the strong
fluctuations in the total market volume. On the other hand the evolution
of the output of the SM process appears to follow closely the decreases in
global output volumes and market fluctuations.
It is our contention that it is important to differentiate in diffusion re-
search between two important situations with respect to the evolution of
the market in which technologies compete. In the first place, when the
market expands rapidly, diffusion takes place via differential growth rates,
Le., changing relative market shares are the result of one technology growing
faster than another. This is in sharp contrast to the diffusion of a technology
in a saturating, even declining market, as in our case. We maintain that un-
der such market conditions, effective diffusion calls for a higher comparative
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Figure 16.5. FRG and France: Casting by 8M and GP processes and total
market volume.
advantage than in the first case as diffusion can proceed only via replacing
existing capital vintages.
It is interesting to point out the situation in the FRG as shown in Fig-
ure 16.5. Despite strong market fluctuations the output figures of the GP
process evolve very regularly, i.e., they are not affected by short-term busi-
ness cycle variations in market volume. Conversely, the 8M process takes
the full burden and acts as the swing supplier, i.e., in response to demand
fluctuations.
It is our contention that the difference in behavior toward demand fluc-
tuations is indicative of a high comparative advantage differential between
the two processes in the FRG.
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16.3.1 In search of specific factors of diffusion in France
and the FRG
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The preceding discussion of the morphological structure of the technological
trajectories leads us to conclude that prior to 1970, the GP process could
compete only for the casting of small batch sizes. In a second period, after
a technological breakthrough involving the conditions of production of lost
patterns, the GP process (which corresponded then to the combinations of
parameters m and n) could effectively diffuse also in mass production and
compete with the SM process. Thus, in order to explain the differences be-
tween the national patterns of diffusion, it is necessary to divide the adoption
process of GP technology into two phases: the diffusion into the first market
niche of complex, small-series production; and the subsequent diffusion into
the mass production market.
The substitution curve, the parameters of which will be commented upon
in Section 16.3.2, is illustrated in Figure 16.6 and shows that a rapid sub-
stitution of the SM by the GP process in the first market niche of complex,
small-series production took place in the FRG during the period 1960-1975.
We must therefore explain the reasons for this rapid first diffusion period in
FRG and then identify its influence on the diffusion trajectory of the second
period.
Dynamics of Demand Structure and Profitability
The first driving force relates to the market niche for complex, small-series
production. This highly specialized market expanded rapidly in the FRG
in the early 1960s (this was not the case in France) and was (as discussed
at the beginning of Section 16.2) an important factor in the rapid diffusion
in the first phase. The documentation of this factor is, however, seriously
hampered owing to the absence of relevant statistics prior to 1970. A second
factor deals with the specific comparative (economic) performance ofthe GP
process in the FRG during the first diffusion period. Figure 16.7 depicts the
sharp differences between the relative value-added for the two processes, in
particular during the first phase of the diffusion of the GP process. The
low level (factor 1.1) of the comparative advantage (value-added) in France
could explain the disinterest by the French firms in the new process. Fur-
thermore, the evolution of the relative value-added between the GP and SM
processes (from 1.4 to 1.1) in the FRG between 1970 and 1987 correlates
with our hypothesis that two phases exist in the diffusion of the GP process.
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Figure 16.6. The substitution process of 8M by GP technology in the first
diffusion period (competition for small batch-size production only) in the
FRG.
During the first phase, the market niche is made up of complex, small-series
production and the comparative economic advantage of the GP process are
correspondingly higher than during the second phase of diffusion where it
approaches the value-added of mass production (Le., a relative value-added
ratio of 1).[3] Thus, the differential represents an initial explanation for the
rapid diffusion of the GP process in its first market niche in the FRG. One
question remains to be answered. How did the diffusion pattern in the FRG
in the first period influence the outcome of competition in the second period?
Knowledge Accumulation and Learning During the First Period
of Diffusion in the FRG
During the first period of diffusion the GP technology was rapidly adopted
in the FRG, in spite of the fact that its adoption entailed a strong tech-
nological breakthrough for the innovative firms. The fundamental feature
in this first diffusion phase is what occurred to some extent underground.
The first diffusion phase generated a process of accumulation of knowledge,
and included, via adequate institutional arrangements, the creation of a
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Figure 16.7. FRG and France: Relative value-added (profitability) between
the GP and 8M casting processes.
technological foundation in Ludwigshafen am Rhein, with strong participa-
tion by German firms (foundries and chemical enterprises). Research pro-
grams were oriented toward improvements in the use of polystyrene patterns
to produce metal castings and the systematic generation of minor innova-
tions, which were required for the industrialization of the GP process.
Thus, optimal pouring rate, adequate density of polystyrene, etc. were
systematically investigated. After the seminal conception of the process
(which can be interpreted as a jump in technical knowledge, Le., a break-
through, in our terminology), research programs were conducted in the
FRG to solve the technological problems which continually occurred during
the initial diffusion phase (Foray and Lebas, 1986). Thus, knowledge was
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accumulated during the first phase of diffusion also through an adequate
institutiunal arrangement. More generally, this initial diffusion in a highly
specialized market permitted the GP process to access, for the first time,
those mechanisms (cf. [2]) related to increasing returns to adoption, learn-
ing by using, economies of scale in production, and informational increas-
ing returns, while at the same time being protected by a high value-added
differential.
Thus, the first phase of diffusion facilitated a learning process, resulting
in the transformation of the technical process (from 0 to m or n, Figure
16.1), enlarging its initial functions, thus providing the basis for experimen-
tation, incremental improvement innovations, increasing returns to adoption,
etc., necessary for subsequent diffusion into the whole market niche.
The Dynamics of the Two Phases
As far as exiting from a lock-in situation is concerned, the German and
French examples are quite instructive. The lock-in concept allows us to
explain how a new and intrinsically superior technology may be impeded
from supplanting an older technology. This is supported by the following
quote:
New inventions are typically very primitive at the time of their births. Their
performance is usually poor, compared to existing (alternative) technolo-
gies as well as to their future performance [Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1983,
p. 147].
Thus, when a new technology is introduced in its initial (and therefore
primitive) form, it has virtually no chance of asserting itself, even if the old
technology is inherently inferior. The latter has profited from its monopo-
listic period and entrenched itself materially (via technological interrelated-
ness) and intellectually (via sui generis evaluation norms) as the dominant
productive paradigm. In this respect, our case study illustrates the crucial
importance of an initial diffusion in a highly specialized market in order to
overcome a technological lock-in. In this first period the new technology, pro-
tected by a high value-added differential, may improve within a quasi in vitro
environment. Thus shielded, the new technology acquires industrial proper-
ties via the mechanisms related to increasing returns to adoption, gradually
armoring itself for competition. Between 1950 and 1970, the GP process
improved in a virtually underground fashion in the FRGj it was later able
to enter the main competition arena under auspicious conditions. Having
missed the first phase, France is now missing the second one also.
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The diffusion of an innovation in a relatively minor market probably
represents a unique tool for preparing the new technology for competition
in its industry's major market. As Utterback (1987) suggests:
Because performance will be initially unreliable and costs higher, a new
technology will tend to start in a relatively small market niche where its
unique performance advantages are critical - one ordinarily not occupied
or of not great importance to the producers of the established product.
Crude as it is, the new technology will gain ground by competing in these
submarkets and its use will expand by means of its capture of a series of
them.
The specificity of the national diffusion trajectories in France (lock-out)
and the FRG (diffusion) is therefore based on the link between the two
phases. According to Silverberg (Chapter 8): "A technology policy that
does not take the interdependence of these two aspects into account will
always be inherently flawed."
16.3.2 The formal analysis of the diffusion trajectories
A formal analysis of the diffusion trajectories of the GP process in the FRG
through two successive market niches - small batch-size production prior to
1970 and mass production thereafter - is, however, seriously hampered by
the absence of relevant disaggregated production statistics. For the diffusion
trajectory within the first market niche for small batch-size production we
assumed that a constant volume of complex castings was produced in small
series in the FRG in the period prior to the mid-1970s in order to calculate
the fractional market share of the GP process. For the second phase of
diffusion we calculate the diffusion trajectory on the basis of the fractional
share in total (tonnage and value) autput. This is based on the conclusions
of the morphological analysis, which has yielded that the GP process is also
in effective competition for mass production in the post-1970 period.
Table 16.1 and Figure 16.8 summarize the quantification of the diffusion
trajectories in the case of the FRG, based on a simple Fisher-Pry type of
technological substitution model. The properties and underlying assump-
tions of this now classical model will not be repeated here; details on the
estimation algorithm used can be found in Griibler, Nakicenovic, and Posch
(1988).[4] In order to increase the analytical resolution of the formal de-
scription of the second phase of the diffusion (substitution) trajectory, we
have used, in addition to output tonnage, output value (measured in current
DM) by casting process in the period since 1970 (data source: Deutscher
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Table 16.1. Phases in the diffusion of the GP process in the casting industry
of the FRG: diffusion modela parameters.
Phase 1
(small batch-size
market niche),
period: 1960-1977
Phase 2
(total market
including mass
production) ,
period: 1970-1987
Fraction of GP
in tonnage output
fj"t = 13.1 (14.74)
to = 1967.8 (14.74)
n = 10
R2 =0.965
fj"t =52.4 (45.76)
to = 1997.7 (45.99)
n = 18
R2 = 0.992
Fraction of G P
in output value
No data
available
fj"t =61.58 (17.70)
to = 1997.9 (17.88)
n = 18
R2 = 0.991
a~t: diffusion parameter, time in years to grow from 10% to 90% market share; to:
inflection point (50% market share), time of maximum growth rate of market shares.
Values in parentheses refer to t statistics of estimated diffusion model parameters.
Gie6ereiverband, 1975, 1980, and 1987). The estimated diffusion parame-
ters are consistent between the two measures, with the diffusion rate of the
GP process calculated on the basis of output value being around 17 percent
slower than for output tonnage figures.
In keeping with the differential for the specific value-added (Le., DM per
kg of product) between the two process technologies discussed above, we
note that the diffusion rate of the GP process into the first market niche of
complex, small-series production is significantly faster (by a factor of 4) than
in the second phase of diffusion, Le., into the lower-value mass production
market niche. This indicates that in addition to the higher specific value-
added (as a proxy for its relative profitability) for the GP process technology
(at least 1.4 in 1970, and most likely larger in the period before), other
comparative economic advantages, such as lower production costs in small
series, are influential factors which help explain the rapid diffusion of the
GP process into the first market segment.
In Figure 16.8 we show the diffusion (substitution) trajectories in the
two successive market niches of the GP process. Particularly noticeable is
the regular pattern of the second diffusion phase since 1970. In order to
illustrate the decisive structural difference between the technological base
in the casting industry between the FRG and France, we have compared
the diffusion trajectory in the case of the FRG with the trajectory of the
market share fraction of the GP process in France, which appears locked
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Figure 16.8. The two diffusion phases of GP casting technology in the
FRG and its lock-out in France.
in at a constant market share fraction below the two percent level. Since
1986, however, this share has increased rather rapidly to the present level
of below eight percent of total casting tonnage in France. This could be a
first indication that the GP process might be at the beginning of a similar
diffusion takeoff as was the case in the FRG some decades earlier.
16.4 Patterns of Evolution
The study of the diffusion trajectories, which develop into a well-defined
morphological space allows us to reproduce finally the historical evolution of
the casting technology. In relation to the MA (Figure 16.1) we are only in-
terested now with the technical processes (located above the final branches in
Figure 16.1), as industrial applications of the various possible combinations
of parameters of the morphological space. However, the MA still remains the
basis for the construction of an evolutionary tree by identifying two principal
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alternatives (Le., the 8M process versus the GP process route). All morpho-
logical combinations possible will, however, not be described. Only those
that have actually evolved and diffused into the industry will be considered.
This last step of the analysis allows us to highlight some characteristics
of technical progress: its cumulative character (Le., evolution of trajectories
defined on the basis of stable morphological combinations) on the one hand,
and the localized character of learning processes on the other.
16.4.1 Construction of the graph
According to the result of the MA, two trajectories can be distinguished: 8M
processes (a, b, c, d) and GP processes (m, n). Both trajectories are based
on the stability of the PI parameter (Figure 16.1) concerning the nature of
the pattern. One trajectory describes the evolution of permanent pattern
technology, and the other, the evolution of lost pattern technology. Appari-
tions of new morphological combinations are indicated by ramifications (b
for 8M and r for GP), while all other improvements, which do not create
new morphological combinations, are incorporated simply by extending the
existing branches of the trajectories. We make use of a data base consisting
of 50 innovations in the foundry industry with a technical description and a
historical dating of their introduction.
16.4.2 Describing the dynamics of technology
Figure 16.9 emphasizes three key features:
• Clustering of chemical based innovations between 1955 and 1975: lost
molds predominantly or completely bonded by chemical means (devel-
opment of the existing trajectory by changes at the level of the P3 and
P4 parameters, see Figure 16.1).
• Emergence of a rival technology: the GP process (creation of a new
trajectory by changes at the level of the PI parameter).
• Clustering of physical based innovations between 1970 and 1985: lost
molds predominantly or completely bonded by physical means (develop-
ment of the existing trajectories by changes at the level of the P3 and P4
parameters) .
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Figure 16.9. Trajectories of the molding processes and clusters of innova-
tions (1945-1989).
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The First Cluster of Innovations
The figure shows a first cluster of innovations during the period 1955-1975.
This cluster was oriented toward the use of a chemical method for the stabi-
lization of the mold. Originally the chemical methods were used by applying
cement, CO 2 gas, oil sand, and shell molding (the croning process) (see bot-
tom of Figure 16.9). Then improvements in the application of inorganic
and organic binders determined a cluster of innovations (furan, alkyd, phe-
nolics, pep set, bentonite, thermoshoc, etc.). According to the MA, these
technological changes cannot be considered to be the emergence of a rival
technology (all morphological distances are inferior to the radius of graph
G). Since 1958, the GP process was used, but given its specific cost struc-
ture discussed above, it was devoted to small batch size and thus was not in
competition with the mass production of castings.
The Emergence of a Rival Technology
In 1970, significant improvements concerning the GP process occurred. In
particular rationalization in the production of lost patterns (pre-expansion
and molding processes of expandable polystyrene) made this process ade-
quate for mass production, so that the GP process (combination of param-
eters m) became substitutable for all existing SM processes (a, c, and d):
The future of the gasifiable pattern process appears to be in large produc-
tion runs using molded polystyrene patterns in unbonded sand. This is in
contrast to its original use which was in the production of large short run
castings [Bailey, 1982].
According to the MA, this technological change can be considered to be
the emergence of a rival technology, given the substitutability of the pro-
cesses and the morphological distance between the two competing processes
(superior to the radius of graph G).
The Second Cluster of Innovations
The cluster of physical based innovations (the use of vacuum and magnetic
fields) occurred after 1975, the year of the first industrial application of
magnetic molding. The magnetic molding was introduced both for SM pro-
cesses (magnetic molding, V process) and for GP processes. These technical
changes were based on new morphological combinations (b and n) without
altering the stability of both states of the P j parameter (i.e., the stability of
both main trajectories).
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16.4.3 The national patterns of evolution
Figure 16.10 shows the differences between the technological structures of
France and the FRG. This figure is consistent with the results of our pre-
vious analysis concerning the diffusion trajectories in France and in the
FRG. While the German pattern occupies the total area of the morpho-
logical space, the French structure leaves a large part uncovered, Le., the
GP trajectory is locked out.
16.5 Conclusion
Our case study was particularly appropriate in showing the advantage of
a morphological analysis (MA) approach in technological diffusion analysis.
Indeed, the MA of the structure of technological trajectories in the casting
industry (Figures 16.1 and 16.2) avoids any misinterpretation concerning
the asymmetrical character and the discontinuities of the diffusion trajectory
of the GP process. On the basis of the morphological space of molding
technologies, we can establish that the molding process under consideration
(GP) cannot be thought of as a unique unaltered artifact throughout the
period of diffusion. In fact, there are two diffusion trajectories corresponding
to two combinations of parameters and therefore to two successive market
niches. This breakdown into two periods allowed an exit from a lock-in
situation by emphasizing the crucial nature of the first period of diffusion,
where knowledge is accumulated and a process of learning within a quasi in
vitro environment occurs, allowing a rival technology to develop capable of
competing within the industry's entire market.
Notes
[1] Notions of arborescence and tree are used here in their specific meaning of graph
theory.
[2] The theory of lock-in effects (Arthur, 1989) provides a clear understanding of the
mechanisms (increasing returns to adoption) by which a technology may over-
come its rivals and how it then generates its own defense mechanisms against -
even inherently superior - technologies. The principal sources of the increasing
returns to adoption are: learning by using, network externalities, economies of
scale in production, informational increasing returns, technological interrelat-
edness, and the production of ad hoc evaluation norms. The last two sources
allow us to explain the phenomena of maintaining mature technologies in the
long term.
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Figure 16.10. National patterns for the trajectories of the molding pro-
cesses (mass production).
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[3] Clearly, the nominal value-added differential illustrated in Figure 16.7 should be
presented in real terms. However, the estimation of real price deflators faces the
difficulty that both the structure of the market and the product are changing
(as demonstrated in the discussion above) and are consequently not reflected
appropriately in the price index published by the industry.
[4] The use of the Fisher-Pry model to describe the diffusion of the GP process in
two distinct periods is based on the argument that the theoretical structure of
this model is appropriate for taking into account this mix between a phenomenon
of continuity and a two-period analysis. However, the question of the use ofother
types of diffusion models (thresholdjprobit models) still remains open.
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Chapter 17
Competition and
Complementarity in
Diffusion: The Case of
Octane
Robert U. Ayres and Ike Ezekoye
17.1 Introduction
The standard ontogenic (life-cycle) model of technological evolution can be
characterized briefly as follows (Ayres, 1987): (1) a radical invention (birth)
creates a new technology; (2) it is commercialized on the basis of performance
and rapidly developed by a series of improvements and modifications (in-
fancy); (3) it is successful enough in the marketplace to attract many vari-
ants and imitators who hope to exploit a growing market (adolescence);
(4) the pace of technological change finally slows down enough to permit
standardization and exploitation of economies of scale, and competition on
the basis of price rather than performance (maturity); and finally a new
and better technology supplants it (senescence).
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The standard model involves substitutions in the adolescent and senes-
cent stages. During the adolescent stage, the new and dynamic technology
is gradually penetrating the markets of its predecessor. During the senes-
cent stage it, in turn, is being displaced from its markets by its successor.
The substitution of a new technology for an older one is often modeled as
a deterministic process, following a simple mathematical formula such as a
logistic function or a Gompertz curve (see, for example, Linstone and Sahal,
1976; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Mahajan and Wind, 1986).
However, complex social systems - including the system of innovation,
adoption and diffusion of technology - are inherently nonlinear. As such,
they must be expected to exhibit the characteristics of nonlinear dynamical
systems. Among these characteristics is the occurrence of non-equilibrium
steady-state behaviors (such as limit cycles and quasi-periodic motion) that
temporarily emulate the behavior of simpler systems, but eventually depart
from it (Crutchfield et al., 1986). In short, social systems cannot be expected
to always behave in accordance with any given simple model. Indeed, simple
behavior, when it does occur, is likely to be an example of non-equilibrium
steady state. Hence, from the standpoint of fundamental dynamical theory
it seems likely that more can be learned by analyzing cases where the simple
models fail than cases where they seem to work well (e.g., Fisher and Pry,
1971).
In particular, the simple deterministic substitution model that is nor-
mally assumed assumes that a substitution process, once it has proceeded
past a certain threshold, inevitably proceeds to completion (unless it is inter-
rupted by a further substitution). This implies the existence of an underlying
self-reinforcing (lock-in) mechanism of some sort. Such mechanisms are in-
trinsically nonlinear in nature. A number of examples have been examined
by Arthur (1983, 1988a, and 1988b). Obviously, the large number of cases
where the substitution process has proceeded according to this script can be
regarded as indirect evidence of the pervasiveness of self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms. Yet, there are significant exceptions. Such a case is the subject of this
chapter. We examine the technological evolution of fuels for spark-ignition
internal combustion engines (e.g., automobile engines) since the beginning of
the present century. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some possi-
ble explanations for the failure of "antiknock" additives to displace cracking
as a means of raising gasoline octane, or conversely.
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17.2 Historical Background
The automobile had no single inventor. It is usually traced to early mod-
els by Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach, and Karl Benz (ca. 1885).
For the next twenty years and more, automobiles were essentially toys for
the rich and adventurous. It was not until after 1905 (the year Ford Motor
Co. was founded) that automobiles were technologically developed enough
to be useful for simple transportation purposes. Even then, for many years,
they remained expensive, unreliable and uncomfortable. However, by 1908
the dominant technological trajectory had been determined and the indus-
try, led by Ford, began to standardize. The enormously successful Model
T was introduced in 1908, which symbolically marks the end of the "child-
hood" phase of the auto industry and the beginning of adolescence and
consolidation.
This chapter is not about autos, however, but about motor fuel. The
relevance of the previous paragraph is simply that after 1908 demand for cars
- and, consequently for gasoline - began to rise rapidly. It is important to
note that in the earliest days automotive fuel was so-called natural gasoline, a
medium volatility product of crude oil refining, consisting of fractions boiling
in the range between 0-70° C and an octane of 72-75. But this light fraction
averages only about 2.4% (by weight) of North American crude and no more
than 4.7% of middle-Eastern crude.[l] To increase the output of motor
fuel, early refineries blended natural gasoline with the next heavier fraction,
naphtha, boiling in the range 70-140° C, but with less desirable combustion
properties. The blend had an octane level of around 50. For North American
crude oils the naphtha fraction averages 6.5% by weight (7.9% for middle-
Eastern crude). Thus, while local details differed, petroleum refiners in the
USA ca. 1910 could only utilize around 9% of their crude oil, by weight,
directly for motor fuel.
At the time (1910), 9% of the crude oil was still adequate to supply the
automotive demand, inasmuch as there were as yet relatively few vehicles
on the roads. Indeed, the biggest market for petroleum products was still
illuminating oil (kerosene), which constituted about 15.6% of the weight of
the refinery product stream. However the heavier, lower-value fractions, gas
oil (now known as heavy distillate, diesel oil, or heating oil), and residual
oil together still constituted 75% of the refinery output. Gas oil, alone,
accounted for about 60% of the product. There were already significant
incentives to add value to the heavy fractions by somehow converting them
into lighter fractions.
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The breakup of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (NJ) in 1911 triggered
a major innovation, the thermal cracking process. The chief inventor and
innovator of the process was William Burton, a vice president of one of
the spinoffs from Standard Oil, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana (now renamed
Amoco). With its refineries on the shores of Lake Michigan, and its major
market the rapidly growing Chicago metropolitan area, Indiana Standard
was faced with an exceptionally rapidly growing market area, together with a
rather limited access to crude oi1.[2] A new technology promising to increase
the fraction of crude oil that could be used for motor fuel was very welcome.
Burton's thermal cracking process - heating a batch of heavy gas oil
in a closed tank or retort - effectively converted about 20% of the gas oil
into a light fraction suitable for blending with natural gasoline and naph-
tha. This effectively doubled the output of motor gasoline from about 9%
to around 21 %, while simultaneously increasing its research octane (RON)
rating from 50 to 55. The Burton process was first introduced in 1913-1914
and was enormously profitable to refiners. For this reason it was rapidly
adopted by others (Figure 17.1). It also set off a great wave of competi-
tive invention and innovation, since other oil companies did not like paying
the high royalties demanded by Indiana Standard for what was, essentially
a very simple invention. Burton and his colleagues began to improve their
first crude batch process. Meanwhile, others entered the field with ideas for
continuous thermal processes and (later) catalytic processes.
Table 17.1 summarizes the major innovations in refining after 1913 and
Figure 17.2 indicates the succession of substitutions in refinery technology in
quantitative terms, as each technology replaced its predecessor and was, in
turn, replaced. (Data for these exhibits has been taken primarily from Enos,
1962, and Lakhani, 1975). It is noteworthy that the substitutions displayed
in Figure 17.2 do seem to fit the standard ontogenic model reasonably well.
From the standpoint of the octane industry, Burton's radical innovation
of 1913 marks the date of birth. But, what makes this case complicated
(and interesting) is that there were two different - and noncomplementary
- market interests and consequently two driving forces involved. The first,
as suggested above, was the petroleum refineries' direct economic interest
in increasing the output of high-value motor fuel per barrel of crude oil.
Doubling the output of motor fuel per barrel from 9% to 20-21 % meant,
in effect, that less than half the amount of crude oil had to be discovered,
pumped, shipped, and distilled to yield the same amount of salable product.
The second market interest - which created a demand for higher octane
per se - was shared by the automobile users and manufacturers, but was
il
Ii
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Table 17.1. Summary of major cracking technologies.
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Name
Burton batch
thermal
cracking
process, Indiana
Standard,
1913-1914
Continuous tube
fj tank thermal
cracking process
(Clark, ESSO,
1922). Dubbs
process (UOP,
1922). Cross
process (1922).
Houdry fixed
bed (batch)
catalytic
cracking process
(Sun Oil,
Socony-
Vacuum,
1938)
Continuous
fluidized bed
catalytic
cracking process
(ESSO et al.,
Mobil, Houdry)
Specific economic
advantage over
predecessor
Increased octane to
about 60 and
motor gasoline
yield per bbl of
petroleum from
about 9% to 21%
or so.
Better suited to
scale-up than batch
process; increased
octane to 72, mpg
by 22% and output
per unit of capital
by 50%. Reduced
process energy by
20%.
Increased gasoline
yield to 40% of
crude, octane to
72. Cut process
energy by 2/3.
Better suited to
scale-up than batch
process; increased
octane to 93-95.
Factors driving innovation
Indiana Standard was created by the
court ordered breakup of Jersey
Standard; it was left with refining and
distribution, but little crude supply.
Demand in Chicago area was rising
imperative to stretch each barrel.
ESSO wanted to invent around
Indiana Standard's processes and to
invalidate other patents (e.g., Cross).
Universal Oil Products (UOP) was
created by a group of regional refiners
to invent around Indiana Standard's
patents because they were unable to
license because they were in the same
marketing area. UOP sued Indiana
Standard to preempt.
Initial research in France was
prompted by fears of shortages and
lack of crude oil in Europe: Backing
by Sun Oil Co. was due to a glut of
heavy fuel oil and Sun's market niche
with a single grade gasoline of higher
octane than its competitors.
Catalytic Research Associates was
formed by Esso, with BP, Shell,
Texaco, UOP, MW Kellogg and IG
Farben to invent around the Houdry
fixed bed process. Members of the
syndicate could avoid royalties on the
process. Mobil developed its own
process for the same reason.
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Figure 17.1. Cracking capacity as percent of total crude oil production
capacity. (Source: Lakhani, 1975, p. 54.)
to some extent contrary to the interests of the petroleum companies. The
conflict and its resolution are part of this story. The inherent characteristics
of internal combustion engines are such that both output power and ther-
modynamic efficiency are functions of the compression ratio of the engine.
Thus, high compression engines offer better performance for the car. The
compression ratio is the ratio of the volume of combustion products after
expansion (exhaust gases) to the volume of the fuel-air mixture at the point
of ignition. Since the exhaust gases must be at atmospheric pressure, this is
also a measure of the amount of compression in the engine.
For a spark-ignition engine - in contrast to a Diesel engine - the maxi-
mum compression is not limited by the geometry of the cylinder and crank-
shaft, or the tightness of the piston-rings, as might be expected, but by the
tendency of the engine to knock or ping, which cuts power output sharply
and can cause damage. Knocking means the octane level of the fuel being
used is not high enough to operate at the design compression ratio. The at-
tribute that permits higher compression is called the research octane number
or RON, or simply octane. It varies considerably from fuel to fuel, depend-
ing on its chemical structure, oxygen content and other factors. In general,
higher octane fuels permitted higher compression engines, which permitted
better automotive performance as well as fuel economy. Figure 17.3 shows
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the historical progression of octanes from 1930 until 1970, while Figure 17.4
shows the close parallel with increasing engine compression ratios.
Increasing fuel economy (due to increased octane levels) meant that gaso-
line sales in volume terms did not increase as fast as automobile usage. On
the other hand, every increase in automotive performance attracted more
first-time buyers of automobiles, and each additional vehicle in the fleet
meant a guaranteed demand for gasoline throughout the life ofthe car. Thus,
the petroleum industry had a somewhat contradictory interest in the octane
race. On the one hand, as long as petroleum supplies were ample, better
fuel economy was not in its direct economic interest. On the other hand, it
did share the interest of the automobile manufacturers in attracting more
and more people to buy cars, because the more cars people bought the more
motor fuel the refiners could sell.
This conflict between short- and long-term interests on the part of the
petroleum refiners had one direct implication, however. Given the possibility
of increasing octane levels independently of changes in refining technology,
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vis-a-vis the possibility of increasing octane levels in conjunction with in-
creasing the fraction of the crude oil that could be utilized for motor fuel, the
latter was vastly preferable for the refiners. This preference explains much
of the history of the octane race. Of course, the technology of increasing
octane levels independently of refinery practice was introduced in the early
1920s. We discuss this next.
17.3 The Introduction of Tetraethyl Lead
The search for an antiknock additive for gasoline began in 1916, when engine
compression ratios averaged only 4:1, yet knocking was a pervasive problem
due to the low octane level of the motor fuels then available. At the time,
however, the cause was not known. Charles Kettering's battery ignition sys-
tem had been introduced only a few years earlier, and rival magneto ignition
system manufacturers blamed it for knock. To counter this ploy (and find
the real explanation, and a solution to the problem), Kettering and his col-
leagues Thomas Midgley, Thomas Boyd, and Carroll Hochwalt launched a
research program at his Dayton Engineering Laboratories. It was subsidized
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Figure 17.4. Automobile engine compression ratios.
by General Motors Corporation (GM), which later purchased Dayton Engi-
neering Labs., (now known as DELCO Division) and made Kettering Vice
President and chief scientist.
The first step was to test Midgley's theory that fuel volatility was the
cause of the problem. (This had seemed plausible because increased de-
mand for motor fuel had been met by increased blending of natural gasoline
with less volatile naphtha). Volatility was ruled out by the end of 1916.
Next, Kettering had a hunch that fuel color[3] might have an influence on
knocking. This was quickly tested by adding various coloring agents to the
fuel. The color theory was quickly discarded, but one of the chemical agents
tested was iodine, which did have a measurably beneficial effect on knock-
ing. For the next five years hundreds of compounds were tested, and some
possible antiknock compounds were found, including aniline, selenium, and
tellurium. They were all rejected for various reasons (such as odor). Finally,
in December 1921, tetraethyllead (TEL) was synthesized by Hochwalt. As
an antiknock additive it has never been equalled, despite many millions of
dollars of subsequent research by the German chemical cartel IG Farben.
For TEL to become a practical fuel additive, a manufacturing process
was needed. This was developed by Charles Kraus, whose research was sup-
ported by Standard Oil Co., NJ. The GM patents on TEL and the Standard
Oil Co., NJ manufacturing patents were consolidated by the formation of
Ethyl Corporation in 1924, jointly owned by GM and Standard Oil Co., NJ.
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Another problem that had to be overcome was the corrosion of spark plugs
by lead oxide deposits. This was finally overcome by the addition of ethylene
dichloride and ethylene dibromide in the additive. The latter, in turn, re-
quired a large and reliable source of bromine, which was finally achieved by
the commercialization of the Dow process to extract bromine from seawater
(1931).
From 1924 to 1930 the Ethyl Corporation was primarily involved in R&D,
testing, advertising and marketing premium or Ethyl gasoline and building
up its distribution network. Meanwhile, GM was actively promoting the
higher performance cars that the new fuel made possible. Whether for this
reason, or others, it was during this period that GM overtook Ford as the
major US auto manufacturer.
Sales of TEL (in the form of ethyl fluid sold by Ethyl Corporation to
refineries, and blended by the latter into commercial gasoline) took off. Mo-
tor fuel (gasoline) sales more than quadrupled from 1929 to 1967, with only
a slight decline even in the worst year of the depression. Meanwhile, the
average content of lead in grams per gallon of gasoline increased ten-fold
and almost monotonically during the depression years (from 0.17 gmjgal. in
1929 to 1.75 gmjgal. in 1939) and reached an all-time peak of 4.71 gmjga1.
in the wartime year of 1944. It hovered in the 3.5-3.9 range in the late 1960s
before the first restrictions on TEL use - for environmental reasons - became
effective. The average lead use, per gallon of gasoline used on highways, is
shown in Figure 17.5.
17.4 Relative Contributions of Refining and TEL
In terms of the life-cycle model referred to briefly at the beginning of this
chapter, one would expect the long-term competition between refinery tech-
nology and additives (notably TEL) to result in a clear superiority of one
over the other, resulting in a well-defined displacement or substitution pro-
cess. Before this hypothesis can be tested, however, we need a methodology
for allocating the apparent octane added in each year (defined as octane per
gallon above the base level of 50) among the various sources. From 1929 to
1970, roughly, the competition was strictly between refining and TEL. Since
the environmental constraints on TEL have been gradually implemented, a
new set of additives - basically alcohols - have appeared on the scene. These
will be discussed later.
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Figure 17.5. Lead use rate (grams/gallon). (Sources: Lead use: US Bu-
reau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, var. vols.; fuel consumption: US Federal
Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, var. vols.)
There are two straightforward methodologies for estimating the octane-
added, as defined above. Both start from the average octane level of fuel sold
in a given year (see Figure 17.3). One approach is to use a lead susceptibility
chart prepared by the Ethyl Corporation to determine the octane gain from
a given amount of lead additive, based on the octane level of the base fuel,
Le., the gasoline as obtained from the refinery process alone. The chart
in question is shown as Figure 17.6. It can be used to estimate the base
fuel octane from the quantity of lead added (in grams per gallon). This
method assumes, of course, that lead is added to average base fuel. In
reality, high octane gasoline from some refineries has always been sold as
unleaded premium, as long ago as the late 1930s.[4] This tends to lower the
average octane level of the base fuel to which TEL was added, distorting the
average picture somewhat.
On the other hand, the alternative approach - which can be termed
"process accounting" - is to calculate the average octane of the base fuel
from the fraction of gasoline produced by each refinery process in each year
and the octane produced by that process. For purposes of this analysis
we have assumed the octane levels indicated in Table 17.1, namely, Burton
batch thermal cracking (55 RON), continuous thermal cracking (73 RON),
Houdry batch catalytic (87 RON), continuous catalytic or fluidic (95 RON).
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Here there are three difficulties. The first is the same as the one noted
above, viz., some high octane refinery products fuels have been sold directly
as lead-free premium gasoline without added lead. The second problem is
that the average octane number associated with each process is only approx-
imate. Moreover, apart from the four main types of cracking process, refin-
ers have had, since the 1930s, a variety of other octane-enhancing processes
available, including hydrogenation, polymerization, alkylation, hydrogen re-
forming and catalytic reforming. In fact, each refinery is unique in its mix of
processes and products. The third problem is that we do not have published
data on production by process, but only on capacity by process. On the
average, over a long period of time, the two probably track together roughly,
but on a year-to-year basis there are likely to be significant variations as
some types of capacity are more highly utilized than others.[5] Apart from
wartime distortions, during the early years of penetration of a new process
one might expect some debugging troubles to reduce capacity utilization;
this is the pattern observed in other cases of new process introduction. By
contrast, in the late stages of a displacement, a refiner might keep an old
depreciated plant on-stream and available, but operating at a low level just
in case of a sudden upsurge in demand. Thus, one would tend to expect
capacity utilization levels for a new process technology to start at moderate
levels, rising gradually due to learning by doing until fairly late in the life of
that technology, before dropping to rather low levels immediately prior to
being phased out.
For the several reasons given above, the two ways of estimating base
fuel octane levels would not be expected to agree exactly. Of the two, the
lead susceptibility method would appear to be more reliable. In fact, the
agreement between the two methods is not remarkably close (Table 17.2).
Using both methods of calculating refinery octane, the share of added octane
attributable to refining technology versus that attributable to the addition
of TEL is plotted in Figure 17.7. The results are very interesting, especially
when the lead susceptibility chart is used to calculate base octane level.
Starting in the late 1920s, the TEL share began to rise rapidly (except for the
single relapse in 1932) to the 50% level, or more, which it held throughout
the 1930s and even increased to a peak of 66% in the war year of 1944.
Thereafter the TEL share began to drop, falling to 36% in 1950, with a
slight pickup to 40% in 1953, followed by a further fall to a low point of 17%
in 1963. Yet it rebounded once again to the 32% level in 1967.
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Table 17.2. Refinery and actual octane plus additive share.
Addi- Addi- Addi-
Refinery Refinery Refinery Actual Actual tive tive tive
octane
Q
octaneb octaneC octane octaneC shareQ shareb sharec
1930 64.0 60.50 67.5 0.200 0.400
1931 63.5 60.88 67.0 0.206 0.360
1932 69.0 61.00 72.0 0.136 0.500
1933 63.5 61.25 72.0 0.386 0.489
1934 60.0 61.50 72.5 0.556 0.489
1935 60.0 61.75 72.5 0.556 0.478
1936 60.0 61.88 73.0 0.565 0.483
1937 60.0 62.00 75.0 0.600 0.520
1938 63.0 62.13 77.0 0.519 0.551
1939 63.0 62.38 77.0 0.519 0.541
1940 62.0 62.63 77.0 0.556 0.532
1941 63.0 62.75 78.2 0.539 0.548
1942 63.0 63.00 79.2 0.555 0.555
1943 63.0 63.38 81.5 0.587 0.575
1944 60.0 65.75 79.6 0.662 0.468
1945 61.0 66.98 79.5 0.627 0.424
1946 68.0 67.75 82.7 0.450 0.457
1948 66.5 68.25 82.5 0.492 0.438
1949 69.0 69.00 83.8 0.438 0.438
1950 74.0 70.25 85.88 0.331 0.436
1951 73.0 71.00 85.95 0.360 0.416
1952 73.0 71.75 86.75 0.374 0.408
1953 73.0 74.25 87.50 0.387 0.353
1957 82.0 79.75 92.20 0.242 0.295
1958 83.0 80.38 93.45 0.241 0.301
1959 85.0 80.82 94.00 0.205 0.300
1962 87.0 82.13 94.90 0.176 0.284
1963 87.0 82.50 95.10 0.180 0.279
1966 81.0 83.75 95.65 0.321 0.261
1967 81.0 83.50 84.1 95.83 92.25 0.324 0.269 0.193
1970 84.6 92.25 0.181
1975 85.4 90.63 0.129
1978 85.8 90.00 0.105
1979 86.0 89.60 0.091
1980 86.2 88.72 0.065
1981 86.3 88.60 0.060
1982 86.5 88.50 0.052
1983 86.6 88.55 0.051
1984 86.7 88.60 0.049
1985 86.7 88.50 0.047
1986 86.7 88.67 0.051
1987 86.8 88.61 0.047
QMethod 1. bMethod 2. CExtended series.
R. U. Ayres and I. Ezekoye 447
........
1980 19901970
' ..
196019501940
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
o-+---,---------r----r----......---,-------,
1930
ILl
l:
"'t:
o
"tl
ILl
"tl
"tl
"'l:
~
"'..c:If)
--- Additive Share (Method 1)
•••••••• Additive Share (Method 2)
........ Additive Share (Extended Series)
1. Prior to 1970 only additive was TEL
2. Octane level of 50 in 1920 assumed
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17.5 Discussion and Conclusions
How can this behavior be explained at all, still less fitted into the conven-
tional substitution picture? As noted earlier, one normally expects the supe-
rior technology to gradually displace the inferior one, following an S-curve
or some similar path. In the present case, TEL became dominant rather soon
after its introduction, but did not replace cracking, or even slow down its rate
of adoption. In fact, since the 1940s the trend has been the other way. TEL
has subsequently been displaced very largely by more advanced cracking and
other refining technologies and new additives (Figure 17.8). This trend was
well advanced even before the environmental regulations restricting the use
of TEL.
On the other hand, neither of the alternatives has ever entirely displaced
the other. Even as TEL was phased out, other octane-enhancing additives
have begun to replace it (Figure 17.8, Table 17.3). If there are economies
of scale or economies of adoption favoring lock-in to either approach, e.g.,
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Figure 17.8. Percentage contribution of different additives.
Arthur (1988a), they are evidently compensated for by diseconomies (de-
clining marginal returns), possibly associated with high-severity petroleum
refining. No matter how sophisticated the refinery technology, it is appar-
ently always economical (in the narrow sense) to gain additional octane by
the addition of some TEL, or one of the alcohols. By the same token, there
are also declining marginal returns to the use of TEL, or other additives,
beyond a certain point. Thus the two technologies, while somewhat compet-
itive, are also to some extent complementary.
Apart from the issue of complementarity, noted above, it is important
also to observe that one of the two technologies, cracking, was evolving
rapidly while the other remained static until regulation forced a change. In
fact TEL is one of the few examples of a technology which essentially did
not evolve at all after introduction. Its diffusion process was therefore pure,
and not the more commonplace combination of technological change and
diffusion together. Are there other cases like this one? Quite certainly there
are, inasmuch as declining marginal returns and complementarity are not
rare phenomena in economics.[6]
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Table 17.3. Percentage contribution of different additives.
TBA plus
TEL Toluene Ethanol TBA Methanola MTBE
1967 100.0
1970 100.0
1975 97.3 2.7
1978 91.4 3.8b 1.0
1979 89.2 7.2 0.4 2.5 0.1 0.6
1980 86.3 6.8 1.2 2.5 0.8 2.5
1981 76.8 9.3 2.2 3.7 3.1 4.9
1982 74.9 6.9 6.0 2.5 4.0 5.7
1983 71.0 6.6 10.9 1.8 3.0 6.6
1984 65.1 7.2 15.5 1.0 3.3 7.9
1985 57.8 7.3 22.5 0.3 1.4 10.7
1986 17.6 12.0 41.2 29.2
1987 12.2 9.4 36.1 42.2
aFar methanol, add (TBA plus methanol) to MTBE.
bMethyl manganese tricasbonyl (MMT) accounted for 3.8% (or 44% of additives used in
unleaded gasoline in 1978). MMT was banned in 1978 by the EPA.
Notes
[1] In fact, for two early Pennsylvania refineries for which data is available -
Pratt's and Downer's - the gasoline output was only 1.5% of the output stream
(Williamson and Daum, 1959).
[2] Indiana Standard had oil wells in Indiana and Illinois, but the reserves were not
large. The breakup of Jersey Standard left the parent company in possession of
Humble Oil Co., with its large Texas crude oil reserves.
[3] Kettering was inspired by the red-green natural dyes in plants, such as the trail-
ing arbutus, and an apparent relationship between leaf color and early blooming
(Raymond, 1980).
[4] For instance, premium Sunoco "Blue" was made directly from the Houdry cat-
alytic process; in the 1960s Amoco sold a premium lead-free gasoline of very
high octane.
[5] During World War II this distorted the picture significantly, inasmuch as the
demand for high octane aviation gasoline soared, soaking up virtually all of the
refinery capacity for catalytic cracking. As a consequence, old thermal cracking
plants were kept in service and the base octane level of fuels used by the civilian
sector declined sharply. It was made up, in part, by extraordinarily high use of
TEL, as shown in Figure 17.5.
[6] Another fairly obvious example is the complementarity between the basic oxygen
furnace (BOF) and the electric arc furnace (EAF) in steel-making. The one
converts pig iron from ore and scrap, but the other converts scrap only. The
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balance between them depends on the scrap supply. On reflection, it must be
clear that every coproduct relationship corresponds to some complementarity.
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Chapter 18
Diffusion: Long-term
Patterns and Discontinuities
Arnulf Grubler
18.1 Introduction
The characteristic S-shaped diffusion pattern and the resulting rates of dif-
fusion are a macroaggregate of an underlying complexity of adoption causes.
Diffusion is therefore not a unary process. Instead, diffusion phenomena are
probably best conceptualized as proceeding through various stages of a diffu-
sion life cycle. In each ofthese stages the process is characterized by different
market niches, different determinants of diffusion, and different relationships
to other diffusion processes - both of a competitive and interdependent na-
ture. Diffusion processes should therefore be analyzed based on multivariate
(Le., considering an innovation diffusion case not in isolation) and multiat-
tribute (i.e., using a number of measures to describe diffusion trajectories
and developing comprehensive vectors of driving variables) approaches.
This multistage view of diffusion also raises the question of whether the
term diffusion in any way captures the essence of most processes of tech-
nological or social/institutional change. Hardly any innovation diffuses into
a vacuum. Along its growth trajectory an innovation interacts with ex-
isting techniques, depends on the development of a mediating framework
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for its effective absorption into the socio-technical system, and changes its
technological, economic, and social characteristics. From such a multistage
perspective, diffusion is probably best described as an "evolution resulting
from a sequence of replacements" (Montroll, 1978), Le., as a succession of
substitutions along various specific (expanding) market niches.
If diffusion is defined as a sequence of replacements, one must analyze
these processes comprehensively. It appears that much of the debate on the
appropriate mathematical model(s) of diffusion, in particular the question
of symmetrical versus asymmetrical diffusion models, may be the result of
looking at an innovation from a unary (Le., an innovation grows into a
vacuum) or a binary (the market share of an innovation is analyzed vis-
a-vis the remainder of the competing technologies) perspective. However,
diffusion phenomena generally call for a multivariate approach, which has
not yet found wide application in the various diffusion disciplines.
Diffusion and substitution phenomena can be observed along spatial and
temporal hierarchies. They range from very short-term processes, such as the
rapid spread (and disappearance) offashion gadgets, to extremely long-term,
pervasive transformations in the technological and social fabric as reflected
in the growth of infrastructures or new forms of social and institutional
organizations. Whereas shorter-term diffusion processes operate within a
more or less equilibrium configuration, very long-term and pervasive diffusion
processes are of an evolutionary, non-equilibrium type nature because they
profoundly transform the very boundary conditions of the system within
which they operate.
Although well established in geography, the importance of the spatial
hierarchy of diffusion processes appears to have found only limited attention
in the technological and marketing diffusion research disciplines. Yet con-
sideration of the spatial hierarchy of diffusion processes could yield useful
insight into the differences in diffusion rates and levels.
When analyzing the diffusion of large, pervasive systems, whose growth
and interaction phases with other innovations span from several decades
to centuries, one observes that these systems are not introduced nor grow
and/or substitute for existing techniques and artifacts in a continuous way.
An empirical investigation into the diffusion history of many processes of
technological, economic, and social change in the USA reveals very strong
nonlinearities, resulting from the discontinuous rate innovations are intro-
duced and become absorbed into a socioeconomic system. The timing of
these discontinuities are closely related to important historical turning points
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identified by researchers of the long-term Wechsellagen of economic develop-
ment, pointing to a deeper causal relationship between the rate of acceptance
(diffusion) and the rate of interaction (substitution) of pervasive social and
technological innovations with successive phases and discontinuities of eco-
nomic growth.
Despite the vast body of diffusion literature, our knowledge of the deter-
minants of diffusion and substitution phenomena in different markets, prod-
ucts, and geographical spaces, as well as the differences and/or convergence
of diffusion trajectories at national levels, is still fragmented and insufficient.
A systematic collection of quantitative diffusion studies from different dif-
fusion disciplines based on comparable measures and the development of a
taxonomy appears necessary in order to advance the understanding of diffu-
sion phenomena.
18.2 Phases of Diffusion
Economic, social, and technological development may be seen as being driven
both by the introduction offundamentally new solutions (basic innovations)
and by incremental improvements in existing techniques and systems (prod-
uct and process innovations). Although an overlap exists, it is important
to distinguish between the two because it is the basic innovations that ex-
pand existing feasibility frontiers. In some cases they are pervasive, spilling
over across many sectors, creating even entirely new industries and growth
sectors. Over time, however, there is a gradual transition in the diffusion
process from basic innovations that initially lead to the creation of new in-
dustries, to incremental improvements, and to product innovations as the
diffusion process matures.
The early phase of the diffusion process is characterized by a highly
volatile environment. Diffusion is primarily performance rather than price
driven. The initial rate of adoption is usually slow, although monopoly
opportunities arise for innovative entrepreneurs in a rapidly changing en-
vironment with a large diversity of competing designs that improve their
technical and economic characteristics. As competition begins, one particu-
lar technological variant becomes dominant and standardization emerges in
the new industry. Initial random fluctuations may result in the prevalence of
a particular design that becomes perpetuated and amplified with increasing
returns to adoption and the economic advantages of initial standardization,
i.e., the lock-in effect of Arthur (1983). This lock-in effect usually occurs
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after an innovation has diffused into its first niche of application, which pro-
vides the experimental field for further technological improvements and cost
reductions. In the case of pervasive systems, this first phase of diffusion
is equally characterized by the development and emergence of a matching
technological style (Perez, 1983), in the sense of an associated set of best
technological and engineering practices (i.e., what has been referred to as a
technological trajectory (Dosi, 1983; Nelson and Winter, 1982), as well as
the emergence of a supportive social and institutional framework for perva-
sive diffusion (Freeman and Perez, 1988). Diffusion in this initial first phase
can be rather fast, when adoption externalities, e.g., in the form of existing
infrastructures, enable the rapid integration of a new technique or artifact
within an existing technical or social context.
This first diffusion phase usually ends with the emergence of a dominant
design and an accompanying increasing standardization. Emphasis shifts to
incremental improvements and small cumulative innovations. Economies of
scale and cost reductions along the learning curve sustain a rapid expan-
sion phase of exponential growth rates, characteristic of the second phase in
the diffusion of pervasive systems. Applications spill over to other sectors,
generating additional positive feedback for sustained growth. The steady ac-
cumulation of benefits to both producers and consumers produces a vicious
cycle (Brooks, 1986) of declining costs and expanding demand, which erects
almost insurmountable barriers to the entry of new competitors (economic
agents or potentially superior technologies or designs).
Nonetheless with gradual maturation many disadvantages become appar-
ent. Cumulative and incremental improvements yield decreasing marginal
returns and eventually market saturation sets in. Adverse social or envi-
ronmental effects often increase nonlinearly with the scale of application of
technology, so that the margin between social benefits and costs decreases
rapidly, sometimes even producing net social costs. The social and institu-
tional response to the attainment of limits of the dominant modes of develop-
ment and growth can also be rather disruptive. Increasing awareness of social
disbenefits and risks and the exhaustion of further incremental productiv-
ity and performance improvements constrain further diffusion. At the same
time the saturation phase provides an opportunity window for a renewed
period of experimentation and introduction of alternative technological and
organizational solutions.
Some of the most important changes in socio-institutional frameworks
and economic structure since the onset of the Industrial Revolution are in-
deed related to the pervasive adoption of new systems. Their adoption did
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not, however, always follow a smooth continuous classical diffusion trajec-
tory nor can they be analyzed in isolation from other diffusion processes. For
example, the diffusion of motor vehicles was contingent on the development
of numerous other systems, such as paved roads, the internal-combustion
engine, oil refining and motor fuels, sheet metals and high-quality steels,
and electrical equipment among others.
The importance of distinguishing different diffusion phases is illustrated
in Figure 18.1, which shows the growth of the automobile in the USA since
the turn of the century. In the first phase the number of cars registered
increased by a rate of approximately 30 percent annually. A major disconti-
nuity by the end of the 1920s marks the transition to a second phase, where
annual growth rates of approximately 5 percent are typical. The reason
for the rapid growth of automobiles in the first diffusion phase and for the
structural discontinuity by 1930 is also shown in Figure 18.1. The number
of automobiles grew fast, first by replacing an existing form of individual
road transportation: horses. This substitution process proceeded along a
regular logistic market share fraction trajectory and was rather swift. The
tlt of the process (i.e., the time to grow from a 10 to 90 percent share in the
total number of road vehicles) is only 12 years. The fast diffusion (substi-
tution) was not only the result of the comparative technical and economic
advantage of automobiles over horses, but was also due to adoption external-
ities, i.e., the possibility of making use of existing infrastructures: surfaced
roads had been already developed for horse carriages (Nakicenovic, 1986).
Another factor contributing to the rapid replacement of horses was the rel-
atively short useful lifetime of the rolling stock, which in fact is very similar
between automobiles and horses.[I]
Another example of a rapid first diffusion phase is the introduction of
natural gas to most industrialized countries. This technology also used an
already existing infrastructure grid to replace traditional (coal-based) city
gas. Once the rapid first diffusion phase is completed, the second phase in
diffusion begins. However, in this second phase markets, driving forces as
well as diffusion speed and ultimate diffusion levels, are drastically differ-
ent from the first phase of diffusion, which illustrates the importance of a
differentiated analysis of the various phases in the diffusion of large" perva-
sive systems. Frequently this rapid growth in the first phase has been used
to postulate a systematically decreasing diffusion coefficient and a resulting
asymmetrical diffusion model describing the diffusion process over the entire
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Figure 18.1. Number of draft animals and cars in the USA, data and model
estimates from logistic substitution model. (Source: Nakicenovic, 1986.)
life cycle. Such a continuous diffusion model application appears problem-
atic considering the distinctly different driving forces and market potentials
in the different phases of diffusion.
The general outline of the phases of the diffusion of large pervasive sys-
tems described above points to the fact that the diffusion process should
not be considered as a single, univariate phenomenon, even if in mathemat-
ical terms the corresponding macro trajectory may be reduced to simple
3-to-4 parameter equations. Diffusion consists of successive phases; in each
phase both the technological and economic characteristics of an innovation
as well as the driving forces and the adoption environment for its diffusion
constantly change.
A smooth S-shaped diffusion trajectory at the macro level is not neces-
sarily a contradiction to a constantly changing adoption environment, diver-
sity, and evolution of determinants of the diffusion process (such as prices,
costs, performance, and learning within the industry) at the micro level, if
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the diffusion process is seen as portraying the features of a dynamic, self-
organizational system, as demonstrated by recent diffusion models in eco-
nomics (Silverberg et al., 1988) and discussed in Chapter 8 by Silverberg.
Diffusion of an innovation of economic or social pervasiveness is a long
process: diffusion time constants (tits) range from decades to centuries.
Even in the case of the diffusion of process innovations, diffusion time con-
stants are considerable. In the summary of a study of international compar-
ative technological diffusion (Nasbeth and Ray, 1974), Ray (1989) reports
that "the time period to reach or to approach saturation is long - about
three decades or even more". Thus, decades are required for the diffusion
of significant innovations, and even longer time spans are needed to develop
infrastructures or pervasive socio-technical systems.
18.3 From Measurements to Models
The problem of measures has been associated with diffusion studies in the
technological area ever since the the first studies by Griliches (1957) and
Mansfield (1961). In a stylized overview of the evolving perspectives on dif-
fusion, one can summarize that diffusion was first viewed as a unary process
(Le., describing the diffusion of an innovation only by isolated measures such
as the number of adopters). In a following step, studies analyzed diffusion as
a binary process of interaction (substitution) with the remainder of processes
or products available on the market. Finally, and what may be considered a
more realistic representation of diffusion processes, studies analyzed diffusion
as a multivariate phenomenon involving a number of competing alternatives
with changing relative market shares over time.
Early measures of diffusion, such as the number of firms adopting a par-
ticular technique, have been criticized on grounds of the prevailing hetero-
geneity between economic agents as well as the different impacts of adoption
decisions during various phases of the diffusion process. Capacity or output
in the field of technological diffusion and first purchases in the case of con-
sumer goods have been used later on as diffusion measures. Still it appears
that relatively little systematic work has been carried out in the various
diffusion research disciplines to analyze a diffusion process based on a sys-
tematic and comparable set of measures of the temporal and spatial spread
of an innovation. Data availability, and not theoretical or methodological
considerations, appears to govern the choice of particular measures used in
diffusion studies. The most obvious criticism of this unary type of diffusion
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model is of course that hardly any innovation diffuses in a vacuum, Le., that
the diffusion of an innovation may be largely due to "cannibalizing" (to use
a phrase from Chapter 6 by Vijay Mahajan) existing techniques or products.
In a next step, diffusion processes have been analyzed interpreting diffu-
sion as a (binary) replacement process (Fisher and Pry, 1971). This binary
diffusion model may be considered the predominant model in technological
and marketing diffusion research. Despite its undeniable success in many
case studies (e.g., Mansfield, 1968a and 1968b), there have been several
critical observations of the model. The critique of the standard binary dif-
fusion/substitution model (which is also valid for the original unary diffu-
sion model, discussed above) primarily concentrates on the assumption of a
static adoption environment. It is argued (e.g., Davies, 1979; Gold, 1981;
Metcalfe, 1983) that in view of a constantly changing adoption environment
and changing characteristics of an innovation, the diffusion path is likely
to consist of an envelope of symmetrical (logistic) diffusion patterns, yield-
ing as a macroaggregate an asymmetrical diffusion path with a decreasing
diffusion coefficient.[2] Other arguments in favor of asymmetrical diffusion
models considered the decreasing profitability of adoption at later stages of
the diffusion process;[3] questioned the complete takeover assumption of the
Fisher-Pry model (Le., any diffusing innovation is assumed to result in com-
plete market takeover), and finally perceived a lack of flexibility or goodness
of fit of the standard model in view of empirical data.
In response to this perceived lack of flexibility alternative models have
been proposed. These include the use of a modified exponential curve follow-
ing Bass' (1969) distinction between external and internal influence driven
diffusion, the Floyd curve, the Gompertz curve, or a cumulative normal or
cumulative lognormal pattern. Other models have tried to develop more
comprehensive formulations with additional parameters to accommodate a
whole set of different S-shaped diffusion patterns. Examples of these models
include the Sharif-Kabir (Sharif and Kabir, 1976) model, the NSRL model
(Easingwood et al., 1981) and the model proposed by Skiadas (1986) (for
an overview see, for example, Hurter and Rubinstein, 1978; or Mahajan and
Peterson, 1985).
However, the flexibility of these models (in terms of how they can de-
scribe a wide range of diffusion patterns) is achieved by paying a theoretical
price. No theoretical rationale underlies various models to explain why a
particular diffusion pattern should follow one of these asymmetrical models
or what the (economic or behavioral) explanation of the additional model
parameters (Le., the various "delay coefficients" introduced into the models)
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might be. To some extent this line of research has thrown out the baby
(behavioral/economic rationale of diffusion models) with the bathwater (the
purported constraining conditions underlying the behavioral rationale of the
logistic diffusion model).
A comment on the goodness of fit of flexible or asymmetrical diffusion
models is appropriate. A prominent example of the application of asymmet-
rical diffusion models was the diffusion of the BOF (basic oxygen furnace)
steel process (e.g., Skiadas, 1986). However, an innovation may not only re-
place existing techniques, but may be influenced (e.g., slowed down along the
lines of an asymmetric diffusion pattern with saturation below 100 percent
market share) also by the diffusion of newer competitors. The asymmetri-
cal diffusion pattern in such cases is not an inherent characteristic of the
diffusion of a particular technology, but simply the result of the diffusion
trajectory of a newer competitor, which is omitted in the analysis under a
binary view of diffusion.
This leads finally to a discussion of mul tivariate innovation diffusion mod-
els. From the above observations, one can conclude that the environment
in which diffusion phenomena are embedded is only rarely so simple as to
allow for a unary or binary view of the diffusion process. In reality structural
changes in the technology base as well as in consumer products markets are
characterized by a sequence of introduction, diffusion, and in turn replace-
ment of a number of innovations, all of which compete simultaneously on
the market. Thus diffusion phenomena are probably, in most cases, only
adequately modeled when considering more than one or two competing in-
novations and their diffusion (or displacement) trajectories.
An extension of the standard Fisher-Pry model to a multiple substi-
tution model was first proposed by Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1979).[4]
Figure 18.2 illustrates such a multiple substitution pattern on the basis of
the changements in the propulsion technology in the merchant marine of the
USA. Despite the fact that the model is still too crude to represent all of
the fine print and turbulences along the diffusion trajectories, two observa-
tions can be made. First, the diffusion trajectory of steam propulsion follows
an asymmetrical diffusion pattern. Prior to 1890 steam propulsion replaces
sails along a logistic substitution pattern. After that time, the diffusion rate
slows down and levels off around the 90 percent market share level by the
end of the 1930s. The reason for this can be easily attributed to the diffu-
sion of a new propulsion system in the form of petroleum-based motor ships,
replacing in turn coal-fired steam ships. The diffusion trajectory of steam
ships can therefore only adequately be described by considering the whole
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Figure 18.2. Successive replacements of the propulsion system in the mer-
chant marine fleet of the USA, in fractional shares of gross tonnage regis-
tered, logit transformation. (Source: Nakicenovic, 1988.)
technological environment into which it is embedded (i.e., the technologies
an innovation replaces as well as newer technologies, the dynamics of which
may in turn influence the diffusion trajectory of any particular technology).
The second observation deals with the displacement trajectory of sail
ships. It has frequently been argued that the "sailing ship effect" (Ward,
1967), i.e., the improvement in the performance of an old technology (clip-
pers in this case) when challenged by a new competitor, results in a no-
ticeable effect of "striking back", i.e., retarding the diffusion trajectory of a
new technology. On the basis of empirical evidence, doubts remain about
whether this effect appears noticeable on the diffusion trajectory of steam
ships and the retreating trajectory of sail ships. Thus, technological im-
provements in clipper technology have to be considered in relation to the
parallel improvements in steam propulsion, as it is the relative technological
performance of technologies, which among other factors, are driving forces
of the replacement process.
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Figure 18.3. Successive replacements of process technologies for raw steel
production in the USA, in fractional shares of raw steel tonnage produced,
logit transformation. (Source: Updated from Nakicenovic, 1987.)
Figure 18.3 presents an additional degree of complexity when consid-
ering multivariate technological substitution processes. Here as many as
four different technologies (with decreasing and increasing market shares)
compete simultaneously on the market (see the 1950s in Figure 18.3); and
the diffusion trajectories of all processes show a high degree of diversity in
their dynamics, Le., diffusion coefficients, ranging in their .6.ts from less than
two decades (replacement of the crucible process) to nearly seven decades
(diffusion of electric arc steel).
Figure 18.3 provides empirical evidence of the argument that the (asym-
metrical) diffusion trajectory of the basic oxygen process can be explained
by the logistic diffusion pattern of electric arc steel, a continuation of which
can be rationalized by the competitive advantages of mini-steel mills as well
as by increasing tendencies for material (scrap) recycling. From this perspec-
tive, it is ironic that the diffusion trajectory of the basic oxygen process has
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figured so prominently as the underlying argument for suggesting alternative
diffusion models to the standard logistic.
Figure 18.3 illustrates yet another characteristic feature of the extin-
guishing process (Poznanski, 1986), Le., the displacement of a technology.
Similar to the cases discussed above, where adoption externalities allow for
a rapid first initial expansion to market shares below the ten percent thresh-
old, one can observe an inverse phenomenon at the end of the diffusion life
cycle of a technology. Old technologies appear - after a period of steady
(logistic) decline in market shares - to retreat at a slower rate from the last
few percent market shares, as a result of preserving competitive advantages
in specialized market niches and taking advantage of production economics
characterized by old, mostly written off, capital vintages.
Along the diffusion trajectories of the successive technological process
generations in raw steel production shown in Figure 18.3, relative prices,
costs, technical performance, etc., all change. Technological performance
increases, and production costs and energy and material inputs decrease
(Ayres, 1989) as a combination of both radical technological transforma-
tions (illustrated by the successive replacements of process technologies in
raw steel production) and gradual improvements in the efficiency of exist-
ing process technologies. The combined effect, for instance, on the energy
efficiency of raw steel production was certainly dramatic: specific energy
requirements per ton of raw steel were in the order to 120 million BTU per
(short) ton in the 1880s, compared with a present value of approximately
12, Le., improvement by a factor of 10 over a period of 100 years (Griibler,
1990a).
In a similar way one can also illustrate the economic effects of the suc-
cessive transformations in the composition of process technologies for raw
steel production in the USA by looking at the long-term evolution of the
real-term prices of iron and of steel rails in the USA. Two characteristic
features of the long-term evolution of iron and steel products prices emerge
from Figure 18.4. The first is the drastic decline of real-term prices in iron
and steel products in the period 1870 to 1910 that goes along with the dif-
fusion of the open-hearth process for raw steel production. A corollary of
this observation is, that the rapid diffusion of the Bessemer process prior to
1870 was not driven by cost cutting, but rather by increased technological
performance (quality of output, Le., high-quality mass production of steel,
and replacement of small-scale production of quality steel by the crucible
process). Figure 18.4 also illustrates the pronounced discontinuities in real-
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Adapted from Griibler, 1990a.)
term prices in the form of price flares, i.e., a succession of rapid inflationary
and deflationary periods. These discontinuities in the real-term prices of
steel products mirror discontinuities in the general wholesale and consumer
price levels, used as an indicator by students of Wechsellagen of economic
development ever since the time of Nikolai Kondratieff (1926).
The innovation diffusion cases discussed above demonstrate the com-
plexity of diffusion phenomena: multiple interaction, sequence of successive
replacements, importance of specific market niches in the introduction and
phaseout of technologies, and a constantly changing adoption environment
(in terms of relative technological performance, costs, and prices) appear
to be inherent characteristics of diffusion and substitution processes. From
such a perspective diffusion can hardly be reduced to single determining
variables but emerges out of a complex vector of influencing factors. The
importance of any individual driving variable such as relative costs or prices
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is not only different in the various phases of the diffusion life cycle of an
innovation (Le., relative costs appear to be of minor importance compared
to technological performance in the initial diffusion phase) but also different
in successive technological generations. The diversity and complexity (at the
same time with a simple and consistent evolutionary structural change pat-
tern at the macro level) suggest that the diffusion of large pervasive systems,
which can span several decades in time, displays the features of dynamic self-
organizational systems rather than operating in a classical equilibrium-type
framework.
A valid point of critique on diffusion models has always been that the
models tend to simplify the complex dynamics and transformations of both
the market environment and the technological characteristics of innovations
during the diffusion process. In other words, it is during its diffusion that a
technology acquires its industrial and economic properties, transforms itself,
and widens the initial market in which it is adopted. Some authors have
consequently inferred the theoretical impossibility of formal representation,
since the object of diffusion is not the same at the beginning, in the mid-
dle, and at the end of the process. It appears, however, that the usefulness
of a formal representation resides in the ability to divide the diffusion pro-
cess into periods, with the aid of criteria which can take into account the
principal transformations of the technology under consideration. This, how-
ever, requires a methodological framework for a clear-cut definition of the
technologies and their characteristics.
In this context it appears appropriate to comment on how one actually
measures (defines) processes, products, etc., subject to diffusion studies. By
which criteria does one consider a priori technological routes as competing
or not competing with each other? What are the generic criteria and theo-
retical underpinnings of defining railways, continuous casting, or automatic
teller machines as the object of the investigation of diffusion research with-
out a comprehensive methodological analysis of the whole space in which
technologies evolve?
The pragmatic answer that whatever leads consumers to purchase and
industry to investment decisions, constitutes an appropriate unit for analysis
of diffusion research, would appear rather unsatisfactory from its atheoretical
nature. Furthermore, this view may lead to restrictions in the analysis, along
the lines of unary or binary views of the diffusion phenomenon discussed
above, Le., missing the potential influence of other technologies or products
on the diffusion trajectory of the particular innovation studied, or identifying
possible technological routes that have been locked out from diffusion in
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the past. There clearly exists an asymmetry in diffusion research between
approaches trying to identify and to define the object under investigation
and the research efforts invested in the subsequent stages of research.
Obviously, when various process technologies differ in basic physical laws,
or different generic functions provide a basis for dividing goods into product
categories, the definition of the competing species may be clear-cut. This
however is basically an ex post type of approach and does not represent
a rigorous and systematic view of the whole environment, from which fu-
ture competitors (ignored to date in the analysis) might emerge. Taking
biology or anthropology as a guide, should we not attempt to define the
object of diffusion research prior to analysis by some sort of evolutionary
tree, spanning the whole diverse domain into which any particular case is
embedded? Improvements and add-on innovations, which result in a partic-
ular technology becoming competitive within a given market segment could
be represented as bmnchings along an evolutionary technological tree and
allow for classification, taxonomy, and vigorous definition of technologies in
competition. The task involved is admittedly complex, as not all techno-
logical settings provide a well-structured domain to carry out a theoretical
analysis of the technological space and to deduce from such an analysis a
definitional framework of competing technologies (as illustrated in Chapter
16). A formal analysis as a methodological framework for the definition of
the object of diffusion research (see, e.g., Foray and Griibler, 1990) could,
however, provide the possibility of ultimately developing a taxonomy and a
classification system of technologies and their diffusion processes, which can
be considered necessary to advance the theoretical foundations and practical
uses of diffusion studies.
18.4 Hierarchy of Diffusion Processes
The diffusion of pervasive systems is charactererized by interrelatedness,
interdependence, and cross-enhancing between a whole host of process,
product as well as organizational and managerial innovations. This cross-
enhancing results in the pervasive (economic and social) effects of whole dif-
fusion clusters forming so-called socio-technical pamdigms (Freeman, 1983).
A mismatch in speed and frequency of diffusion or between technological in-
novations proper and the supportive social and organizational environment
can result in disruptive effects or in the blockage of innovation diffusion, in
case they are introduced outside appropriate "opportunity windows" (Soete
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and Perez, 1988) for their effective mediation into the social and economic
context.
The diffusion of pervasive systems at the macro level involves therefore a
host of related diffusion processes in a hierarchical structure, from the macro
down to the micro level. One way to describe such a hierarchical structure of
interrelated diffusion processes would be to develop a time scheme (much like
a PERT graph) of all the different diffusion processes on which the growth
of a pervasive system (a socio-technical paradigm) is contingent. However,
no systematic research in this area has yet been performed. A simpler mea-
sure of a hierarchy of diffusion processes (without however considering their
interdependence) would be to consider hierarchy in terms of the spatial or
temporal patterns of diffusion.
The spatial hierarchy of diffusion processes is a well-recognized feature
established in geography ever since the seminal contributions of Torsten
Wigerstrand (1952 and 1967). Figure 18.5 illustrates the spatial diffusion of
railways in Europe (Godlund, 1952) and shows the two major characteristic
features of spatial diffusion phenomena: the neighborhood effect and the
hierarchy effect. Four spatial hierarchy levels can be identified in Figure
18.5. The spatial diffusion of railways originated in the UK (1826). Ten
years later railway networks extended over much of England and reached
a second spatial hierarchy level: Belgium, Lyon in France, and Bohemia in
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From these second hierarchy levels railways
extended over much of central Europe by 1846, and by that time the third
spatial hierarchy level was reached (Napoli in Italy and St. Petersburg in the
USSR). The last (fourth) spatial hierarchy level was reached some 30 years
later, when railway networks started to be constructed in Greece.
The railway network in all European countries was basically completed
(i.e., achieved its maximum network size) by the end of the 1930s. Ever since,
the railway network has undergone rationalization and decommissioning of
links (the only exception being in the USSR). The completion of railway
expansion throughout Europe by the 1930s, along with the later starting
dates of railway construction in peripheral areas of Europe as shown in Figure
18.5, demonstrates a noticeable catch-up effect in the development of railway
networks in Europe. Thus, while some 100 years passed in the UK between
the start-up of railway construction and completion of the railway network,
this development process proceeds much faster in the fringe countries of
the European continent, such as Scandinavia, where this process took only
about 50 years. Whereas the start-up dates of railway construction are thus
spaced rather widely over time, there is stronger convergence in the ultimate
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Figure 18.5. Spatial diffusion of railways in Europe showing spatial hierar-
chy and neighborhood effect, in isolines (10 year intervals) of spatial coverage
by railway networks. (Source: Godlund, 1952.)
completion dates of this particular infrastructure expansion pulse, due to the
catch-up effect.
Another observation on the spatial diffusion of railway networks is that
the ultimate railway density between the core countries (i.e., the first hi-
erarchical levels of the spatial diffusion of railways) and their hinterlands
was in fact very different. The railway network density (either per capita
or per unit country area) decreases with the distance to the innovation and
the spatial hierarchy centers of diffusion (as shown in the next chapter by
Nakicenovic).
A second possibility of establishing a hierarchy of diffusion processes is to
consider the temporal dimension, i.e., a hierarchy along the required diffusion
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Table 18.1. Hierarchy of diffusion processes in the transport sector of the
USA and the USSR, measured by their temporal diffusion parameters.
USA USSR
to ~t to ~t
Total length of 1950 80 1980 80
transport infrastructures
Growth of railways
1830-1930 1858 54 1890 37
1930-1987 decline decline 1949 44
Treated ties (USA) 1923 26
Track electrification (USSR) 1965 27
Replacement of
steam locomotives 1950 12 1960 13
time between introduction and saturation ofthe diffusion process. Table 18.1
illustrates such a (temporal) hierarchy of diffusion processes in the transport
sector of the USA and the USSR (Tzarist Russia prior to 1917). The time
variables of diffusion and substitution processes are as follows (based on a
logistic diffusion/substitution model): to denotes the inflection point, Le., the
time of maximum growth (replacement) at the 50 percent diffusion (market
share) level; ti.t the time period in years that is needed to grow (substitute)
from the 10 to the 90 percent diffusion (market share) level.
Table 18.1 shows that while the diffusion processes are shifted in time
(time lag between to), the diffusion time constants appear to be of a similar
order of magnitude between the two countries. Of coUrse decisive differences
remain. For instance, the railway network in the USA has been decreasing
since the beginning of the 1930s (reduction by some 40 percent of the 1930
network), whereas the USSR has experienced a second pulse of railway con-
struction since that time period, doubling the length of its railway network.
However, also this "second wind" in railway construction appears close to
saturation.
The similar duration in the diffusion of technologies and infrastructures
between the two countries, with their distinct differences in history and
market-clearing mechanisms, enables us to develop a rough hierarchical clas-
sification of diffusion processes, as reflected by their diffusion constants (ti.t).
At the macro level, when considering the growth of the total length[5] of
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transport infrastructures (Le., the length of canals, railways, roads, and air-
ways) as a diffusion process the time constants involved are very long indeed;
some eight decades are required to go from 1 to 50 percent of the final net-
work length. This process spans over successive generations of diffusion life
cycles of individual transport infrastructures and across major social and
economic transformations.
At the next hierarchical level, when considering the growth of individual
transport infrastructures, we observe that the development of major infra-
structures proceeds with a /It of typically between four and five decades.
The growth of the railway network in 19th century Tzarist Russia occurs
some 30 years later than in the USA, but proceeds somewhat faster (Le.,
catching up).
As a next hierarchical level in the temporal pattern of diffusion, we con-
sider the case of technological change or upgrading within an already existing
infrastructure grid, i.e., the substitution of treated wooden railway cross-ties
in the USA (a substitution occurring in a contracting market, as the railway
network of the USA has been decreasing since the 1930s) and the electrifi-
cation of railway tracks in the USSR. Here diffusion time constants (!It) of
less than three decades are typical, i.e., significantly faster than in the case
of new constructions of infrastructure grids.
Finally., at the last hierarchical level of the time constants of diffusion
presented in Table 18.1 above, we consider a replacement process within the
capital vintage structure in the form of the rolling stock of railways. The re-
placement of the coal-fired steam locomotive by diesel traction (in the USA)
and by diesel and electric traction locomotives (in the USSR) proceeds in
both countries with a /It of 12 to 13 years, Le., a similar diffusion constant,
which is even more noteworthy when considering the different adoption envi-
ronments and economic driving forces prevailing between the two countries.
Proceeding further in the hierarchical structure of temporal diffusion
processes to the micro level, one observes even faster diffusion !lis, in the
order of a few years for consumer products, and one hierarchical level further
down one can even observe !lts of a few months, e.g., in the diffusion of
fashion items or novelty gadgets.
Thus we propose that diffusion processes can be characterized as oper-
ating within a temporal hierarchical structure, when considering the time
constants (!It) involved in diffusion. This hierarchy extends from the macro
to the micro scale, throughout which one observes a self-similarity in the
basic diffusion pattern, i.e., a fractal type of structure of diffusion processes
all along their temporal (or spatial) hierarchical levels. Along the temporal
470 Diffusion of Tecllnologies and Social Behavior
hierarchy, diffusion processes appear to be faster the closer one gets to the
micro level. Of course more empirical studies will have to be carried out be-
fore such a hypothesis can be firmly substantiated; however, a classification
of diffusion processes along a hierarchical structure may indeed be a first
step to develop a quantitative taxonomy of diffusion processes.
Two final observations on the temporal hierarchy of diffusion processes
should be made. First, in view of the increasing time constants involved in
diffusion when moving to the macro level (several decades), it is unlikely that
equilibrium configurations can be expected at these higher hierarchy levels.
Over such long time spans the technological and economic characteristics
of technologies as well as the macroeconomic and social context into which
they are embedded change drastically. This also means that the power of
diffusion models in terms of establishing detailed causality and economic
driving variables will dwindle the larger the system and the higher the level
of aggregation.
Second, the importance of the diffusion phenomena, in that they ulti-
mately transform the technological, economic, and social fabric into which
they are embedded, also increases along the temporal diffusion hierarchy; the
more important (pervasive) a particular diffusion process is in technological,
social, and macroeconomic terms, the longer its diffusion constant b..t will
be. From such a perspective, the diffusion rate of pervasive systems at the
macro level appears to depend more on the absorption capacity and medi-
ation rate of the socioeconomic system than being the inherent property of
a particular innovation (like relative profitability in innovation diffusion at
the micro level). The next section uses this hypothesis in the discussion of
the average long-term diffusion rate derived from a large sample of diffusion
histories in the USA.
18.5 The Discontinuous Nature of Diffusion
Clusters
Interrelatedness, cross-enhancing, and a certain degree of clustering appear
to be features in the diffusion of pervasive socio-technical systems. Within
the area of influence of technological and social/organizational innovations
on long-term economic growth, a major debate has been concerned with
the discontinuous nature of technological change and its repercussions on
Wechsellagen of economic development.
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Ever since the work of Mensch (1975), this debate has been dominated by
the discussion of the Schumpeterian hypothesis of the discontinuous rate of
the appearance of innovations. Although evidence exists that the "bunching"
of innovations in recessions and depressions is much weaker than originally
maintained by Mensch a certain clustering of innovations can apparently still
be identified at a statistically significant level (Kleinknecht, 1987). It is not
the "bunching of innovations", however, that explains the whole sequence
of discontinuities in economic growth, from slowdown to recession, recovery,
and renewed growth. Innovations proper will only have a marginal impact
on the economy as a whole. Only at a later stage, when being translated via
diffusion into the creation of new infrastructures, industries, and product
lines, would an innovation bunch provide for economic growth.
To some degree it is surprising that the debate has almost entirely concen-
trated on the appearance aspect of innovations (Mensch, 1975; Kleinknecht,
1987; Freeman et al., 1982), whereas the diffusion aspect, Le., how do inno-
vations contribute to economic growth and - when saturating - to economic
slowdown, has received relatively little attention. Although most researchers
would agree on the theoretical rationale that economic slowdown and reces-
sion are saturation phenomena, extensive empirical evidence has not yet been
assembled to demonstrate the coupled dynamics in the long-term pattern of
introduction, diffusion, and saturation of a larger sample of innovations.
In the following the long-term history of innovations at a country level is
described by considering their whole diffusion life cycle, Le., from introduc-
tion to growth and eventual saturation. It can be shown that discontinuities
in the long-term evolution result even without a rigid clustering in the ap-
pearance, growth, or saturation of innovations, although evidence indicates
that the clustering effect is more focused toward the end of the diffusion life
cycle (i.e., a kind of season of saturations) than during earlier phases.
In this context, innovations should not be defined only within a narrow
technological context. Innovations consist of a host of interrelated techno-
logical, institutional, and organizational new ways to perform traditional
or new tasks or to produce traditional or new products and services. The
importance of such a set of interrelated, interdependent, technological, insti-
tutional, and organizational innovations as the major driving forces behind
economic expansion periods was convincingly argued for and summarized
under various headings, such as technological trajectory or paradigm or socio-
technical paradigm (Perez, 1983; Dosi, 1983; Freeman and Perez, 1988). For
our purposes, it suffices to stress the importance of the interdependencies
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between technological innovations, and the associated new forms of produc-
tion organization, new institutions, and management methods, etc., required
to realize fully the inherent growth potential(s) of a new industry.
The examples of innovation histories considered in the present context
are therefore not only taken from the technological field. The empirical cases
considered include the areas of energy, transport, manufacturing, agriculture,
consumer durables, communication, military, and economic and also social
diffusion and structural change processes such as the diffusion of literacy,
reduction of infant mortality, and structural changes in employment. The
diffusion histories of two samples of innovations in the USA since around
1800 are discussed below. The first sample consists of 117 diffusion cases
analyzed at IIASA. This sample is augmented by additional cases found in
the literature with a quantification of diffusion parameters. This brings the
size of the sample to a total of 265 innovation cases.
Figure 18.6 shows the histogram of the diffusion rates as measured by
their 6.ts for the two samples. As can be seen they range in duration from
very short-term processes of only a few years to extremely long durations of
up to 300 years. The mean value ranges between 40 and 60 years, with a
standard deviation of about equal magnitude. It should be noted that the
largest number of diffusion processes have 6.ts in the order of between 15 to
30 years, some of which we have given for illustrative purposes above (e.g.
motor vehicles or steel production methods). In general, 6.ts appear to have
a rank-size distribution.
The histogram gives one kind of summary about the distribution of diffu-
sion processes: at any period of time, structural change can be decomposed
into a large number of diffusion/substitution processes with a great variety in
their 6.ts. Sometimes it is argued that the diffusion rate (Le., 6.t in our def-
inition) should accelerate (systematically shorter 6.ts) over time, as a result
of better communication and information channels. This hypothesis could
not be substantiated on the basis of the two samples.[6] In fact the only
significant acceleration tendency appears to occur within the diffusion of a
given technological cluster. As a given cluster (e.g., the automobile industry)
matures, it becomes increasingly characterized by an accelerating pattern of
diffusion of incremental improvement innovations. Figure 18.7 (Jutila and
Jutila, 1986) illustrates this for the US automobile industry,[7] and shows
the convergence tendency of the diffusion processes toward the end of of the
diffusion life cycle (Le., the season of saturations). Similar observations can
also be made at the macro level when analyzing, for instance, the catch-up
A. Griibler 473
30
~ 20
l::
Q)
::J
C'"
Q)
...
.....
....
l::
Q)
U
...If 10
r---"!
I I
I I
I I
I I
SAMPLE A (117 cases) mean = 57.5 st.dev = 52.5 var = 27581
SAMPLE B (265 cases) mean =41.0 st.dev =42.0 var = 1752.1
o
o 30 60 90 120 150
Elt
180 210 240 270 300
Figure 18.6. Histogram of diffusion constants tlt for two innovation diffu-
sion samples in the USA, in frequency of tlts in percent. (Source: Griibler,
1990b.)
processes at an international level that result in a similar convergence in
completion dates (see the next chapter by Nakicenovic).
Another possible aggregate measure is the average diffusion rate over
time for the whole socioeconomic system. For this measure we calculate the
average diffusion rates of our innovation samples, Le., the sum of the first
derivatives of the diffusion/substitution trajectories[8] at any given point in
time divided by the number of diffusion processes occurring at that moment.
This indicator is the diffusion equivalent to the annual GNP growth rate.
Our average diffusion rate measures the changing average rate of technical,
economic, and social change at the country level: in our case the USA since
1800.
Figure 18.8 shows the average diffusion rate of 117 diffusion processes.
It displays peaks and troughs, indicating that the process of change is not
gradual and linear but is instead characterized by pronounced discontinu-
ities. The general increase in the average rate of change is not indicative
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because, as one approaches the present, the number of shorter-term diffu-
sion processes which can be documented increases. The increasing average
rate of change is therefore likely a statistical artifact stemming from the bias
in the sample. Although averages are used in the study, a higher number
of overlapping short-term processes in one interval could result in a higher
aggregate diffusion rate.
Figure 18.8 represents an aggregate rate of change over all diffusion
processes, regardless of their social or economic importance. The question of
how to weigh an extreme diversity in technical and social diffusion processes
is indeed difficult. One could, for instance, resort to subjective weighting of
different diffusion processes, e.g., by some kind of DELPHI method. Such
an exercise was not attempted because of the inherently subjective criteria
underlying such a relative weighting of processes of change, which span a
period of about 200 years. Instead, it is assumed that the importance of
any particular process of diffusion or change is directly related to the time
constant of diffusion. Thus, the longer a process takes and the higher it is
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ranked in the temporal hierarchy of diffusion processes, the more pervasive its
macro level effects are assumed to be.[9] Of course, this measure also remains
debatable, but it is a plausible hypothesis. More important, however, is the
fact that even this weighted average rate of socia-technical change still reveals
pronounced long-term discontinuities as shown in Figure 18.9.
These long-term discontinuities in the rate of socia-technical change are
the result of the complex coupled dynamics of the discontinuous rate at
which innovations are first introduced and of their subsequent different rates
of absorption (diffusion) in the socioeconomic system. Periods of acceler-
ating technological and social diffusion rates indicate the emergence of a
new socia-technical paradigm under which many (often interrelated) inno-
vations diffuse into the economic and social environment contributing, via
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backward and forward linkages, to prolonged periods of economic growth.
These periods are followed by periods where progressively more and more
innovations enter their saturation phase of diffusion. Thus, each peak in the
average rate of change in Figure 18.9 characterizes the start of saturation
of a corresponding cluster or family of diffusion processes. This season of
saturations results in a significant decline in the average rate of technical and
social change and, via market saturation and a decrease in investments, also
to a slowdown in economic growth. The results also indicate the importance
of new innovations, which initiate phase transition out of a "stalemate" po-
sition into a new period of accelerated rates of change. Presumably many
innovations have emerged during the last decades that may turn out to be
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successful. If they were included they could perhaps lead to a trend reversal
in the rate-of-change curve sometime after the mid-1990s - the time when
these successful innovations, after a slow initial diffusion, would in turn enter
into the steep exponential part of their diffusion life cycle.
The conclusion on the discontinuous nature of socioeconomic change is
corroborated by analyzing the average diffusion rates of the second inno-
vation sample comprising 265 innovation cases. Compared with the first
sample, the greater preponderance of shorter-term diffusion and substitu-
tion processes after World War II results in a shorter mean t:i.t of the sample
(Le., of the weighting measure). Therefore, the weighted aggregate rate of
change is higher in the second sampIe (Figure 18.9). However, this does
not mean that this larger sample of diffusion processes yields higher rates of
overall socio-technical change, but rather it indicates the emphasis diffusion
research has placed on recent time periods and the resulting better docu-
mentation of also shorter-term diffusion processes. This is understandable
both from the higher interest in the present rather than the past and from
the data availability. Still, pronounced discontinuities remain, and the larger
sample confirms the findings that the diffusion rate has been declining since
1970, indicating an increase in (market and diffusion) saturation phenomena
ever since.
It should be noted that the turning points (discontinuities) in the diffu-
sion rates of technological and social innovations coincide with the turning
points of long-term Wechsellagen of economic growth identified by a num-
ber oflong-wave researchers (van Duijn, 1983; Goldstein, 1988; Vasko, 1987).
The resulting peaks (Le., the maxima in the rate of socio-technical change
and the onset of leveling-off and saturation phenomena) occurred in 1840,
1912, and 1970. Troughs (maxima of saturation periods and the slow begin-
ning of a new phase of accelerated socio-technical change) occurred in 1820,
1875, and 1930. It is certainly not incidental that these troughs coincide
with pronounced recessions, even depressions in the US economy.
The diffusion history of the large number of processes of technical, eco-
nomic, and social change outlined above points to an essentially Schumpete-
rian view of long-term development. Major economic expansion periods ap-
pear driven by the widespread diffusion of a host of interrelated innovations,
leading to new products, markets, industries, and infrastructures. These
diffusion processes are sustained (in fact contingent) by mediating social
and organizational diffusion processes. The growth (diffusion) of a dom-
inant socia-technical pamdigm cannot, however, be sustained indefinitely.
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Market saturation, the dwindling improvement possibilities of existing pro-
cess technologies, managerial, and organizational settings, and an increasing
awareness of the negative externalities involved in the further intensification
and extension of the dominant "development paradigm" pave the way to a
season of saturations. During such periods opportunities arise for the intro-
duction of new technological, organizational, and social solutions, some of
which may have been latently in existence but were barred from market en-
try owing to the dominance of the previous "growth paradigm". Even when
such innovations are introduced successfully, their penetration rates in the
initial phase of their diffusion life cycle are rather slow and a matching new
social and economic mediating context has still to emerge. This perpetuates
the period of phase transition where the old is saturating and the new is still
embryonic. It is only after such a period of transition, crisis, and mismatch
that a new prolonged period of widespread diffusion of a new socio-technical
bandwagon, and thus a period of prolonged economic growth, emerges.
Before precise linkages and causality mechanisms can be developed, such
a conjecture clearly remains at the phenomenological level. A necessary
step in this direction would be to establish linkages and interrelationships
between and within socio-technical innovation bandwagons by a taxonomy
of diffusion processes. Still, the picture that emerges from the approach
presented here is that the overall development trajectory appears punctuated
by phase transitions from an old saturating to a new but yet uncertain
development path. As such, diffusion, and its discontinuities, may be an
inherent feature of the evolutionary process that governs social behavior.
Notes
[1] The average active life of horses used for transportation purposes is from 12 to
14 years (recall here the Dot of their replacement in the order of 12 years) which
at present is similar to the average useful life of an automobile: the replacement
of the automobile fleet by cars equipped with catalytic converters also proceeds
with a Dot of about 13 years (Nakicenovic, 1986).
[2] The exponential diffusion coefficient of the standard logistic model should de-
crease over time, yielding an asymmetrical diffusion curve.
[3] This of course is a simplification of the assumption underlying the standard dif-
fusion model, which considers expected profitability as the driving variable. At
a later stage of the diffusion process, profitability declines along with the uncer-
tainty associated with the outcome of an adoption decision; thus, the resulting
vector on expected profitability may also stay constant over time.
[4] For the algorithmic and computer implementation of the model see Nakicenovic
(1979).
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[5] One of the findings in the analysis of the growth of transport infrastructures
in the two countries is that not only the development of individual systems
like canals, railways or surfaced roads proceeds along a sequence of S-shaped
(logistic) growth patterns (as shown in the next chapter), but also that the
evolution of the aggregate of all these individual systems proceeds along an
S-shaped growth trajectory. The growth pulses of individual transport infra-
structures, which overlap in their various growth (even decline) phases, are thus
consistent with a structured evolutionary path at the macro level of the whole
transport system.
[6] In fact, such a hypothesis only appears warranted when the diffusion phe-
nomenon is primarily reduced to a learning and communication process. It
has been argued above that such a view might indeed represent an oversimplifi-
cation in view of the different market niches, multiple competition environments
and resulting changes in the driving forces over the diffusion life cycle.
[7] In the absence of quantitative diffusion model parameters, the cases shown in
Figure 18.7 are not part of the diffusion samples considered in the present
context.
[8] Calculated from the parameters ofa logistic model, i.e., fl.t and to. In the case of
asymmetrical diffusion/substitution patterns, growth rates are calculated based
on piecewise linear trends in log F/(l-F) transformation. The contribution of
Maximilian Posch in the development of the computational algorithm underlying
the results is gratefully acknowledged.
[9] The weighting measure proposed links the importance of a particular diffusion
process proportionally to its diffusion time constant fl.t. Thus, we suggest that
a one percent growth in the railway network of the USA (fl.t of 55 years) is pro-
portionally (55/12) more important than a one percent growth in the diffusion
of diesel/electric locomotives (replacing steam locomotives) proceeding with a
fl.t of 12 years.
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Chapter 19
Diffusion of Pervasive
Systems: A Case of
Transport Infrastructures
Nebojsa Nakicenovic
19.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the diffusion of perva-
sive systems worldwide tends to cluster toward the saturation period. The
advanced hypothesis is that the time span between the start of diffusion
in leading and lagging countries decreases as the diffusion progresses. The
process, therefore, appears much more focused internationally toward the
saturation phase. However, this visible catch-up effect refers only to the rel-
ative diffusion rates and not to the absolute level of adoption. The leaders
achieve higher diffusion levels and the followers lower ones, roughly in pro-
portion to the lag in the introduction of a given innovation. This tendency
will be illustrated on the basis of the evolution of transport infrastructures
and systems in several countries.
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There are three reasons for choosing transport infrastructures and trans-
port systems. First, they are pervasive in the sense that they are an im-
portant aspect of the techno-economic development: they affect almost all
facets of economic and private activities. Second, transport systems depend
on numerous regional and national characteristics so that any congruence
in their evolution must be related to the basic driving forces of economic
and social development. The third reason for choosing this example is that
historical data for a number of countries over relatively long periods are
available.
19.2 Diffusion and Evolution of Technologies
Diffusion starts after the successful commercialization of a basic innovation
leads to the creation of a new process, product, or service. Eventually, some
innovations replace their predecessors, and some become pervasive in that
they lead to a host of interrelated new activities in many sectors, creat-
ing whole new industries and thereby contributing to social and economic
development. Electricity, automobiles, or computers are examples of such
innovations that have changed many facets of everyday life.
During the early development phases of this process, the new industry
is fluid with a high degree of diversity and experimentation. The initial em-
phasis is on improving technical performance without much regard for cost
and price. Eventually one particular technological variant becomes domi-
nant and is locked in leading to standardization in the new industry. This
is usually a disruptive phase of development with a characteristic "shake-
out" that only a few competitors survive. Prices decrease with increasing
cost reductions owing to standardization, stronger competition, learning by
doing, and many cumulative improvements resulting from incremental in-
novations. Economies of scale and cost reductions along the learning curve
lead to advantages from which only a few competitors can internalize and
benefit. This is also the development phase, when the pervasive nature of
some technologies can be recognized. Some of them diffuse in many sectors.
As the technology and its applications mature, the possible disadvantages
become evident. Improvements can cover an increasingly smaller domain of
technical and managerial possibilities (Brooks, 1986). Saturation starts, and
the problems associated with widespread and large-scale application become
important. The social and institutional response is rather nonlinear and dis-
ruptive, and the awareness of social disadvantages and risks often increases
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rapidly making further adoption unacceptable. The perceived disadvantages
of further applications can outpace incremental improvements as the tech-
nological and social potentials appear to be exhausted. Further adoption is
virtually blocked. Just like the initial introduction and commercialization
of a new technology or system, empirical evidence indicates that this sat-
uration phase is also an international phenomenon. Innovations spread in
space and time, but lag behind in the peripheral regions. However, the time
interval between the leaders and the laggers tends to decrease as the diffu-
sion progresses, so that the process appears much more focused toward the
saturation phase. Thus, a visible catch-up effect in the diffusion of pervasive
techno-economic systems throughout the world is evident. Saturation lags
are smaller because diffusion processes in the peripheral or lagging regions
accelerate over time (due to external learning, transfer of know-how and
capital, etc.) proportionally to the introduction delay with respect to the
diffusion duration in the leading regions. The intensity of diffusion is, how-
ever, lower in the lagging regions. In this sense, the diffusion processes can
be seen internationally as Schumpeterian bandwagons or clusters of related
families that emerge, with time lags in different parts of the world, to focus
more strongly during the saturation phase.
During the periods when old systems saturate, new techno-economic
paradigms emerge; the old development trajectory associated with the pre-
vious generation of pervasive technologies and institutional forms is not only
challenged, but in time is also replaced with the new solutions. Dosi et ai,
(1988) have identified innovation diffusion and the resulting technological
change as a fundamental force in shaping the pattern of transformation of
the economy, They have shown that the dynamic adjustment mechanisms
during these transformations have to do with both technical and institutional
change, or the lack of it. With regard to technological change, it is both dis-
ruptive during the transition period (marked by fluctuations, frictions, and
sometimes crises) and a source of order for the directions of change and dy-
namic adjustment processes, as new technologies diffuse through national
and international economies. Thus, some of the most important changes
in socio-institutional frameworks and economic structure are related to the
pervasive adoption of new systems. Today, the emergence of new systems,
such as the information and communication technologies, is often mentioned
in this context because they may become pervasive throughout the economy;
they will not diffuse in just a few selected sectors. Another way to formu-
late this phenomenon is to consider the interrelationships among different
diffusion processes and their clustering in space and time.
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Table 19.1. Clusters of pervasive technologies.
Period:
1750-1820 1800-1870 1850-1940 1920-2000 1980-2060
Dominant Systems:
Water power, Coal,
sails, canals,
turnpikes, iron, steam
iron castings, power,
textiles mechanical
equipment
Emerging Systems:
Mechanical Steel,
equipment, city gas,
coal, sta- indigo,
tionary steam, telegraph,
canals railways
Organizational Style:
Manufacture Industrial
production
Railways,
steam ships,
heavy industry,
steel, dyestuff,
telegraph
Electricity,
cars, trucks,
Radio, roads,
oil, telephone,
petrochemicals
Standard-
ization
Electric power,
oil, cars,
radio, TV,
durables,
petrochemicals
Nuclear power,
computers,
gas, tele-
communication,
aircraft
Fordism-
Taylorism
Gas, nuclear,
aircraft,
telecomm.,
information,
photo-
electronics
Biotech.,
artificial
intelligence,
space indo
& transport
Quality
control
Table 19.1 illustrates that this clustering effect reoccurred five times
since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. It gives the dominant techno-
economic systems for each epoch in the top row, and the list of emerging
ones in the middle row. For example, the dominant cluster of the 1920-2000
period includes the growth of electric power, oil and petroleum, petrochem-
icals, cars, radio and TV, and consumer durables. During the same period
we saw the emergence of new industries, which could become important in
the future: nuclear power, computers, natural gas, telecommunication, and
advanced aircraft. The last row lists the predominant organizational and
management models (or "styles") during the respective periods. The list of
clusters given in Table 19.1 is of course not unique; it could be modified and
extended. The timing is also not precise. However, it provides an illustrative
account of interrelationships and clusters of pervasive technological systems
(for a detailed analysis, see Freeman and Perez, 1988).
These changes in the techno-economic paradigms, as illustrated by the
emergence and diffusion of interrelated clusters of pervasive technologies,
show the history of development. For example, they show the history of eco-
nomic restructuring, in terms of changes in employment and skills. They also
show the history of transport systems. The following sections describe this
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evolutionary process of techno-economic and social change by illustrating
the historical development of transport infrastructures and their clustering.
19.3 Transport Infrastructures
Transport and communication systems are the elements integrating human
activities in space and time. As a rule, infrastructures used for the movement
of people, goods, and information diffuse slowly and span many decades
from their first introduction to obsolescence. Some are almost immortal,
albeit usually providing different services from those originally intended.
Old harbors are being converted into modern commercial and residential
areas. A few of the obsolete canals were reused to build railways. Many
ancient Roman roads are buried beneath modern highways.
In this sense many infrastructures serve as rights-oj-way as actual trans-
port systems replace each other in the eternal quest to increase quality of ser-
vice, reliability, and speed, and make the movement of people, information,
and tangible goods more efficient and convenient. While old infrastructures
are frequently recycled, new systems appear that provide even greater pos-
sibili ties, so that diversification and productivity usually increase in time.
Thus, complexity increases resulting in numerous interlaced and overlap-
ping niches occupied by competing modes of passenger travel, information
channels, and transport of goods and services.
One clear trend emerges from the historical analysis - transport systems
became ever faster and more productive. The first major improvement oc-
curred with the age of canals. Canals represented a fundamental construction
effort toward reducing natural barriers to connect coastal and inland water-
ways. At the same time, canals were a powerful motor of the industrial age:
waterways allowed for new flows of goods, unprecedented exchanges between
regions, specialization of labor, and access to more distant energy and raw
material resources. The modern age of canals started about two centuries
ago and lasted almost a hundred years. By the 20th century most national
canal systems were in place, and many links already decommissioned. Even-
tually they yielded to the vicious competition from railroads.
The first railways were constructed in the 1830s and were able to extend
the range, speed, and productivity offered by canals. More important, per-
haps, was the capability to overcome even more imposing natural barriers.
Bridges and tunnels were built for canals, but railways were capable of ac-
commodating traffic and freight demands more directly - wherever demand
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existed it was almost always possible to build a railway line. In time, elabo-
rate networks of railway systems were built in North America and Europe.
Together with railways, a new era of coal, steam, steel, and telegraph began.
The great railway era lasted until the 1920s.
Around the turn of the century the automobile was born and became
the symbol of modern industrial development along with oil, petrochemi-
cals, electricity, the telephone, and (Fordist) manufacturing. Paved roads
reduced the time-space dimensions of modern societies. Speed and perfor-
mance increased once again. The flexibility offered by an individual mode of
transport became affordable for a wider social strata, and only recently have
the disadvantages of the automobile become socially transparent although
they have been known for a long time. This perception lag illustrates to
what extent the automobile age was perceived as one of the preconditions
for modern industrial development. This notion still appears to continue to
prevail in many developing regions of the world.
Each successive mode of transport expanded into an infrastructure that
was ten times larger than the previous one. For example, the length of
transport infrastructures in the United States has increased by almost five
orders of magnitude during the last two centuries. Each successive transport
infrastructure was not only larger than the one it was replacing, but also
faster. A hierarchy of space and time territories emerges. As Simon (1988)
noted, most of the natural and man-made systems are often hierarchical,
Le., they have boxes-within-boxes architecture; transport systems portray
a similar structure. A man walking or using waterways can cover a mean
circle of a few kilometers diameter in one hour, the size of a village or small
town. A person traveling by rail or horse could travel more than a dozen
kilometers in the same period a hundred years ago. The automobile and
rapid rail systems offer a larger range - up to 100 km - and can, thus,
effectively connect cities; air travel extends the radius to almost 1,000 km.
As connected territory increases so does travel, tangible goods transport,
and information flow increase in a unit of time.
The sequences of development of canals, railways, and roads appear in
Figure 19.1 as regular diffusion processes when their size is plotted as a
percentage of the saturation level. In addition, the figure shows the devel-
opment of telegraphs and oil and gas pipelines. In time the complexity and
diversification of transport and communication systems increased. While
ancient roads and later canals were used for all transport and communi-
cation services, telegraphs evolved along with the railways as a specialized
communication system. Oil pipelines represent a dedicated transport system
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Figure 19.1. Diffusion of canals, railroads, telegraphs, roads, and oil and
gas pipelines in the USA, in percent of saturation length.
related to the development of roads, the automobile, and the oil industry.
The six S-shaped growth pulses can be subdivided into three groups: canals
followed by railways and telegraphs, followed by oil pipelines, roads, and gas
pipelines.
Figure 19.2 reproduces the diffusion of canals, railways, and roads on
a logarithmic scale as the ratio of the growth level reached in a given year,
divided by the amount of growth left to the saturation level. [1 ] The diffusion
of telegraphs and oil and gas pipelines is omitted from Figure 19.2 to enhance
the clarity of presentation. This is a convenient way of presenting S-shaped
diffusion processes as straight lines. The growth pulses of canals, railways,
and surfaced roads are separated in time by 55 years when measuring the
distance between the respective inflection points. The saturation and the
onset of decline of all five infrastructures coincides with the beginning of
prolonged recessions (in the 1870s, 1930s, and 1980s) of the last three long
waves. [2] The development of canals, relative to the achieved saturation
level, was much quicker than the expansion of railways and roads. The time
constant of growth, ti.t, is about 30 years for canals, 54 years for railroads,
and 56 years for surfaced roads.[3] Thus, the life cycles of infrastructures
are indeed very long, spanning periods of a century from introduction to
saturation. The duration of senescence can be even longer.
The most vital of the structures, however, are permanent. They may
provide different services than originally envisaged. More than a century
after the canal era, the remaining inland waterways are used for leisure
490 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
102---,-----------------,,------------,--------r0.99
101 0.90
~
I»
......., n
u.. .....
I o·
10°
:::J
.... 0.70
.."
'-"
-
IIu..
-<
-'"10-1 0.10
10- 2 -+---r---.--.-.-+-,......,,___,---.__r__._---.----r--'-r---.--.--.--,--~,___,---.__r__.___+_ 0.01
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Year
Figure 19.2. Logistic growth of infrastructures in the USA: length achieved
in a given year divided by growth left to saturation level.
activities, transport of low-value goods, a.nd irrigation. There are also more
sails today than in the heyday of ocean clippers, but most of them are on
pleasure boats.
19.4 Diffusion Clustering
The great canal expansion was initiated in the Uni ted Kingdom between
1750 and 1850. By the 1850s the canal construction saturated with a total
network of about 5,630 km including 60 km of water tunnels and a large
number of locks and aqueducts. The successful English experience in canal
development, and especially the canal mania of the end of the 18th century,
became the development model on the Continent and in the United States,
albeit with a considerable time lag. For example, the growth of canals in
France and the United States started much later and occurred almost in par-
allel and ended in practically synchronous saturation toward the 1860s with
a total network length of about 4,825 km and about 7,010 km, respectively.
Thus, there is a pronounced catch-up period in canal construction in France
N. Nakicenovic 491
and the United States compared with England. Despite a considerable time
lag in the introduction of canals, growth proceeded much faster, and as a re-
sult the expansion of canal networks reached saturation in all three countries
(and most other industrialized countries) within a relatively short period of
about two decades.
Canal construction did not come to a complete standstill, even after the
networks had reached their maximum size and proceeded to decline. For
example, substantial canal network extensions occurred in Germany and
Russia after the 1860s.[4] However, these new constructions could not com-
pensate for the overall network decline after saturation. The canal busi-
ness was eroded to such an extent by competition from the railways, that
many important canals were decommissioned and the lengths of the networks
declined.
In general, the diffusion of canals was swifter in the countries that were
the "late starters" leading to congruence and a season of saturations. The
onset of decline under the competitive pressure of railways was an interna-
tional phenomenon apparently affecting both the early innovators and the
followers at about the same time. The consequences of these developments,
however, are different. The leading countries developed canal networks over
longer periods, and consequently the systems were larger and more perva-
sive than in the countries that exhibited a pronounced catch-up effect. In
those countries the saturation was initiated before the canals became a vital
and important component of overall economic development. They became
isolated links and never achieved the great economic importance as in the
leading countries.
The development of railways was initiated in the United Kingdom dur-
ing the 1830s, and within two decades the first major railways were built in
other countries. Figures 19. 3( a) and 19. 3( b) document both the expansion
and decline phases of the railway network in six industrialized countries,
illustrating to what extent the development of railroads has converged in-
ternationally. Figure 19.3(a) shows the diffusion of railroads in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Federal Republic of Germany
after World War II) and Figure 19.3(b) in the Austro-Hungarian Empire
(Austria after World War I) and France, and the two growth pulses of the
railways in Russia and the Soviet Union. While the railway construction
processes differ both in slope and duration, there is a high degree of con-
gruence in the ultimate saturation of railway networks in the industrialized
countries during the 1920s.
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These six examples clearly show that the development of a particular
techno-economic trajectory can follow similar paths even in countries with
fundamentally different social and economic relations, different technological
bases, and certainly different initial conditions. In this sense we can speak
of international bandwagons in the diffusion of pervasive techno-economic
systems. The most interesting cases are France and the Soviet Union; they
show departures from the development pattern of the other countries.
In France there are two unusual features worth noting. The first is that
the turbulence during the saturation phase is very large compared with other
countries; the second feature is the introduction of the TGV (train agrande
vitesse) during the 1970s. Without the additional infrastructure dedicated
to the TGV, the length of the French railway system continues to decline
along the historical path, while the inclusion of the TGV links could indicate
the beginning of a trend reversal. Thus, one could speculate whether the
introduction of rapid rail transport systems does not, in fact, represent the
beginning of a new transport infrastructure. To document this possibility,
the growth of TGV lines is plotted in the lower right corner of the graph.
The development path of railroads in Tzarist Russia is almost identical to
the patterns observed in the other five countries, until the onset of saturation
in the 1920s. This period also coincides with the October Revolution. The
reconstruction period is the possible reason for the further expansion of
railroads in the Soviet Union. Thus, two consecutive expansion pulses of the
railway network (which are analogous to the two phases of canal construction
mentioned in [4]) are evident. After saturation of the first pulse, the second
followed a similar trajectory with a slightly longer duration, and is now
entering its own saturation phase.
The diffusion cluster of railway networks that reached saturation by the
1930s accounts for almost 70 percent of all railroad lines constructed to
date. This implies that the development trajectory based on the exten-
sive construction of railroads was not repeated by latecomers, i.e., by those
countries not participating in the expansion pulse. In fact, the global railway
network reached a length of about 1.3 million kilometers by the 1930s and
has remained at that length ever since. Decommissioning of lines in the core
countries was compensated by new construction in the peripheral regions. In
these core countries railroads reached completion within a very brief period
starting in the 1930s and ending during the 1940s. The railway bandwagon
focused as it evolved, converging toward the saturation period. Thus, the
focusing increased as the diffusion cluster matured. In other words, the early
introduction of railroads occurred with great lags between the early and late
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adopters. However, the latecomers appeared to achieve faster diffusion rates
than the original innovators. A pronounced catch-up effect is convergent to-
ward the saturation. This focusing of the expansion pulse of the railway era
is noteworthy considering that the whole development process lasted about
100 years in the leading countries and only a few decades in the late-starters.
Some evidence indicates, however, that the absolute level of adoption is
much lower for the laggers toward the end of the cluster. In other words,
the ultimately achieved railroad density is in general higher the earlier the
railroads are introduced; leaders achieve the highest diffusion levels. Figure
19.4 shows this phenomenon. The density of the railway networks is mea-
sured as a ratio of the peak of national railway length over land area. Figure
19.4 includes both the countries where the networks were completed by the
1940s and those that built railways later and thus did not belong to the rail-
way bandwagon. For each country two different empirical measures are used
to assess the starting date of railway construction: first, the year when the
network reached one percent of its ultimate maximum length, and second,
the date when the first railway line of national importance was constructed.
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Figure 19.4. World railway network density as a function of introduction
date. (Source: Griibler, 1990.)
Figure 19.4 shows that the railway densities can be grouped within a
declining density envelope as a function of the introduction date. This re-
sult shows that the diffusion rate accelerates with the introduction lag, but
that the intensity of the final adoption level decreases at the same time.
Furthermore, the intensity falls further for those countries that introduced
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railways after the completion of the expansion pulse in the core countries.
This identifies an opportunity window for the diffusion of pervasive systems
like railways, which were the dominant transport system during the second
half of the last century.
Roads and automobiles are the most pervasive transport system of the
present. Roads existed long before the automobile. For example, the French
road network of the 1890s had a total length of 500,000 km compared with
800,000 km in 1985; in the United Kingdom roads extended over 283,000 km
in 1920 compared with 349,000 km in 1986; and in the United States the
road length was 5 million km in 1921 compared with 6.2 million km in 1985.
Thus, the total mileage of all roads increased only slightly in most of the
industrialized countries during this century as the road transport systems
evolved. However the quality of roads improved dramatically during this
period, and in time surfaced and paved roads emerged as a new transport
infrastructure replacing the old, dusty road system. Unfortunately, this pro-
cess is not well documented in most countries, so that very few comparable
statistics are available concerning the road system development.
Figure 19. S shows that the diffusion of the surfaced road networks in the
United States and the Soviet Union occurred at about the same rate (6.t of64
and 66 years, respectively). However, the development of roads in the Soviet
Union lags by about 30 years compared with the United States. In contrast
to the diffusion of canals and railroads that have saturated in the past, the
diffusion of surfaced roads in the Soviet Union is still far from the potential
(estimated) saturation level. The current length of about 812,000 km rep-
resents about 56 percent of the estimated saturation level (K of about 1.4
million km). In comparison, the current length of paved roads in the United
States is about 5.6 million km with an estimated saturation level of about 6
million km. Owing to limited data describing the international development
of the modern road systems, the diffusion rates and adoption levels of the
automobile will now be analyzed.
During the last century horse-driven vehicles were the predominant form
of road travel. In the United States the number of road horses peaked
at more than 3 million in the 1920s, but declined rapidly thereafter. The
horseless carriage was introduced toward the end of the last century. The
spread of the automobile was very swift until the 1930s when a structural
change occurred in the growth path followed by lower expansion rates (see
the previous chapter by Griibler).
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Figure 19.5. Diffusion of surfaced roads in the USA and the USSR. Note
that there is a factor 4 difference between the estimated ]( in the two coun-
tries. (Sources: Griibler, 1990; Nakicenovic, 1988b.)
By 1930 horses had virtually disappeared from the major roads in most
industrialized countries, indicating that motor vehicles filled the niche pre-
viously occupied by horses. Thus, the replacement process lasted altogether
about 30 years. Additional evidence is seen in the fUI~damental transforma-
tion of the vehicles themselves after the 1930s and the numerous innovations
in production methods and vehicle design that provided for higher perfor-
mance, more comfort, and lower price. Several changes in other sectors
also made the automobile more attractive and accessible to the public. Ex-
amples include innovations in the steel industry (higher-quality alloys and
wider sheet metal), the petrochemical industry (high-quality rubber and cat-
alytic cracking, see Chapter 17 by Ayres and Ezekoye), and a host of other
institutional changes, which eventually even led to automobile compatible
settlement patterns. Incidentally, automobile use today has led to numerous
environmental problems, but in a historical perspective the replacement of
horses by cars alleviated one of the grave environmental problems of the
cities of the last century, namely, horse manure in the streets.
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Figure 19.6. Diffusion rates and ownership densities of passenger cars as a
function of introduction date. (Source: Griibler, 1990.)
The adoption level of the automobile in different countries follows the
same pattern as the observed saturation levels of railroads. Of all industri-
alized countries, the diffusion rate was the slowest in the United States and
Canada, faster in most ofthe European countries, and fastest in Japan. This
tendency is also confirmed at the global level; the adoption of the automobile
was even quicker in the developing countries, albeit that it has only recently
started and has led, at least for the time being, to relatively low levels of car
ownership.
Figure 19.6 reports these results by giving the estimated diffusion rate
(~t, given on the lower curve and labeled on the left vertical axis) as a
function of the beginning of the innovation diffusion given on the horizontal
axis. For example, the diffusion of the automobile started in the 1920s in
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Australia, with a diffusion time constant (~t) of about 50 years. The shaded
band on the top of the figure gives the estimated automobile adoption levels
(plotted on the right vertical axis in number of cars per 1,000 capita with
the associated statistical uncertainty bands), again as a function of auto-
mobile introduction dates. Thus, a pronounced acceleration of the diffusion
rates can be observed that is proportional to the time lag in the innovation
adoption and also that the ultimate adoption levels decrease with the lag in
the innovation adoption.
This result is consistent with spatial patterns of innovation diffusion.
Originating from the innovation centers that reach the highest adoption lev-
els, the innovation generates additional gravity centers in space; however,
the adoption levels remain lower in the peripheral regions compared with
innovation centers. Our result confirms this finding at an international level
in both time and space. Early innovators achieve higher adoption levels and
have the longest diffusion or learning times. Peripheral regions catch-up so
that the diffusion process focuses toward the saturation period, but the adop-
tion level in the periphery remains much lower than in the leading centers.
The data confirm this acceleration tendency, which leads to lower adoption
levels and explains as much as 89.4 percent of the variance (R2 adjusted for
the degrees of freedom). This acceleration tendency in the global diffusion
process indicates that a country that just started adopting private automo-
biles now would have a diffusion rate (~t) ofless than a decade. Such a rapid
diffusion of car ownership appears quite infeasible from a practical point of
view. Should it actually occur, it certainly will not result in a significant
growth of both absolute and relative car adoption levels.
19.5 Substitution Waves
The evolution of transport infrastructures can also be seen as a substitution
process. Instead of analyzing their development as a sequence of individ-
ual diffusion processes (as the succession of growth pulses shown in Figure
19.2), they can be viewed as systems that replace each other in time. Figure
19.7 reproduces the growth in the length of the transport infrastructures in
the United States (from Figure 19.2) as a substitution process[5] and shows
for comparison the equivalent substitution process in the Soviet Union. It
shows the successive substitution of the four transport infrastructures in the
two countries: canals, railroads, surfaced roads, and airways. The shares
of each infrastructure in the total length are plotted as the ratio of the
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Figure 19.7. Substitution of transport infrastructures in the USA and the
USSR, fractional shares in length. (Sources: Griibler, 1990; Nakicenovic,
1988b.)
share of one infrastructure divided by the sum total shares of all others on
a semi-logarithmic scale. This particular representation shows the relative
importance of competing infrastructures and the dynamics of the evolution
process since 1800. In any given period, there is a clear market dominance
(Le., more than a 50 percent share) and simultaneous spread of transport
activities over two or three different systems. Thus, while competing infras-
tructures are all simultaneously used, their mix changes over time leading
to the expansion of the area connected in a unit of time. Projecting this
competitive process into the future leads to the increasing importance of
airways and their possible market dominance after the 2050s, notwithstand-
ing the likelihood of a new competitor emerging in the coming decades, such
as magnetic levitation trains (maglevs) and advanced forms of air trans-
port (e.g., hypersonic aircraft) for transcontinental distances. Although air
transport and the automobiles are still expanding modes of passenger travel,
railroads are now in a phase of postsaturation in most industrialized coun-
tries. Their once dominant position in intercity passenger traffic has been
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eroded. Two symbols of this decline are the discontinuation of the transcon-
tinental railway service in the United States, and the burgeoning deficits
of most national railway systems in other countries. Similar evolutionary
changes in the development of transport infrastructures also occurred in the
European countries. Thus, the international diffusion bandwagons of trans-
port infrastructures can be also described as an evolutionary substitution
process, revealing the changing structure of transport systems.
Even the planned economies have undergone a similar evolutionary path.
The pattern of temporal changes in the Soviet Union (and Russia before the
revolution), like in the United States, is marked by a high degree of regu-
larity and a quest for higher speed and productivity. The phase transitions,
however, are lagged by a few decades when compared with the United States.
For example, the dominance of railways lasts until the 1940s while in the
United States it ended two decades earlier. The decline of canals occurred
much later as well, while the growth of national airways follows the same
path as in the United States. During the last decades, the development of
the transport infrastructures in the two countries has been converging. Also
the rate of relative growth in the importance of road infrastructure and their
saturation appear synchronized in the two countries. Thus, there is an in-
creasing congruence and similarity in the structural and functional evolution
of the transport system in the two countries. To a large extent this is also
due to the fact that both countries have relatively low population densities
and vast territories that modern transport systems must bridge in a matter
of hours.
This irreversible process of evolutionary change (the survival of the fittest
in an ever-changing environment) is nevertheless only a proxy for the real
dynamics in the development of transportation systems, which should be
measured in some common performance unit. Because transport systems
provide a whole range of services, such a common descriptor is difficult
to define. Furthermore, most transport services require a mix of different
transport modes. On average this mix apparently changes in time.
Two obvious choices for an appropriate indicator are ton- or person-
kilometers per year. These units distinguish between freight and passenger
services, although they are usually offered simultaneously, but they do not
distinguish between short and long distances. Thus, there is no obvious
shortcut and it appears necessary to analyze passenger and freight transport
separately for both short and long distances. Fortunately, the available data
make it possible to reconstruct the dynamics of these substitution processes
for at least some countries. As these results have been reported elsewhere
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(see, for example, Nakicenovic, 1988a and 1988b; Griibler, 1990) we will
describe briefly the modal split for long-distance passenger transport in the
United States and the Soviet Union, and then show the evolution of freight
transport in the Federal Republic of Germany. These examples are repre-
sentative of the developments in most industrialized countries and illustrate
the convergence in the development of transport systems. They show more
explicitly the linkages in the development of pervasive systems between the
transport infrastructures, vehicles, and other related technologies and the
overall pattern of economic and social restructuring.
Figure 19.8 shows the substitution of different transportation modes in
intercity (long-distance) passenger travel in the United States and the Soviet
Union. By excluding urban and metropolitan transport, the competition for
intercity passenger traffic is reduced to four major transport modes in the
United States: railways, buses, cars, and airways. The major competitors
over this period in the Soviet Union were boats, railways, buses, and airways;
the automobile never gained any significant importance. Today, most of
intercity travel is by car and plane in the United States and by rail, bus, and
plane in the Soviet Union. Comparison of the two countries shows that in the
past the intercity passenger transport development portrayed a phase-shift
in the two countries. Rail and bus are virtually extinct in the United States,
while in the Soviet Union they are still the dominant means of transport.
The substitution dynamics indicate that by the end of the century air-
ways may become the dominant form of intercity travel in the United States
and the Soviet Union. The evolutionary paths appear to be convergent. In
both countries road transport has currently the largest share, albeit by au-
tomobile in one case and by bus in the other. What is important is that the
average choice of different modes of passenger travel changes consistently in
both countries and favors faster and more productive systems.
Zahavi (1979) has shown that traveling is optimized under the constraints
of individual time budgets and family income. On average roughly 15 percent
of disposable family income is allocated to travel so as to maximize distance.
Szalai (1972) analyzed time budgets of the inhabitants of 12 cities through-
out the world including industrialized and developing countries. His work
indicates that the time spent for traveling (work and non-work) is roughly 1.5
hours a day. In a given situation, each individual will make different choices,
but on average the modal split will change as income increases, despite the
assumed invariance of travel-time budgets. Incomes have increased and the
cost of travel has decreased in real terms, leading to an increase in the vol-
ume of travel (passenger-kilometers) and the range in a given unit of time.
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Figure 19.8. Substitution of intercity passenger transport modes in the
USA and the USSR, fractional shares in inter-city passenger-km. (Sources:
Griibler, 1990; Nakicenovic, 1988b.)
Over time, larger shares of travel are thus allocated to faster modes. The
slower modes recede to service fewer people over shorter distances (fewer
passenger-kilometers) and low-value segments of freight transport. Their
shares in passenger transport decline, resulting in the rationalization of the
respective infrastructures. The least productive links are decommissioned,
and the infrastructure declines. The diffusion of more productive and faster
means of transport leads to increased range and connects even larger areas
into one single complex. During the last two centuries villages merged into
towns, towns into cities, and cities into metropolitan areas. Large urban
corridors have evolved throughout the world, some approaching a hundred
million inhabitants.
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While the possibility of constant travel time allocation would tend to in-
crease the demand for faster modes of passenger transport subject to mone-
tary budgets, the changes toward faster modes of freight transport are caused
by different driving forces. Transport of tangible goods imposes more strin-
gent requirements with increasing value-density (value per unit weight or
volume). Long transport times require larger inventories and correspond-
ingly higher capital expenditure. Furthermore, the risk of loss or damage
also tends to increase with the exposure time. All told, more valuable goods
are transported by faster transport modes. With the introduction of flexible
manufacturing, larger worldwide transport of perishable goods and fashion-
able garments, the air-road systems are increasing their competitiveness.
The increasing value density of tangible goods and the decreasing materials
intensiveness tend to generate higher value added on most efficient routes.
Figure 19.9 shows a snapshot in time of imports of manufactured goods
into the Federal Republic of Germany as a function of value-density. The
figure illustrates that the most valuable goods are transported by more ef-
ficient and faster means of transport. Basic materials such as coal, gravel,
scrap, and ores in the value range of a few DM per kilogram are mostly
transported by sea, canal, and rail. But even in this lowest segment, trucks
are more competitive and are the dominant transport mode with value of
up to about 100 DM per kilogram. Most of the manufactured goods such
as automobiles and machine tools fall into the range below this threshold.
Electronics, computer, and precision instruments are usually shipped by air.
The highest value manufactured goods that are exclusively transported by
air are aerospace products and aircraft themselves.
Recently, General Motors started a 5,000 kilometers production line con-
nected by airfreight. Cadillac Allante car bodies are assembled at Pininfa-
rina in Turin, Italy, and transported by Lufthansa and Alitalia B-747 cargo
aircraft to Detroit for final assembly of engine, power train, and electronics.
This airlift assembly line is apparently cost-efficient considering all the direct
and indirect costs of potential damage risks and the production inventories
that would be locked in ocean freighters for weeks. On a more speculative
note, the further dematerialization of manufactured goods and an increase
in value through software and information content would tend to increase
the share of air transport in freight. Collocation of production facilities and
services close to airports may proceed in a similar way as industrial activi-
ties condensed along previous transport infrastructures: railways and later
roads.
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19.6 Clusters and Families
The substitution of older transport infrastructures for new ones has shown
strong linkages in the evolution of pervasive systems. These examples show a
degree of synchronization in the diffusion of transport systems that converge
toward the onset of the saturation phase. They reflect strong linkages in
the evolution of techno-economic systems denoting major techno-economic
paradigm shifts. Countries in which the innovation is introduced with a lag
behind the leading regions tend to catch-up but saturate at lower adoption
levels. A comparison of the evolution of transport systems in the United
States and the Soviet Union indicates that the catch-up effect occurs also
over longer periods: from one generation of transport system to another.
While the modal structure was out of phase between the two countries only
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world level.
a few decades ago, there is convergence in the recent stagnation of road
development and vigorous growth of air travel.
These phenomena can be documented internationally and not in just
a few selected countries or sectors. Figure 19.10 summarizes our findings
from the illustrative examples given above and other case studies and shows
the international diffusion bandwagons of canals, railways, and automobiles.
The various diffusion processes that define the bands are listed below each
cluster. As mentioned earlier, the focusing is not very pronounced at the
time when the innovations are introduced, and there is a high degree of over-
lap among the various bandwagons due to differences in the time constants
(bat) among individual diffusion processes. Nevertheless, three rather clear
clusters can be distinguished. The first saturates about 1860, the second
506 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
about 1930, and the third is centered a few years away in 1995. Each cluster
is converging toward the saturation period. The focusing increases as the
diffusion cluster matures. In other words, the introduction of innovations is
associated with great lags between the early and late adopters. However, the
latecomers appear to achieve faster diffusion rates than the original innova-
tors. Thus, a pronounced catch-up effect is convergent toward saturation.
We have also observed, however, that the extent of the absolute diffusion
level is much lower for the latecomers toward the end of the cluster. The
saturation density of railroad networks of a particular country is lower if
the diffusion rate is higher. In other words, the ultimately achieved railroad
density is, in general, higher the earlier the railroads are introduced; leaders
achieve the highest diffusion levels. We have observed the same phenomenon
in the spread of motorization in different countries, the early innovators such
as the United States having the highest per capita density with the achieved
density decreasing in proportion to the lag in automobile introduction.
In this sense the saturation phase of each cluster represents a barrier
to further diffusion at the international level. Very few diffusion processes
can tunnel through this barrier. If it is true that this marks the beginning
of paradigm shifts, it is not surprising that the further diffusion of systems
associated with the old techno-economic development trajectory is blocked
and thus makes way for the new. It is the disruptive crisis of the old that
provides the fertile ground for new systems to develop; it is a process of
creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1939).
Our working hypothesis is that the diffusion processes within each clus-
ter constitute families of interrelated systems that enhance each other and
promote the pervasiveness of the three successive development trajectories.
Classification or a taxonomy of each innovation that belongs to a given clus-
ter and which makes it viable, would probably reveal a hierarchical system
with one successful diffusion having a positive feedback and catalytic effect
on the development of many others within the whole cluster. If this is the
case, then the clustering is not coincidental as Schumpeter (1939) pointed
out. It is likely that it is the interdependence of individual diffusion processes
that in time focuses each cluster.
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19.7 Conclusions
A certain degree of regularity, synchronization, and recurrence can be noted
within each family of interrelated technologies, although the clustering or
bundling is not very rigid. There is stronger evidence for the congruence
in the saturation of diffusion processes rather than in their emergence, so
that the focusing increases as the systems mature. In other words, the
time span between the beginning of the diffusion of new pervasive systems,
Le., between the leaders and the laggers, tends to decrease as the diffusion
progresses; the process appears much more focused toward the saturation
phase. This visible catch-up effect refers only to the relative diffusion rates
and not to the absolute levels of diffusion. The leaders usually achieve higher
diffusion levels; the levels of the followers are lower roughly in proportion to
the lag in the introduction of a given innovation.
The results, however, cannot be conclusive before explicit linkages are
established between the individual diffusion processes that constitute each
cluster of techno-economic development. A taxonomy and establishment of
hierarchies within each cluster could be a worthwhile route toward determin-
ing the relationships and driving forces behind the clustering effect observed
in the samples of innovation diffusions. This could perhaps answer some of
the questions that emerge from the analysis. For example, why are the clus-
ters more focused toward the saturation phase? Alternatively, under which
conditions could unbundling occur and perhaps lead to a more even pace
of structural change? The overall development path is punctuated by crises
that emerge in the transition from an old saturating cluster to a new one.
The creative destruction of the old systems is characteristic for evolutionary
processes in biology. The extinction of old ecosystems is followed by expan-
sion of new ones. Techno-economic development paths portray apparently
similar features of evolutionary change.
Many new techno-economic systems and innovations made over the last
few decades have not diffused sufficiently to make an impact at the aggregate
level, while the older systems, based on the old paradigms, are approaching
or have already reached market saturation. Depending on whether and how
societies adopt the systems, we may witness new clusters of diffusion in the
future that would have fundamental impacts on employment and competi-
tiveness, on the structure of the economy, and consequently on the transport
systems. Since their adoption and mediation by society will not be homoge-
neous and will affect countries and regions differentially, the process can be
expected to be disruptive.
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[1] Historical data and the fitted logistic curve are transformed as Y/(K - Y),
where Y denotes the actual infrastructure length in a given year and K the
estimated saturation level. The data and the estimated logistic trend are plot-
ted as fractional shares of the saturation level, F = Y/ K, which simplifies the
transformation to F/(1 - F), the level of relative growth achieved divided by
the remaining potential. Transformed in this way, the data appear to be on a
straight line, which is the estimated logistic function. Without this transforma-
tion, the data and the trend curve would portray the same S-shaped growth as
shown for the three transport infrastructures in Figure 19.1: canals, railways,
and surfaced roads.
[2] The evolutionary path of successive replacements of traditional by new para-
digms as seen in the diffusion of technologies and institutions, economic restruc-
turing, and transformations in social relations is captured in the Schumpeterian
notion of the long waves in economic development, i.e., the seesawlike pattern
of the Kondratieff (1926) pulses experienced in the market economies during
the last two centuries. Freeman (1963), Marchetti (1985), and many others
have subsequently extended both the conceptual and empirical description of
long waves, diffusion, invention, and innovation processes, albeit from different
methodological and theoretical perspectives. For a comprehensive review of this
research area see van Duijn (1983), Vasko (1987), or Goldstein (1988).
[3] The duration of the diffusion process is conveniently measured as the time that
it takes to grow from 1 percent to 50 percent of the saturation level. We call this
measure dt. In this example dt equals 30 years. Due to the symmetry of the
logistic function, the same time is required for an increase from 50 to 99 percent
of the saturation level. An alternative definition of dt is the time required to
grow from 10 percent to the 90 percent level. In this case the value of dt would
be slightly different from the other definition, but for all practical applications
both definitions can be used interchangeably.
[4] The canal growth pulse in Russia was slower than in other countries and con-
tinued beyond 1870, but it also saturated toward the end of the century with
a total length of about 900 km. After the Revolution an ambitious new canal
development program was implemented leading to the second pulse in canal
growth extending the size of the network close to 21,000 km (it will be shown
below that railroads also developed through two growth pulses). Despite this
enormous effort, canals currently represent less than two percent of all transport
infrastructures in the Soviet Union (as will be shown below).
[5] The fractional shares, F, are not plotted directly but as the linear transforma-
tion of the logistic curve, i.e., F/(l-F) , as the ratio of the market share taken
by one infrastructure over the sum of the market shares of all other compet-
ing systems. This form of presentation reveals the logistic substitution path
as an almost linear secular trend with small annual perturbations. Thus, the
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presence of some linear trends in Figure 19.7 indicates where the fractional sub-
stitution of transport infrastructures follows a logistic curve. In dealing with
more than two competing technologies, we must generalize the Fisher and Pry
(1971) model, since in such cases logistic substitution cannot be preserved in
all phases of the substitution process. Every competitor undergoes three dis-
tinct substitution phases: growth, saturation, and decline. This is illustrated
by the substitution path of railways (and later roads), which curve through a
maximum from increasing to declining market shares (see Figure 19.7). In the
model of the substitution process, we assume that only one competitor is in
the saturation phase at any given time, that declining technologies fade away
steadily at logistic rates, and that new competitors enter the market and grow
at logistic rates. As a result, the saturating technology is left with the residual
market shares (i.e., the difference between one and the sum of fractional market
shares of all other competitors) and is forced to follow a nonlogistic path that
joins its period of growth to its subsequent period of decline. After the current,
saturating competitor has reached a logistic rate of decline, the next competitor
enters its saturation phase and the process is repeated until all but the most re-
cent competitor are in decline. A more comprehensive description of the model
and assumptions is given in (Nakicenovic, 1979).
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Chapter 20
Determining the Service Life
Cycle of Computers
Theodore Modis and Alain Debecker
20.1 Introduction
Nowadays most people in business are familiar with the application of lo-
gistic growth to the sale of products even if they ignore its mathematical
formulation. They all use a bell-shaped curve to refer to a product's life
cycle. The corresponding S-curve, for a product's cumulative sales, is also
something with which they feel comfortable.
Business people are, however, less in tune with the mortality of their
products. Hardware maintenance contracts for computers closely follow sys-
tems sales. At the beginning the number of contracts increases at the same
rate as sales, but instead of the familiar S-curve, contracts reach a peak and
then slowly start declining as machines become old and obsolete. In Figure
20.1 we see the familiar forms: the sales life cycle, the corresponding S-curve
of cumulative sales, and the less familiar service life cycle. Notice that the
last graph peaks only after the product has completed its sales life cycle.
Qualitatively the business world is aware of the service life cycle. They refer
to it as the product's end-oi-life curve. Quantitatively, however, they fall
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....... Time
Figure 20.1. (a) Life cycle of sales, (b) Cumulative number of sales, (c)
Number of active service contracts at a given time.
short of being able to predict when the product will peak and at what rate
revenue will decline afterwards.
The life cycles of products are becoming shorter. A specific computer
model used to sell for 4-5 years in the 1970s; they now only sell for 1-2
years. Service life cycles have been known to last for 12-14 years. By how
much are they going to decrease in the future?
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A recent article in the Harvard Business Review addresses this question
(Potts, 1988). Graphs and figures liven up the discussion, but the treatment
remains qualitative and rather pictorial. It corroborates the intuition but
does not help with quantitative forecasts. Determining the service life cycle is
interesting for other reasons besides the ever-increasing importance of service
revenue. It provides knowledge of the installed base, its actual and future
size, which is crucial in marketing strategies for add-ons (follow-up sales in
terms of accessories, upgrades, etc.), software, and a variety of services. This
is why we propose a quantitative approach for determining a product's life
span as opposed to its sales life cycle only.
20.2 Logistic Diffusion
Logistic growth formulated in the Volterra-Lotka equations accurately de-
scribes situations where a niche is being filled under natural competition, be
it an ecological or a market niche. The situation becomes more complicated
when one is interested in tracking down the survivors of a generation over
time. The total number of units sold of a particular product increases with
time reaching its ceiling at the end of the product's life cycle. The number of
products in use, however, never reaches the same ceiling as there is a certain
mortality among the products sold. Out of a hundred units sold in month
one, 98 may be still "alive" a year later but only 50 in five years time. This
erosion comes from aging and obsolescence, and sets in right from the be-
ginning. While populations grow happily along their S-shaped birth curve,
they are at any point in time subject to a certain mortality.
Mathematically the case calls for a convolution function. The folding
of logistic growth with a mortality function. What shape should the latter
have? Sales follow a logistic growth, namely the rate of sales over time, P(t),
proceeds along a bell-shaped curve of the form:
(20.1 )
where M, Q and to are constants. To introduce mortality we begin with the
simplest possible assumption of a constant percentage decay rate, in other
words an exponential decay:
1 dR(u) = -k
R(u) du
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Figure 20.2. Above: life cycle outlining sales of service contracts and
exponential mortality rates over a five-year period. Below: the integrated
number of contracts with finer time bins (trimesters). The overall envelope
represents total survivors at a given time.
where R(u) is the remaining contracts of age u, and k is a constant. The
convolution function is given below and graphically it is shown in Figure
20.2.
I
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Q(t) 100 P(t - u)R(u)du
100 Me-ku-,--------.,,.------..,...,------,-,--,.---.,....,...duo (1 +eQ(t-u-to »)( 1 +e-a(t-u-to ») (20.2)
When we first applied this formulation to real data we obtained good
results, particularly for old products for which the sales life cycle had finished
years ago and service contracts were already beyond their peak and declining.
However, two difficulties soon emerged. One was related to relati vely young
products where the rate of decay was so low that it implied they would
be around for a very long time. This fact contradicts the increasingly rapid
cycling of products witnessed in the computer industry. The second difficulty
was more revealing. When tracking decay rates in a number of areas we
found that they were not constant over time. These observations prompted
us to raise the level of sophistication for mortality, i.e., to try a second degree
function for the decay rate:
_1_ dR(u) = a R(u) +b
R(u) du
where a and b are constants. Setting N = -bja we can rewrite this expres-
sion as
dR
- = -a R(N - R)du (20.3)
which unveils the logistic nature of the assumed form. Furthermore, we
can eliminate one constant by setting N = 1.0 since the mortality ceiling is
100%.
We have now arrived at a logistic mortality, however, it was not en-
tirely circumstantial. An older study on the appearance and survival of
supertankers had revealed to us an exemplary S-shaped mortality for that
"species". In addition, Marchetti has investigated human mortality (Mar-
chetti, 1990) and has also established logistic laws for the process. However,
what is important is that the logistic mortality better fits the data on com-
puter service contracts we were trying to describe. The new convolution
function described below involves five parameters, three from the logistic
growth of contract "births", equation (20.1), and two from the logistic mor-
tality, equation (20.3), (uo is an integration constant). This is graphically
depicted in Figure 20.3.
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Figure 20.3. Above: life cycle outlining sales of service contracts and
logistic mortality rates over a five-year period. Below: the integrated number
of contracts with finer time bins (trimesters). The overall envelope represents
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Q(t)
20.3
100 P(t - u) R(u) du
[00 M
Jo (1 + e a (t-u-to ))(l +e- a (t-u-to ))(l + ea(u-uo ))
Applications
(20.4)
Using equation (20.4) in forecasting or business planning implies that the
five parameters have to be determined. To do this experimentally one needs
at least five measurements - monthly or quarterly data points on active con-
tracts. In order to limit the uncertainties involved in logistic fits one must
have many data points. Consequently parameter determination becomes a
fitting procedure where the five unknowns are to be determined from many
more than five data points. The procedure we used is one ofaX 2 minimiza-
tion. The X 2 is formed as follows:
(20.5)
where D is the data array, Q from equation (20.4), w a series of weights to
be supplied, and i the index of time bins.
A function minimization program was used to search for the values of
the five parameters. The weights were usually taken to be uniform, but in
some cases they were adjusted through business knowledge. An example is
shown in Figure 20.4. For this older computer model, even though we are
missing the early data, we have enough points (monthly data for six years) to
make a reliable determination. In fact, by ignoring the most recent year, the
last 12 points from the fit have a negligible effect on the parameter values.
Repeating the operation, i.e., dropping the last 24 points, still replicates
closely the parameter values originally found. In conclusion, we can say that
as long as the historical data go far enough to hint at the decline beyond the
peak, the parameter determination shows a remarkable stability.
We did, however, encounter two unexpected difficulties.
20.3.1 Young products
The first difficulty involved young products, i.e., products for which the
historical data have not yet reached the peak. In these cases a 4- or 5-
parameter fit, involving equations (20.2) or (20.4) respectively, produced a
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Figure 20.4. Monthly data and fit for the hardware service contracts of an
old computer model. Each point represents the number of active contracts
at the time. The fit (solid line) is based on the data up to the end of 1985,
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extrapolation of the convolution function determined from the fit.
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Figure 20.5. Trimesterly data and fit for the active contracts of a recent
computer model. The fitting program yielded a null mortality (dotted line).
The solid line suggests the realistic evolution taking mortality into account.
null mortality most of the time. The best fit found by the program would be
a simple logistic growth with zero mortality. This was seen in terms of the
fact that the difference between contracts sold and contracts active was very
small in the early days of a new product. The program could not determine
mortality parameters if a simple 3-parameter growth logistic could describe
the data just as well (see Figure 20.5). Although this is a comforting feedback
on the robustness and stability of the parameter determination method, it
precluded the determination of contract mortality for young products.
At the same time it inspires a resolution to the problem through factor-
ization. We adopted a two-step procedure. First we fit the contract sales
data, i.e., the appearance of new contracts, to a simple 3-parameter logistic.
Once we determine the ceiling this way, we fit the active-contract data to the
convolution function (20.2) or (20.4), but this time with the maximum M
fixed at the value already determined from the sales fit. Clearly the proce-
dure demands knowledge of the "birth" of contracts as well as the contracts
active at a given time.
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20.3.2 Speeding up the computation
The second difficulty concerned the computer time required. Working for a
computer company one is often spoilt because there are usually unlimited
computing resources. Nevertheless, human nature is such that having does
not quench greed. When we realized that the minimization ofaX2 involving
the convolution of two logistic functions, with five parameters needing to be
determined, required more than a few minutes of real time computing, we
found the situation unacceptable. Rather than searching for programming
tricks to reduce the computing time we adopted a mathematical trick. The
calculation of the exponentials involved in the logistic expression takes a long
time to calculate. Logistic growth, however, can also be obtained through a
simple hyperbola and the recursive relation (Meade, 1985):
X n+l = +ba X n
(20.6)
where a and b are constants and the third constant is the starting value X O '
The new approach then is to construct an array, element by element,
using relation (20.6) and a similar one for mortality with two parameters only
(the starting value is taken close to 100%, representing mortality at age zero).
The five parameters are then determined by using the minimization program
to best match the constructed array to the data, the active contract array is
shown at the bottom of Figure 20.6. Whenever the data are available in this
way, in the full diagonal matrix form, a further factorization becomes possible
and mortality can be determined independently from each line (across), while
sales keep growing along their life cycle (down).
20.3.3 Phasing out as a generation
It is common knowledge that the usefulness of a generation of computer
models decreases with time not because of aging, e.g., material fatigue re-
sulting in frequent breakdowns, but due to obsolescence. Computer models
do not drop out of use individually like used cars. They phase out together
as their technological generation becomes outdated.
This phenomenon is confirmed here in a formal way. From Figure 20.3
we see that the number of models in operation declines logistically from the
day of sales. The end-of-life point, taken as the 1% of sales that remains
at a certain date, is reached at approximately the same date for all models.
People who bought the very first models will keep them for up to 16 years.
Those who bought the last few models sold say six year later, will only
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100%-----
Contract
"births"
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
7 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2
11 11 10 9 8 7 7 6 5 5 4 4
16 16 15 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
19 19 17 15 14 12 11 10 9 8
16 16 15 13 12 11 10 9 8
11 11 10 9 8 7 7 6
7 7 6 5 5 4 4
3 3 3 3 3 2
2 2 2 1 1
2 5 11 21 35 51 61 67 68 63 59 55 47 42
Active
contracts
~ Time
Figure 20.6. The full matrix of contracts for a hypothetical model. The
diagonal elements represent initial contract sales. Projected vertically on the
left they give rise to the life cycle. Each horizontal array displays mortality
over time. The bottom line represents active contracts as a function of time.
keep them ten years. This generation of computers had a sales life-cycle
of six years and a service life-cycle of 16. Perhaps unfairly, the models
fabricated last, even though perfected and more reliable are endowed with
shorter lifetimes.
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20.4 Conclusion
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Unlike cumdative product sales, service contracts display a mortality over
time. Computer service contracts are best described and forecast through
the use of a convolution function of two logistics: one representing the growth
of contract sales (three parameters) and the other representing contract mor-
tality (two parameters).
For young products it is recommended to factorize the process into two
fits, births of contracts first and active contracts afterwards. To keep com-
puting time within convenient limits, one should use a recursive hyperbolic
relationship instead of the analytic function involving exponentials.
Computer models in operation phase out independently of the date they
were sold. As their technological generation becomes obsolete, early sales
and late sales all drop out of use at the same time.
Beyond hardware service revenue forecasts, the approach offered here
helps determine the strategically important installed base which is the mar-
ket for add-ons, software, and a multitude of other services.
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Chapter 21
Diffusion of Process
Technology in Dutch
Banking[l]
Paul Diederen, Rene Kemp, Joan Muysken,
and Rombout de Wit
21.1 Introduction
Structural changes have been occurring in Western economies Slllce the
1970s. It has gradually become apparent that the service sector can no
longer absorb the labor force which cannot be employed in the manufac-
turing or government sectors. In reaction to these structural changes, it
was generally felt that the flexibility of the economy should be improved:
economic activity should adapt much quicker to changes in its environment.
The diffusion of new information technologies plays an important role in
this process of structural change. Since these technologies facilitate decen-
tralization, they have a profound impact on the division of labor, within and
between organizations, and on patterns of employment, e.g., part-time and
self-employment.
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Banking is a sub-sector of the service industry, in which the diffusion of
applications of information technology is particularly prominent. Hence it
can be considered as an appropriate case study when analyzing the develop-
ments mentioned above. This chapter deals with the diffusion of information
technology in the Dutch banking sector. It begins with an overview of tech-
nological development in banking. A model is then introduced to analyze
the diffusion of technology. Finally our experiences in estimating this model
for applications of information technologies in handling bank accounts are
reported.
21.2 Dutch Banking: An Overview
The banking industry is a conglomerate of many different financial services
firms, most of which carry out several functions. According to the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISle), the Dutch banking industry
can be divided into four branches. The first branch consists of the Central
Bank and general commercial banks (wholesale, retail, trading, and invest-
ment banks); the second branch comprises cooperatively organized (agri-
cultural) banks, postal giro services, and savings banks; the third consists
of other credit and financial institutions like building societies and brokers;
finally, the fourth contains complementary financial firms like commission-
agents in bonds and stocks and financial administrative firms.
The banking industry has four functions. Firstly, we mention its inter-
mediating function in the payment system. Secondly, assets management
is important, by which banks are directing the composition on the assets
side of the balance sheet. Activities rated among this function are partic-
ipations and financing (loans, credits, mortgages, and the like). The third
function consists of activities directed towards the acquisition of financial
means like savings and (demand and time) deposits, classified as liabilities
management, indicating its effects on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
Finally, banks perform a number of other financial services like issuing shares
and stock-jobbing, on the one hand, and services originally not part of the
banking profession, like acting as an agent on behalf of insurance companies
and travel-agencies, on the other hand.
The analysis in this article will mainly focus upon the first two bank-
ing branches, Le., general commercial banks, cooperatively organized banks,
postal giro services, and savings banks. In the Netherlands, these branches
are currently dominated by six large banking organizations, accounting for
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between 80% and 90% of the banking industry's economic output and more
than 90% of its employment. The sort of technological change considered in
this chapter mainly concerns innovations influencing the first function men-
tioned, the intermediary function in the payment system. The six largest
Dutch banks take care of the payment system in the Netherlands.[2]
21.2.1 Main developments
Until the early sixties the banking world was relatively quiet. Traditionally,
the different banks were strongly specialized, and their activities were re-
stricted to their own territory. The former postal giro services took care of
the mass payment traffic of wage earners and consumers. The trading banks
(general commercial banks) financed loans and credits for trade and manu-
facturing and accepted money deposits and savings from the same economic
sectors as well as from the wealthy. Cooperatively organized agricultural
banks financed activities and acquired savings in the agricultural sector,
while laborers had their accounts at a savings bank or with the postal giro
serVIce.
Since the mid-sixties, however, the situation has changed dramatically
(see Peekel and Veluwenkamp, 1984). The prosperous economic growth of
the whole economy led to a great demand for loans and credits. This resulted,
on the one hand, in a series of mergers between the banks and, on the other
hand, in the penetration of each other's markets. Wholesale banks started to
operate on the retail market with the ultimate objective of acquiring savings
to finance industrial loans and credits. Conversely, cooperatively organized
banks with huge savings balances entered the wholesale market to sell loans
and credits. Thus, besides the process of concentration, a process of branch
blurring started and competition increased.
While the number of independent banks decreased dramatically, the
number of offices in the country increased until the early eighties. Since
then the reverse trend can be seen, Le., a decrease in the number of offices.
The total number of offices grew steadily from 7,520 in 1971 to more than
8,600 in 1981, and then it decreased to 8,232 in 1986. In 1986 the number of
inhabitants per bank office was estimated to be 2,616 or 1,765 if post offices
are included. International comparable figures are 2,310 in the United States
and 1,524 in France.
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21.2.2 The economic growth of banking
Table 21.1 gives an indication of the growth of banking compared with the
market sector as a whole. It gives an overview of gross value-added in 1980
prices for the period 1971-1986.
Table 21.1. Economic growth of banking and of the market sector at large
(amounts in Dutch guilders X 109).
Banking industry Whole market sector
Value Index Annual Value Index Annual
Year added number rate added number rate
1971 6 100 226 100
1976 9 155 9.1% 268 119 3.5%
1981 12 206 5.9% 287 127 1.4%
1986 14 237 2.9% 307 136 1.4%
1971/86 5.9% 2.1%
Sources: CBS (1971-1987) and CPB (1971-1987).
The figures indicate that the banking industry, compared to the whole
market sector, flourished during that time period. Average annual growth
rates in each five-year period were well above the comparable growth rates
of the market sector as a whole, with an average annual growth rate over
the last fifteen years of 5.9% versus 2.1 % for the whole market sector.
As mentioned, the banking sector carries out different functions, the pay-
ment function, the assets and the liabilities management, and other financial
services. In Table 21.2 we present some indicators referring to the first three
functions. The indicators do not represent (any kind of) value added but
the aggregated balance figures at the end of the year. Therefore, although
they do not represent the development of economic output, they give us a
rough idea of how total production volumes of different banking activities
have changed.
The average annual growth rate of payment transactions by more than
25% is striking. The highest growth rates, however, occurred in the early
seventies (an average annual rate of 75%), while the growth rates during
the last ten years varied between 5% and 6%. The banking industry has
only been capable of processing these huge volumes because it changed to
an automated payment system.
The other two functions have been developing more or less parallel to
the banking industry as a whole, growing at about 6% per annum. Retail
functions both on the assets side (consumer credit and mortgages) and on
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Table 21.2. Development of different banking functions (index numbers
1971 = 100; average annual growth rates 1971-1986).
Func- Bank- Pay- Liabili ties
tion ing ment Assets Management Management
Value Trans- Mort- Cons. Debt. Savings Near
Year added actions Loans gages credit balance balances money
1976 155 1680 167 205 195 211 107 225
1981 206 2194 166 165 179 301 155 217
1986 237 2945 223 201 177 248 160 306
1971/86 5.9% 25.3% 5.5% 4.8% 3.9% 6.2% 3.2% 7.7%
Source: CBS (1971-1987).
the liabilities side (savings balances) have experienced lower growth rates
than wholesale activities such as loans and debtors balances on the assets
side and near money on the liabilities side.
21.3 Technological Developments[3]
Technological developments in the banking industry began in the system
of payment. It is generally accepted that a distinction is made between
countries that might be characterized as having a cheque payment system
and others having a giro payment system. Table 21.3 shows clearly that the
Netherlands has a giro payment system.
Table 21.3. Composition of payment instruments in 1983, in percent.
Transactions Amounts
Cheques/ Giro Cheques/ Giro
creditcard transfers creditcard transfers
France 85 15 10 90
Netherlands 23 77 1 99
United Kingdom 71 29 10 90
United States 97 3 28 72
Germany, F.R. 11 89 16 84
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1985).
The banking industry's path of technological development, its technolog-
ical trajectory (this term was coined by Nelson and Winter, 1982), differs
according to the prevailing payment system. Technological developments
in countries like the Netherlands with a giro payment system started with
528 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior
the automation of, firstly, records of the accounts of clients in the sixties
and, secondly, of giro transfers. This was accomplished by investments in
big mainframe computer systems in connection with the development and
introduction of new regular payment instruments like giro salary accounts
and automated debits and credits. In cheque countries, however, one was
less able to develop comparable automated instruments for periodical pay-
ments like salaries, mortgages payments and monthly rents. Consequently,
payers were forced to continue writing cheques periodically. Technological
developments in countries like the USA, the UK and France were mainly
directed at the automation of the labor intensive processing of cheques.
The automation of payment transactions began after World War II, when
the economic revival induced a strong growth in payments. Mechanical book-
keeping machines were introduced in the fifties. The first mainframe com-
puter (1962/1963), combined with the punched card (1960), made it possible
to automate financial mutations in the account records of the administra-
tions at the central offices of the banks. This process of central automation
was reinforced by the establishment of a so-called automated clearinghouse.
The decentralization of computer and communication technology started with
the automation of local offices and banks and was intensified by the estab-
lishment of information networks. Consequently, the following phases of
technological development can be distinguished:
(1) Central automation
(a) at the head offices of individual banks (1960-1970);
(b) of clearinghouses and external integration with business clients
(1970-1980);
(2) Decentralized automation
(a) of the back offices and front offices of local branches (1980-1990);
(b) of information networks as the merger of computer and communi-
cation technologies (1990-... ).
Both stages of central automation took place at only a few production
centers of commercial banks and clearinghouses. Its applications concern
the centralized registration ofthe loans, savings, and securities accounts, but
above all the central administration of current and salary accounts as well
as the payment transactions involving debiting and crediting these accounts.
The effect of this process of technological development was mainly a strong
increase in the labor productivity associated with the central processing of
the payment transactions.
P.J.M. Diederen, R.P.M. Kemp, J. Muysken, and C.R. de Wit 529
We now witness, in the two decentralized automation phases, as opposed
to the period of central automation, a process of technological development
in which offices of certain local banks could be qualified as early adopters and
others as laggards with respect to the adoption of computers and commu-
nication technology. In other words, the process of diffusion of technologies
through the branch network of banks is paramount. Moreover, the effects
on employment will not be restricted to a small group of production workers
at clearinghouses and production centers at the head offices, but will apply
to the majority of bank employees, about two-thirds of which are working
at local offices throughout the country.
21.3.1 Local banks and offices
The technological development at branches and local banks can be divided
into four stages; the first two interact with phases l(a) and l(b) of central
automation and the last two are a further differentiation of phase 2(a) as
distinguished above.
1a Manual production process, making use of mechanical bookkeeping machin(
(1960-1970);
1b Optical character recognition (OCR) equipment (1970-1980);
2a (i) Mini computer system with back-office terminals (1980-1985);
2a (ii) Counter terminals in the front office (1980-1990).
During phase 1 of central automation, the technological developments at
local banks and offices were restricted to the use of mechanical bookkeeping
machines [stage (a)] until the early seventies. From the beginning of the
seventies onwards, OCR equipment [stage (b)] came into use. The equipment
was used for typing the payment orders of clients on counting slips, which
could be read optically by the mainframe computers at the central head
offices of the banks. Most machines were equipped wi th controlling functions
correcting simple mistakes and producing a cleaner input at the mainframes.
Up to this stage there were no major differences regarding technological
developments at the local offices between the organizations involved.
The start of computer and communication systems at local banks and of-
fices [stage 2a(i)] can be located around the middle to late seventies. This led
to a productivity increase in back-office work which had little consequences
for employment due to an increase in output. The next stage of technologi-
cal development at local banks was the installation of terminals at the bank
counters [stage 2a(ii)] and so-called quick-cash terminals. These counter
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terminals are "smarter", having more in-built functions. The possible ef-
fects on employment and the organization of work are more pronounced. In
particular, the work of cashiers and counter clerks is now automated.
The adoption of more advanced information-technology-based produc-
tion techniques has consequences for commercial policy: before the intro-
duction of off-line counter terminals the commercial policy could be quali-
fied as product-oriented, implying that employees were specialized in certain
products, for instance, cash, insurances, consumer credits or business loans.
With the introduction of counter terminals in the eighties, commercial pol-
icy changed into some type of integrated client management. This kind of
management implied that clients were, in principle, served the whole range
of banking products by a personal banker who was assisted by some counter
clerks. This meant on average that the commercial employees were expected
to have a higher education and more skills, but at the same time that they
also had to fulfill routine activities and tasks in which they were not so well
trained.
Banks are currently at the stage of designing, establishing, and imple-
menting information networks [stage 2(b)]. An information network orig-
inates when the management at offices and local banks can retrieve data
(about accounts and characteristics of clients as well as external financial
data) from the central or local computer systems, use the data with the
aim of gathering information for management purposes, and possibly send
the newly processed information back to the central computer systems or to
clients. The actual applications of the networks are expected to mature in
the nineties.
21.3.2. Banking products and processes
In banking, it is not so easy to distinguish between process innovation, on the
one hand, and product innovation, on the other. Usually, the two develop
hand in hand. For instance, the process of central automation at the head
offices of banks and clearinghouses could not have been realized without
a simultaneous introduction of new products like the salary and current
accounts, automated debits and credits, and giro-cards inviting payment.
The fast increase in the number of machine-readable payment instructions
at the automated clearinghouse (from 5.8 million in 1970 to 278 million in
1985) illustrates the growth of the bank's new payment products. Diffusion
of new process technology is reflected in the gradual introduction of new
product innovations.
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Asset management is relatively unaffected by information technology so
far. The contracting of loans still predominantly consists of face-to-face
negotiations and an analysis of the client's financial data. The use of personal
computers for financial analysis, the recording of the client's financial data,
the word processing of standard financial contracts as well as the associated
administration, have only just started. Applications in the field of mortgages
are a little bit more advanced in the sense that it is possible to produce
standard offers; however, it is felt that the applications do not go much
further than a qualitative support of the negotiations with the client. In
the case of insurance policies and travel arrangements, some use is made of
on-line communication when processing the contract for a final insurance
policy or the booking of a journey.
Finally, some remarks should be made regarding the relatively new elec-
tronic banking products like cash dispensers, point-of-sale and electronic
banking terminals. These products were mainly developed in the United
States. In Europe, cheque countries like the United Kingdom and France
soon followed. The developments in giro countries like the Netherlands and
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) started much later because origi-
nally no action against unsecured cheques was needed. Nowadays high labor
costs of teller transactions and pressures from the retailers and petrol com-
panies accelerate the diffusion of cash dispensers.
21.4 Modeling Technology Diffusion
In the previous section the process of technological change has been ana-
lyzed in a qualitative way. In this section an analytical framework will be
presented which should enable us to analyze this process more quantitatively.
To this end a diffusion model has been developed, which describes changes
in production volume, manufactured by different techniques, as a result of
adopting new techniques and scrapping existing ones. The model generates
a life-cycle pattern in the course of time for each technique. Since the inputs
required for each technique are known, the model also generates the changes
in employment volume, work requirements and occupational structure.
The model presented in subsequent sections tries to express the idea that
learning and adjustment processes are the most important ingredients guid-
ing the process of technology adoption.[4] To learn and to adjust established
routines takes time and money. Firms weigh these sacrifices against expected
benefits from new technology. As benefits grow, risk decreases and learning
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proceeds, and the diffusion of new production techniques progresses. First
a briefframe of reference will be presented, expressing the angle from which
we try to look at technological change. Then the model will be outlined,
specifying what variables are considered to be relevant in the case of the
banking industry.
21.4.1 The diffusion of innovations and the role of
information
Two stages in the process of technological change can be distinguished. First
of all, there is the decision to invest in new technology. Second, there is
the process of learning to operate a new technique. Common to both is
the fact that complex information processing is involved. Information pro-
cessing plays a key role in the determination of the speed of technological
progress. In the first stage of technical change information about invest-
ments in alternative techniques has to be gathered. This information has
to be structured and valued in order to estimate the costs and benefits of
switching to new production techniques. In the second stage new techniques
have to be learned and new skills have to be mastered.
These processes of learning, gathering, structuring, using and mastering
information are at the core of technological change. We are flooded with
enormous amounts of various types and forms of information. Also, infor-
mation comes from sources of varying reliability and importance. However,
learning is a costly activity, since human capacity to interpret and process
all this information is limited. Thus, to be of practical use, information is
usually structured in some hierarchical order.
To introduce a hierarchy in available information, we assume that the
more information ties in with present practice, the more attention it re-
ceives and the better we are able to value the information. New facts are
easier to interpret, the more they correspond to what is already known.
Furthermore we suppose that decision makers are not equally susceptible to
information from different sources. The closer the source, the more influen-
tial the information will be. Moves by direct competitors, operating in the
same submarket, in the same geographical area, using similar techniques, are
watched most closely. Consequently, perception of alternatives and ensuing
decisions are conditional upon one's position in a competitive environment.
Relevant information can be of three types, as indicated in Table 21.4.
First, we distinguish global information: general facts and knowledge about
the sector structure and its working conditions. Then there is firm-specific
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Table 21.4.
Information
Global
Firm specific:
External
Internal
Categories of information.
Examples
Product-, inputs- and labor market development; technological
trends; industry structure and macro-economic development; gov-
ernment policy.
Competitors marketing strategies (product differentiation, spe-
cialization, pricing, geographical spread, promotion); firm struc-
ture; production techniques.
Organizational and financial structure; technical features; market
position; firm specific knowledge and values; entrepreneurship.
external information, coming from the environment, its impact depends on
the position of the firm in relation to its competitors. Finally there is firm-
specific internal information, depending on the conditions within the firm
itself.
The core problem of dealing with information in real-life situations is
precisely how to combine data of qualitatively different dimensions system-
atically, such that conclusions lead to unequivocal decisions. Decision algo-
rithms are not only intricately complex, but also tend to be rather situation
specific. It is impossible to observe decision making on the basis of all rele-
vant information directly in a model and to describe quantitatively the eval-
uation of multidimensional information leading to a decision. Models can
only approximate the weight or impact of information by looking at a lim-
ited number of key variables. We use (1) production volumes, (2) so-called
technical distances between techniques, and (3) disparities in efficiency.
The production volumes in the present period and the distribution of pro-
duction over techniques are the direct reflection of the outcome of strategic
behavior in the past. Thus there is a lot of information implicit in production
volume figures. The behavior of the system in the next period is approxi-
mated by relating the actual values of production volumes to their potential
values. The ratio of the two is a determinant of the speed of change.
Suppose techniques can be ranked according to increasing efficiency from
1 to n. Figure 21.1 pictures production volumes corresponding to the avail-
able techniques. The actual amount produced by means of technique i is
indicated by the starred column (**). Under conditions of a constant total
production in time, and assuming an efficient use of techniques, the potential
maximum amount that can be produced with technique i is this column plus
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Figure 21.1. Production volumes by techniques 1 to n.
the amount produced less efficiently at present, represented by the speckled
columns (::). This corresponds to the total production volumes of techniques
1 to i. The ratio between these actual and potential volumes is used in the
expression we call the competitive force of technique i. Similarly we define
the competitive pressure on technique i, using the ratio of the actual pro-
duction volume and the maximum effectively competing volume in terms of
production costs. The latter is represented by the starred plus open columns
in Figure 21.1 and corresponds to the total production volumes of techniques
i to n.
We characterize production techniques by means of vectors of input co-
efficients. This enables us to define a distance function in the vector space
of techniques. This so-called technical distance between two techniques is
assumed to represent the extent to which these techniques resemble each
other. When a firm scraps an old technique and adopts a new one, this dis-
tance represents the technical barrier that has to be overcome. The concept
tries to embody a host of information of a different character, concerning
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A
CB
---------------~
Xl/Y
Figure 21.2. Costs and benefits when switching from techniques A to B.
adjustment problems, friction costs, learning efforts, and attitude towards
risk.
In the model, technical distance is balanced with the efficiency disparity
variable, which captures the gains from switching techniques. The gains
are expressed by computing the cost difference of producing one unit of the
product by the old and the new technique.
If a technique uses only two factors of production, Xl and X2, the situation
can be pictured in a diagram as in Figure 21.2. Suppose a firm operates
a technique at A. A new technique is available at B. The lines CA and CB
depend on factor prices and connect all input combinations with equal costs.
If a firm switches from the old to the new technique, it has to cross barrier
A - B. The benefits of this move are proportional to the distance between
the cost lines, distance A-C. The ratio of benefits A-C and costs A-B will
determine the extent to which the firm is prepared to switch. When factor
prices change, this affects the numerator A - C but not the denominator
A - B in this ratio.
21.4.2 The diffusion model
The elements introduced above are now combined in a diffusion model.
Given the inputs, a range of valuable techniques and the development of
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demand, the model can describe the changes in the use of a production tech-
nique in the production of a banking product. This change is the result of
two components. The first element is the increase in the use of a technique,
because the technique is adopted by firms that formerly operated using less
efficient techniques. The second component is the decrease, caused by the
fact that former users of the technique scrap it and switch to a better one.
The model is defined by:
Change = Increase - Decrease. (21.1)
Firms that decide to switch techniques do this by balancing expected
benefits against estimated costs. In appraising benefits and costs, they take
into account the production techniques used by competitors as a source of in-
formation on their market position and relative efficiency. When it considers
the virtues of a new technique, the firm must determine the following:
(1) The riskiness of adopting a new technique.
(2) The extent of its present use, relative to its potential use: competitive
force.
(3) The efficiency benefits.
(4) The barrier to be overcome when the firm adopts the new technique.
These are represented in the model as follows:
(1) The risk of adopting a technique i is assumed to be due to a lack of
information and experience and is assumed to vary with the extent of its
use in the last period: Yi'-l' where t is the time index.
(2) The extent of its present use, relative to its potential use is the ratio of
li'_l and L~=l Yk'_l' where summation is over the less efficient tech-
niques. We use this ratio in an expression symbolizing the attractiveness
of a technique, called the competitive force - CF[5] (see also Figure 21.1).
(3) The efficiency benefits - Ell - is supposed to vary with the cost difference
per unit of output.[6] This corresponds, in the two-dimensional case
pictured in Figure 21.2, to the distance A-C.
(4) The barrier to be overcome - TD - is also expressed in terms of input
coefficients.[7] This corresponds to the technical distance A - B in Figure
21.2.
Thus we can conclude that:
EB
Increase = al *Yi'-l * T D *C F (21.2)
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where the parameter al is a scale factor with respect to the speed of diffusion
resulting from competitive force.
Analogously, we specify the decrease in the use of a technique. Whereas
the impulse to increase the production volume made by using a technique
i is related to the use of less efficient techniques, the decrease is related to
characteristics and volumes of more efficient techniques:
EB'
Decrease = a2 * Yi I - 1 * T D' * C P (21.3)
Here summation is over the production volumes of better techniques;
when defining competitive pressure, CP, the technical distance, T D', and
efficiency discrepancy, EB', are between technique i and the average better
alternative, where the parameter a2 is a scale factor with respect to the
speed of diffusion resulting from competitive pressure.
Pulling all elements together, the change in the production volume made
by using technique i in period t is described by:
EB EB'
Yi l - Yi I - 1 = al * Yi I - 1 * T D * CF - a2 *Yi I - 1 * T D' * CP (21.4)
The model is a combination of two expressions that closely resemble
logistic curves. Together they result in a life-cycle path for every distinct
technique.
Given input coefficients per technique, we are able to compute technical
distances, as can be seen from the definition of TD above. Given wages and
factor prices, we can determine the efficiency gap EB between techniques.
New techniques are expected to be cheaper than older ones, if not from the
outset, then at least after a process of learning by doing and after capacity
utilization, which tends to be low immediately after the introduction of new
equipment, has reached normal operating levels. Production volumes are
used to compute competitive force and pressure CF and CP, respectively.
This being done, the parameters al and a2, influencing the general reaction
speed to innovations, can be estimated.[8]
21.5 Estimating Diffusion of Technology
The model presented in the preceding section has been estimated, using
data from one large Dutch banking organization, which consists of more
than 900 relatively independent local banks. The local banks decide when
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to adopt new technology. Out of this population of almost 1,000 banks, a
representative sample of 100 was included in the data set.
The model has been used to describe changes between 1979 and 1987
in the technique of handling accounts. This product mainly involves the
transfers of payments from one account, business or private, to another and
the withdrawal and depositing of cash. For account handling four tech-
niques are to be distinguished during this period: (1) conventional OCR
equipment, (2) back-office automation, (3) front-office automation, (4) cash
dispensers/ automatic teller machines.
Both OCR equipment and back-office terminals are used for data input
activities (cheque and payment orders). Counter terminals and cash dis-
pensers affect data processing (which is done automatically), but primarily
deal with teller transactions. Counter terminals came into use in the early
eighties, and rapid growth started after 1983.
21.5.1 Data
Given the inputs, a characterization of the four available techniques and the
development of demand, the diffusion model outlined above enables us to de-
scribe the diffusion of techniques in handling accounts in the branch offices
of our case study bank. Local branch offices appear to have different atti-
tudes toward the introduction of new technology. There are early adopters,
cautious imitators, slow responders, and conservative laggards. Before elab-
orating on this, we will first briefly describe the main techniques used in the
model, together with the relevant factors of production.
In Table 21.5 the different inputs are presented. We subdivide labor into
five categories, and we divide capital into two parts: one that does embody
technological change (equipment) and one that does not (housing). Finally,
we distinguish two other production inputs: mail, which also includes the
intermediary services of the central office, and other factors such as energy,
advertising, and cleaning. With respect to labor requirements, it should be
noted that these are not measured by numbers of employees or man-hours
of an employee, but by job content, by hours of activity of a certain type.
The production factors can briefly be described as follows:
• Commercial work: negotiations with clients over loans, selling of insur-
ance and travel services and administrative work like the conclusion and
continuation of contracts and handling claims.
• Counter work: all counter activities, such as dealing with deposits and
withdrawals and the opening and closing of accounts.
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Table 21.5. Factors of production in banking.
Labor Capital
Commercial work Buildings
Counter work Inventory including computer equipment
Data input work
Administrative work
Managerial work
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Other
Mail
Other
• Data input work: consisting of data input for payment transfers and
control (checking balances of accounts).
• Administrative work: other administrative activities including account-
ing, catering services, and small repairs.
• Managerial work.
• Central computer processing and mailing (ccpm): processing oftransfers,
storing accounts and savings information, and mailing at the central
office.
• Inventory including computer equipment: inventory and computer and
communication systems at the local branch office.
• Buildings.
• Remaining inputs: energy, advertising, and cleaning.
Vectors describing a technique will have nine elements, corresponding
to the production factors in Table 21.5. Furthermore prices of the various
capital services, mailing and maintenance, as well as wages for five different
types of labor, are needed. Finally, we need the production volumes made
every year by the distinct techniques.
For the 1973-1987 period, cost figures for inputs, employment figures,
and production volumes of products were collected from the 100 banks sam-
ple. Price indices for inputs stem from local offices (like labor costs per
man year) and from other sources (price indices on computer equipment
coming from the Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands). Produc-
tion volumes for accounts are based on the number of payment transfers,
teller transactions, and the number of payment accounts, both personal and
business. [9]
In every local branch office during every time period, a technology for
payment transfers is identified through detailed data on automation from
individual offices. We also know production volumes and inputs per branch
office. This makes it possible to determine aggregate production and input
coefficients for each technique in use. Production volumes for techniques are
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computed by aggregating the production volumes of local offices which used
the same kind of technology. Input coefficients for accounts are calculated
by aggregating the costs of inputs of offices using the same technology and
deflating these costs by their price index, and dividing this by their (aggre-
gated) production volume. For the entire estimation period input coefficients
are computed for each technique, not only showing differences in the amount
of an input per unit of output between techniques, but also within a single
technique over time.
The aggregate input coefficients are presented in Figure 21.3{ a), for the
1975-1987 period.[10] Accounts experienced substantial labor savings. Au-
tomation is reflected (directly) through input coefficients for computer equip-
ment and inventory. Figure 21.3 clearly shows how input coefficients for
computer equipment increased.
Looking at the decomposition of labor input per unit of output for ac-
counts [Figure 21.3{ b)], we learn that technological change decreased the
input of counter work, data input work, and administrative work. Although
labor input per unit of output decreased, employment increased in this pe-
riod due to the growth of production volumes (5.3% in the whole 1975-1987
period).
Comparing disaggregated input coefficients for different techniques of
account handling shows that input coefficients for computer equipment were
higher for every consecutive technique. On average, each new technique
leads to less labor input, mainly as a result of less data input work and
less administrative work. Labor savings for counter work do not appear
in the data. Implementation of counter terminals does not lead to large
labor savings, at least initially. Also in the case of cash dispensers, input
coefficients do not reflect the labor savings on counter work.
21.5.2 Estimation results
Measures for competitive forces and competitive pressures of techniques have
been computed using the production volumes of techniques from the previous
period. Efficiency gaps and technical distances between techniques have been
calculated for several years and the diffusion model has been estimated using
these figures.
The inclusion of these variables, EB and TD, respectively, does not im-
prove the performance of the model. It turned out that sometimes new
techniques are more expensive than old ones. Measurements of technical
P.J.M. Diederen, R.P.M. Kemp, J. Muysken, and C.R. de Wit 541
(a) Input coefficients for accounts
ccpm
__---, Labor
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
/---_/
-----_/
---
-------
Inventory/computer equipment
·_·_·---·_·_·_·_·_-----.1. Other
t:::-:=:::=:7:=-:-=-------------:.:.:.:-=~.Building
o-t----.--,-------r-----,---.--,-------r----r---,----,--------,--,
75
60
50
II> 40...
l:
..,
'u
~
.., 300
u
...
::J
C.
l: 20
10
Year
(b) Input coefficients for accounts: labor
24-,-----------------------
20
Data input work
...........
.........
.........
---
-------__ Administration work
--
--
--
--
8
16
...
::J
C.
l:
II>
...
l:
..,
'u
~
o 12
u
4 Managerial work
_.-.-._._-_. -'---'-'-.
Commercial work
O-+---r---.-------.----r----r--.-----.----.----r--.-------,---i
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Year
Figure 21.3. Input coefficients for accounts.
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distances, although of the right sign, fluctuated strongly over time, and there-
fore did not provide accurate information about technical barriers. This can
be caused by several factors:
• Measurement problems: accurate determination of a vector of technical
coefficients per production technique is nearly impossible due to factors
like economies of scale, joint production, and special circumstances; accu-
rate calculation of costs of production is equally difficult, due to problems
of attribution.
• Aggregation and definition of the product: the product made with the
new technique is not really identical to the product made by using the
old technique. Mostly there is some type of improvement, e.g., in the
flexibility or speed with which the service is delivered.
• The current difference in production costs of the new and the old tech-
nique might not be a good approximation for the expected benefits of
adopting a new technique. A new technique can be adopted because it
is expected to be cheaper in the future, despite the fact that it might be
more expensive in the introduction phase. Due to learning by doing and
economies to scale, the price of a new technique may fall considerably
after it is first introduced.
• The efficiency gain may not be one of the main arguments to adopt a
new technique. The firm is merely afraid to fall behind in the level of
technology or is motivated to keep up with its competitors.
• At the moment of introduction the new technique does not operate at full
capacity. Investments in a new technique often lead to excess capacity,
which in the short term disproportionally raises the costs of the new
technique.
The diffusion process of technology was best explained by competitive
force and competitive pressure as the only variables. Model results for this
simple version of the diffusion model will be given. The estimations are pro-
duced by minimizing least squares (under the restriction of at and a2 being
the same for all techniques, but not at and a2 being equal). Market expan-
sion is reflected by the estimates for at and a2, 1.45 and 0.74, respectively,
at being almost twice as high as a2.[1l]
In Figure 21.4 (a) real production volumes of techniques for accounts in
the 1978-1987 period are presented, together with the production volumes
for techniques as explained by the diffusion model [Figure 21.4(b)].
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Figure 21.4. The diffusion of techniques for handling accounts: (a) data
and (b) model results.
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Figure 2LI shows how conventional OCR equipment is replaced by back-
office computer equipment. Back-office terminals, first adopted in 1978, ex-
perienced a fast growth within five years. In 1983 nearly all banks possessed
back-office computer systems. In the years following 1983, front-office ter-
minals and cash dispensers were implemented. Like back-office terminals,
front-office terminals grew rapidly over a five-year period. Cash dispensers
in local branch offices experienced an even faster growth. It is likely that
this fast growth will continue in the coming years.
Changes in the choice of technology, among other factors, lead to changes
in factor demand. Since each technology is characterized by input coeffi-
cients, reflecting the amount of input per unit of output, the consequences
of technology diffusion on factor demands can be computed. However, in
order to calculate overall changes in factor demands of the banking indus-
try, the above estimation exercise has to be performed for every banking
product.
21.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we gave an overview of the application of information tech-
nology in Dutch banking and presented a diffusion model to explain several
of the developments in more detail. To this end, we employed data of a large
Dutch banking organization. The diffusion model analyzes the diffusion of
techniques in local branch offices. The model is based on the notion that
technological change involves a learning process under uncertain conditions.
Therefore the availability of a more profitable technique does not imply that
it will be used immediately: different techniques will be employed at each
moment to produce a certain product. This is a consequence of phenom-
ena such as the limited capacity of individuals and organizations to process
multi-type information, the balancing of current expenditure against un-
certain future benefits, and the dependence of firm decisions on perceived
reference groups. These phenomena are captured in the model by the no-
tions of technological distance, efficiency barrier, competitive power, and
competitive pressure. The notions lead to two expressions that closely re-
semble logistic curves, one for the growth in the use of each technique and
one for its decline. Together they result in a life-cycle path for every distinct
technique.
In the model a technique employed for a certain product is characterized
by its input coefficients, Le., the amount of inputs necessary to produce one
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unit of output. Since this requires very detailed information, we confined the
implementation of the model to one large bank over the period 1979-1987,
for which we obtained data on about 100 local branch offices.
For our case study bank the impact of technological change is analyzed
at the local branch office level (where most people employed in banking are
situated). Technological change at the central office, predominantly through
the use of large mainframe computers and information technologies in trad-
ing rooms, is exogenous in the model analysis. From our case study bank
detailed cost figures, data on production volumes, and information on in-
vestments in automation were available for each local branch office, making
a more profound analysis possible.
Although all activities at local branch offices are influenced by technologi-
cal change to some degree, model results are only reported for the aggregated
product that is most strongly affected by technological change: account han-
dling. Accounts include personal accounts and business accounts. Relevant
activities are teller transactions (deposits and withdrawals) and the process-
ing of transfers (data input and control).
With respect to the techniques used, for accounts four techniques are dis-
tinguished during this period: (1) conventional, (2) back-office automation,
(3) front-office automation, (4) automatic teller machines. From data on the
contributions of the different technologies to output growth, it is clear that
new technologies in banking were not installed at once. Back-office automa-
tion was installed in the late seventies by our case study bank over a five-year
period. Front-office automation began in the mid-eighties and also took five
years. Cash dispensers were implemented just after front-office automation
was installed but experienced a more rapid growth.
In addition to the four different kinds of non-labor inputs, five kinds of
labor inputs are distinguished: commercial work, counter work, data input
work, administrative work, and managerial work. These labor inputs relate
to activities (job content) instead of occupations.
Technological change has had an important impact on factor input with
respect to some banking activities. In the case of accounts there were sub-
stantial labor savings on data input work (including the checking of the
balances), administrative work, and counter work. Computer equipment
in the back office led to savings on the processing of transfers that involve
data input work, and the checking of the balances of accounts; personal
computers and mainframe computers, storing information, led to savings on
administrative work.
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On a broader level, technical change has induced changes in commercial
policy in banks. There has been a move from a product-oriented approach
to an approach called integrated client management, where customers are
served the whole range of banking products by a single personal banker.
The gradual adoption of new techniques, and the development of the
input coefficients of a single technique over time, reflects the notion that
technological change involves learning and adjustments. Benefits that are
related to the new technologies are not captured immediately. Employees
must be retrained and must adjust to new technology: it takes time to learn
to work more productively.
A necessary extension of the model is to allow for the fact that techniques
diffuse which are temporarily inefficient, at least in their initial stages of
introduction. In this context the relationship between technological change
and new products is also important. Another important extension would be
to determine more explicitly what elements in the evolution of specific firms
are favorable to the introduction of new techniques. The skill structure of the
work force is an obvious candidate. Finally, the change in input coefficients
over time of existing techniques should also be explained. This change can be
considerable. These possible elaborations point at limitations of the model
in its present form. However, the possibility to identify these limitations
illustrates that a model is a very useful way to analyze causal relationships.
Moreover, in spite of these deficiencies, the model fits the data well. Also
one should realize that by using the model some causal relationships between
variables could be firmly established.
Notes
[1] This article is based on a report entitled Technological Change, Employment,
and Skill Formation in Dutch Banking, University of Limburg, Maastricht,
April 1989. This report was part of the Dutch contribution to the OECD jCERI-
project Technological Change and Human Resources: the Service Sector.
[2] The six largest Dutch banks are: AEN-AMRO [Algemene Bank Nederland
(General Netherlands Bank) and Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank], RABO (Coopera-
tieve Raiffeisen- Boerenleenbank; Cooperative Raiffeisen-Agricult ural Bank),
NMB-Postbank [Nederlandsche Middenstands Bank (Netherlands Retailers
Bank) and the former postal giro services and postal savings bank], CLEN
(Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland; Lyon Credit Bank Netherlands), NCB (Ned-
erlandse Crediet Bank; Netherlands Credit Bank) and NSBB (Nederlandse
Spaar Bank Bond; Netherlands Savings Bank Association).
[3] This section is based on de Wit (1988).
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[4] The theoretical background has been exposed in Diederen et al. (1988). It
draws on ideas put forward by Kornai (1971) and by Nelson and Winter (1982)
and subsequent authors. See also Iwai (1984) and Day (1987).
[5] CF =1- /'._1
L Y'.-l
k=l
m
[6] EB = L Wk(Xi, - Xj,), i being the new and j being the average old tech-
k=l
nique, and summation being over all input coefficients Xk.
m
[7] TD = L (Xi, - Xj,)2 .
k=l
[8] Due to disembodied technological change and learning by doing, techniques
can change to some extent over time. This process can influence their relative
costs and technical distances. Therefore, we measure technical coefficients of
one technique at several points in time. We expect the size of a1 and a2
for different products to reflect the toughness of competition in the distinct
product markets. The a1 will be slightly larger than the a2 in expanding
markets.
[9] Resulting production volumes for accounts and savings are composed of these
components by weighing their importance by unit costs: for accounts, the
number of payment transfers, teller transactions (deposits and withdrawals),
and the payment accounts (to include the actual establishing of an account)
are aggregated according to the ratio of their unit costs, i.e., 1:4:60.
[10] The input coefficients, depicted on the vertical axis, give the amount of input
per unit of output, as computed, using price indices for inputs and composed
production volumes for products.
[11] It is hard to draw conclusions with respect to the competitiveness of the market
(reflected by the absolute value of the estimates) because the values for a1 and
a2 cannot be compared with the values in other sectors.
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Chapter 22
The Chain Saw in Swedish
Forestry[l]
lonny Hjelm
22.1 Introduction
The kind of technology and the kind of machines and tools that are used in
the labor process are always chosen by one or several individuals. The people
who select the technology and those who use it are usually not identical, but,
as we shall see, sometimes they are. The choices are never made in a social
vacuum. The social structure imposes constraints on who can make the
decisions as well as on how the decisions are made.
Technical change has rarely been studied from the perspective of the
technology users. When, however, technical change has been considered
from such a perspective, the following two questions have been asked:
• How does technical change affect the content of the working process and
the demands on labor skills?[2]
• How do workers adjust to technical change?[3]
In this kind of research the employers and affiliated technical groups
are looked upon as the only decision makers, the workers being ascribed a
passive role.
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This study describes how a group of workers actively introduced a new
technique to their own labor process. The intention of the research is to
analyze a technical change, where the workers' own views and actions are of
central importance. Great emphasis, however, is also put on the economic
and social structure in which they worked. With such an approach it is
hoped to shed new light on the dynamics of technical change and, in turn,
to provide a sound basis for discussions of future technical developments. For
a more detailed presentation of the benefits of research from such a starting
point, see Edquist and Edqvist (1980).
More specifically, this study is concerned with how the Swedish forest
workers, during the 1950s gradually replaced the manual one-man crosscut
saw with the motor-driven saw. The introduction of the chain saw in forestry
was only the first step in the rapid and accelerating mechanization of the
Swedish forestry during the postwar period. The point of departure for this
study is the following: It was the forest workers themselves who financed and
bought the chain saw. It is unusual that wage earners participate in technical
change in this way and in this example, because of its marked profile, we
can discern some important features of technological change that might be
difficult to observe in many other cases.
22.2 Technical Development in Swedish Forestry
Swedish forestry (Figure 22.1) delivers the raw material, i.e., the timber,
to the forest industry where it is then processed. Timber production in
forests is usually divided into primary and secondary production. It is in
the secondary production stage, where the trees are sawed down, that we
find the forest workers.
Before mechanization the forest worker felled the trees, crosscut them
into suitable pieces, removed the branches and bark, and either alone or
with the help of a horse or some technical device, transported the timber
to the nearest river. This work was done during the winter. The most
important reason for this was that the transport of timber required frozen
ground covered with snow. Afterward, usually in spring but sometimes even
in summer, the timber was floated down the rivers to the forest industry on
the coast.
During the cutting operation, the axe was originally the universal tool in
all phases of the work. During the second part of the nineteenth century the
crosscut saw made its entry successively. It replaced the axe both in felling
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Figure 22.1. Structure of the forestry sector.
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and in crosscutting operations. The crosscut saw had a handle on each end
and was used by two men. During the first decades of the twentieth century,
it was replaced by the one-man crosscut saw which, as the name implies,
had only one handle. The same decades also witnessed the appearance of
the buck saw. It was mainly used for the felling of weaker timber dimensions.
A new tool was also used for removing the bark from the stock; the so-called
barking spade replaced the axe here. As of this time, the forest worker used
the axe only to remove branches from the trees.
The cutting operation was organized by a contractor until the 1940s,
usually a farmer with a horse. He competed with other farmers to fell the
timber and transport it to a drivable water course at the lowest price. A
contract was drawn-up between the forest contractor and the buyer or owner
of the wood to settle the financial terms, as well as the rules stipulating how
the cutting operation should be done. The rules where rather detailed,
and breach of contract could lead to prosecution. For example, it could be
stipulated that the timber had to be delivered by a certain date and that the
stumps were not allowed to be too high, which would mean loss of timber.
In order to meet the stipulations of the contract, contractors employed and
paid as many forest workers as were needed. Often the workers were relatives
or neighbors of the contractors. Workers used their own tools; tools which
they either bought for a relatively small amount of money in the village shop
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or made themselves. As a result, there were considerable variations in tool
design and efficiency.
The contract system meant that the real employers (the wood owners
and buyers; for example, the large private forestry companies and the state
company Domanverket) were not directly involved in the organization of the
cutting operation. As long as the tools and the methods of work did not
violate the rules of the contract, the forest worker could freely choose how
to work, what kind of tools to use, and also what time of day he wanted to
work. The individual contractor was in charge of the cutting operation and
had to ensure that it was done as stipulated.
During the 1930s and 1940s conditions in the Swedish forestry came un-
der attack. Some people questioned whether it really was a task of the
workers to decide upon tools and methods of work. Should not, they asked,
forest work be analyzed in a scientific and systematic way? After such an
analysis one could perhaps find more effective ways of organizing and carry-
ing out cutting operations.
It is clear that many who discussed these views were influenced by the
ideas of the Scientific Management movement, a movement that had its real
breakthrough in Sweden in the 1920s and 1930s (see, for example, Bergren,
1981). The first concrete result of this new movement occurred quite rapidly.
During the 1930s, Domanverket and the larger forestry companies in Norr-
land established two research institutes which immediately began a system-
atic study of the different logging operations, for example, the cutting opera-
tion. At the beginning, the main purpose was to provide the employers with
useful information for wage negotiations. However, very soon the institutes
began to study the efficiency of the tools and tried to find the best way of
using them.
Machines for motorized felling and cutting that were already in existence
at that time were also studied (see Staaf, 1983; Leijonhuvfud, 1953). At-
tempts to mechanize the heavy, and time demanding, manual felling and
crosscutting operations of forest work had already been made during the
last part of the nineteenth century and the first decades of this century, e.g.,
in the USA and the Nordic countries. There were various sporadic experi-
ments in which people, steam engines, and combustion engines were used as
energy sources. However, these attempts were not successful (Lidberg and
Burenius, 1961).
The first chain saw that was of practical use was constructed during the
1920s. It was the so-called two-man chain saw. It was not only the first
somewhat functional chain saw, it was also the first that both looked like
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and was technically similar to the chain saw which made its breakthrough
in the middle of this century.
The two-man chain saw was not used in Sweden very much. During the
1940s it became clear that a functional one-man chain saw at a reasonable
price was needed, Le., a price which would make it possible for the worker
to buy his own. Hitherto, and particularly in the case of the two-man chain
saw, the high price had made such purchase impossible. The two-man chain
saws were mainly owned by the forest companies.
In 1948, six hundred one-man chain saws were sold in Sweden. The
number increased slowly but steadily until the middle of the 1950s when
sales figures suddenly increased. Over the following ten years, about 25,000-
30,000 chain saws were sold per year (see Figure 22.2). Sales advertisements
promised a great deal.
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Figure 22.2. Sales of one-man chain saws in Sweden during the period
1948-1964. (Source: Helgeson et at., 1979.)
An advertisement from the mid-1950s stated: "Now it is coming - the
new one-man chain saw which makes the heavy work in the forest an easy
game". But it was not only salesmen who described the chain saw in such
lyrical words. Similar opinions were formulated both by top managers in-
volved in large-scale forests and by groups within the Swedish Forestry Work-
ers Union (SSAF). To summarize, the one-man chain saw was expected to
reduce the physical burden of forest work and to give the forest worker a
higher income; but it was also anticipated that it would lead to an increase
in well-being and give the forest worker an increased social status.
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Between the introduction of the first chain saws and those that where
used in the middle of the 1960s, there was a period of technical improvement
(from now on the term chain saw is used instead of the older and longer term
one-man chain saw). The weight of the saw was reduced from about 15-20
kilograms to 7-10 kilograms. At the same tIme the construction was made
more reliable and effective. Until 1972 the forestry workers financed and
bought their own tools, including their own chain saws. But at about this
time the large logging machines became common. Later, during the 1970s
and 1980s, they were to supersede the forestry worker with his chain saw.
These new machines are usually handled by one operator who fells, crosscuts,
and piles up the timber for further transport.
Toward the end of the 1970s, about 70 percent of all the cutting was done
by the logging machines. This percentage has remained the same during the
1980s. More than half ofthese expensive machines are today owned privately
by forest workers - a fact that has been subject to a lot of attention and
critical discussion.
The critics point at several aspects, but in general they argue that the
current system is similar to the 1930s contractor system. They argue, for
example, that the economic risks are too heavy for the individual with a
long and stressful workday. Several studies have shown that the working
conditions of the machine operator have caused physical and psycho-social
problems (Liden, 1989).
A similar development - the machine replacing human and animal energy
sources - can be seen in other parts of the forest industry during the post-
war period. The horse has been replaced by the tractor and river floating
by lorry transport. Another important change is the great effort and re-
sources that the forest industry has spent on silviculture. The development
after the postwar period can be illustrated in Figure 22.3 for productivity
development.
22.3 Interviews
In traditional studies of the technical development of forestry, analyses and
descriptions of the transition from the one-man crosscut saw to the chain
saw are rare (Stridsberg and Mattson, 1980;[4]). Usually, it is only men-
tioned that the chain saw was introduced during the 1950s and that the new
tool improved productivity. It is characteristic for this type of research that
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Figure 22.3. Productivity development measured in man-days/cubic me-
ter. (Source: Andersson and Hultman, 1980.)
forestry's technical development is described with only costs and productiv-
ity in mind. Why the forest workers themselves bought a chain saw that
was about twenty times more expensive than the one-man crosscut saw is a
question that has not been given a satisfactory answer. When a reason is
given, it is that the forest worker wanted better pay and less burdensome
work.
Against this background, Le., how the changing process has been dealt
with and the problems of finding an answer in the forestry history books,
it was decided that the best and only way to get a proper answer is to ask
those who where part of the changing processes. Therefore fifty elderly forest
workers, who had worked in forests in the county of Vasterbotten in northern
Sweden (Figure 22.4) during the 1950s when the chain saws superseded the
one-man crosscut saws, were interviewed.
All of the people interviewed had worked the greater part of their active
life in the forest, and they had not only experienced the introduction of
the chain saw but also the rapid technical changes during the last decades.
Moreover, it could be presumed that the majority had lived the greater part
of their life in an environment which was influenced not only by forestry
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Figure 22.4. Map of Sweden and research area - Vasterbotten County.
development, but also by the transition from small-scale farming to large-
scale mechanized production.
The first part of the interview was spent in asking the forest workers
about their life history, since this was of more interest than the tools them-
selves. During the first part of their lives they had one foot in a small farmer's
society and the other foot among the wage earners of the growing industrial
society. However, when forestry and farming were rationalized, the base for
small farming was slowly pulled away from under their feet. Some stayed
in the countryside and became wage earners on an annual basis and some
moved to industrial work in more densely populated areas.[5] One facet of
this development is the technical development of forestry; in particular, the
introduction of the chain saw. This meant that forest workers themselves
took part in the process which in the end undermined their traditional small
farming way of living. This meant that the research was not only concerned
with technical development, but that, in fact, it was also probing into the
forest workers' collective history.[6]
22.3.1 The pioneers[7]
The first chain saws used by those interviewed were the two-man chain saws;
they were heavy, clumsy, and not very reliable. Most of the two-man chain
J. Hjelm 557
saws that they knew about were owned by the companies. Usually, both one-
and two-man chain saws were demonstrated by the employers. Sometimes a
few saws were available on loan at no or very little cost to the forest workers.
However, neither those who hired nor those who bought their own one-man
chain saw during the early 1950s were satisfied (nobody interviewed bought
a two-man chain saw). Under normal circumstances the forest workers still
preferred to use the one-man crosscut saw. But in felling and crosscutting,
especially in very thick and hard-to-saw forests, the chain saws might be
used. For this type of forest work the chain saws could both lessen the
physical strain and improve the income.
The forest workers who bought or hired these chain saws were the pi-
oneers. They had some, but very little knowledge of the chain saw before
they used it for the first time. Until the forest workers could see with their
own eyes the chain saw being used, they were not sure what type of machine
it was. The fact that a motor replaced muscle power was impressive, and it
fostered great hopes. It was through the pioneers that the most important
information and knowledge about the chain saw was spread at this stage.
The predominately negative experiences among the pioneers during the first
part of the 1950s made most forest workers uninterested or somewhat skepti-
cal about the chain saw, believing that it could never be used as an effective
tool.
22.3.2 The breakthrough
In the middle of the 1950s, the reputation of the chain saws slowly improved
and more forest workers began to think about buying them. One reason for
this change was persuasive advertising, but even more important was the fact
that the chain saws had been significantly improved. These improvements
changed the forest workers negative opinion into a more positive one. Those
interviewed who, during the breakthrough, bought and began to use the
chain saw, were clearly more pleased with their new tool than the pioneers
had been. Under certain working conditions, (e.g., felling where snow is not
deep and with a majority of thick older timber free from knots) a chain saw
was considerably superior.
However, not all forest workers had such positive experiences. There were
many who were disappointed with the chain saw since their high expectations
were not fulfilled. Their experiences differed mainly because of (1) the labor
process, which involved heavy physical work and also required continuously
changing methods, and (2) the piecework wage system.
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The cutting operations were physically trying, and in addition, required
a great deal of planning. It was important to be able to adopt quickly to
the changing working conditions. The extent of the difficulties and how the
corresponding problems were solved, varied among the forest workers. How
well they managed to handle their problems was reflected in the size of the
wage packet.
One of the main reasons behind the piecework wage system was that it
would compensate for the differences between cutting areas. Every cutting
area was evaluated by means of several criteria, e.g., the number of knots in
a tree or the length and form of the tree. The cutting areas were divided
into five classified groups. [8] How successful the forest workers were in their
local wage negotiating procedures depended on many factors. In general, the
majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that during the second half
of the 1940s as well as in most of the 1950s they had a strong negotiating
position because of the scarcity of workers.
The two main reasons for buying a chain saw were that the forest workers
hoped to lessen the physical work load and to improve their wages. Their
hopes were fulfilled to a limited extent. The chain saw first replaced the one-
man crosscut saw for such work as felling and crosscutting; two tasks that
had been physically hard. But as this work was about only half of the total
work, and as the chain saw was heavy to carry around in the cutting area,
the workers were just as tired as before after a day's work in the forest. The
other important feature was the piecework wage system. Under this type
of wage system every possible work- and time-saving device or method was
used to increase output. In other words, the time saved by the chain saw was
not used for rest, but to increase the individual forest workers production
volume.
Wage expectations were fulfilled to a greater extent by those who had
bought a well-functioning chain saw and had the opportunity to use it in
the type of forest where motorized felling was effective. Most respondents,
however, said that their wages did not change in any specific direction after
they had begun to use the chain saw. But such a comparison is difficult to
make because of the piecework nature of wages since it has to relate to a
number of factors which vary from work place to work place. The conse-
quence was that the forest workers had to evaluate the purchase of a chain
saw with rather extreme measures. The purchase was from an economic
point of view either good, bad or so-so. It was almost impossible to be more
exact. These difficulties in evaluating the economic consequences provided
hope for improvement.
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With the introduction of the chain saw the psychological work load in-
creased. The main reason was the uncertainty about the reliability of the
chain saw. For example, would it start in the morning without a problem
and function the whole working day? If anything went wrong, which was
not unusual, the irritation was great; every involuntary break in work put
the forest worker under pressure. These problems decreased during the sec-
ond part of the 1950s when the forest worker's own knowledge increased and
when the retailers of the chain saws, as well as smaller motor repair shops,
started to give quick and effective service.
22.4 Forestry and Farming
In this particular case, because the forest workers used and cared for their
own tools, their attitude toward using more effective tools and methods of
work was taken into consideration. Many of those in favor of a rationalization
doubted that forest workers were positive to such changes. Sometimes it was
explicitly stated, but usually it was only insinuated that an alarming number
of workers were traditionalists and preferred to work in the same way and
with the same kinds of tools that their forefathers had used (see, for example,
Hultma,rk, 1946 and 1957).
However, the forest workers' background in small farming did not, as the
rationalization spokesmen feared, slow up or hinder the technical develop-
ment of forestry. Instead, this background (together with the wage system)
made them take an active part in the transformation. At the same time, it
lay the foundation for their disappointment with mechanization in the long
term. The manual forest work did not become physically less burdensome
or a more well-paid occupation.
The close relationship between forestry and farming is easily seen in one
particular area: the ownership of tools. It was natural that every farmer
owned the tools necessary for forest work. Furthermore, the tools for forest
work were also used for providing the household with wood for heating.
When the more expensive chain saws appeared on the market, and became
a realistic alternative to the one-man crosscut saw, all interviewees took it
for granted that they themselves had to bear the costs for the chain saw.
The idea that their employers would do this was alien to them. Three people
who were actually given their first chain saw thought it was a mistake or
a deed of goodwill on the part of their employers. It was not expected to
happen again.
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The forest worker received information about the chain saw in more or
less the same way as information about farming tools was received. Neigh-
bors, relatives, and work-mates were the most important information chan-
nels. The decision process was carefully thought-out and made by the indi-
vidual forest worker himself. Every forest worker tried, as far as possible, to
make a rational judgment and take as many factors as possible into account.
22.5 Individual Actions and Their Consequences
The basic attitude among the forest workers to the purchase of a chain saw,
and to its use in the cutting operation, was not to any appreciable extent
influenced by traditionalism or disinterest in innovations. From the very
beginning, attitudes were positive but cautiously pragmatic. Of course, the
workers themselves were satisfied if they could find a tool which lessened the
extent of manual labor while improving wages. The forest workers purchased
the chain saw as soon as they realized that it was a more functional tool than
the one-man crosscut saw.
Every forest worker who bought a chain saw used all the accessible infor-
mation channels. After having thoroughly considered the different alterna-
tives, a decision was taken. It is quite clear that the forest worker conformed
to small farmer behavior. The interviews testify, for example, that the work-
ers never considered using their trade union to obtain information about the
chain saw. Also, it was never questioned what standpoint they, as a collec-
tive, should have toward the new tool. Relations with the Swedish Forestry
Workers Union (SSAF) were clear-cut. The union's task was to negotiate
the best possible wage agreement, not to influence production technology.
Neither the union meetings nor the union magazine was used as a forum to
exchange information about the chain saw.
Later on, at the beginning of the 1960s, when almost all forest workers
had obtained a chain saw, unemployment slowly started to increase. Since
the 1940s, unemployment had been almost nonexistent. At the same time
the piecework wage system slowly b~gan to change. According to those
interviewed, these changes often meant a decrease in wages per unit pro-
duced. The benefit of increased production, with the more effective chain
saws, could not and would not go solely to the forest workers. Their em-
ployers and the forest owners were also to have a share. The forest workers
responded by increasing their work tempo. In this way salaries remained at
a high level for the most efficient workers. For others, the older and those
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who were less productive, salaries decreased. The increase in work intensity
implied an increase in accidents and injuries which meant that the level of
job satisfaction deteriorated[9] (see also Nohrstedt, 1975).
The forest workers slowly began to realize that their individual space of
action was limited. A proper decision and a rational choice may have com-
pletely different consequences when the whole collective of forest workers
takes the same course of action. Philosophers have labelled such mecha-
nisms as counterfinality. A rational action with a definite goal produces the
opposite outcome (see, for example, Elster, 1978).
The lesson the forest workers learned, which guided their actions when
new machines were later introduced into forestry, was the importance of
acting as a collective. Equally important, however, was the insight that
good working conditions and positive wage developments are dependent not
only upon technology, but upon the social order in which the technology
is embedded. The wage system increased the tempo and could turn all
technical improvements into something that simply increased the rate of
accidents. This was the reason why all fifty interviewees were critical of
what had happened within forestry during the last decades. The time-rate
system, which the forest workers fought for during the 1960s and were still
striking for in 1975, was established between 1975 and 1980. However, this
has by now been slowly undermined by the decline in wage levels and by
the introduction of the so-called bonus system, a type of group piecework
wage system. The machine operators have a specific entrepreneurial system
which, like the piecework wage system, makes them work at the highest
possible rate with as long a workday as possible, often well into the night.
The technical development in forestry has not only changed the labor
process and the working conditions; the repercussions in the social milieu
have also been significant. When forest workers changed from being sea-
sonally employed to being employed on a yearly basis, the already ongo-
ing closure of farms and rural depopulation increased. The restructuring
of both the farming and the forestry industries, and the accompanying de-
crease in the demand for workers changed the social milieu. The countryside
of Vasterbotten, which in the 1950s was full of life, is today very sparsely
populated. Deserted houses and abandoned farms and schools meet those
who travel through the countryside. That this state of affairs would be the
result of the entry of chain saws and tractors into forestry, and of the cor-
responding technical development in farming, was something that very few
forestry workers realized during the 1950s.
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22.6 Conclusion
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Studies of technical change within capitalist production are seldom carried
out from the workers' perspective. Usually, the worker is regarded as the
passive receiver of a new technique. An attempt has been made here to
show that this outlook is too limited. Workers can participate in technical
developments in a variety of ways, even though the case of forestry may be
a very special case. The forest workers both introduced and used a new
technology. This summarizes the first aim of this chapter.
The second purpose was to underline the importance of analyzing the
economic and social structure within which the actors work. The introduc-
tion of the chain saw can only be understood if the forest workers' small
farming milieu is taken into account, an environment which both formed
and constrained the actors. While they were actively engaging in the tech-
nical development offorestry, they were undermining their position as small
farmers. The small farmer who seasonally worked in the forest was trans-
formed into a full-time employed forest worker. Those who participated in
this process gradually abandoned their individualist attitude to new tech-
nology and replaced it with a more collective outlook on forestry. They also
developed a more complex view of the effects of technology on society, and
they became fully aware of the complex relationship that existed between
the individual and collective rationality in technical change.
Notes
[1] This chapter is a summary of a book that will be published in 1991 by Arkiv,
Lund, Sweden. The preliminary title is Skogsarbetaren och motorsagen. En
studie i teknik- och arbetsprocessJorandring and will contain a complete list of
references.
[2] Perhaps the most well-known researcher is Harry Braverman, Labor and Monop-
oly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974. See also discussions of the
so-called Braverman-debate in, for example, Paul Thompson, 1983, The Nature
oj Work, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., London, UK.
[3] This was the main question for many researchers in the industrialized countries
during the early postwar decades. For a more exact account of this research in
Sweden, see Chapter 2 in Torsten Bjorkman and Karin Lundkvist, 1982, From
Max to Pia, Arkiv, Lund, Sweden (in Swedish).
[4] For a more historical aspect of the technical development in forestry, see, for ex-
ample, Sven Embertsen, 1975, SCA Secondary Production in the Area oj Kram-
Jors 1911-1965, Lund, Sweden (in Swedish).
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[5] This is a transformation which Dan Backlund has analyzed in On the Outskirts
of Industrial Society, Umea, Sweden, 1988 (in Swedish).
[6] For a discussion about collective biography - prosopography - see Lawrence
Stone, 1981, Chapter 2 in The Past and the Present, Cambridge University
Press, London, UK. An earlier representative of this way of writing of labor his-
tory was Edvard Bull, 1958, Arbeidermiljo under det industrie//e gjenombrudd,
University Press, Oslo, Norway.
[7] Where nothing else is indicated the sections on The Pioneers and The Break-
through are built on the interviews.
[8] The basis for the piecework wage system was presented in 1945 at a Conference
arranged by SDA. See Lectures at an SDA - an organization for work and time
studies - conference on forestry rationalization issues), SDA Meddelande, Nr.
21-29, 1945 (in Swedish).
[9] This was something that many interviewees emphasized.
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Chapter 23
The Spatial Spread of the
Aids Epidemic in Ohio:
Data Analyses via Expanded
Regressions
Emilio Casetti and C. Cindy Fan
23.1 Introduction
The spatial realities of the spread of AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome) have not attracted the attention commensurate with their im-
portance. A few spatial geographical studies of the epidemic have begun to
appear (Dutt et al., 1987; Jager and Ruitenberg, 1988; Wood, 1988; Gard-
ner et al., 1989; Gould, 1989; Shannon and Pyle, 1989). However, most
studies concerning the spread of this epidemic focus upon homosexuals and
intravenous drug users, and are often concerned with determining to what
extent the members of these groups modified their patterns of behavior out
of concern for AIDS (Curran et al., 1985 and 1988; Gong and Ruknick,
1986; Kulstad, 1986). These studies clearly imply that the spatial spread
of AIDS will differ across geographical spaces and environments, but these
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implications are not translated into systematic investigations of which pat-
terns occur where and when; of which types of spatial spread of AIDS exist;
of which relations exist between such types of dynamics and the spatial ge-
ographical environments to which they are associated.
It is useful to focus on the theoretical and practical significance of investi-
gations concerned with the spatial dimensions of the AIDS epidemic. These
investigations have an important role within the context of the war against
AIDS, are critically useful to planners and policymakers, and are important
components of a body of knowledge for which a critical need exists.
Education and prevention are the strongest weapons against AIDS avail-
able at present (Johnson and Adler, 1987). AIDS education and the danger
awareness it produces can bring about behavior modifications that will slow
down the diffusion of AIDS within the groups mostly at risk today, and into
the segments of the heterosexual population in which a multiplicity of sexual
partners is more prevalent (teenagers and singles).
It is well known that efforts to educate people about AIDS and to induce
requisite behavior modifications encounter a resistance rooted in values and
mores that is very difficult to overcome. Only when opinion leaders and
the public at large have a perception of impending danger are these resis-
tances more easily overcome, and effective, widely publicized, educational
efforts become possible. Understanding the realities and scope of the spatial
spread of the AIDS epidemic can induce a perception of impending danger
in communities that AIDS has not yet touched to any significant degree.
The awareness of spa.tial spread can do much to convince people and com-
munities that AIDS is not somebody else's problem and to realize that it is
very much their problem also. However, consciousness-raising actions about
the spatial spread of the AIDS epidemic will have the greatest impact when
they are based on solid scientific research.
Community leaders, planners, and policymakers have a critical need for
knowledge concerning the spatial spread of AIDS. They are likely to be
confronted by spatially and geographically disaggregated realities and need
spatially disaggregated forecasts. They need to know which types of spatial
spread of AIDS are likely to unfold in the regions for which they are respon-
sible. They require this knowledge to anticipate needs, to plan, to target
scarce resources to where they can do the most good, and to request from
appropriate governmental agencies a support commensurate to forecasted
needs. A knowledge base that does not address the spatially disaggregated
dimensions of the spread of the AIDS epidemic does not provide the type of
information required to allocate resources, to plan, and to inform.
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The empirical analysis of the spatial spread of AIDS constitutes an im-
portant component of the body of knowledge concerning this epidemic. Let
us place the pertinent issues into perspective. The compartment models us-
ing differential equations or stochastic processes formalizing the transitions
from "susceptibles" to "infectives" to "removals" (Bailey, 1957 and 1975;
Bartlett, 1960) have a critical role in the modeling of epidemics including
AIDS. The parameters in these models define modalities of any epidemics,
and their estimation is very important to understanding the specifics of the
AIDS epidemic and to design policies to cope with it. However, the esti-
mation of the parameters of the spatial versions of these models has proved
especially difficult because very different mixes of parameter values can ac-
count for the same data. Certainly, the spatial variants of the classical epi-
demiological models constitute one direction of research that is very much
worth pursuing, but this is not likely to produce in the short-run spatially
disaggregated portraits and projections of the spread of AIDS (Gould, 1989).
The patterns of spatial spread of the AIDS epidemic constitute the reali-
ties that the classical epidemiological models and their spatial extensions are
designed to explain. In fact, the contributions that identify these patterns
and test hypotheses concerning their occurrence and change define the reali-
ties that the classical epidemiology models need to explain. The complemen-
tarity between the two classes of models is obvious, and is the counterpart
of similar complementarities in other research fields. For instance, in eco-
nomics, structural models based on economic theory are employed side by
side with forecasting models that emphasize the temporal patterns and well-
established empirical relations between variables, as in the case, for instance,
of the leading economic indicators.
23.2 Research Approach
The research approach employed in the analyses presented in this chapter
involves adding spatial dimension(s) to models formalizing the temporal dy-
namics of the AIDS epidemic, or adding a temporal dimension to models of
the spatial distribution of AIDS cases.
The analyses implement the expansion method techniques and paradigm
(Casetti, 1972, 1982, and 1986), and are aimed at investigating the drift of
models relating the number of AIDS cases to time with respect to spatial
geographical variables, and the temporal drift of models relating the number
of AIDS cases to spatial geographical variables. From the exposition that
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follows it will be apparent that these twin investigations correspond to the
primal and dual formulations of the same expansion formalisms.
The expansion methodology is a technique and a research philosophy or
pamdigm. As a technique, it can be used for the orderly introduction of
complexities into simpler mathematical formulations, for modeling paramet-
ric variation, and for investigating whether substantively meaningful models
drift across substantively meaningful contexts. As a paradigm, the expansion
method suggests asking questions concerning the empirical occurrence and
the theoretical bases of parameter drift, while at the same time providing
orderly and easily implementable routines to answer these questions.
The expansion method involves:
• Specifying an initial model in which some or all of the parameters are in
letter form.
• Specifying expansion equations that redefine some or all of these letter
parameters into functions of substantively relevant variables or random
variables.
• Generating a terminal model by substitution of the expanded parameters
for their counterparts in the initial model.
The terminal model encompasses into the same structure the initial rela-
tionship, and a specification of its potential drift across a substantively rel-
evant context. When the terminal model is estimated and tests of statistical
hypotheses are carried out upon its coefficients, conclusions concerning the
occurrence of contextual drift may be reached, and mappable or graphable
mathematical portraits of this drift can be obtained. Reviews of applica-
tions of the expansion method are contained in Casetti (1986) and Casetti
and Jones (1987).
In the paragraphs that follow, the research approach employed in this
chapter is demonstrated focusing upon the variation (drift) in the temporal
growth of AIDS in response to population densities, which is a convenient
descriptor of geogmphical environmental contextual differentiation. In fact,
population density constitutes an especially useful proxy for many indices
of spatial differentiation at the county level of resolution. Low population
densities are generally an attribute of rural environments. However, ru-
ral population densities tend to be higher with proximity to urban centers,
the more so the larger and the more closely spaced these centers are. Fur-
thermore, theoretical and empirical research in the mathematical land-use
tradition has shown that urban population densities tend to decline with
distance from city centers, and tend to be higher in larger urban centers
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(23.6)
and agglomerations. This suggests that population density can position a
county on a continuum with remote rural environments at one end, and the
core portions of large urban agglomerations at the other. Here, we propose
to model and investigate the drift that occurs when a polynomial relating
AIDS counts to time holds with different parameter values depending upon
the population density of the county considered.
The implementation of the expansion methodology begins with the defi-
nition of an initial model capable of expressing the change in the number of
AIDS cases over time. The following initial model was selected
A = ao +alt + a2t2 +a3t3 +(, (23.1)
where A stands for the natural logarithm of the cumulated number of AIDS
cases, t denotes time, and ( is an error term. A was specified as a third-degree
polynomial in time in order to allow for the possibility that the growth rates
of AIDS increase at first, and then decline.
We wish to investigate the spatial geographical unfolding of the AIDS
epidemic in Ohio. This research objective can be operationalized as a search
for the parametric drift of equation (23.1) with respect to variable(s) specify-
ing significant dimensions of geographical differentiation at the county level
of resolution. Specifically, the coefficients of equation (23.1) were expanded
into quadratics in D, where D stands for population density. A quadratic was
selected to allow for rates of growth of AIDS higher in urban environments,
and possibly comparatively lower in larger metropolitan agglomerations in
which the awareness and fear of AIDS has induced substantial changes in
behavior.
The expansion equations used are:
ao = 100 +100D +102D2 (23.2)
al = 110 + l11D +112D2 (23.3)
a2 = 120 +121D +122D2 (23.4)
a3 = 130 +13lD +132D2. (23.5)
By replacing the right-hand sides of equations (23.2) through (23.5)
with the corresponding parameters in equation (23.1), the following terminal
model is obtained
A = 100 + 100D + 102D2 +
llOt + l11tD + 112tD2 +
120t2 + 12lt2 D + 122t2 D 2 +
130t3 + 13lt3 D + 132t3 D2 + (.
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Equation (23.6) incorporates both the temporal trend specification con-
tained in the initial model and the spatial drift specification represented by
the expansion equations. Hypotheses concerning the occurrence of geograph-
ical drift can be easily tested using (23.6). To this effect the parameters of
equation (23.6) are estimated from empirical data, and then tested for sig-
nificance. For instance, we can test the null hypothesis that the population
parameters of the terms in which the drift variable D appears are zero. If
the hypothesis is rejected, the occurrence of drift may be taken as proven,
and the estimated terminal model and related estimated expansion equations
provide a statistically significant mathematical portrait of how, in Ohio, the
unfolding of the AIDS epidemic varies depending upon the population den-
sities of the counties involved. However, before describing the results of our
empirical analyses, the dual of the mathematical formulation represented by
equations (23.1) through (23.6) needs to be focused upon.
Whenever a terminal model has been generated from a linear initial
model by linear expansion equations, there is a second linear initial model
and associated linear expansion equation(s) that will yield the same terminal
model (Casetti, 1986). If a terminal model is given, as soon as a linear initial
model and linear expansion equations capable of producing it are defined,
a second linear initial model and associated linear expansion equations that
will produce the same terminal model become defined. The two initial mod-
els and associated expansion equations may be called, respectively, primal
and dual. Which expansion is primal is arbitrary, but, when an expansion is
defined as primal, the second one becomes the dual of the first one.
The intrinsic duality of the linear expansions is illustrated by the fact
that the same terminal model (23.6) can be arrived at from an initial model
relating the logarithm of AIDS counts, A, to population densities, D, and
by expanding its coefficients in terms of the t variable. To show this, assume
the dual initial model
and the dual expansion equations
f30 = /00 + /lOt + /20t2 + /30t3
f31 = /01 + /11 t + /21 t 2 + /31 t3
f32 = /02 + /12 t + /22 t2 + /32 t3 .
(23.7)
(23.8)
(23.9)
(23.10)
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By replacing the right hand sides of (23.8) through (23.10) for the corre-
sponding parameters in (23.7) terminal model (23.6) is again obtained. Sup-
pose we estimate the parameters of the terminal model (23.6) from empirical
data, and replace the numerical parameter estimates obtained for the corre-
sponding letter parameters in the primal and dual expansion equations. The
"estimated expansion equations" thus produced are mathematical portraits
of the empirically observed drift of the relationship between AIDS counts
and time represented by the primal initial model, and of the empirically ob-
served temporal drift of the dual ini tial model that expresses AIDS counts
as a function of population densities. Also, the estimated primal expansion
equations will yield an estimated relationship between AIDS counts and time
at any arbitrary level of population density. Similarly, the estimated dual
expansion equations can produce an estimated relationship between AIDS
counts and population densities at any arbitrary point in time.
Equations (23.1) through (23.10) relate the logarithm of AIDS counts to
t and D. However, in this research, the focus is upon the dynamics of the
AIDS epidemics, which is best expressed by the growth rates of the AIDS
cases. Consequently, while equation (23.6) was estimated using empirical
data, the interpretation of the results obtained was based on a derived for-
mulation obtained by taking the time derivatives of equations (23.1), (23.6),
(23.8), (23.9), and (23.10). The population densities, D, were assumed to
be invariant over the time horizon considered.
23.3 Population Density Expansions
The empirical analyses were based on quarterly county-level AIDS counts
for the 88 Ohio counties for the time horizon spanning from 1982 to the
fourth quarter of 1987. The population densities were calculated using 1985
populations and areas. The D variable is scaled in thousands of people per
square mile. The following stepwise regression estimate of equation (23.6)
was obtained:
A = -0.2486+0.0315tD2+O.0107t2+O.0766t2D-0.0028t3 D 2
(-2.32) (2.32) (3.57) (15.34) (-7.94) (23.11)
R 2 = 0.80.
t-values are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. Equation (23.11)
was used to parametrize the derived system, thus producing the following:
(23.12)
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al = 0.0315D2
a2 = 0.0107 + 0.0766D
a3 = -0.0028D2
A' = bo + bID +b2 D2
bo = 0.0107(2t)
bl = 0.0766(2t)
b2 = 0.0315 - 0.0028(3t2 ),
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(23.13)
(23.14)
(23.15)
(23.16)
(23.17)
(23.18)
(23.19)
where A' denotes percentage rate of change of AIDS counts.
Equations (23.13), (23.14), and (23.15) are the "estimated expansion
equations" of the primal derived system. They portray the drift of the re-
lationship between percentage rate of growth of the AIDS counts and time.
This means that a time trend in growth rates can be specified for any ar-
bitrary value of D. Plots of these trends corresponding to values of D of
0.1, 0.4, and 1.6 are shown in Figure 23.1. These A, B, and C trends in
the Figure correspond, respectively, to population densities of 100, 400, and
1,600 people per square mile. The D variable is dimensioned in thousands
of people per square mile. To evaluate these densities, consider that the D
values for the Ohio counties range from 0.028 to 3.167 with an average of
0.271.
Clearly, at the low densities represented by the A trend, the growth
of the AIDS counts increased throughout the time span considered, but
moderately so. At intermediate densities (the B curve) it did increase more.
At the higher densities represented by the C curve it increased even more
but in 1986 it started to decline. No evidence of such decline is apparent
for the lower densities. The percentage growth rates in AIDS counts in the
vertical axis of the figure are best interpreted in terms of "doubling times".
Consider that A' values of 0.2; 0.4; 0.6; 0.8; 1.0; and 1.2 percent will bring
about a doubling of a county's AIDS cases, respectively, in 3.4; 2.31; 1.15;
0.85; 0.69; and 0.58 years.
The estimated expansion equations of the dual derived system, namely,
equations (23.17) through (23.19), are mathematical portraits of the tem-
poral drift of the relationship (23.16) between AIDS growth and population
densities. Figure 23.2 shows these relationships for the years 1983 (A curve),
1985 (B curve), and 1987 (C curve). Notice the increasingly strong tendency
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Figure 23.1. Estimated relations between percentage rates of growth of
AIDS counts (A', vertical axis) and time (t, horizontal axis; t = 0 in 1980).
The 'A', 'B', and 'C' curves are estimated trends, respectively, corresponding
to levels of population densities of 100,400, and 1600 people per square mile.
for the AIDS growth to become lower at higher population densities in more
recent years, while no such tendency existed in 1983.
Figures 23.1 and 23.2 point toward the notion that different mixes of the
mechanisms propagating AIDS are at work in different geographical environ-
ments. The AIDS scare of more recent years had the effect of differentially
slowing down the diffusion of AIDS among homosexuals and to a lesser de-
gree among drug users, which is reflected by the AIDS dynamics in higher
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Figure 23.2. Estimated relations between percentage rates of growth of
AIDS counts (A', vertical axis) and population densities (D, horizontal axis,
in thousands of people per square mile). The 'A', 'B', and 'C' curves are
estimated relationships evaluated respectively for 1983, 1985, and 1987.
population densities counties. At the same time other mechanisms more dif-
fuse, more broadly based, and less controllable, which are operating in the
background, render the AIDS epidemic ubiquitous and pervasive. Perhaps,
these other mechanisms tend to have a greater relative importance in coun-
ties with lower population densities, and, in perspective, they may be having
an increasingly important role over time.
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23.4 Spatial Polynomial Expansions
The analyses discussed in the preceding section involve investigating the
temporal dynamics of the AIDS epidemic in terms of its drift in response to
differences in geographic environments. In the example, the initial model is
a polynomial in time, and the expansion equations relate deterministically
the polynomial's parameters to population density, which is a good proxy
for a number of variables differentiating geographic environments. Portraits
of the spatial drift of temporal dynamics of AIDS, and of the temporal drift
of relationships between AIDS and environmental characteristics, constitute
the results of an analysis implementing this approach.
The second type of expansions reported in this chapter is in terms of
spatial polynomials. The spatial polynomials considered here are trend sur-
faces and two-dimensional Fourier polynomials, which are widely used in the
spatial disciplines such as geography, geology, and regional science for the
mathematical analysis of spatial variation. They both involve relating geo-
graphically distributed phenomena to polynomials in the spatial coordinates
of the observations.
Of the two types of spatial polynomials, the trend surfaces (Agterberg,
1984; Chorley and Haggett, 1965; Tobler, 1969; Yeates, 1969) have been used
more often and have proved to be very useful to separate gentler trends at the
regional level of resolution. On the other hand, the two-dimensional Fourier
polynomials (Casetti, 1966; James, 1966; Rayner, 1971; Tobler, 1969) are
better suited to depict spatial patterns characterized by multiple maxima
and minima. In particular, they can better represent geographical landscapes
with urban centers of varying size arranged into the patterns suggested by
central place theory.
In this study, the parameters of the same initial model (23.6) employed
in our earlier analysis were redefined into f(x, y) functions of the spatial
coordinates x and y. These functions were specified as trend surfaces in the
first analysis, and as two-dimensional Fourier polynomials in the second.
The trend surface expansions and the Fourier polynomial expansions ex-
tend the spatial polynomial analyses to the expansion method environment.
While trend surfaces and Fourier polynomials model and portray the spatial
variation of a variable, trend surface expansions and Fourier polynomial ex-
pansions are aimed at investigating the spatial variation of a model. Here,
they are used to analyze the spatial variation of the dynamics of AIDS counts
specified as a polynomial in time. The terminal model obtained by trend
surface expansions is best suited to investigate broad regional trends in the
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spatial variation of the AIDS dynamic. Instead, its counterpart obtained by
Fourier polynomial expansions will filter out and display the spatial variation
of the AIDS dynamics at a finer level of resolution. In fact, the results of the
empirical analyses reported later in this chapter suggest that the two expan-
sions reveal two distinct and complementary aspects of the spatial temporal
manifestation of the AIDS epidemic.
As noted earlier in this chapter, terminal models can be generated by
primal or dual initial models and expansion equations. With regard to the
trend surface expansions and the Fourier polynomial expansions, the primal
formulations involve expanding the parameters of an initial model, relating
AIDS counts to time, into functions of the spatial coordinates x and y.
However, the same terminal models can be obtained by expanding dual initial
models relating AIDS counts to their spatial coordinates, into polynomials
in time.
Upon estimation, the terminal models generated by spatial polynomial
expansions can be used to portray the temporal trend in AIDS counts at
any given point in the study area (primal formulation), or to portray the
spatial distribution of the AIDS epidemic at any given point in time (dual
formulation). A few simple manipulations can extract from these, temporal
trends or spatial distributions in the growth rates of AIDS. The results from
our analyses are presented in the form of maps of the spatial distribution of
AIDS growth, which correspond to realizations of the dual initial models at
selected values of the dual expansion variable, that is time.
The regressions on which the maps are based yielded an R2 of 0.25 with
6 variables in the case of the trend surface expansions and an R 2 of 0.72
with 20 variables in the Fourier polynomial expansions.
Figure 23.3 shows the county outlines and the location of the major
urban centers and interstate highways in Ohio. All the shaded polygons
refer to counties included in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with
boundaries as defined on 30 June 1983 (US Bureau of Census, 1988). The
darkest shading identifies counties that contain one (or more) central cities of
the MSAs in the state. They are usually referred to as "central city counties".
For example, Cuyahoga county in the northeast contains Cleveland, which
is the central city of the Cleveland MSA. The names shown in Figure 23.3
are names of the central cities rather than of counties, since the former
are more directly linked to the location of major urban centers and of the
MSAs. The lighter shading represents other counties that are included in
the state's MSAs. They are usually called "suburban counties". The central
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Figure 23.3. Metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in Ohio.
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city and suburban counties together form the metropolitan areas, whereas
the unshaded counties are the non-metropolitan areas of the state.
In Ohio, the largest urban centers are found along a diagonal running
from northeast to southwest. Among them, Cleveland, Columbus, and
Cincinnati developed earlier and are also the most populated. In the north-
east and southwest, there are conglomerations of urban centers referred to
as Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs). These are the
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain CMSA and the Cincinnati-Hamilton CMSA. Other
metropolitan areas include Toledo and Lima in the northwest, and smaller
urban centers in the Appalachian areas in the south and east.
Maps (a) and (b) in Figure 23.4 display the estimated growth rates in
AIDS cases, for the years 1984 and 1987, based on the trend surface expan-
sion analysis. The patterns in both maps are dominated by the Cleveland-
Akron-Lorain CMSA in the northeast, by the Cincinnati-Hamilton CMSA
in the southwest, and by the northeast-southwest alignment. These pat-
terns do indeed reflect the fact that the AIDS epidemic spread earlier and
faster (1) in the largest urban centers, (2) where several major urban cen-
ters are relatively close to one another, and (3) along major transportation
routes. All of these increase the opportunities for human interactions, and
heighten the chance for AIDS transmission. Clearly, the trend surface ex-
pansions bring forth the dominant aspects in the spatial spread of the AIDS
epidemic in Ohio at the regional level of resolution. This spread manifests
itself in a widening of higher growth areas around the two CMSAs, and in
the tendency for the two areas to grow closer along 1-71, which is the major
routeway linking Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati.
The estimates of growth rates of AIDS for 1984 and 1987 based on the
Fourier polynomial expansions are portrayed in Maps (c) and (d) in Figure
23.4. The growth rates intervals controlling the shading in these maps are
the same as those used in Maps (a) and (b), to facilitate the comparison
between the results of the two analyses. Maps (c) and (d) show highest
growth rates for most of the metropolitan counties. Also, unlike the growth
estimates produced by the trend surface expansions, the ones displayed in
Maps (c) and (d) capture the growth in AIDS counts in urban centers away
from the northeast-southwest corridor, and, more specifically, in the smaller
metropolitan areas in the southeast and northwest. Clusters of counties with
high growth rates are also found along the 1-90 highway running from east to
west along the lake shore and along the two interstates from north to south,
1-77 and 1-75. Maps (c) and (d) suggest that most of the spatial diffusion
of AIDS between 1984 and 1987 runs along these arteries. In fact the two
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Figure 23.4. The diffusion of AIDS in Ohio: estimated growth rate; (a)
1984 and (b) 1987 (based on trend surface expansions); (c) 1984 and (d)
1987 (based on Fourier polynomial expansions).
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maps show that except for some counties south of Columbus, the interstices
not serviced by interstate highways generally display the lowest growth in
AIDS counts.
The differences between Maps (a) and (b) on one hand, and Maps (c)
and (d) on the other, indicate that the Fourier polynomial expansions have
a greater capability to resolve the spatial drift in the temporal dynamics
of the AIDS epidemic at the county level. However, the trend surface and
the Fourier polynomial expansions can filter distinct aspects of spatial vari-
ation. The trend surface expansions give a broad and more general picture
of dominant regional trends. In contrast, the Fourier polynomial expansions
yield generalized but fine-grain portraits at a considerably higher level of
resolution.
23.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the expansion method's research philosophy is applied to
investigating the spatial spread of the AIDS epidemic in Ohio. To this ef-
fect, the spread of the epidemic was conceptualized as the parametric drift of
mathematical relationships capable of representing the temporal dynamics
of the cumulative count of AIDS cases. One approach to formalizing this
spatial drift involved redefining the relationship's parameters into functions
of a variable, population density, selected for its ability to differentiate geo-
graphical environments. In terms of the second approach, the spatial drift
of the AIDS dynamics was investigated by expanding its parameters into
functions of spatial coordinates.
The results of our analyses indicate that in Ohio the AIDS epidemic grew
earlier and faster in larger urban centers and along major transportation
routes. Our results also suggest a trend toward a slower growth of the
epidemic in the core areas of the major metropolitan agglomerations.
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Chapter 24
Branching out into
the Universe
Cesare Marchetti
Work on diffusion models started at IIASA in 1974 when we were searching
for a solution to the problem of putting some internal logic into the dynamics
of energy markets (Marchetti, 1975). The problem was formally solved by
using multiple competition dressed in logistics which are the simplest coder
for the simplest diffusion process, the epidemic one.
The immensely complex phenomenon of using energy in various forms
with all the interfacing of economics, technologies, and politics, and over a
period of more than 100 years, showed up as a crystalline substitution, Le.,
a multiple diffusion process (Figure 24.1). The result was a philosophical
shock to me, because it robbed the process of its contemporaneity. A single
set of equations, each with an input of only two parameters, was capable
of describing the whole process even 100 years or more ago. [n addition
the description did not require the notion of money or other economic para-
phernalia. Everything could be reduced to the timing and speed of the
introduction of each new competitor. All the rest was a consequence, even
100 years later. Apart from the isolation resulting from the effects of daily
affairs, the system showed an incredible long-term self-consistency, in spi te of
the continuously changing technical, economic, and political substrate. The
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Figure 24.1. World primary energy substitution, in fractional shares of pri-
mary energy consumption by source. (Source: Marchetti and Nakicenovic,
1979.)
precision of the match discouraged any thoughts that it was a pure coinci-
dence. The next step was in fact the initial branching out into a whole set
of cases of primary energy substitution, from single countries to electricity
production, to single industries.
Altogether we collected about 300 cases (Marchetti and Nakicenovic,
1979), showing that the multiple diffusion process was an unsinkable descrip-
tor of the dynamics of the real world in the energy area. The first branching
out from energy proper started here, where we were using proxies, like the
number of diesel versus steam locomotives to pattern the substitution of
oil versus coal for railway transport, or the amount of coal extracted using
various technologies, to pattern the competition between these technologies.
Everything worked very well, and the suspicion was that the methodology
could be of very broad significance.
Our ancestors operated in the thirties under the spur of the work of
Volterra in Italy and Lotka in the USA. Both gentlemen were dealing with
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biological systems, but there was an overspill of interest for people working
in the area of economics and sociology. A number of papers appeared, some
with penetrating insights into the possibility of using logistic analysis to
map social processes. I still wonder what inhibited an explosion of research
at that time. Certainly multiple competition or diffusion was not under
control or even in the minds of these precursors. Nor was the strong effect
of Kondratieff cycles in single penetration logistics. Nor the frantic hunt
around the asymptote for certain economic systems.
My exploration was, however, prudent, choosing contiguous subjects.
Having a loose consulting contract with FIAT, I was asked to peep into the
car system. The original stimulus was to see if technological innovations or
promotional campaigns had an effect on sales and on the ownership of cars.
The first case that I studied was Italy where I looked at cars in circula-
tion, a statistic more easily available than the one on sales (see, for instance,
Marchetti, 1983). I was again philosophically shocked. The diffusion runs
with an astonishing stability and precision, insensitive to any initiative com-
ing from the industry or sudden changes in economics and politics on the
outside. The first and second oil shock did not produce the tiniest dent,
not to speak of promotional campaigns into which the car industry sinks
fortunes.
Sponsors and colleagues were equally upset. The faith in pretty girls had
deep emotional roots. Obviously all the mise en scene had the purpose of
beating competition, and not really to increase the ownership of cars. That
was the explanation of my results. So I went to see the evolution in time
of market shares between the main car producers in the USA and Japan.
The results confirm that obviously all the fuss was not about beating the
competitor, but to keep him at bay.
My personal interpretation, based on hundreds of evident examples, is
that people talk and the system does its business. The French have a deli-
cious fable written down by Lafontaine, La Mouche Cochere, where a fly by
actively flying up and down helps a pair of oxen to pull a heavy cart. And
it is also very tired and self-satisfied at the end. A great deal of the talk of
decision makers seems to fit this description very well. I wonder how many
ponderous decisions had to be taken to keep the curves of Figure 24.1 in
such good shape.
The philosophical breakthrough in the application of these diffusion equa-
tions came when a friend of mine, president of the Italian Marketing Associa-
tion, asked me to prepare an innovative paper for a conference on innovation
which he had organized in Turin in 1979 (Marchetti, 1980). I had on my desk
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the Mensch book on innovation, "Das Technologische PaU", with statistics
on basic inventions and innovations dating back to 1800 (Mensch, 1975).
The quality of these statistics comes from a homogeneous definition for the
dates when inventions and innovations appeared.
In order to make these statistics treatable with our diffusion equations, I
then made the hypothesis that an innovation can be considered as an object,
a product, like a car, generated in response to market demand. The set of
innovations would progressively fill the market, like cars. The thread was
thin but it held. Not only innovations, but also invention waves fit the
model very well. This was the first hint of the fractal nature of the social
and economic system we shall talk about later on.
The analysis of the inventions and innovations waves a la Mensch re-
vealed internal regularities that led me to find some arithmetic rules to
calculate the ones that followed. The result of this exercise is reported in
Figure 24.2. That the system regulates so precisely such fancy action like
inventing and innovating was really an unexpected result.
But also entrepreneurship is equally regulated. For instance, an analysis
of the opening of firms producing cars and of firms quitting the market
follow perfect (cumulative) logistics. Nitety-nine percent of the firms did
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quit, and that gives a glimpse of what could be defined as the Holocaust of
the enterpreneurs.
The chart of Figure 24.2 reveals also another detail in the behavior of the
system: that the centerpoints of the innovation waves are spaced at 55 year
intervals, the distance of one Kondratieff long cycle. It puts the mechanisms
into a Schumpeterian vision of markets progressively saturated leading to
recession. Innovation and entrepreneurship reopen the game into a new spurt
of activity. A completely different approach was taken by Stewart (1982) of
Nutevco who measured the deviations of primary energy consumption and
electricity consumption from the secular trends. Also his analysis shows in
crisp form the pulsations of the global activity. With a periodicity of 55
years.
Faith and daring come with success and at this point all inhibitions were
removed. After all experimenting was cheap, and failures could find their way
to the paper basket. Only a short sampling can be taken out of the 3000 odd
examples which Nakicenovic, Griibler, and I have collected. I must honestly
say that being beyond my career I was always the most daring. I did not
have much to lose and have no professional peers to keep me in line. Much
stimulation comes when critics start gnawing at the borders to check the
consistency of the stuff. One of the first observations was that the model
only operates for Western countries during the last century or so. It was
true that all our examples fell into this time slot, but the obvious reason was
the availability of sound statistics.
But a number of things are well recorded from a deeper past, so I an-
alyzed the diffusion wave of the construction of gothic cathedrals. Their
cumulative number in terms of first stones is reported in Figure 24.3. The
regularity of the process, over such a long period of time, with economic
revolutions, wars and plagues, is really astonishing. In my view it is a mile-
stone in revealing the deep regulatory feedbacks of the social system. This
self-regulation is pervasive. In a completely different field we can observe,
e.g., the perfect resilience of the air transport system growth to the oil price
shocks of 1974 and 1979. The immunity was acquired through a complex
and painful internal reorganization of the air companies. Going to central-
ized economies does not change the situation either, as much work done by
Griibler (see, for instance, Chapter 19) shows.
At this point the concept started taking shape, i.e., the diffusion pro-
cess is really at the cultural level and paradigms are generated and selected
somewhere, and then move into the heads of people to become finally action.
Hagerstrand's field measures of the mechanisms of this diffusion through very
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Figure 24.3. Building gothic cathedrals (an incredible burden to the pop-
ulations of the Middle Ages) analyzed as a diffusion process. The chart
gives the cumulative number of first stones for what will in time become a
cathedral. The dates are well documented. (Source: Marchetti, 1986.)
stable social networks made by sets of about 100 people, gives a hint about
the causes of the stability of the process.
These friendly gangs, as they emerge from anthropological studies, al-
ready existed in the neolithic age. Fast travel and telecommunication gives
them larger territories without changing the structure and timing of their in-
teractions very much. This communication by internal lines neatly explains
why the information pouring by the media does not seem to dent the rates
of a diffusion process, even over a span of 100 years.
Speaking of media, a couple of years ago I did some research for the
CEE on nuclear energy and the social system (Marchetti, 1988). Measuring
the opinion of people is a hard task because people rarely know the deeper
meaning of their actions, and sometimes lie about this. But the media act on
strict feedback from their customers, and try desperately to match what the
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customers want to hear. So I started measuring the media in order to check
public opinion. The hypothesis behind the use of the media as a proxy for
public opinion may be right or wrong, but the result I want to show is that
the coverage (cumulative number of articles or TV spots) follows exactly the
scheme of a diffusion process. Figure 24.4 reports the coverage of nuclear
power by the media in the USA. Dailies and TV are much the same as they
fish in the same pond of public opinion. The periodical press has a slightly
higher time constant.
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Figure 24.4. Media coverage of nuclear energy in the United States (mea-
suring cumulative number of evening news reports in US TV networks and
coverage index by US periodicals on nuclear power plants; data from Mazur,
1984). Also shown are the cumulative number of major US nuclear acci-
dents. Observed is a parallel of the accident wave with the press wave as
if opinion intensity preceded accident probability by a couple of years. The
Three Mile Island accident, perceived as the worst, happened when coverage
by the periodical press was at a maximum (F = 50%). (Source: Marchetti,
1988. )
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Figure 24.5. Media coverage on nuclear energy as represented by Der
Spiegel is well correlated to the beginning of nuclear reactor construction in
the FRG with a time lag of seven years. (Source: Marchetti, 1988.)
Also if one takes an individual journal, like Der Spiegel, one gets exactly
the same result (Figure 24-5). The coverage is highly correlated with re-
actor construction start-ups both in the USA and the Federal Republic of
Germany, if with many years delay time. Also accident waves are correlated
with periodic press coverage. The Three Mile Island accident occurred when
public attention, as measured by the periodical press, was at a maximum.
This certainly does not establish a cause-effect relationship, but the time
sequence proves invalid the reverse cause-effect, Le., that the accident wave
is the stimulus for press coverage.
The variety of subjects touched never ends, from the witch hunt of the
Middle Ages, to the adoption of stamps in the Western hemisphere or the
writing of papers on the greenhouse effects of CO 2 • The same elementary
mathematics neatly covers the fact.
At this point I have to draw some conclusions. As the economist Walt
Rostow once said after listening to one of my presentations, we may have
struck a deeper level of truth. The deeper level, as I see it now, is that our
culture operates as the carrier of action paradigms at all levels of spatial and
hierarchical integration. Humanity then operates as a gigantic quasifractal
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system, where the equation is always the diffusion equation but its parame-
ters depend on the level of fractality.
If this is true, and everything we have done to date conveys that, a really
deeper level of truth has been struck revealing the single and all-pervasive
mechanism of the working of society. Studying primary energy substitution
can lead very far indeed!
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